Tyler Harrison v. Sheriff, Holmes County Florida

USCA11 Case: 22-14288 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/06/2024 Page: 1 of 14

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-14288

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

TYLER HARRISON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHERIFF, HOLMES COUNTY FLORIDA,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00005-RH-MJF

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14288

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is a disability discrimination case brought under the

Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Tyler Harrison, a former employee of

the Holmes County Sheriff’s Office, alleged that the Sheriff

constructively discharged him because of his mental health issues.

The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff.

At bottom, this appeal hinges on whether Harrison’s alleged

constructive discharge was based (1) solely on Harrison’s mental

illness; or (2) at least partially on Harrison making misleading

comments about his relationship with his coworker, and shooting

himself while intoxicated and on call in a county vehicle. Harrison

argues that a reasonable jury could find that it was the first

alternative. We disagree and affirm the district court’s summary

judgment order.

I. Background

Harrison began his employment with the Holmes County,

Florida Sheriff’s Department in 2001 as a correctional officer. He

eventually became a certified law enforcement officer, achieved

the rank of lieutenant, and oversaw narcotics investigations. In

2018, after taking twelve weeks of leave under the Family and

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) because of a self-inflicted gunshot

wound that he suffered while on call in his patrol vehicle, Harrison

resigned.

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Almost four years later, Harrison filed a civil complaint

against the Holmes County Sheriff, alleging that he was

constructively discharged on the basis of his actual or perceived

disability—namely, his mental health issues—in violation of the

RA. The relevant facts here, construed in the light most favorable

to Harrison, fall into three buckets: Harrison’s (1) relationship with

his coworker, Page Fleming, (2) history of mental illness

culminating in his suicide attempt, and (3) resignation. We discuss

each in turn.

A. Harrison’s Relationship with Page Fleming

Harrison worked alongside Page Fleming in the narcotics

division. They worked closely together, and spent time together

outside of work. One night in the fall of 2017, Harrison and

Fleming were “hanging out” and “had a few drinks.” “[O]ne thing

led to another” and they “ha[d] sex.” But according to Fleming,

they did not engage in an ongoing sexual relationship.

In October 2017, the Sheriff received a call from Fleming’s

ex-husband stating that something was going on between Harrison

and Fleming. Based on the call, the Sheriff directed Harrison’s

direct supervisor, Major Michael Raley, to inquire into the status of

Harrison’s and Fleming’s relationship. On October 30, 2017, Raley

met with both Harrison and Fleming separately; each denied that

there was anything “going on” between them. 1 But Fleming later

1 Both Harrison and Fleming claim that their denials were truthful because

they were not asked specifically if they had sex.

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revealed that, before her meeting with Raley, Harrison told

Fleming not to say anything to Raley about their intimacy. 2

B. Harrison’s History with Mental Illness

Harrison suffers from stress, anxiety, depression, PTSD, and

alcoholism. Harrison’s general practitioner, Dr. Contini,

diagnosed Harrison with depression in February 2017, and

Harrison took medication for depression and anxiety throughout

2017. Despite taking medication, Harrison’s depression worsened,

causing sleep disruption and reducing his ability to concentrate and

communicate. Harrison then saw Dr. Joy Rabon for two

counseling sessions. She diagnosed Harrison with generalized

anxiety disorder. She also stated that Harrison had what she “felt

like” was alcoholism, depression, and PTSD, but did not make a

formal diagnosis.

Harrison’s mental health struggles were not kept secret.

Harrison told Tate (before he became Sheriff) that he was

depressed, told Raley that he was seeing a counselor, and told

Deputy Ryan Segers that he was struggling with depression and

taking medication.

In 2017, Sheriff Tate heard rumors that Harrison had been

drinking a lot and asked Raley to talk to Harrison about it.

Harrison told Raley that he was struggling with alcoholism.

Around this same time, Harrison told Fleming he was drinking

2 It violates the Sheriff’s office policy to “make any false or misleading

statements or misrepresent facts under any circumstances.”

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more and that he was seeing a doctor about his depression and

sadness. Fleming even accompanied Harrison to his first

counseling session with Dr. Rabon. Fleming also reported to Raley

that Harrison was depressed and that Raley needed to call Harrison

to check on him.

Harrison’s mental health issues came to a head on January

1, 2018. Fleming received a call from Harrison in the early

afternoon. Harrison, who was working on call, was “crying really,

really bad” and was incomprehensible. Fleming kept him on the

phone until she could get to him. When she arrived on the scene,

Harrison was sitting in the driver’s seat of his unmarked police

truck with a revolver in his hand. She could tell that Harrison was

drunk. 3 Fleming then saw Harrison point the gun at himself and

heard a gunshot. Harrison had shot himself under his chin. 4

Fleming administered first aid until first responders arrived on the

scene. Harrison was hospitalized and later discharged on January

3, 2018.

On January 22, 2018, Harrison received FMLA leave for the

injuries he sustained from the shooting. He received twelve weeks

3 It violates office policy to bring alcohol into any county vehicle, to use

alcohol while on duty, and to use alcohol while armed.

