Opinion

David Mason v. Department of Homeland Security

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Feb 5, 2024
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 15.0%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID R. MASON, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-1221-12-0005-W-3

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: February 5, 2024

SECURITY,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

David R. Mason , Gallatin, Tennessee, pro se.

Steven Lewengrub , Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

granted his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)

appeal regarding a letter of reprimand and denied his request for corrective action

regarding a 4-month detail. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in

the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and

material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

The appellant was employed by the agency as a Financial Specialist at the

Nashville International Airport (BNA Nashville), and his duties included “budget

formulation, execution, oversight[,] and management of travel and acquisitions

activity and monitoring and ensuring compliance of budget and financial

activities with all [agency] policies and guidelines.” Mason v. Department of

Homeland Security, AT-1221-12-0005-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6,

Subtabs 4k, 4m. On March 2, 2010, the appellant emailed his immediate

supervisor, the Assistant Federal Security Director (AFSD), to advise her that a

purchase request had been submitted to purchase books through the Barnes and

Noble website and that the terms and conditions of the website included an

indemnification clause that violated the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA). IAF, Tab 6,

Subtab 4i at 7. The appellant’s email documenting his concern was forwarded to

the agency’s legal and finance officials. Id., Subtab 4h at 5-8. An agency

attorney responded and stated that he “would not interpose any legal objection to

access or use of these websites” for certain Government purchases. Id. at 6.

On March 8, 2010, the appellant emailed a number of agency officials an

expenditure report for BNA Nashville that included annotations of “ADA

violation” or “Hold for potential ADA violation” for several purchases, including

the Barnes and Noble purchase. IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4j. The Federal Security

Director (FSD), the appellant’s second-line supervisor, replied to the appellant’s

email, noted that the budget and legal officials “substantially disagreed” with his

interpretation of an ADA violation, and questioned the accuracy of several of the

ADA annotations, especially for the Barnes and Noble purchase. Id., Subtab 4i

at 4. The FSD instructed the appellant to recall his expenditure report and to

resubmit a corrected copy. Id. The appellant responded to the FSD’s email. Id.

at 3. On March 9, 2010, the FSD directed the appellant to “ resubmit a correctly

annotated expenditure report through [his] AFSD [no later than close of business]

on Friday, March 12 .” Id. (emphasis in original).

On March 12, 2010, the appellant sent the FSD a lengthy email in which

he, among other things, requested clarification regarding whether he was being

directly ordered to resubmit a corrected report, and requested an extension of time

to file the corrected report. Id. at 1-2. The FSD denied the extension request. Id.

at 1. The appellant timely submitted a corrected expenditure report to the Acting

AFSD. Id. However, rather than deleting the references to ADA violations or

potential ADA violations in the corrected expenditure report, the appellant noted

that he had reported to the AFSD certain transactions as potential ADA

violations. Id. at 9-11, 14, 16. The Acting AFSD forwarded the corrected

expenditure report. Mason v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket

No. AT-1221-12-0005-W-3, Appeal File (W-3 AF), Tab 28, Exhibit B. On

March 15, 2010, the AFSD ordered the appellant to remove the references to the

ADA violations from the corrected expenditure report. IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4h

at 1-2. The appellant complied with the AFSD’s order. Id., Subtab 4e at 2. On

April 14, 2010, the agency issued to the appellant a letter of reprimand (LOR) for

“failure to follow the instruction of [the] FSD [] to remove extraneous

annotations from the Nashville Expenditure Report by close of business, Friday[,]

March 12, 2010.” Id. at 1-3.

On January 14, 2011, the AFSD notified the appellant that he would be

detailed to the position of Program Analyst, from January 18, to April 17, 2011,

“[to] assist with analysis of data regarding the in-line baggage system.” 2 IAF,

Tab 6, Subtab 4c. The notice advised the appellant that he still would encumber

his current position of record and his pay would remain unchanged, although the

detail would be documented in his Official Personnel File. Id. at 1.

