Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

No. 1 February 1, 2024 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Tim KNOPP,

Daniel Bonham,

Suzanne Weber, Dennis Linthicum,

and Lynn Findley,

Petitioners,

v.

Lavonne GRIFFIN-VALADE,

Oregon Secretary of State,

Elections Division,

Respondent.

(CA A182122) (SC S070456)

On certification from the Court of Appeals under ORS

19.405.

Argued and submitted December 14, 2023.

John DiLorenzo Jr., Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, Portland,

argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners. Also on

the briefs were Aaron K. Stuckey and Blake Robinson.

Dustin E. Buehler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,

argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent. Also on

the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and

Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Steven C. Berman, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter,

P.C., Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae APANO,

Basic Rights Oregon, Oregon AFSCME Council 75, Oregon

Education Association, Oregon League of Conservation

Voters, Accion Politica PCUNnista, Planned Parenthood

Advocates of Oregon, and SEIU Local 503. Also on the brief

was Lydia Anderson-Dana.

Margaret S. Olney, Bennet Hartman, LLP, Portland,

filed the brief for amici curiae Andrea Kennedy-Smith and

Reed Scott-Schwalbach.

Kelly Simon, American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon,

Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae American Civil

2 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

Liberties Union of Oregon. Also on the brief was Alicia

LeDuc Montgomery.

Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog,

Bushong and James, Justices, and Walters, Senior Judge,

Justice pro tempore.*

PER CURIAM

The Secretary of State’s Temporary Rules ELECT 12-2023

and ELECT 16-2023 are upheld.

______________

* Masih, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 3

PER CURIAM

In 2022, voters approved Ballot Measure 113, which

amended Article IV, section 15, of the Oregon Constitution.

That amendment provides that any state legislator who

accrues 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative

session shall be disqualified from holding legislative office

“for the term following the election after the member’s cur-

rent term is completed.” Or Const, Art IV, § 15.

The parties in this proceeding dispute the timing

of the disqualification imposed by that amendment. In rules

promulgated to implement the amendment, the Secretary of

State has applied the disqualification to a legislator’s next

term of office—that is, the term immediately following the

term in which the legislator accrued 10 or more unexcused

absences. Petitioners are legislators who each accrued 10 or

more unexcused absences during the 2023 legislative ses-

sion. They challenge the secretary’s rules, contending that

the disqualification should apply one term later—that is,

that a legislator who accrues 10 or more unexcused absences

during a legislative session should be allowed to serve the

next term of office, but not the term after that.

The resolution of that dispute requires that we apply

our well-established methodology to construe the text of the

amendment, by determining how the voters who adopted

the amendment most likely understood its text, including

considering the information presented to the voters through

the ballot title and in the voters’ pamphlet. That informa-

tion expressly and repeatedly described the disqualification

as occurring immediately following the legislator’s current

term. Petitioners concede that that information supports the

secretary’s interpretation and not their own. Nevertheless,

petitioners argue that what they view as the plain meaning

of the amendment’s text must control. They contend that the

text clearly applies the disqualification to the term after the

next term of office and is not capable of supporting the sec-

retary’s interpretation.

As we will explain in greater detail, we disagree.

Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the text is capable of sup-

porting the secretary’s interpretation. And that interpretation

4 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

is uniformly supported by the ballot title and the voters’ pam-

phlet, both of which inform voters’ understanding of ballot

measures. Reading the text of the amendment in light of

the ballot title and the voters’ pamphlet, voters would have

understood the disqualification to apply to the term of office

immediately following the term in which a legislator accrued

10 or more unexcused absences. Thus, for the reasons that

follow, we conclude that voters intended that result and reject

petitioners’ challenge to the secretary’s rules.

I. BACKGROUND

Each chamber of the Oregon Legislative Assembly

may conduct business only if two-thirds of the chamber’s

members are present. Or Const, Art IV, § 12. In some cir-

cumstances, therefore, a minority of legislators may prevent

a chamber from conducting business by not being present.

That practice is commonly known as a legislative walk-

out. Although legislators have used walkouts throughout

Oregon’s history, the frequency of walkouts has increased in

recent years.

Measure 113 was designed to curtail legislative walk-

outs. To do so, the measure proposed amending Article IV,

section 15. Before the amendment, that constitutional pro-

vision authorized either chamber of the legislature to “pun-

ish its members for disorderly behavior” and, “with the con-

currence of two thirds, [to] expel a member.” Or Const, Art

IV, § 15 (2020). Measure 113 proposed adding the following

words:

“Failure to attend, without permission or excuse, ten or

more legislative floor sessions called to transact business

during a regular or special legislative session shall be

deemed disorderly behavior and shall disqualify the mem-

ber from holding office as a Senator or Representative for

the term following the election after the member’s current

term is completed.”

