Opinion

James Eric McDonough v. Carlos Garcia

  • 90 F.4th 1080
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Filed
Jan 10, 2024
Status
Published
Nature of suit
NEW
Cited by
4 cases
Authority
More cited than 49.1%

explaining that if an official was acting within his discretionary authority, a plaintiff may still overcome qualified im- munity by establishing a violation of a clearly established right

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that if an official was acting within his discretionary authority, a plaintiff may still overcome qualified im- munity by establishing a violation of a clearly established right

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11421

____________________

JAMES ERIC MCDONOUGH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CARLOS GARCIA,

GARLAND WRIGHT,

individually,

CITY OF HOMESTEAD,

a political subdivision of the State of Florida,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-21986-FAM

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

James McDonough, a self-styled citizen activist, was

escorted out of a city council meeting in Homestead, Florida after

he verbally attacked one of the council’s members. That removal,

which the parties now agree was legal, was followed by a series of

events that do not benefit from a similar posture of détente—an

arrest for disorderly conduct, an indefinite ban from city hall, and

an arrest for cyberstalking.

This lawsuit challenges all three. McDonough first says the

City and its officials violated the First Amendment by banning him

from future meetings. Before we can consider that argument, we

need to know what kind of public forum those meetings are,

because the City’s ability to restrict McDonough’s speech depends

almost entirely on the answer to that question. But that inquiry

highlights an unresolved tension in our Circuit’s First Amendment

jurisprudence. While the Supreme Court’s public forum

framework has evolved substantially over the last forty years, our

precedents have failed to keep pace.

It seems likely that the Supreme Court would treat the

Homestead City Council meeting as a limited public forum. That

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22-11421 Opinion of the Court 3

Court, however, has not specifically considered city council

meetings—and this one has. Our earliest panel precedent treats a

city council meeting reserved for the discussion of limited subjects

as a designated public forum, so the comparatively tougher

standards for analyzing speech restrictions in that kind of forum

must apply here. Following those standards, we reverse the district

court’s grant of summary judgment for the City on the speech ban.

But we affirm the district court’s summary judgment decision

finding qualified immunity for the officer who enforced the City’s

ban.

Moving on to the false-arrest counts, McDonough first

argues that he should not have been arrested for disorderly conduct

after he was removed from City Hall—even accepting as true the

officers’ claims that he was grabbing his crotch and loudly cursing

at them. Here, we agree. Our precedents show that yelling,

cursing, and making obscene gestures toward police officers,

without more, does not amount to probable cause for a disorderly

conduct arrest. The arresting officers should have known this too,

so we deny qualified immunity.

McDonough also argues that the City did not have probable

cause to arrest him for cyberstalking. This time we disagree.

Though it is a close question, it was not unreasonable for the City

to interpret Florida’s cyberstalking statute as barring McDonough

from targeting one of its officers with his series of posts. That

means the City did have probable cause to arrest him for

cyberstalking. We thus affirm in part and reverse in part.

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

I.

Homestead, Florida holds monthly city council meetings at

its City Hall. During the comment portion of these meetings,

members of the public are invited to speak for three minutes at a

time on any matters “pertinent to the City.” James McDonough

was a regular, attending and speaking at more than half of the

meetings held between 2015 and 2017. But it did not always go

smoothly; the City had stopped him from completing his remarks

several times.

Things came to a head during the July 2016 meeting.

McDonough rose to address the council, and spoke for about two-

and-a-half minutes without incident. He touched on various

subjects, including alleged police misconduct, body cameras, and

claims of nepotism within the police department. But toward the

end of his allotted time, things took a turn for the worse.

McDonough loudly confronted a city councilman, launching a

personal challenge: “The last point I’d like to hit off with is, Mr.

Maldonado, you know I’d appreciate it if you got something to say

to me, you can come say it in my face, and you don’t have to talk

about me behind my back in public to other people.” Sergeant

Garland Wright, who later testified that he took these comments

as a threat, quickly approached the podium and ordered

McDonough to leave. He characterized his action as a de-

escalatory tactic.

McDonough complied—at least with the instruction to

leave. As he walked out of the auditorium, he threatened to “su[e]

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22-11421 Opinion of the Court 5

the shit” out of Wright, and then annotated his departure with a

description of Homestead police that was laced with curse words.

Meanwhile, the city council meeting continued without further

disruption.