The appellant filed this IRA appeal challenging the issuance of the LOR

and the imposition of his 4-month detail. IAF, Tab 1. The appeal was twice

dismissed without prejudice and refiled. IAF, Tab 17; Mason v. Department of

Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-12-0005-W-2, Appeal File,

Tabs 1, 4; W-3 AF, Tab 1. The administrative judged determined that the Board

has jurisdiction over this IRA appeal, and he afforded the appellant a hearing on

the merits. W-3 AF, Tab 19 at 1-2, 5, Tab 29, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 8-9. The

administrative judge found that the appellant made protected whistleblowing

disclosures in 2010 regarding potential ADA violations that were a contributing

factor in the agency’s decision to issue the LOR and to detail him to the Program

Analyst position. 3 ID at 10-14. The administrative judge further found that the

The detail was extended to May 17, 2011. IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4b at 1.

Relying on the Board’s decisions in Chavez v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 22 n.5 (2013), Day v. Department of Homeland Security,

119 M.S.P.R. 589 (2013), and Mason v. Department of Homeland Security,

116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶¶ 18-25 (2011), the administrative judge also found that the

appellant established that his 2008 disclosures regarding a possible ADA violation and

2007 and 2008 disclosures regarding a $160 taxi fare incurred by another agency

employee were protected whistleblowing disclosures. ID at 11-12. However, the

administrative judge determined that the appellant did not prove the “timing” prong of

the knowledge/timing contributing factor test regarding the 2011 detail and he did not

establish that he exhausted his administrative remedy with OSC regarding his claim that

any 2007 or 2008 disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to

issue the LOR. ID at 14 n.4. The appellant does not challenge these findings on

review, and we affirm them herein.

agency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have issued

the 2010 LOR in the absence of the appellant’s disclosures, and thus, the

appellant was entitled to corrective action. ID at 14-21. However, the

administrative judge determined that the agency proved by clear and convincing

evidence that it would have detailed the appellant in the absence of his protected

disclosures; thus, he denied the appellant’s request for corrective action regarding

the detail. ID at 21-26.

The appellant has filed a petition for review and a supplement to his

petition, and the agency has filed a response. Petition for Review (PFR) File,

Tabs 1, 3-4.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s

conclusion that he made protected whistleblowing disclosures in 2010 that were a

contributing factor in the agency’s decision to issue the LOR and to detail him to

the Program Analyst position. Nor has he challenged the administrative judge’s

finding that the agency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it

would have issued the LOR absent his whistleblowing disclosures. The agency

has not filed a cross petition for review. Accordingly, we affirm these findings

herein. The only substantive issue before us is the administrative judge’s

determination that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it

would have detailed the appellant absent his whistleblowing disclosures.

The agency has shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have

detailed the appellant in the absence of his protected whistleblowing disclosures.

Under the law in effect at the time of the material events in this appeal, 4

once an appellant has met the burden of showing that he made a protected

disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and that the disclosure was a contributing

factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action, the

burden shifts to the agency to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it

would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected disclosure.

5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110,

¶ 12 (2015). In determining whether the agency has met this burden, the Board

will consider all of the relevant factors, including the following (“ Carr factors”):

(1) The strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the

existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency

officials involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes

similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers, but who are

otherwise similarly situated. Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d

1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Soto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB

6, ¶ 11.

Below, the administrative judge thoroughly analyzed the Carr factors in

accordance with Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed.

Cir. 2012). ID at 21-26. In pertinent part, he found that the agency had sound

reasons for detailing the appellant, including that the appellant had the best skill

set to analyze the relevant data and was detailed to the Program Analyst position

so that he could focus solely on those duties, rather than being assigned

additional duties along with his regular duties. ID at 21-24. The administrative

All of the relevant events occurred before the December 27, 2012 effective date of the

Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA). Pub. L. No. 112-199,

§ 202, 126 Stat. 1465, 1476. Even if we analyzed the appellant’s claims under the

WPEA, a different outcome is not warranted. Moreover, we have reviewed the relevant

legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal and have concluded that it does

not affect the outcome of the appeal.

judge found that there was a “fairly strong” motive to retaliate by the AFSD and

FSD. ID at 16-24. He also determined that the differences between the

appellant’s situation and proposed comparator employees detracted from their

probative weight, and he concluded that the agency took similar actions against

employees who did not make whistleblowing disclosures. ID at 24-25. Thus, he

concluded that the agency met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that it

would have detailed the appellant in the absence of his protected whistleblowing

disclosures. ID at 25-26.

