Opinion

Kim LaForge v. Department of Homeland Security

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Feb 1, 2024
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 15.0%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KIM S. LAFORGE, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, PH-0752-15-0435-I-1

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND DATE: February 1, 2024

SECURITY,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

W. Scott LaForge , Carolina, Puerto Rico, for the appellant.

Aaron Baughman , Springfield, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

sustained her separation by involuntary workforce reduction (IWR). Generally,

we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the

initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent

with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting

error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal

argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not

available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this

appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under

section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the

petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to find

that the Board has jurisdiction over the appellant’s allegation of age

discrimination, and to adjudicate that allegation, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

The appellant was employed in the agency’s Office of Security Operations

(OSO) as a Transportation Security Manager (TSM), SV-1801-I, at the Barnstable

Municipal Airport located on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Initial Appeal File

(IAF), Tab 8 at 29. In December 2014, three of the appellant’s managers visited

her to discuss an upcoming IWR. IAF, Tab 30, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD)

(testimony of the appellant). The managers told her that her position would be

eliminated, and she was being reassigned to a vacant TSM position at Boston’s

Logan International Airport. Id. The reassignment, however, did not occur.

In March 2015, the agency implemented the IWR 2 within OSO to abolish a

number of TSM positions that it determined were no longer necessary. IAF,

Tab 8 at 74-77. The agency sent out notices to affected TSMs, including the

appellant. Id. at 70; IAF, Tab 30, HCD (testimony of the appellant). The notice

informed the appellant that she would be required to find a new position during

one of two stages of the IWR. During stage one, she would be able to request

voluntary placement into 1 of 12 vacant positions in the Boston hub/spoke, at or

below her current pay band, subject to agency determination of her qualifications.

IAF, Tab 8 at 68, 70-71. If the appellant did not secure a position during stage

one, she would have the opportunity to move onto stage two and compete for

vacancies on a nationwide level. Id. at 70-73.

The stage one list of 12 vacant positions did not include the TSM position

referenced by the three agency managers who met with the appellant prior to

issuance of the notices. Id. at 68. The appellant chose three of the vacant

positions listed in stage one for voluntary placement–Supervisory Human

Resources (HR) Specialist, Nonsupervisory HR Specialist, and Assistant Federal

Security Director-Generalist (AFSD-G). Id. at 67-68. The agency informed the

appellant that she was not qualified for the HR positions, and that, although she

was qualified for the AFSD-G position, she was not eligible because that position

was in a professional series, with more opportunities for pay band promotion than

the series she currently occupied. Id. at 67. The lengthy list of stage two

vacancies that the appellant would have to compete for, however, included the

TSM position in Boston, and the agency selected her to fill it. Id. at 35, 38-59.

The agency’s IWR procedures are similar to reduction in force (RIF) procedures;

however, the two procedures are not identical. Title 5 RIF provisions are not applicable

to the TSA. See Garofalo v. Department of Homeland Security, 108 M.S.P.R. 169,

¶¶ 7-8 (2008). Instead, the agency applies its internal IWR policy, Human Capital

Policy No. 351-3. IAF, Tab 8 at 195-218. In this nonprecedential decision, we use the

acronym IWR when the acronym RIF would be used in a separation pursuant to

5 C.F.R. part 351. Despite the fact that Title 5 RIF procedures are inapplicable to the

TSA, the Standard Form 50 effecting the appellant’s separation indicates that the nature

of the action is “separation-RIF.” Id. at 29.

The appellant declined the position. Id. at 34. The agency then offered her a

lower-graded Transportation Security Officer position at Barnstable Municipal

Airport. Id. at 33. She also declined the lower-level position, and the agency

separated her from service. Id. at 29-33.

The appellant filed a Board appeal, alleging that she was treated unfairly

during the IWR by not being given the AFSD-G position merely because it was in

a different job series. IAF, Tab 1 at 4. She also alleged that, during an earlier

IWR, employees had been allowed to “jump job series,” id., and that the agency

engaged in age discrimination by not allowing her to do so. IAF, Tab 28 at 3.