(Emphasis added.)

Measure 113 originated as an initiative petition, for

which the Attorney General must prepare a draft ballot title

and then, following a comment period, a certified ballot title.

ORS 250.065 - 250.067. The ballot title for a state measure

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 5

consists of three parts: (1) a caption of not more than 15

words that reasonably identifies the measure’s subject mat-

ter; (2) simple and understandable statements of 25 words

or less that describe the results of a “yes” vote and a “no”

vote; and (3) a concise and impartial statement of not more

than 125 words that summarizes the measure and its major

effect. ORS 250.035(2).

The certified ballot title plays an important role in

the initiative process. The ballot itself—that is, the document

that voters use to cast their votes—is required to include the

caption and the result statements of the certified ballot title.

ORS 254.175(2). Counties also may choose to print the full

ballot title, including the summary. ORS 254.145(7).

For the initiative petition that became Measure 113,

the Attorney General prepared a draft ballot title, which

became the certified ballot title after it was neither revised

(following a comment period) nor challenged in this court.1

Each part of the ballot title addressed the timing of the

proposed disqualification, stating that the measure would

disqualify a legislator from holding legislative office for the

term immediately following the term in which the legislator

accrued 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative

session. The ballot title caption provided:

“Amends Constitution: Legislators with ten unex-

cused absences from floor sessions disqualified from hold-

ing next term of office.”

(Emphasis added.) The result statements provided:

“Result of ‘Yes’ Vote: ‘Yes’ vote disqualifies legis-

lators with ten unexcused absences from legislative floor

sessions from holding office as legislator for term following

current term of office.

“Result of ‘No’ Vote: ‘No’ vote retains existing law.

Absent legislators may be punished by legislative chamber

(potentially expelled by supermajority); present legislators

have legal authority to compel attendance.”

1

As noted, the Attorney General first prepares a draft ballot title, which is

subject to a public comment period. ORS 250.067(1). Following any revisions by

the Attorney General, any elector who submitted a timely comment on the draft

may challenge the ballot title by petitioning this court. ORS 250.085(2).

6 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

(Emphasis added.) And the summary provided, in relevant

part:

“Measure specifies that ‘disorderly behavior’ includes legis-

lator’s failure to attend ten or more legislative floor sessions

during a regular or special legislative session without per-

mission or excuse. Under measure, legislator who engages

in ‘disorderly behavior’ through unexcused absences is dis-

qualified from serving as a Senator or Representative for

the term following the end of the legislator’s current term.”

(Emphasis added.)2

More information about Measure 113 was provided

to voters in the voters’ pamphlet, which is sent to every

household with a registered voter. OAR 165-022-0060(7).

The voters’ pamphlet contained the full text of Measure 113

and the full ballot title—both set out above—as well as an

explanatory statement and arguments that advocates sub-

mitted on the merits of the measure. ORS 251.185(1); Official

Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, Nov 8, 2022, 65-71.3

The explanatory statement is “an impartial, simple

and understandable statement explaining the measure” in

500 words or less. ORS 251.215(1). The explanatory state-

ment is approved by a committee of five members: two pro-

ponents of the measure, two opponents of the measure, and a

fifth member chosen either by the four other members or by

the Secretary of State. ORS 251.205(2)-(5). In this case, all

five members of the committee voted to approve the explan-

atory statement that appeared in the voters’ pamphlet. See

ORS 251.215(4) (requiring statement to show dissenting

votes, if any); Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 66 (showing no

members dissented or were absent). Like the ballot title, the

explanatory statement characterized the measure as dis-

qualifying a legislator from holding legislative office for the

term immediately following the term in which the legislator

accrued 10 or more unexcused absences:

2

Two people submitted comments on the Attorney General’s draft ballot title

during the public comment period. Neither comment challenged how the ballot

title characterized the timing of the disqualification that would be created by the

measure.

3

Page cites to the Official Voters’ Pamphlet refer to the pamphlet circulated

to Marion County voters.

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 7

“The measure deems the failure to attend without excuse

to be disorderly behavior and disqualifies the legislator

from holding office after the legislator’s current term ends.”

Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 66 (emphasis added).4

As noted, the voters’ pamphlet also included numer-

ous arguments that advocates submitted on the merits of

the measure. By either paying a $1,200 fee or obtaining sig-

natures from 500 voters, any person or organization may

submit a written argument—not exceeding 325 words—

supporting or opposing the measure for publication in the

voters’ pamphlet. ORS 251.255(1)-(2); ORS 251.255(4); OAR

165-022-0050(5). The voters’ pamphlet for the 2022 elec-

tion contained 19 advocate arguments—each supporting

Measure 113, and none opposing it. While not all the argu-

ments addressed the timing of the proposed disqualification,

those that did described it as disqualifying a legislator from

holding legislative office for the term immediately following

the term in which the legislator accrued 10 or more unex-

cused absences. Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 67-71.5

Media coverage of Measure 113 was consistent

with the statements in the ballot title and voters’ pamphlet.

The secretary has cited numerous media accounts that

described the measure as disqualifying a legislator with

10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative session

from holding office during the next term of office.6 For their

4

The explanatory statement is subject to a public hearing, ORS 251.215(2),

and possible challenge in this court, ORS 251.235(1). No challenge to the explan-

atory statement for Measure 113 was filed in this court; the record before us does

not reveal whether a public hearing was held, and if so, what happened at any

such hearing.

5

See, e.g., Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 68 (argument submitted by Tan

Perkins, Vote Yes On 113) (“It would create a consequence for lawmakers who

skip 10 sessions without an excuse, by banning them from holding their seat

the following term.”); Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 70 (argument submitted by

Heather L. Stuart, Fair Shot For All Coalition) (“Under Measure 113, if a politi-

cian has 10 or more unexcused absences, they will be barred from holding their

office the following term.”).

6

See, e.g., Claire Withycombe, Midterm ballot measure to decide if Oregon

lawmakers will be punished for absences, Statesman Journal, (Sept 19, 2022),

https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/politics/2022/09/19/2022-ore-

gon-midterm-election-ballot-measure-113-walk-outs-republicans/66152421007/

(accessed Jan 25, 2024) (reporting that the measure “would disqualify state law-

makers from holding office for the next term” if they accrued enough absences);

Editorial Board, Voters can already remove legislators for unexcused absences,

8 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

part, petitioners have not identified any media accounts sug-

gesting that the timing of the disqualification would work

differently.

At the November 2022 General Election, voters

approved Measure 113, thus amending Article IV, section

15, to add the new disqualification. The total vote count was

1,292,127 to 599,204, with 68.3 percent voting in favor and

31.7 percent voting in opposition. The parties report that,

during the 2023 legislative session, which was the first ses-

sion after the amendment took effect, 10 senators accrued

10 or more unexcused absences and that petitioners were

among those senators.

In August 2023, the secretary adopted temporary

administrative rule ELECT 12-2023 to, among other things,

implement the amendment for the 2024 General Election.

That rule adopted, and incorporated by reference, the State

Candidate Manual, which applied the amendment’s disqual-

ification to the term of office immediately following the term

in which the legislator accrued too many unexcused absences.

Specifically, the rule provided that candidates for state repre-

sentative and state senator “must not have 10 or more unex-

cused absences from legislative floor sessions during a regular

or special legislative session to be eligible for the term immedi-

ately following their current term.” State Candidate Manual 10

(rev Aug 2023) (emphasis added). In September 2023, the

secretary suspended that rule and adopted a revised version

of the State Candidate Manual through temporary adminis-

trative rule ELECT 16-2023. No changes were made to the

section of the revised State Candidate Manual implementing

the amendment. State Candidate Manual 10 (rev Sept 2023).

Accordingly, the more recent rule similarly applies the dis-

qualification to the immediate next term of office.

Petitioners challenged both rules in the Court of

Appeals under ORS 183.400, arguing that the rules violate

Article IV, section 15, by applying the disqualification to

the next term of office, rather than the term after that. The

Bend Bulletin, (Sept 13, 2022), https://www.bendbulletin.com/opinion/editori-

al-voters-can-already-remove-legislators-for-unexcused-absences/article_152d-

30ca-3387-11ed-bb34-2f960479e9bd.html (accessed Jan 25, 2024) (reporting that

disqualified legislators would be barred “from holding office in the term following

the current term”).

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 9

Court of Appeals certified the matter to this court under

ORS 19.405, and we accepted the certification.

