Ada Anglemeyer v. Craig Ammons

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 22-2788

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ADA ANGLEMEYER; RICHARD C. ANGLEMEYER;

JEFFREY ANGLEMEYER; JOSEPH KLUSKA,

Appellants

v.

CRAIG AMMONS; BRIAN ATKINSON; NATHAN

AUKAMP; MARK A. BENSON; DAVID BRODEUR;

JOHN P. CHULOCK; PETER DEL GAIZO; BRIAN L.

KING; MICHAEL D. LANG; VINCENTE LOPEZ;

ROBERT W. MCGARVEY; TERRANE W. MERANTE;

CLINTON C. PAINTER; JASON PELOTTE; MATTHEW J.

PIEROTTI; LANCE SCHIMP; KEVIN WARD; DANIEL

WILK; MATTHEW WYSOCKY; JOHN DOE

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 5:19-cv-03714)

District Judge: Honorable John M. Younge

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Argued: September 12, 2023

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Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and PORTER

Circuit Judges.

(Filed: February 7, 2024)

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Caleb Kruckenberg [ARGUED]

Brian Zeiger

Levin & Zeiger, LLP

1500 JFK Blvd., Suite 620

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellants.

Claudia M. Tesoro [ARGUED]

Office of Attorney General

1600 Arch St., Suite 300

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellee.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Policing can be rough business. But the Constitution

requires police to use reasonable restraint, even when force

may be necessary. Here, four family members who were not

suspected of any wrongdoing suffered injuries at the hands of

certain officers executing a pre-dawn, no-knock raid. The

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injured family members sued the officers for excessive use of

force. The District Court determined the officers were entitled

to qualified immunity. We will reverse.

I

Richard and Ada Anglemeyer live in Bangor Township,

Pennsylvania, with several family members, including their

two sons—Jeffrey and Mark Anglemeyer—and their son-in-

law, Joseph Kluska. At about 6:00 a.m. on February 23, 2018,

forty-three officers with the Special Emergency Response

Team (SERT) of the Pennsylvania State Police took positions

outside of the Anglemeyer home and prepared to execute a no-

knock search warrant. They were acting on information that

Mark allegedly engaged in multiple sales of methamphetamine

in a workshop near the family home. No other members of the

Anglemeyer family were suspected of wrongdoing. The SERT

officers were informed that some members of the Anglemeyer

family may own firearms. They were also informed that Mark

was a white male and 52 years old.

Shortly after arriving, one of the officers noticed

Richard looking out his window and radioed the other SERT

members that the team’s secrecy was compromised. The

officers then rushed into the family home. Their faces were

partially obscured, and they wore helmets but not nameplates

or badge numbers. The four plaintiffs in this case—Ada,

Richard, Jeffrey, and Joseph—each provide their own account

of the events that followed and the injuries that they allegedly

suffered.

Ada was 76 years old at the time of the incident. She

awoke in her first-floor bedroom after hearing a loud noise as

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the SERT team forcibly entered her home. As she took a step

outside of her bedroom wearing her night clothes, Officer

Clinton Painter struck her in the face with his shield, causing

her to fly backwards on her back. The blow broke multiple

teeth and one vertebra, which required long-term treatment.

Ada testified that the SERT officers did not announce

themselves and that she did not hear Officer Painter give

instructions or warnings before striking her.

Richard was 77 years old at the time of the incident. He

slept on the couch that night in the living room. Waking from

the sound of his dog growling, Richard went to the window

where he saw flashing lights. He assumed that it was the fire

department and thought the house might be on fire. As he

moved toward the door to investigate, SERT officers burst

through and stormed inside. An officer whom Richard later

identified as Officer Mark Benson approached and shined a

flashlight into his eyes. Officer Benson then struck Richard in

the head with the flashlight, grabbed his neck, and forced him

to the ground. The fall caused Richard to hit his head on the

fireplace, rendering him briefly unconscious. Richard suffered

multiple contusions and facial abrasions and tore the menisci

in his right knee, requiring surgery.