The administrative judge found that the agency complied with its

regulations governing reorganization and realignment. IAF, Tab 32, Initial

Decision (ID) at 9-10. Regarding the appellant’s assertion that she was treated

differently from two employees who, during an earlier IWR, were allowed to

circumvent restrictions on what job series they were allowed to transfer into, the

administrative judge found that this prior placement violated agency procedures

and the agency was not required to continue to violate its procedures for the

appellant’s benefit. ID at 9. He also found that the appellant failed to show that

the agency managers actively misled her by telling her that she would be

reassigned to Boston prior to the IWR, or that she mistakenly relied upon

information provided by agency managers regarding her ability to transfer to a

position listed in stage one of the IWR, information that allegedly caused her to

limit her selection of positions on the stage one list, a decision that later turned

out to be detrimental to her interests. ID at 10.

In addition, the administrative judge found that the Board does not have

jurisdiction over the appellant’s allegation of age discrimination. He found that

her discrimination allegation was not based on a claim that the agency separated

her while retaining younger employees impacted by the reassignment. ID at 11.

Rather, her claim was based on her assertion that the agency permitted two

younger employees to circumvent restrictions on what job series they were

allowed to transfer into during an earlier IWR, while the agency did not allow her

to do so in her transfer request during phase one of the IWR process. He

characterized the denial of her transfer request as a nonselection, and found that

her discrimination allegation in the nonselection was beyond the scope of the

action over which the Board has jurisdiction, her separation. ID at 11-12.

In her petition for review, the appellant asserts that the administrative

judge erred in denying two of her requested witnesses and that he was biased

against her in his description of the facts and rulings on witnesses. 3 Petition for

Review (PFR) File, Tab 2 at 8, 10-11. 4 She also asserts, as she did below, that

she was deceived by her supervisors into believing that she would get any

position she requested during stage one, including the AFSD-G position. Id.

at 8-11. She asserts that she had been performing the AFSD-G position duties for

more than 9 years and that that position still exists at Barnstable. 5 Id. at 9. The

agency has filed a response to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 4.

On review, the appellant states that the agency did not provide some documents to her

during the processing of her appeal that she requested about jobs that were provided to

other employees. PFR File, Tab 2 at 8. She states, however, that the information that

she sought through the documents was provided through the testimony of the agency’s

witness. Id. She does not indicate that she sought this information through discovery

and does not explain how her case was harmed by the agency’s failure to provide these

documents.

The appellant filed two identical petitions, one timely filed by facsimile transmittal,

PFR File, Tab 1, and one by e-filing, PFR File, Tab 2. For ease of reference, we cite to

the e-filed petition for review at Tab 2.

The appellant also alleges that the agency violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(4), which

prohibits deceiving or willfully obstructing any person regarding such person’s right to

compete for employment, and section 2302(b)(6), which prohibits granting any

preference or advantage not authorized by law, rule, or regulation to any employee or

applicant for employment to improve or injure the prospects of any particular person for

employment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. The appellant raises these allegations for the first

time on review. IAF, Tab 28 (Summary of Prehearing Conference). We decline to

consider this argument because the appellant has not shown that it is based on new and

material evidence not previously available despite her due diligence. Banks v.

Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980).

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge was biased.

In making a claim of bias or prejudice against an administrative judge, a

party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies

administrative adjudicators. Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R.

382, 386 (1980). An administrative judge’s conduct during the course of a Board

proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if his comments or actions evidence

“a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed.

Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)); Smets v.

Department of the Navy, 117 M.S.P.R. 164, ¶ 15 (2011), aff’d, 498 F. App’x 1

(Fed. Cir. 2012). The appellant’s allegations on review, which do not relate to

any extrajudicial conduct by the administrative judge, do not satisfy that standard.

The administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in denying two of the

appellant’s witnesses.

The appellant requested two witnesses to testify about the emotional impact

that the IWR process had on her, about the unfairness of the process, and about

how agency employees were not informed and were confused during the IWR

process. IAF, Tab 23 at 13-14. The administrative judge denied these witnesses,

finding that such testimony was not relevant to the issue of whether the agency

followed its internal IWR procedures. IAF, Tab 28 at 6-7. On review, the

appellant contends that the administrative judge’s decision to deny these

witnesses was detrimental to her case. PFR File, Tab 2 at 8.

It is well established that administrative judges have broad discretion to

regulate the proceedings before them, including the discretion to exclude

witnesses. See Fritz v. Department of Health and Human Services , 87 M.S.P.R.