A month later, McDonough was back; he planned to attend

the August city council meeting. But as soon as he arrived,

Sergeant Wright intercepted him. He informed McDonough that

the City had issued a trespass order, which amounted to a blanket

ban from the premises—including during city council meetings.

When McDonough asked how he could get the ban lifted, Sergeant

Wright told him to “write a letter.”

So far the exchange had been cordial, but as McDonough

walked away he flipped his middle finger and said, “I’m leaving

buddy, bye-bye.” What happened next is debated. Wright claims

he observed McDonough stop, grab his crotch, and say “fuck you.”

For his part, McDonough denies cursing or grabbing his crotch,

though he admitted it was “possible” that Wright could have

mistaken his taking his phone out for the more vulgar gesture. 1

Either way, the handful of other bystanders in the parking lot at the

time seemed unconcerned about the interaction.

Sergeant Wright, however, did not take McDonough’s

response lightly—he ordered him to stop and then arrested him for

1 Because McDonough admits that Wright could have believed he saw him

grabbing his crotch, we assume for this opinion that it happened. Even so, we

note that the videos do not show McDonough doing anything resembling a

crotch grab during this encounter.

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

disorderly conduct. Sergeant Carlos Garcia arrived on the scene

later. After speaking with the arresting officers and reviewing

surveillance video of the incident, Garcia informed McDonough

that he was also under arrest for trespassing. Sergeant Garcia

prepared McDonough’s arrest form, charging him with both

crimes. Officers then took McDonough to the police station,

where he was held overnight before being released on bond the

next day.

After his release, McDonough decided to hash out his

frustrations online. Over the course of about fifteen minutes, he

made three posts on a law-enforcement blog referencing his

August arrest, identifying by name one of the officers involved. He

also posted a link to a public YouTube video featuring that officer’s

public comments against body cameras. McDonough then

challenged the same officer to wear a body camera, calling him a

“frigging coward,” a “slipttail [sic],” and a “giant twat.” He warned

that “any further retaliation” would be dealt with “swiftly, harsly

[sic], and lawfully.” McDonough closed by emphasizing that he

would “be blasting [the officer’s] address.”

These blog posts did not sit well with the targeted officer,

who later testified that he feared for his own safety and his family’s.

The City again arrested McDonough, this time for cyberstalking

and witness tampering. After a Miami-Dade Criminal Court judge

agreed that probable cause supported the cyberstalking charge (but

not the witness tampering one), McDonough bonded out.

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The state attorney eventually dropped all criminal charges

against McDonough. But that was not the end of the matter—once

the state criminal case was over, this federal civil case began.

McDonough sued the City of Homestead and four police officers

involved in his arrests. After the district court dismissed claims

against two of the officers, the lawsuit proceeded to summary

judgment on the seven remaining counts. Count 1 alleged that

Sergeant Wright violated McDonough’s First Amendment rights

when he removed him from the July city council meeting. Counts

2 and 3 alleged that the City and Wright, respectively, violated

McDonough’s First Amendment rights when Wright issued the

August trespass order barring McDonough from future meetings.

Count 4 alleged false arrest by the City when Wright and Sergeant

Garcia arrested McDonough for disorderly conduct; Counts 5 and

6 alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment by Wright and

Garcia, respectively, for the same. Finally, Count 7 alleged false

arrest by the City for the September cyberstalking arrest. The

district court found for the defendants on all counts.

McDonough has abandoned Count 1, but appeals the

district court’s rulings against Counts 2 through 7.

II.

We review a district court’s order granting summary

judgment de novo. Brown v. Nexus Bus. Sols., LLC, 29 F.4th 1315,

1317 (11th Cir. 2022). “We view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, and we draw all justifiable

inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. at 1317–18 (quotation

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

omitted). “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 1317 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

III.

The first issue we consider is whether the City violated

McDonough’s First Amendment rights when it barred him from

attending city council meetings. We have long understood the

commonsense point that the Constitution does not require the

government to “grant access to all who wish to exercise their right

to free speech,” no matter the setting, “without regard to the

nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by

the speaker’s activities.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.

Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799–800 (1985). Disallowing any limits

whatsoever in all government spaces would often lead to chaos,

and could even keep the government from fulfilling its lawful

functions. But that is not a license to evade the First Amendment,

which demands a close look when the government restricts speech.