Jeffrey was 55 years old at the time of the incident. He

was asleep in the living room near his father when he awoke to

loud noise and bright lights. Thinking there was a fire, Jeffrey

walked into the kitchen and was met by Officer Robert

McGarvey, who shouted at Jeffrey to get down. Before Jeffrey

could comply, Officer McGarvey clothes-lined him and forced

him to the ground. An officer, whose identity is in dispute, then

placed his boot on the back of Jeffrey’s neck, zip-tied him,

pulled him up by the zip-ties, and sat him in a chair. Jeffery

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witnessed the attacks on his mother and father and demanded

that someone call for an ambulance. The same officer who zip-

tied Jeffrey slapped him across the jaw and repeatedly punched

him. Jeffrey’s testimony suggests that Officer McGarvey zip-

tied and punched him, while a police report suggests that it was

Officer Vicente Lopez. Jeffrey suffered sprains to his shoulder

and other lasting injuries.

Joseph was 45 years old at the time of the incident. He

was asleep in an upstairs bedroom when SERT officers burst

into his room. Officer Matthew Wysocky jumped onto

Joseph’s bed and zip-tied him. Though Joseph was

cooperative, Officer Wysocky lifted him up and slammed him

on the floor. Joseph suffered tears in both rotator cuffs,

requiring surgery.

After subduing the occupants, the SERT team searched

the property. They did not discover methamphetamine, and

Mark Anglemeyer was never convicted of any crime resulting

from the search.

Ada, Richard, Jeffrey, and Joseph sued several officers

who participated in the raid, alleging that they used excessive

force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court

concluded that the SERT officers were entitled to qualified

immunity and granted summary judgment. It found that, under

the facts presented for Ada, Jeffrey, and Joseph, the officers

did not engage in objectively unreasonable conduct sufficient

to constitute a claim for unconstitutional use of excessive

force. It further found that Richard’s and Jeffrey’s claims for

excessive force fail because they could not identify with

sufficient particularity the officer or officers who allegedly

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injured them. In reaching its holding, the District Court

predominantly credited the officers’ version of events.

Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s decision as it

relates to their claims against Officers Benson, Painter,

McGarvey, Lopez, and Wysocky.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s

grant of summary judgment. Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 77

n.1 (3d Cir. 2021). “Similarly, we review de novo the legal

grounds underpinning a claim of qualified immunity.” Mack v.

Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 227 n.14 (3d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation

marks and quoted source omitted). “Summary judgment is

appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted). “We

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and quoted source omitted).

III

We use a two-pronged analysis to evaluate qualified

immunity claims. Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d

633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015). “First, [we] must decide ‘whether the

facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown make out a violation of a

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constitutional right.’ And second, [we] must determine

‘whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time

of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Id. (quoting Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). The officers bear the

burden of persuasion under each prong. Mack, 63 F.4th at 227.

A

The right to be free from the use of excessive force has

been recognized under the Fourth Amendment, which

guarantees the right of citizens “to be secure in their persons

. . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 394 (1989); see Jefferson, 21 F.4th at 78.

The question in excessive force cases is whether, under

the totality of the circumstances, “the officers’ actions are

objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or

motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (internal quotation

marks and quoted source omitted). We analyze this question

“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. And

we make “allowance for the fact that police officers are often

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount

of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 397.

In assessing the officers’ reasonableness, we consider

factors such as “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. We also

consider “the physical injury to the plaintiff, the possibility that

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the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent

or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action

takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility

that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with

whom the police officers must contend at one time.” El v. City

of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal

quotation marks and quoted source omitted).

Here, the District Court failed to construe the evidence

in favor of each plaintiff. Instead, the District Court

predominantly credited the officers’ version of events. But

when viewing the evidence in the non-movants’ favor, as we

must at this stage of the case, a reasonable jury could find that

the officer or officers who harmed each plaintiff used

objectively unreasonable force.