4 Harrison initially claimed the shooting was accidental. However, in his reply

brief, Harrison concedes that “the record makes clear that the shooting was

anything but accidental, and the situation was reported immediately as an

attempted suicide.” Given the surrounding circumstances, we find, for

summary judgment purposes, that the shooting was a suicide attempt.

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of leave, dated back to January 2, 2018. The medical notes stated

that Harrison had “acute stress disorder” and “will be following

with a mental health disorder.”

C. Harrison’s Resignation

Sometime during Harrison’s FMLA leave, Raley told

Harrison that if he did not resign, the Sheriff would investigate “the

shooting” and “the [Fleming] thing” to support terminating him.

However, he was told that after one year, he could return. On

April 2, 2018, the day Harrison was set to return from FMLA leave,

he received a Notice of Internal Investigation which stated that he

would be investigated for allegedly violating several of the office’s

policies, including “Unbecoming Conduct,” “Use of Intoxicants,”

and “Testimonies and Truthfulness.” Harrison resigned the same

day. Despite being told that he could return after a year, Harrison

was never hired back by the Sheriff’s Office.

In support of his claim for discriminatory constructive

discharge and disparate treatment, Harrison pointed to several

comparators who he claimed engaged in similar misconduct but

were treated differently. First, Investigator Ken Tate took FMLA

leave for over four months to recover from heart surgery, was

reportedly drinking on duty, and allegedly sexually harassed

Fleming. Yet, Tate was not investigated or asked to resign.

Second, Patrol Officer Zack Neitsch, while off duty, caused a car

accident resulting in a death but was not forced to resign or

threatened with termination. And third, Greg Gordon “was

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contributing alcohol to an 18-year-old girl and sleeping with her”

but was not fired.

The Sheriff denied that Harrison was constructively

discharged, and stated that Harrison violated office policies by

making misleading comments about his relationship with his

coworker, and by shooting himself while intoxicated in a county

vehicle. Accordingly, the Sheriff maintained that Harrison could

not make out a prima facie case of discrimination and moved for

summary judgment.

The district court held a hearing and orally granted the

Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. Applying the McDonnell

Douglas 5 framework, the district court first found that Harrison was

not disabled within the meaning of the RA because there was no

evidence that Harrison was diagnosed with alcoholism or that his

depression was a permanent condition that substantially impaired

a major life activity. 6 But even assuming the presence of a

disability, the court found that Harrison was not constructively

discharged solely by reason of his alleged disability as required

under the RA. Instead, the court found Harrison was discharged

5 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

6 For Rehabilitation Act purposes, a “disability” is “a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” See 29

U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (cross-referencing 42 U.S.C. § 12102). “[M]ajor life activities

include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,

seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,

breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and

working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

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because he had committed actionable misconduct. Harrison and

Fleming had been in a relationship of some sort and Harrison had

admitted to telling Fleming not to tell the Sheriff about their

relationship. The district court also found that Harrison had been

drunk on call in a county vehicle, which constituted fireable

misconduct even if his actions were caused by a mental health

disability. The district court also distinguished the comparators

from Harrison. Finally, the district court explained that Harrison

failed to show that the Sheriff’s reasons were pretext for

discrimination based on a disability. Thus, the court granted

summary judgment for the Sheriff. Harrison appealed.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327,

1333 (11th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is proper if there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “A genuine issue of material

fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its

favor.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)

(en banc) (quotations omitted). All submitted evidence is viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Owens, 52

F.4th at 1333.

III. Discussion

On appeal, Harrison argues that the district court erred in

finding that he had (1) not established a prima facie case of disability

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discrimination under the RA; and (2) not shown that the Sheriff’s

stated reasons for Harrison’s constructive discharge were

pretextual. After review, we affirm the district court.

The RA prohibits federally funded programs from

discriminating against qualified individuals with a disability.

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). RA and Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) claims are analyzed under the same legal framework.

Owens, 52 F.4th at 1333–34. “[T]hus, cases involving the ADA are

precedent for those involving the [RA].” Id. at 1334 (alterations in

original) (quoting Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.

2005)). A plaintiff can survive summary judgment by either (1)

alleging direct discrimination; (2) satisfying the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework; or (3) demonstrating a convincing

mosaic of circumstantial evidence warranting an inference of

intentional discrimination. Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d

1213, 1220 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“Lewis I”); Center v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 895 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2018). Because

Harrison has not alleged direct discrimination, he must either (1)

satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, or (2)

show a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence warranting

an inference of intentional discrimination.

A prima facie case under the RA requires that the plaintiff

show he (1) has a disability or is perceived as having such a

disability; (2) is qualified for the job; and (3) suffered an adverse

employment action as a result of the disability. Center, 895 F.3d at

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1303. 7 The plaintiff must prove that the adverse employment

action was “solely by reason of” his disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a);

see also Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6

(11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “plaintiffs claiming intentional

discrimination under the RA must show that they were

discriminated against ‘solely by reason of [their] disability,’ [while]

the ADA requires only the lesser ‘but for’ standard of causation”

(internal citation omitted)). 8 Thus, a plaintiff suing under the RA

cannot prevail if the employer based the adverse employment

action partially on disability and partially on other factors. Ellis v.