Enter forum analysis, which considers “when the Government’s

interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose

outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for

other purposes.” Id. at 800.

The government’s ability to impose restrictions on speech

varies depending on the nature of the forum. See Keister v. Bell, 29

F.4th 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc.

Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). So what type of forum are

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the city council meetings here, and what is the proper legal test for

the City’s speech restrictions? These questions seem

straightforward. But they are not—at least not here and not now.

The histories of First Amendment public forum doctrines here and

in the Supreme Court are jagged, and they lead us to the somewhat

uncomfortable conclusion that in this Circuit a city council

meeting like the one McDonough wished to attend is a designated

public forum.

We call that conclusion uncomfortable because if we were

starting from scratch it might be more appropriate to define city

council meetings as limited public forums, where regulations

survive so long as they are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. But

our Court’s earliest relevant precedent held that a city council

meeting just like the one here was a designated public forum,

which means the government’s authority to limit speech is itself

quite limited. Because that same holding was reaffirmed after

Supreme Court precedents that pointed to—but did not demand—

a different answer, we are bound by it here.

A.

The Supreme Court first outlined public forum doctrine in

Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association.

Synthesizing several decades’ worth of First Amendment

jurisprudence, the Court set out three categories and explained that

the government’s ability to restrict expressive activity would be

different in each one. 460 U.S. at 45–46.

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The first was the traditional public forum—places that “have

immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time

out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,

communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public

questions.” Id. at 45 (quotation omitted). The quintessential

examples are streets and parks. Id. Unsurprisingly, in this kind of

forum the government’s ability to restrict speech is highly

constrained. Regulations that depend on the content of speech

need to satisfy strict scrutiny, which means they must be “necessary

to serve a compelling state interest” and “narrowly drawn to

achieve that end.” Id. As for content-neutral “time, place, and

manner” regulations—when, where, and how speech can happen,

regardless of the speaker’s message—the standard is somewhat

looser. Even so, such rules must be “narrowly tailored to serve a

significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative

channels of communication.” Id. 2

Next was the designated public forum, or “public property

which the State has opened for use by the public as a place for

expressive activity.” Id. Examples given by Perry include

2 Those two standards, though similarly worded, are different. For a time,

place, and manner restriction to be “narrowly tailored,” it “need not be the

least restrictive or least intrusive means of” serving “the government’s

legitimate, content-neutral interests.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.

781, 798 (1989). Instead, “narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the regulation

promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less

effectively absent the regulation” and it does not “burden substantially more

speech than is necessary to further” that interest. Id. at 799 (alteration adopted

and quotation omitted).

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“university meeting facilities,” “school board meeting[s],” and

“municipal theater[s].” Id. at 45–46. These forums and others like

them need not be held open indefinitely for public speech, the

Supreme Court said, but when the government does choose to

open a designated public forum, it is bound to respect the same

First Amendment standards that applied in traditional public

forums. Id. at 46.

The third and final category described in Perry was the

nonpublic forum. This type of forum is, as the name suggests, not

really a public forum at all, and includes government property that

“is not by tradition or designation a forum for public

communication.” Id. The First Amendment, after all, “does not

guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or

controlled by the government.” Id. (quotation omitted). The

internal school mail facility at issue in Perry was one such nonpublic

forum; other examples are mailboxes, military bases, and jails. Id.;

see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S.

114, 128–29 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); Adderley

v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966). For these, the Court said, the

state can impose “reasonable” regulations on speech in order to

“reserve the forum for its intended purposes,” but only if those

restrictions are viewpoint neutral. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.

The Supreme Court followed this tripartite framework

without interruption for about a decade, until Rosenberger v. Rector

& Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). There, the

Supreme Court made an important shift—though without saying

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so—setting out a fourth category, the limited public forum. Perry

had not recognized a separate category of “limited public forums.”

But it did use that term to describe a subset of designated public

forums, those “created for a limited purpose such as use by certain

groups, or for the discussion of certain subjects.” Perry, 460 U.S. at

46 n.7 (citations omitted). To underscore the overlap, Perry

recycled two of its examples of designated public forums as also

being limited public forums: university meeting facilities and

school board meetings. See id. And for these meetings, the

government needed to respect the same First Amendment

boundaries as in other designated public forums. See id. at 45–46,

46 n.7.