287, ¶ 15 (2000); Franco v. U.S. Postal Service, 27 M.S.P.R. 322, 325 (1985)

(stating that an administrative judge has wide discretion under 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.41(b)(8), (10) to exclude witnesses when it has not been shown that their

testimony would be relevant, material, and nonrepetitious). Here, the appellant

has failed to show that the denied witnesses would have given testimony relevant

to the agency’s application of the IWR procedures to her. To the extent that they

could have corroborated the appellant’s assertions that agency managers did not

provide sufficient information when conducting the IWR and that employees were

confused about the IWR process, she herself had the opportunity to testify about

the IWR process and employees’ understanding of it. HCD (testimony of the

appellant). She also elicited testimony from agency officials who implemented

the IWR. HCD (testimony of Human Resources Specialist). We therefore find

that the administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in denying these

witnesses.

The Board’s scope of review of the IWR is the same as its scope of review in a

reduction in force (RIF) under 5 C.F.R. part 351.

The Board has jurisdiction over an appeal challenging the RIF separation of

an excepted-service TSA employee. See Wilke v. Department of Homeland

Security, 104 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 16 (2007). However, under 49 U.S.C. § 114(n),

TSA has the authority to modify the RIF procedures applicable to its

excepted-service employees, id., ¶ 22, and it has done so, implementing

procedures for an IWR, IAF, Tab 8 at 195-218 (Human Capital Management

(HCM) Policy No. 351-3); see Garofalo v. Department of Homeland Security ,

108 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶¶ 7-12 (2008).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that “[a]n

agency is accorded wide discretion in conducting a [RIF]; absent a clear abuse of

that discretion, a substantial departure from applicable procedures, a

misconstruction of governing statutes, or the like, we do not upset a final agency

decision.” Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 723 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir.

1983) (quoting Dancy v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 300 (1982)); Garofalo,

108 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶ 15. We recognize that the IWR procedures at issue here

differ from traditional RIF procedures. However, we find that, even in a case

such as this, when the workforce reduction is implemented under unique

procedures, the Board is afforded only a limited scope of review. See Pettis v.

Department of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 1176, 1179 (Fed. Cir.

1986); Cooper, 723 F.2d at 1562; Garofalo, 108 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶ 5. We have

provided the appropriate scope of review in this case.

The agency properly applied its IWR procedures to the appellant’s TSM position.

The appellant does not dispute that HCM Policy No. 351-3 contains the

standards by which the agency’s action in this appeal should be evaluated. HCM

Policy No. 351-3 encourages management officials to consider a number of

options before initiating IWR separations. IAF, Tab 8 at 198. These options

include implementing hiring freezes, encouraging voluntary actions such as

resignations or retirements, directing the reassignment of employees to other

locations, and offering employees within affected organizations the opportunity to

volunteer for IWR separations. Id. at 198-99. The policy does not require any of

the enumerated options to be used in any particular case, however. Id. Once

employees are identified for separation pursuant to IWR procedures, HCM Policy

No. 351-3 authorizes management officials to offer those employees other

positions within TSA, and states that, before alternative positions are offered, the

employees must be fully qualified for placement in the alternative positions. Id.

at 205. Such offers are not required, however. Id. The policy also states that

employees identified for separation do not have assignment rights (bump or

retreat rights). Id. The IWR procedures are applied to employees based on their

positions of record. Id. at 200.

Although the appellant argued that she had been performing the AFSD -G

position duties for years before the agency initiated the IWR at issue, that job was

not her position of record. HCM Policy No. 351-3 defines “position of record”

as:

The employee’s permanent position, as documented on the

Notification of Personnel Action (SF-50 or equivalent), the current

job description, and any other pertinent job documentation for the

employee’s current, permanent position. The position of record is

defined by the employee’s permanent pay band, occupational

category, job series, work schedule type, and any other conditions

that determine coverage under human capital management systems.

Id. at 197. A position to which an employee is temporarily assigned, i.e.,

detailed, acting, or temporarily promoted, is not considered the position of record

for that position. Id. The record establishes that the appellant’s position of

record was TSM SV-1801-I. Id. at 29. Thus, the agency correctly used that

position in determining the appellant’s proper placement during the IWR.

The appellant’s TSM position was in the I-band. Id. In the agency’s notice

of opportunity to request voluntary placement, it stated that stage one placements

only would be to positions at the same pay band and with the same pay band

opportunity or to a lower pay band with no greater opportunity than previously

held. Id. at 70. The appellant requested voluntary placement into the three

I-band positions on the vacancy list provided, including the AFSD -G position.