1. Ada Anglemeyer

There is no dispute that Officer Painter struck Ada with

his shield after she stepped outside of her bedroom in her

nightgown. Giving weight to Ada’s testimony, Officer Painter

could not reasonably believe that Ada posed an immediate

threat to his or his fellow officers’ safety, particularly in light

of Ada’s age and stature. Additionally, the Anglemeyers

owned guns. But a jury could find that Officer Painter should

have known that Ada—confused and dressed only in a

nightgown—was not armed. Officer Painter also knew prior to

entering the Anglemeyer home that Mark Anglemeyer lived

with his elderly parents and other family members, who were

not suspected of any wrongdoing. And he could not reasonably

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confuse Ada with Mark, who Officer Painter knew was a white

male and 52 years old.

A reasonable factfinder could also conclude that Officer

Painter failed to give prior instructions or warnings before

striking Ada, affording her no opportunity to comply.

Although Officer Painter contends that Ada failed to cooperate

with his commands, her testimony refutes that allegation. And

we must weigh the facts in Ada’s favor. Mack, 63 F.4th at 227

n.14. Viewing these facts in the totality, a jury could find that

there was no need for any force against Ada, making Officer

Painter’s conduct toward Ada objectively unreasonable. See

Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 497 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding

unconstitutional excessive force where officers tackled

plaintiff in his own home, even though plaintiff was unarmed,

cooperative, and not resisting arrest or attempting to flee);

Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 195-96 (3d Cir.

2021) (finding that the officer used unconstitutional excessive

force in striking an unarmed, compliant, and non-threatening

individual).

2. Richard Anglemeyer

As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute which

officer allegedly hit Richard in the head with a flashlight,

strangled him to the ground, and caused him serious injury.

Through process of elimination, Richard concludes that it must

have been Officer Benson, while the officers contend that

Richard failed to successfully zero in on one defendant because

other officers were also in the vicinity. The District Court

agreed with the officers and found that Richard failed “to

present evidence establishing the personal involvement of the

defendant.” (App. Vol. I 21-22.)

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We disagree. Officer McGarvey testified that he took

down a male in the kitchen who was “not [a] senior citizen,”

which thus rules out Richard. (App. Vol. II 164.) Officer Lance

Schimp confirmed in his police report that while Officer

McGarvey handled the male in the kitchen, Officer Benson

was “dealing with another male” in the next room on the

ground floor. (App. Vol. II 221.) That room could only be the

living room, where Richard was attacked. So Richard has

brought forth sufficient evidence implicating Officer Benson

as the officer who engaged with him. Jutrowski v. Twp. Of

Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[A] plaintiff

must produce evidence supporting each individual defendant’s

personal involvement in the alleged violation to bring that

defendant to trial.”).

A reasonable factfinder could also conclude that Officer

Benson’s force was objectively unreasonable. Based on

Richard’s testimony, he was plainly unarmed and cooperative,

following Officer Benson’s flashlight with his eyes before

Officer Benson gratuitously struck him. And Officer Benson

could not reasonably confuse Richard with Mark, who Officer

Benson knew was 52 years old. Like Ada’s case, a jury could

find that no force was necessary against Richard—let alone

force of the degree exercised, particularly against a non-

threatening and elderly individual. See Couden, 446 F.3d at

497; Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 195-96.

3. Jeffrey Anglemeyer

The parties dispute the identity of the officer or officers

who attacked Jeffrey. While the record clearly shows that

Officer McGarvey was the officer who initially took down

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Jeffrey in the kitchen, they offer competing evidence as to who

subsequently zip-tied him and struck him in the face. Based on

the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could conclude

that, after Officer McGarvey struck Jeffrey with his shield,

Officer Lopez zip-tied Jeffrey’s wrists, sat him up in a chair,

and punched him. Though Jeffrey’s testimony implicates

Officer McGarvey in those acts, Officer Lopez’s police report

states that he zip-tied a man who matched Jeffrey’s description.