II. DISCUSSION

As amended by the voters’ approval of Measure 113,

Article IV, section 15, now disqualifies legislators with 10 or

more unexcused absences from holding a future term of office:

“Failure to attend, without permission or excuse, ten or

more legislative floor sessions called to transact business

during a regular or special legislative session shall be

deemed disorderly behavior and shall disqualify the mem-

ber from holding office as a Senator or Representative for the

term following the election after the member’s current term

is completed.”

(Emphasis added.) The dispute in this case centers on

whether the disqualification applies to the immediate next

term of office, as the secretary argues, or the term after

that, as petitioners argue.

Resolving that dispute presents a question of inter-

pretation. We interpret the Oregon Constitution by “exam-

in[ing] the text, in its historical context and in light of rel-

evant case law, to determine the meaning of the provision

at issue most likely understood by those who adopted it,

with the ultimate objective of identifying relevant underly-

ing principles that may inform our application of the con-

stitutional text to modern circumstances.” Couey v. Atkins,

357 Or 460, 490-91, 355 P3d 866 (2015).7 Therefore, when

interpreting a constitutional amendment adopted through

an initiated ballot measure, we consider “the voters’ intent,”

focusing on the text and context as well as “the measure’s

history, should it appear useful to our analysis.” State v.

Algeo, 354 Or 236, 246, 311 P3d 865 (2013). A measure’s

history includes the ballot title, other materials in the vot-

ers’ pamphlet, and media reports. AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto

Source v. Dept. of Rev., 363 Or 411, 418, 423 P3d 71 (2018).

We begin with the text. The amendment applies to

members of the legislature and provides that a member’s

7

The amendment at issue in this case does not require identifying underly-

ing principles that must be applied to modern circumstances, because the voters

adopted this amendment in November 2022.

10 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

failure to attend 10 or more legislative floor sessions without

excuse “shall disqualify the member from holding office as a

Senator or Representative for the term following the election

after the member’s current term is completed.” Or Const, Art

IV, § 15 (emphasis added). As an initial matter, the parties

agree that “term” refers to a legislator’s term of office. In

Oregon, senators are elected to a four-year term of office,

while representatives are elected to a two-year term of

office. Or Const, Art IV, § 4. The parties also agree that “the

member’s current term” refers to the term of office in which

a legislator accrues 10 or more unexcused absences during a

legislative session.

The parties disagree, however, as to the term for

which the legislator would be disqualified from holding

office—whether it is the term immediately following the

legislator’s current term or the term after that. Their dif-

fering interpretations depend on the interplay between the

distinct phrases used in the text of the amendment.

Petitioners interpret the amendment to mean that

a legislator who accrues 10 or more unexcused absences

would be allowed to serve the next term of office but would

be disqualified from holding office for the term after that. To

get there, petitioners read the amendment so that the words

“the term” are modified by “following the election,” and then

the words “the election” are modified by “after the mem-

ber’s current term is completed.” According to petitioners, to

identify “the term following the election after the member’s

current term is completed,” we should begin by identifying

when the legislator’s current term is completed, then iden-

tify the election after that, and then identify the term that

follows that election.

For example, as petitioners posit, if a senator

accrues 10 or more unexcused absences during a legislative

session in a four-year term that begins in January 2021,

then the senator’s “current term is completed” in January

2025. See Or Const, Art IV, § 4 (a legislative term shall

commence on the second Monday in January following

the legislator’s election). Petitioners argue that the phrase

“the election after the member’s current term is completed”

should be understood to refer to the first general election

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 11

for the legislator’s office held after the legislator completes

their current term. That election would take place during

the next term of office because general elections are held

in November of the year before a new term begins. So, if a

senator’s current term is completed in January 2025, then

the next general election for that senate office would take

place in November 2028, for the term beginning in January

2029.8 And if “the election after the member’s current term

is completed” refers to the November 2028 General Election,

then “the term following the election after the member’s cur-

rent term is completed” must refer to the term that begins

after that election—namely, the term beginning in January

2029. So, according to petitioners, a senator who accrued

10 or more unexcused absences during the 2023 legislative

session and whose term of office would end in January 2025

would be allowed to serve during the next term of office—

beginning in January 2025—but would be disqualified from

holding legislative office for the term after that—beginning

in January 2029.