England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005). Under McDonnell

Douglas, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability

discrimination, and the employer articulates a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, the plaintiff must then

show that the stated reason was pretext for discrimination. Center,

895 F.3d at 1303. The burden of persuasion remains on the

employee throughout. Id.

7 A voluntary resignation is not an adverse action, but a resignation is not

voluntary if it was a constructive discharge forced by an employer’s duress or

misrepresentation of a material fact. Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560,

1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1995).

8 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (RA provision providing that “[n]o otherwise

qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his

disability, . . . be subjected to discrimination . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 42

U.S.C. § 12132 (ADA provision for public employers providing that “no

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, . . . be

subjected to discrimination . . . .” (emphasis added)).

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Here, even assuming that Harrison is (1) disabled,

(2) qualified for the job, and (3) suffered an adverse employment

action, the adverse action was not based solely on a disability. See

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable

to Harrison, he was constructively discharged, at least in part (if not

entirely), based on misconduct unrelated to his disability. By

Harrison’s own account, the Sheriff stated that he would

investigate “the shooting” and “the [Fleming] thing” to support

terminating Harrison. And the official notice of investigation

stated that Harrison would be investigated for “Unbecoming

Conduct,” “Use of Intoxicants,” and “Testimonies and

Truthfulness.” Because the dishonest statements about his

relationship with Fleming are clearly unrelated to any alleged

disability, his alleged constructive discharge was based at least

partially on factors other than his disability. Thus, he cannot

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the RA. See Ellis,

432 F.3d at 1326.

Even the conduct that Harrison argues was tied to his

disability—being drunk and armed while on call in a county

vehicle—is a fireable offense irrespective of whether his disability

involved depression and alcoholism. See Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch.

Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1217 (11th Cir. 2021). In Todd, the plaintiff

teacher threatened to kill herself and her child, took “an excessive

amount of Xanax while at school,” and threatened to harm school

administrators. Id. We held that, even though the teacher’s threats

likely stemmed from her depressive disorder, the defendant school

district was not required by the RA to countenance dangerous

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misconduct just because it was caused by a disability. Id. The same

holds true here. Harrison was intoxicated while on call behind the

wheel of his patrol car, and discharged a firearm in the presence of

two individuals. This conduct endangered himself, other officers,

and members of the community. And there is no evidence that the

alleged constructive discharge was based on Harrison having a

disability, rather than the dangerous conduct that his disability may

have caused.

Finally, none of the comparators Harrison presented is

similar enough to establish disparate treatment. “[A] plaintiff must

show that [he] and [his] comparators are ‘similarly situated in all

material respects.’” Lewis, 918 F.3d 1213. Ordinarily, a similarly

situated employee will have (1) engaged in the same basic conduct

or misconduct as the plaintiff; (2) been subject to the same

employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff; (3) been

under the same supervisor as the plaintiff; and (4) have the same

employment or disciplinary history as the plaintiff. Id. at 1227. Ken

Tate was accused of sexual harassment and drinking on the job

(which he denied); Neitsch caused a deadly car accident while off

duty; and Gordon was accused by a criminal defendant of

providing alcohol to and sleeping with an 18-year-old. None of

these comparators both made misleading comments about a sexual

relationship with a coworker and drunkenly shot themselves while

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on call in a county car. Thus, Harrison fails to make out a prima

facie case of disability discrimination. 9

IV. Conclusion

Because Harrison failed to make out essential elements of

his prima facie case 10 of disability discrimination under the RA, the

9 We need not venture any further with the McDonnell Douglas test to resolve

Harrison’s claim, because his failure to make out a prima facie case “reflects a

failure of the overall evidence.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939,

945 (11th Cir. 2023). “Under McDonnell Douglas, the failure to establish a prima

facie case is fatal only where it reflects a failure to put forward enough

evidence for a jury to find for the plaintiff on the ultimate question of

discrimination.” Id. at 947. For example, “the plaintiff’s failure to produce a

comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case,” but,“[a] plaintiff

who fails to prove that she was a member of a protected class . . . or that she

suffered an adverse employment action, will be unable to prove that she was

unlawfully discriminated against.” Id. at 946.

Here, not only has Harrison failed to produce a comparator, but he has also

failed to show that he was fired solely because of a disability—a necessary

element of his ultimate claim. Thus, because Harrison’s failure to make out a

prima facie case “reflects a failure of the overall evidence,” we need not

consider his argument that the Sheriff’s proffered reasons for his constructive

discharge were pretextual. Id. at 945–47.

10 While not addressed by the district court, Harrison made passing reference

below and on appeal to an alternative “convincing mosaic” framework for

showing employment discrimination. Under such a framework, “we look

beyond the prima facie case to consider all relevant evidence in the record to

decide the ultimate question of intentional discrimination.” Tynes, 88 F.4th at

947. But regardless of whether we apply the McDonnell Douglas test or the

convincing mosaic framework, Harrison must still point to enough evidence

for a reasonable factfinder to infer that he was fired solely because of a

disability. For the reasons discussed above, Harrison has failed to do so.

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district court did not err in granting the Sheriff’s summary

judgment motion.

AFFIRMED.