The appellant raises numerous procedural and evidentiary arguments on

review, but he does not appear to assert any substantive challenge to the

administrative judge’s clear and convincing analysis concerning his detail. 5

Based upon the administrative judge’s thorough analysis of the Carr factors in

this regard, we affirm his conclusion.

The appellant has shown no error in the administrative judge’s rulings on

procedural and other evidentiary matters.

On review, the appellant largely challenges the administrative judge’s

rulings on testimony, witnesses and discovery, and his decision to exclude certain

evidence. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-11. For example, the appellant argues that the

administrative judge improperly denied his request for additional witnesses,

thereby denying him access to key evidence and testimony. Id. at 5-8. However,

an administrative judge has wide discretion under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(8), (10)

to exclude witnesses when it has not been shown that their testimony would be

relevant, material, and nonrepetitious. Franco v. U.S. Postal Service,

The appellant generally contends that the administrative judge’s citations to the

hearing testimony are inconsistent with his recollection of the hearing testimony, and he

asserts that he was unable to provide detailed arguments concerning the hearing

testimony because he did not receive the hearing compact discs that he had requested.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Although the appellant asserts that he did not receive the hearing

compact discs prior to the filing deadline for his supplement to his petition, PFR File,

Tab 3 at 4, he did not request an extension of time to file an additional supplement. We

have thoroughly reviewed the record, including listening to the hearing testimony, and

we have found no merit to the appellant’s general claims of error.

27 M.S.P.R. 322, 325 (1985). In this case, the administrative judge approved

5 witnesses (including the appellant) to testify for both parties, an additional

7 witnesses to testify solely on the appellant’s behalf, and he disapproved an

additional 14 witnesses proffered by the appellant because he failed to establish

that their testimony would be relevant and/or not redundant. W-3 AF, Tab 19

at 4.

The appellant fails to identify any relevant testimony that was improperly

excluded. PFR File, Tab 1. For example, he argues that the testimony of several

witnesses was “evasive” when they stated that they “did not know” or “did not

remember” when questioned, and he asserts that other witnesses could have

“fill[ed] in those blanks,” id. at 6-8, but he does not specifically identify which

other witnesses could have testified and how their testimony would be relevant.

Instead, he appears to be arguing that the administrative judge denied his

witnesses erroneously assuming that the testimony of all of the witnesses would

be truthful, and thus, redundant. Id. at 6.

Although unclear, the appellant appears to identify two instances in which

the testimony of the FSD and AFSD was impeached. Id. at 6-8. We have

considered these instances, which appear to involve knowledge of unpaid invoices

or activity concerning invoices. Id. However, neither instance persuades us that

the administrative judge erred in his analysis of the Carr factors or otherwise

warrants a different outcome regarding the 2011 detail.

We have considered the appellant’s assertion that S.W. should have been

allowed to testify because he later became his FSD and was responsible for

eliminating his position in 2014 pursuant to a reduction in force (RIF). PFR File,

Tab 1 at 5-6. The record reflects that the administrative judge dismissed a stay

request concerning this action because the appellant failed to allege that he

exhausted his administrative procedures before OSC. Mason v. Department of

Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-12-0005-S-2, Order on Stay

Request (May 2, 2014). Because the elimination of the appellant’s position as a

result of a RIF is not properly before the Board, and there is no suggestion that

S.W. was involved in the decision to detail the appellant in 2011, S.W.’s

testimony is not relevant to this appeal. We therefore find no error by the

administrative judge in excluding this witness.

We also have considered the appellant’s contention that the FSD testified

that he had discussed the appellant with S.W., the appellant made a “motion for

discovery to verify what information the witness had provided to [S.W.],” and the

administrative judge erroneously denied that motion. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6.

The Board will not reverse an administrative judge’s rulings on discovery matters

absent an abuse of discretion. Wagner v. Environmental Protection Agency ,

54 M.S.P.R. 447, 452 (1992), aff’d, 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Table). For

the reasons described above, any such information provided to S.W. does not

appear relevant to the detail at issue in this appeal, and we discern no abuse of

discretion in the administrative judge’s ruling in this regard.