And Jeffrey later claimed that the same person who zip-tied

him also punched him. At this stage in the case, that is enough

to proceed to trial against Officer Lopez. See Smith v.

Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that, even

though the plaintiff was not sure who participated in the

beating, competing evidence as to the identity of the officers

was “a classic factual dispute to be resolved by the fact

finder”).1

1

The officers argue—and the District Court held—that

our decision in Jutrowski necessitates dismissing Jeffrey’s

action against Officer Lopez because Jeffery focused on

several “possible wrongdoers” instead of homing in on one

defendant (Appellee’s Br. at 29, citing Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at

280). But Jutrowski held that the plaintiff could not proceed

against multiple officers because he failed to provide “any

ascertainment” of who engaged in excessive force. Jutrowski,

904 F.3d at 292 (internal quotation marks and quoted source

omitted) (emphasis added). We thus concluded that the “record

[was] insufficient for any reasonable jury to identify which, if

any, of the [i]ndividual [d]efendants used excessive force.” Id.

at 292-93 (footnote omitted). But here, Jeffrey has offered

evidence implicating Officer Lopez—most persuasively

Officer Lopez’s own police report suggesting he zip-tied

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Weighing the evidence in favor of Jeffrey, a reasonable

jury also could conclude that the officers’ force was objectively

unreasonable. Like his mother and father, Jeffrey was unarmed

and not suspected of any wrongdoing. Jeffrey also had no time

to comply with Officer McGarvey’s command to get down

before Officer McGarvey struck him with his shield. Once

Jeffrey was zip-tied, the officers could not have reasonably

believed that Jeffrey posed any threat, and there is no

indication that he was resisting the officers’ restraints. So a jury

could find that an officer stepping on Jeffrey’s neck, yanking

him up by his zip-ties instead of aiding him to his feet, and

punching him—all while Jeffery was bound and defenseless—

rises to objectively unreasonably conduct. See Couden, 446

F.3d at 497; Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 195-96; Smith, 293 F.3d at 649

(“Punching and kicking someone who is handcuffed behind his

back and under the control of [officers] . . . is ‘repugnant to the

conscience of mankind.’”) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 10 (1992)).

4. Joseph Kluska

Finally, giving weight to Joseph’s testimony, a

reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Wysocky engaged

in objectively unreasonable conduct when he picked up Joseph

by his zip-tied arms and dropped him to the floor, tearing both

Jeffrey—sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude Officer

Lopez ultimately punched him. While Officer Lopez’s alleged

conduct may not ultimately be proven, the very fact that this

material evidence is disputed necessitates reserving this

question for the jury.

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of his rotator cuffs. Though Officer Wysocky saw a handgun

lying on the back of Joseph’s bed, Officer Wysocky harmed

Joseph after he was fully secured, cooperative, and not at risk

of flight. As we have previously explained, “striking a

physically restrained and nonthreatening” person is “nowhere

near the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.”

Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 197 (internal quotation marks and quoted

source omitted).

B

Because the officers have failed on the first prong of the

qualified immunity analysis, they are entitled to summary

judgment only “if they can bear the burden of showing, on the

second prong, that reasonable officers could not have known

that their actions violated clearly established law.”2 Mack, 63

F.4th at 228. We must proceed by defining the right allegedly

violated with a “high degree of specificity” and then asking

“whether that right was clearly established at the time of its

2

The District Court at times conflates both prongs of

the qualified immunity analysis. (See App. Vol. I 14-15, 17.)

However, like the parties, we understand the District Court’s

opinion to resolve only the first prong of the qualified

immunity analysis. Because we resolve the first prong in favor

of Plaintiffs, we exercise our discretion to also address the

second prong. See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg.

Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that it is

“generally appropriate” for us to reach an issue that the district

court did not if “the issues provide purely legal questions, upon

which an appellate court exercises plenary review”).

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alleged violation.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,

63 (2018) (internal quotation marks and quoted source

omitted); Mack, 63 F.4th at 228.

“Clearly established means that, at the time of the

officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is

unlawful.” Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 196 (quoting Wesby, U.S. at 63).

“In each case, we must focus on ‘whether the violative nature

of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Id. (quoting

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). “Thus, the central

question is whether the existing law gave the officer ‘fair

warning’ that his particular conduct was unlawful.” Id. (citing

Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2011)).

“[E]xisting precedent . . . [must] place[] the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Dennis v. City of

Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation marks and quoted source omitted). Thus, the

“specificity of caselaw [is] ‘especially important.’” Jacobs, 8

F.4th at 196 (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12). While “we do

not require that the prior precedent have indistinguishable

facts,” Dennis, 19 F.4th at 288, “[c]ases with closely analogous

facts can . . . help move a case beyond the otherwise hazy

border between excessive and acceptable force and thereby

provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is

unlawful.” Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 196 (internal quotation marks and

quoted source omitted).

Here, all four plaintiffs had the right to be free from

serious bodily harm as individuals who were plainly unarmed,

substantially outnumbered by law enforcement, cooperative,

not suspected of wrongdoing, and in their own home. Our prior

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decision in Couden—a “closely analogous” case to the facts

before us here—shows that Plaintiffs’ rights were clearly

established.

In Couden, the Delaware Joint Violent Crime Task

Force, after receiving a tip that a fugitive wanted for drug

charges might be staying at a certain address, conducted a

stakeout in a Delaware neighborhood. 446 F.3d at 489. Two

houses down from the surveilled address, Pamela Couden and

some of her children, including 14-year-old Adam, drove up to

their home in the family car. Id. Adam exited the car and

entered his home. Id. Presumably thinking Adam was the

wanted fugitive simply entering a different home, the police

attacked Pamela’s car, causing her to drive off to call 9-1-1. Id.

at 490. At least four officers then stormed inside the house,

grabbed Adam inside his home, and threw him to floor. Id.

While one officer pressed his knee into Adam’s back, they

pushed Adam’s head into the ground, pointed guns at him, and

sprayed him with mace. Id. at 490, 497.

We held that it was clearly established that it was

unlawful for the officers to engage in this level of force when

the individual posed no “potential threat” to the officers, was

substantially outnumbered by officers in his own home, and

was not “resisting arrest, armed, or attempting to flee.” Id. at

497. We determined that, at the very most, officers under this

set of facts would be entitled to only “the use of low level

force.” Id. Our sister circuits have denied qualified immunity

in cases factually similar to Couden. See, e.g., Shannon v.

Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding it was

clearly established that it is unlawful for an officer to engage

in serious bodily harm when the individual posed no danger to

the officer and did not resist or attempt to flee); Darden v. City

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of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 733 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that

the officer’s conduct would violate clearly established rights if

he used violent force, such as slamming or striking, against a

plaintiff who did not resist or presented no safety threats).

Here, the officers’ force against all four plaintiffs was

even more egregious than the force exercised in Couden. The

plaintiffs were not only plainly unarmed, substantially

outnumbered, cooperative, and in their own home, but they

were not suspected of any wrongdoing or facing arrest.

Accordingly, any reasonable officer in our case would have

known that the officers’ force was unlawful under this set of

facts.

* * *

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to

each plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the officer who

harmed each plaintiff used objectively unreasonable force. At

the time of the officers’ conduct, it was clearly established that

it was unlawful for the officers to inflict serious bodily harm

on individuals who were plainly unarmed, substantially

outnumbered by law enforcement, cooperative, not suspected

of wrongdoing, and in their own home. We will therefore

reverse the District Court’s order granting summary judgment

to the officers.

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