The secretary interprets the amendment’s text dif-

ferently. She interprets the text to mean that a legislator

who accrues 10 or more unexcused absences would not be

allowed to serve the immediate next term of office. In her

view, the words “the term” (for which a legislator is disqual-

ified) are modified by both the phrase “following the elec-

tion” and the phrase “after the member’s current term is

completed.” As a result, whereas petitioners understand the

phrase “after the member’s current term is completed” to

modify the words “the election,” the secretary understands

the phrase “after the member’s current term is completed”

to modify the words “the term.” She maintains that reading

the amendment that way emphasizes two facts about the

term of disqualification: that it follows an election, and that

it occurs after the disqualified legislator completes their

current term. The secretary thus understands the term

“after the member’s current term is completed” to refer to

the term immediately following the term in which a legisla-

tor accrues 10 or more unexcused absences.

8

For a member of the Oregon House of Representatives whose term ends

January 2025, the next general election after that term is completed would be in

November 2026, for a term beginning January 2027. Or Const, Art IV, § 4.

12 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

Applying that interpretation to the same exam-

ple from above, if a senator accrues 10 or more unexcused

absences during a legislative session in a four-year term

that begins in January 2021, then the senator’s “current

term is completed” in January 2025. The term immediately

following that term would also begin in January 2025; the

election to decide who would serve in that following term

would be held in November 2024. The senator would be dis-

qualified from holding legislative office for the term of office

that both follows the November 2024 election and comple-

tion of the senator’s current term of office—that is, the term

beginning in January 2025.

The text of the amendment does not unambiguously

support either interpretation. The text would more clearly

support petitioners’ reading—and weaken the secretary’s

reading—if it referred to “the term following the election

[that occurs] after the member’s current term is completed.”

Without those bracketed words, the intended interplay

among the distinct phrases in the amendment is less imme-

diately apparent, and the secretary’s reading gains plausi-

bility. Still, petitioners are not wrong to argue that their

proposed reading is supported by certain interpretative

principles. Namely, it conforms with two canons of construc-

tion: the rule against surplusage, which provides that we

interpret a provision’s text to give effect to every word and

avoid redundancy, State v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or 745, 755,

359 P3d 232 (2015); and the doctrine of the last antecedent,

which provides that “ ‘[r]eferential and qualifying words and

phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely

to the last antecedent,’ ” State v. Webb, 324 Or 380, 386, 927

P2d 79 (1996) (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland

Statutory Construction § 47.33 at 270 (5th ed 1992)); see also

AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto Source, 363 Or at 418 (explain-

ing that, when examining constitutional text, “we apply

rules of construction that bear directly on the provision’s

interpretation”).

Under the secretary’s interpretation, the amend-

ment to Article IV, section 15, would contain a redundancy,

because the amendment would have the same legal effect

even if the words “following the election” were deleted from

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 13

the text—it would disqualify the “Senator or Representative

for the term * * * after the member’s current term is com-

pleted.” The secretary contends that the redundancy high-

lights a fact that might otherwise not be apparent to the

voters—that a legislator’s disqualification takes effect only

after the election to replace them has occurred and not

before the newly elected person can take office.

The secretary’s interpretation also creates tension

with the doctrine of the last antecedent because it does not

treat the modifying phrase “after the member’s current term

is completed” as modifying the words immediately preced-

ing it, “the election.” Instead, the secretary reads the phrase

“after the member’s current term is completed” as modify-

ing the words “the term.” The secretary acknowledges that

her interpretation would be clearer if a comma separated

the phrases “following the election” and “after the member’s

current term is completed.” Petitioners’ interpretation does

not present a similar difficulty.

Canons of construction, however, are merely guide-

lines for interpreting text that, in any given case, may give

way to contrary evidence of intent. See State v. Lane, 357

Or 619, 629, 355 P3d 914 (2015) (describing canons of con-

struction as “mere assumptions that always give way to

more direct evidence of legislative intent”); see also State

v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 97, 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (“[T]he fact

that a proposed interpretation of a statute creates some

measure of redundancy is not, by itself, necessarily fatal.

Redundancy in communication is a fact of life and of law.”);

Thomas Creek Lumber and Log Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 344 Or

131, 138, 178 P3d 217 (2008) (adopting interpretation of a

tax statute that made “some words * * * redundant,” not-

ing that “nothing prohibits the legislature from saying the

same thing twice”); Johnson v. Craddock et al, 228 Or 308,

316, 365 P2d 89 (1961) (stating that the “doctrine of the last

antecedent is not inflexible and is never applied when a fur-

ther extension is clearly required by the intent and meaning

of the context or when to apply a grammatical rule literally

would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result, defeating

the legislative purpose”).

14 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

For example, both the rule against surplusage and

the doctrine of the last antecedent gave way to ballot mea-

sure history in Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 305 Or

472, 753 P2d 939 (1988). In that case, we were required to

interpret a referred constitutional amendment that pro-

vided the governor with the authority to veto “any provision

in new bills declaring an emergency.” Or Const, Art V, § 15a.