The appellant also appears to be challenging the administrative judge’s

dismissal of his request to stay the agency’s “denial of due process.” PFR File,

Tab 1 at 9-11. Although somewhat unclear, we believe that this argument refers

to a February 3, 2012 memorandum issued to him by the FSD, which ordered him

to “vet any accusations of [misconduct] or poor management of Government

resources through [his] supervisory chain” prior to raising such accusations to the

agency’s Office of Investigation. IAF, Tab 14 at 5-7. The appellant seems to

allege that the memorandum effectively denied him due process by intimidating

and restricting the testimony of potential witnesses, and he notes that he filed a

stay request regarding this memorandum, which the administrative judge denied.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 9; IAF, Tabs 14, 16. This argument is unavailing.

An appellant may not challenge an administrative judge’s order on a stay

request under the whistleblower protection statutes through the petition for

review process; a request for an interlocutory appeal is the only option.

McCarthy v. International Boundary and Water Commission , 116 M.S.P.R. 594,

¶ 14 (2011), aff’d, 497 F. App’x 4 (Fed. Cir. 2012). However, once the

administrative judge denies a request for certification of an interlocutory appeal,

the party that sought certification may raise the matter at issue in a petition for

review filed after the initial decision is issued. Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.93(b). Here,

the administrative judge denied the appellant’s request for a stay, but the

appellant did not submit a request for an interlocutory appeal of that decision.

Therefore, the appellant is barred from challenging on review the administrative

judge’s denial of his stay request. McCarthy, 116 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 14.

Finally, the appellant includes the following documentation for the first

time on review: (1) Congressional documents relating to a May 2016 House

Oversight Committee hearing on “Examining Management Practices and

Misconduct at [the Transportation and Security Administration]”; and (2) a

February 29, 2016 Human Capital Advisory Memorandum, which notified agency

officials that all directed (involuntary) reassignments were suspended and that

approval from the Office of Human Capital would be required prior to directing a

reassignment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12, 14-15. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the

Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time on review

absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the

party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214

(1980). Further, the Board will not grant a petition for review based on new

evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome

different from that of the initial decision . Russo v. Veterans Administration,

3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980).

Even if we assume for purposes of our analysis that this evidence is “new,”

a different outcome is not warranted. The appellant appears to be arguing that

this new evidence is material because if a stay had been granted, his detail may

have been precluded by the Human Capital Advisory Memorandum. PFR File,

Tab 1 at 12. However, as noted above, the appellant was only temporarily

detailed to the Program Analyst position in 2011 and he continued to encumber

his permanent position of Financial Specialist. In contrast, a reassignment, which

appears to be the focus of the 2016 Memorandum, is “a change of an employee,

while serving continuously within the same agency, from one position to another

without promotion or demotion.” 5 C.F.R. § 210.102(b)(12). Because the

Memorandum was issued several years after the relevant events transpired, and

the appellant was temporarily detailed and not reassigned, we find that the

documents submitted for a first time on review are not material to this case and

do not warrant a different outcome. Russo, 3 M.S.P.R. at 349. Accordingly, we

find no basis upon which to disturb the initial decision.

ORDER

We ORDER the agency to cancel the April 14, 2010 letter of reprimand and

to eliminate all references to the reprimand from the appellant’s personnel

records. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts , 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir.

1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date

of this decision.

We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing

when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has

taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask

the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully

carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement

with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant

believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition

should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not

fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of

any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of

the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The

regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees

and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.

You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued

the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT

REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your consequential

damages, including medical costs incurred, travel expenses, and any other

reasonable and foreseeable consequential damages. To be paid, you must meet

the requirements set out at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214 (g) or 1221(g). The regulations may

be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201 , 1201.202, and 1201.204. If you believe you

meet these requirements, you must file a motion for consequential damages

WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You

must file your motion with the office that issued the initial decision on your

appeal.

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

A copy of the decision will be referred to the Special Counsel “to

investigate and take appropriate action under [5 U.S.C.] section 1215,” based on

the determination that “there is reason to believe that a current employee may

have committed a prohibited personnel practice” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 5 U.S.C. § 1221(f)(3). Please note that

while any Special Counsel investigation related to this decision is pending, “no

disciplinary action shall be taken against any employee for any alleged prohibited

activity under investigation or for any related activity without the approval of the

Special Counsel.” 5 U.S.C. § 1214(f).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board has updated the

notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board

cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the