Id. at 68. The agency explained to the appellant, however, that, although she

qualified for the position, she was ineligible for placement in it under

noncompetitive procedures. Id. at 67. The agency further explained that the

appellant’s TSM position had the promotion potential to the I -band, while the

AFSD-G position was in the professional category and had the promotion

potential of a higher level, the L-band. Id. at 64-65. The agency stated that its

Management Directives/Handbook provides that an employee must compete for

entry into a different job category that has a higher promotion potential. Id.

at 64. The agency indicated that it listed the AFSD -G position on the stage one

list that the appellant received because other TSMs, who also received the list,

may have held professional category positions in the past and thus might have

been eligible for placement into that job category without competition. Id. The

agency’s explanation for the appellant’s nonselection into the AFSD -G position is

consistent with the official information that it provided the appellant regarding

stage one of the IWR. This determination was within the agency’s discretion,

i.e., during stage one, only making placements to positions at the same pay band

and with the same pay band opportunity. IAF, Tab 8 at 70; Cooper, 723 F.2d

at 1562. We therefore disagree with the appellant that the agency misled her into

believing that she would get any position she requested during phase one,

including the AFSD-G position.

The Board does have jurisdiction over the appellant’s claim of age discrimination.

The appellant contended below that the agency unfairly failed to offer her

reassignment to a vacant AFSD-G position during stage one of the IWR process,

i.e., the offer of vacant positions, based on her age, and thus the agency

implemented HCM Policy No. 351-3 discriminatorily. As noted above, the

administrative judge treated the appellant’s claim as an allegation of nonselection

for the AFSD-G position, rather than as an allegation of discrimination in the

conduct of the IWR. As explained below, however, under the circumstances of

this case, the appellant’s claim that she was not offered the vacant AFSD -G

position because of her age rises to an allegation of discrimination in the conduct

of the IWR.

As noted above, HCM Policy No. 351-3 does not require the offer of vacant

positions to employees identified for potential separation. It states that “[a]n

employee whose position is eliminated and who is identified for potential

separation may be offered another vacant TSA position.” IAF, Tab 8 at 205

(emphasis in original). However, the agency’s use of this alternative at stage one

of the IWR makes it part of the IWR. As such, any improper motivation in

extending the offers of vacant TSA positions during the IWR, including any age

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633a, may taint the IWR. Cf. Decker v. Department

of Health and Human Services, 40 M.S.P.R. 119, 127 (1989) (finding that, even

though an agency establishes that a RIF was conducted for a valid management

reason, its improper motivation will taint the RIF). We therefore disagree with

the administrative judge that the appellant’s nonselection for the AFSD -G

position was a nonselection outside of the IWR process.

In Garofalo, the appellant raised a claim of age discrimination in his

separation under IWR procedures. The Board found that, because the record was

fully developed, the inquiry was whether Mr. Garofalo met his ultimate burden of

proving that his age was a determinative factor in the action. Thus, the Board

reviewed all of the evidence to determine whether the agency intentionally

discriminated against Mr. Garofalo. Garofalo, 108 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶ 19; Jackson

v. U.S. Postal Service, 79 M.S.P.R. 46, 51-52 (1998). Here, the record is fully

developed. Thus, we have reviewed all the evidence to determine whether the

appellant established her allegation of age discrimination.

In Wingate v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶ 7 (2012), the Board

held that a Federal employee may prove age discrimination by showing that age

was “a factor” in the personnel action, even if it was not a but-for cause. Id., ¶ 7.

In this case, the appellant has provided no evidence to support her

allegation that her age was a factor in the agency’s decision. She contends that,

during an earlier IWR, the agency allowed two similarly situated younger

employees to transfer to positions with greater promotion potential, but because

of her age, it did not afford her similar treatment. However, the appellant has

provided no evidence to support her assertion that this difference in treatment was

motivated by age discrimination. See Wingate, 118 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶ 9 (finding

that the appellant’s speculation about the agency’s motives does not establish that

age was a factor in the agency’s actions). Additionally, the violation of the rule

did not relate to the agency’s actions in the current IWR that resulted in the

appellant’s separation, but related to actions in a different IWR that occurred a

year earlier. Because the appellant’s evidence is insufficient to establish that her

age was a factor in the agency’s decision not to transfer her into the vacant

AFSD-G position, we find that she failed to prove her claim of age

discrimination. 6

Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision, as modified by this Final

Order.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

Because the appellant failed to show that her age was a motivating factor in the

agency’s decision to separate her, we do not reach the question of whether age was a

but-for cause of her separation. See Johnson v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

2023 MSPB 9, ¶ 5 n.2

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420, (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)

(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either

with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.