The defendants interpreted the amendment broadly to

mean that, in new bills that contained a provision declaring

an emergency, the governor could veto any provision within

the bill, not only the provision declaring an emergency. The

plaintiffs, by contrast, interpreted the amendment narrowly

to mean that the governor could veto only the provision that

declared an emergency in a new bill. In support of their

interpretation, the plaintiffs argued that the word “provi-

sion” was modified by both “in new bills” and “declaring an

emergency.” 305 Or at 485. The defendants countered that

the plaintiffs’ interpretation created a redundancy because

the phrase “in new bills” would have no legal effect—all bills

presented to the governor are new bills. Id. The defendants

further pointed out that their interpretation conformed with

the doctrine of the last antecedent, under which the word

“provision” was modified only by “in new bills,” and the word

“bills” was modified by “declaring an emergency.” Id. The

defendants, therefore, argued that their interpretation rep-

resented the unambiguous meaning of the amendment.

We concluded that the amendment was “not as

unambiguous as defendants claim.” Id. Ultimately, we

held that the canons of construction must yield to the voter

understanding demonstrated by the ballot measure his-

tory, including material in the voters’ pamphlet, which

supported the plaintiffs’ interpretation. See id. at 486

(“Contemporaneous materials widely available to the voters

in 1921, particularly the explanation by a committee of leg-

islators in the official Voters’ Pamphlet, leave no doubt that

the amendment to Article V, section 15a, was intended to

authorize the Governor to veto a declaration of emergency

in a bill so as to protect the opportunity of voters to petition

for a referendum.”).

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 15

In this case, as the court did in Lipscomb, the sec-

retary relies on the ballot measure history—in particular,

the ballot title and explanatory statement—to determine

how the voters would have understood the words used in the

amendment to Article IV, section 15. As noted above, the bal-

lot title caption and the result statements were printed on

every ballot.9 The ballot title caption expressly stated that a

legislator with too many unexcused absences would be “dis-

qualified from holding next term of office.” The “yes” result

statement characterized the amendment as disqualifying a

legislator for the “term following current term of office.” The

voters’ pamphlet contained both those statements as well

as the ballot title summary, which stated that the disqual-

ification would apply to “the term following the end of the

legislator’s current term.” Official Voters’ Pamphlet at 65.

Also contained in the voters’ pamphlet was the explanatory

statement, which stated that the disqualification would pro-

hibit “the legislator from holding office after the legislator’s

current term ends.” Id. at 66.

Petitioners acknowledge that the ballot measure

history materials uniformly support the secretary’s inter-

pretation. No statements that appeared on the ballot or in

the voters’ pamphlet support petitioners’ interpretation. And

the parties have not identified any media accounts prior to

the election suggesting that anyone understood the amend-

ment to allow a legislator to serve one more term before the

disqualification would take effect. Nevertheless, petitioners

contend that we must disregard the ballot measure history

materials that contradict their proposed interpretation

because, according to petitioners, the text of the amendment

is capable of only one meaning—as disqualifying a legisla-

tor from holding office for the term after the next term.

If petitioners were correct that the text is capable

of supporting only one meaning, then no ballot measure his-

tory could justify a different meaning. Cf. State v. Gaines,

346 Or 160, 173, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (“When the text of

a statute is truly capable of having only one meaning, no

9

See Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551, 575,

871 P2d 106 (1994) (Fadeley, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of the

ballot title and results statements because they “are printed on the ballot used by

every person who voted to adopt the initiative amendment”).

16 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

weight can be given to legislative history that suggests—or

even confirms—that legislators intended something differ-

ent.”). But we disagree with petitioners’ assertion that the

amendment in this case is capable of only one meaning. See

generally Lipscomb, 305 Or at 485 (“[C]ourts rarely see dis-

putes over interpretation when the opposing party cannot

show a possible alternative reading of the words, which it

claims to be correct in context.”).

While petitioners’ interpretation of the text may be

the more grammatical reading, the text is capable of sup-

porting the secretary’s interpretation. The amendment at

issue is a complex sentence. The parties’ competing inter-

pretations depend on how they understand the relation-

ship between three phrases within the amendment: (1) “the

term”; (2) “following the election”; and (3) “after the member’s

current term is completed.” Or Const, Art IV, § 15. Those

phrases have no single necessary relationship between

them. As explained above, if the sentence had contained

the additional phrase “that occurs” immediately after “the

election,” petitioners’ reading would be more compelling.

Without that or a similar phrase, the intended meaning of

the sentence is more uncertain. The words “the term” may

be modified by both the phrase “following the election” and

the phrase “after the member’s current term is completed,”

as the secretary argues. That is the same construction that

this court applied in Lipscomb, concluding that one word

was modified separately by the two phrases that followed it.

See 305 Or at 485 (holding that “provision” was modified by

both “in new bills” and “declaring an emergency”). Applying

that construction here treats the two phrases—“following

the election” and “after the member’s current term is com-

pleted”—as emphasizing two different facts about the dis-

qualification: that voters would retain the right to choose

the person who would serve during the next term of office

and that the disqualified legislator would be allowed to

serve the remainder of the current term of office.

If we were required to choose between petitioners’

and the secretary’s interpretations based on the text alone,

petitioners would have a strong argument that their read-

ing is the better one. But we do not review the text in a

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 17

void. We instead seek to understand how voters would have

understood the text in the light of the other materials that

accompanied it. And those other materials expressly and

uniformly informed voters that the amendment would apply

to a legislator’s immediate next terms of office, indicating

that the voters so understood and intended that meaning.

In arguing against that conclusion, petitioners con-

tend that the ballot measure history materials are categor-

ically insufficient to overcome what they regard as the more

natural way to read the amendment’s text. Petitioners sup-

port that argument by relying on statements that this court

made in Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Frank, 293 Or 374,

648 P2d 1284 (1982). There, the court was asked to inter-

pret a constitutional amendment that had been referred by

the legislature and adopted by the voters through a ballot

measure. The amendment dedicated the revenue from cer-

tain taxes to the Common School Fund. Id. at 378. Applying

that ballot measure as it was drafted, however, would have

disrupted funding for the Department of Energy, which was

evidently not an effect that the legislature had considered

or intended when it drafted the measure. Id. The court was

asked to apply the ballot measure in a manner that would

avoid that unintended consequence compelled by the text of

the measure. In rejecting that argument, the court stated:

“There is no reliable record of what the voters intended

beyond the language of the amendment itself. There are no

official committees, no minutes, no formal debates. Given

the fact that it is the electorate, the ultimate sovereign,

which has adopted the amendment to our Constitution, we

are slow to go beyond the face of the enacted language into

materials not presented to the public at large.”

Id. at 381. Petitioners rely on those statements to argue that

ballot measure history is entitled to little weight in inter-

preting constitutional amendments adopted by the voters.

We disagree with petitioners’ reading of Northwest

Natural Gas. As an initial matter, the court’s statements

in that case must be understood in the context of that case.

The court was rejecting a specific argument based on the

specific ballot measure history offered in that case—namely,

that the legislators who had drafted the measure had not

18 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

considered the legal effect of the text that they chose. When

the court referred to “materials not presented to the public

at large,” the court was referring to materials from legisla-

tive proceedings demonstrating that legislators never con-

sidered how the amendment would affect the Department of

Energy’s funding. Id. at 381.

Further, in Lipscomb, this court expressly rejected

reading Northwest Natural Gas as imposing broad meth-

odological constraints on our constitutional interpretation,

noting that Northwest Natural Gas does not confine us “to

historically blind exegesis” of constitutional text and that

questions of constitutional interpretation “cannot be decided

simply by parsing the words of the amendment.” 305 Or at

484-85. Reading Northwest Natural Gas as imposing such

constraints would be inconsistent with the court’s practice,

both before and after that decision, to routinely consider bal-

lot measure history, “to the extent that it appears useful to

our analysis.” AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto Source, 363 Or at 418;

see, e.g., Couey, 357 Or at 490 (discussing recent case law on

the role of ballot measure history); State ex rel. Chapman v.

Appling, 220 Or 41, 68, 348 P2d 759 (1960) (noting that the

court had “recognized in a number of cases that arguments

in the official Voters’ Pamphlet relative to measures submit-

ted to the people may be resorted to as an aid to construc-

tion” and collecting cases); Allen v. Multnomah County, 179

Or 548, 562, 173 P2d 475 (1946) (“As the amendment was

adopted by initiative, we turn to the 1912 Voter’s Pamphlet

as an aid to its interpretation.”); Turnidge v. Thompson, 89

Or 637, 175 P 281 (1918) (reviewing the ballot title prepared

by the Attorney General, noting that the ballot title “was

printed upon the ballots submitted to the electorate”).

Instead of making categorical judgments about

the role of ballot measure history in our analysis, we

assign weight based on the substance and probative qual-

ity of those materials. See generally Gaines, 346 Or at 172

(“[W]hether the court will conclude that the particular legis-

lative history on which a party relies is of assistance in deter-

mining legislative intent will depend on the substance and

probative quality of the legislative history itself.” (Emphasis

in original.)). Not all ballot measure history materials serve

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 19

the same role or are owed the same weight. See, e.g., State

v. Sagdal, 356 Or 639, 643, 343 P3d 226 (2015) (expressing

caution in relying too heavily on statements in the section

of voters’ pamphlet containing arguments from advocates).

The ballot measure history materials on which

the secretary relies in this case—namely, the ballot title

(including the caption, the “yes” result statement, and the

summary) and the explanatory statement—directly and

unequivocally address the question at issue, each stating

that the amendment would disqualify a legislator from hold-

ing office during the immediate next term of office. Further,

those materials were widely distributed to the voters. As

noted above, the ballot title caption and the result state-

ments are required to be printed on the ballots, ensuring

that they were visible to all voters. ORS 254.145(7); ORS

254.175(2). And the complete ballot title and the explana-

tory statement are included in the voters’ pamphlet that

is mailed to every household with a registered voter. OAR

165-022-0060(7).

Petitioners do not offer any ballot measure his-

tory materials that contradict those materials. Instead,

they argue that those materials do not reflect how the vot-

ers would have understood the amendment because those

materials neither were drafted by the voters nor purport

to record the thoughts of voters. But petitioners misunder-

stand the role of the ballot title and explanatory statement.

Those materials reflect voter understanding not because

they record that understanding, but because they inform

that understanding. For example, the purpose of the bal-

lot title “is to guide and inform the voters.” Richardson v.

Neuner, 183 Or 558, 562, 194 P2d 989 (1948). Similarly, the

explanatory statement is intended to be “an impartial, sim-

ple and understandable statement explaining the measure,”

ORS 251.215(1), drafted by a committee composed of mem-

bers who both support and oppose the ballot measure, ORS

251.205(3)-(5). Here, the explanatory statement reveals that

the drafting committee unanimously agreed to the construc-

tion of the amendment on which the secretary now relies.

Petitioners maintain, however, that we cannot

assume that voters read and understood the ballot title and

20 Knopp v. Griffin-Valade

explanatory statement. We disagree. We assume that vot-

ers have familiarized themselves with the issue that is pre-

sented on the ballot, just as we assume that legislators have

familiarized themselves with the bills on which they vote.

See Anthony et al. v. Veatch et al., 189 Or 462, 498, 220 P2d

493 (1950) (“On the whole, in view of the jealous regard of

the people for the initiative process and of the opportuni-

ties which exist for the voters to acquaint themselves with

the background and merits of a proposed initiative measure,

we are of the opinion that, in the construction of such mea-

sures, the courts should indulge the same presumption as to

the knowledge of historical facts on the part of the people,

as they indulge with reference to acts passed by the leg-

islature.”). The ballot title and explanatory statement are

materials accessible to all voters attempting to familiarize

themselves with a ballot measure.

Because the text is capable of supporting the sec-

retary’s interpretation, and considering the clear import of

the ballot title and explanatory statement in this case, we

agree with the secretary that voters would have understood

the amendment to mean that a legislator with 10 or more

unexcused absences during a legislative session would be

disqualified from holding legislative office during the imme-

diate next term, rather than the term after that. Petitioners’

contrary interpretation fails to account for the ballot title

and explanatory statement, which expressly and repeatedly

described the disqualification as taking place during the

next term. Voters would have understood the meaning of

the amendment’s text in light of those materials. The uni-

formity of those materials, and their availability to voters,

persuades us that the voters would have understood the

amendment to disqualify legislators with too many unex-

cused absences from holding office during the next term of

office.

III. CONCLUSION

After considering the text and the ballot measure

history of the amendment to Article IV, section 15, that

voters approved in 2022, we conclude that the phrase “the

term following the election after the member’s current term

is completed” refers to the term immediately following the

Cite as 372 Or 1 (2024) 21

term in which a legislator accrued 10 or more unexcused

absences during a legislative session. That construction is

consistent with the secretary’s interpretation of the amend-

ment, as reflected in her temporary rules, ELECT 12-2023

and ELECT 16-2023.

The Secretary of State’s Temporary Rules ELECT

12-2023 and ELECT 16-2023 are upheld.