But in Rosenberger, the Court moved limited public forums

into the nonpublic forum bucket. Rosenberger explained that in a

“limited public forum”—one created “for certain groups or for the

discussion of certain topics”—the government could enforce

speech restrictions that were “reasonable in light of the purpose

served by the forum” and did not discriminate on the basis of

viewpoint. 515 U.S. at 829 (quotation omitted). This was the same

test it had offered before for nonpublic forums. See Perry, 460 U.S.

at 46.

Rosenberger cited two post-Perry cases to support this point.

See 515 U.S. at 829 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788; and Lamb’s Chapel

v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)). But both

of them had outlined the same three-part forum analysis as Perry—

including a recognition that the stricter standard associated with

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traditional public forums applied when the government designated

a forum for open public expression. 3 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800;

Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390–93. Cornelius, like Perry, identified

school board meetings and municipal auditoriums as examples of

designated public forums. 4 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803. It reiterated

that the reasonable-and-viewpoint-neutral test applied for

“nonpublic forum[s].” See id. at 806. Lamb’s Chapel, for its part,

simply quoted Cornelius for the same rule. 508 U.S. at 392–93.

Neither established a new category of “limited public forums.”

Rosenberger thus represented a break from Perry and its

progeny. Where Perry described limited public forums as a subset

of designated public forums, Rosenberger said the test applied in

limited public forums was the same as the test used in nonpublic

forums. So what probably read as a minor conceptual shift—after

all, these categories are often based on a matter of degree—turned

out to have major implications for the analysis courts use and the

standards we set.

This doctrinal change came with its own growing pains. Just

three years later, the Court appeared to walk back Rosenberger’s

3 Same with International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, which

repeated Perry’s three-part framework but was uncited in Rosenberger. See 505

U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992).

4 The Cornelius dissent, for what it is worth, explicitly used the term “limited

public form” as a synonym for designated public forum, and there is no sign

that the majority disagreed with that characterization. See Cornelius, 473 U.S.

at 813 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 48).

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14 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

creation of the limited public forum. In Arkansas Educational

Television Commission v. Forbes, the Court briefly returned to Perry’s

three categories: traditional public forum, designated public forum,

and nonpublic forum. 523 U.S. 666, 677–78 (1998). The Forbes

Court described a forum open only to “a particular class of

speakers” as a type of designated public forum—consistent with

Perry but contrary to Rosenberger, which called a forum reserved

“for certain groups” a limited public forum. Id. at 678; see Perry, 460

U.S. at 45–46, 46 n.7; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.

But in 2001, Good News Club v. Milford Central School

cemented Rosenberger’s change. 533 U.S. 98. The Supreme Court

reaffirmed Rosenberger’s shift, applying the reasonable-and-

viewpoint-neutral standard to restrictions in a limited public

forum. See id. at 106–07. The Court maintained its earlier standard

for restrictions on speech in traditional or “open” (an apparent

synonym for designated) public forums, describing those

categories as “subject to stricter scrutiny than are restrictions in a

limited public forum.” Id. at 106. So Perry’s early characterization

of limited public forums as a specific subset of designated public

forum was dead and gone—at least at the Supreme Court.

The characterization of the limited public forum as a

category distinct from the designated public forum remains in force

at the Supreme Court. So does the application of the reasonable-

and-viewpoint-neutral standard to restrictions on speech within

that kind of forum. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S.

460, 470 (2009); Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal.,

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Hastings Coll. of the L. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010). And in

Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the Court

set out the limited public forum as a category independent from

both designated public forums and nonpublic forums. See 576 U.S.

200, 215–16 (2015). That leaves, for today, four kinds of forums

recognized by the Supreme Court: the traditional public forum, the

designated public forum, the limited public forum, and the

nonpublic forum. 5

B.

This Circuit’s public forum doctrine has also evolved—just

not always in tandem with the Supreme Court’s. In 1989 we

deemed a city commission meeting, which was open for public

comment on agenda items, a designated public forum. Jones v.

Heyman, 888 F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1989). Consistent with

Perry, we held that content-based restrictions were subject to strict

5 The Supreme Court has also said at times that there are only three, using the

categories of “limited public forum” and “nonpublic forum” interchangeably.

See Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 (recognizing traditional public

forums, designated public forums, and limited public forums); Minnesota Voters

All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (recognizing traditional public

forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums); see also Am. Freedom

Def. Initiative v. King Cnty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting

from denial of certiorari) (noting that a “limited public forum” is “also called

a nonpublic forum”). Perhaps it is irrelevant if the same test is applied to

speech restrictions in either setting. But in any event, whether “the limited

public forum” and the nonpublic forum are “distinct type[s] or merely a

variant of one” another “is not important to our analysis.” Cambridge Christian

Sch., Inc. v. Florida High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 942 F.3d 1215, 1237 n.5 (11th Cir.

2019).

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scrutiny in this designated public forum, while content-neutral,

time, place, and manner restrictions needed to be “narrowly drawn

to achieve a significant governmental interest” and “allow

communication through other channels.” Id. So far so good.

Four years later, we correctly read Perry to say that one “kind

of designated public forum is the limited public forum.” Crowder v.

Hous. Auth. of Atlanta, 990 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1993). We went

on to hold that an auditorium in a public housing unit “was a

limited public forum” because it was open for a wide range of

activities. Id. All remained well because at that time both this

Court and the Supreme Court considered limited public forums a

type of designated public forum, subject to the same test. We

struck down the regulations limiting the auditorium’s use for Bible

studies. See id. at 592–93.

Trouble held off for a little over a decade. 6 In 2004, nine

years after Rosenberger made clear that restrictions in limited public

forums should be evaluated for reasonableness and viewpoint

neutrality (and three years after Good News Club did the same), this

Court held that city council meetings were limited public forums.

6 In 2003, sitting en banc, we explained that there were three forum categories:

traditional public forum, designated public forum, and nonpublic forum.

Atlanta J. & Const. v. City of Atlanta Dep’t of Aviation, 322 F.3d 1298, 1306 n.9

(11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). We wrote that strict scrutiny applied to content-

based restrictions in traditional and designated public forums, while the

reasonable-and-viewpoint-neutral test applied to restrictions in nonpublic

forums. Id. at 1306–07. We made no mention at all of the limited public

forum.

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Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Crowder, 990 F.2d at 591). No problem there. But Rowe applied the

designated forum test rather than the nonpublic forum test to this

allegedly limited forum, saying that content-neutral restrictions on

the time, place, and manner of speech “must be narrowly tailored

to serve a significant government interest.” Id. at 802–03

(quotation omitted). 7 This was consistent with Perry, as well as

Jones and Crowder, but not with the more recent Rosenberger and

Good News Club, which would have reviewed restrictions in a

limited public forum only for viewpoint neutrality and

reasonableness in light of the forum’s purpose. In other words, our

treatment of limited public forums diverged from that of the

Supreme Court.

By 2011, we had partially corrected course. In Bloedorn v.

Grube, a case about a non-student seeking to preach on a public

university’s campus, we articulated the difference between public,

designated, and limited forums and described the tests applicable

to each consistent with the Supreme Court’s latest explanation as

laid out in Good News Club, Pleasant Grove City, and Christian Legal

Society. See 631 F.3d 1218, 1225–26, 1230–32 (11th Cir. 2011). The

university’s sidewalks, pedestrian mall, and rotunda were limited

public forums because they were limited to use only by university

community members, while the Free Speech Area open to outside

7 Rowe did, we note, characterize the regulations that it approved as

“reasonable and viewpoint neutral” in its concluding paragraph, despite

having applied a different test in the analysis. Rowe, 358 F.3d at 804.

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speakers was a designated public forum. Id. at 1232–34. We

concluded that the university’s ban on outside speakers in the

limited public forums reserved for university members was a

reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction. See id. at 1235. And the

requirement that outside speakers seek a permit to access the Free

Speech Area was upheld as a content-neutral, time, place, and

manner restriction narrowly tailored to the university’s significant

interests in regulating competing uses of the space and maintaining

campus safety, leaving open ample alternative channels for speech.

See id. at 1236–42. That was all consistent with Good News Club.

The problem is that Bloedorn did not cite or explain away Rowe,

which came after Good News Club but still applied our earlier

approach for limited public forums, categorizing them with

designated public forums rather than nonpublic.

So, in the post-Good News Club era, this Court has had two

inconsistent but concurrent approaches to analyzing limited public

forums: Rowe, which requires content-neutral restrictions in a

limited public forum to be narrowly tailored to a significant

governmental interest (and implicitly requires strict scrutiny for

content-based restrictions), and Bloedorn, which reviews all

restrictions only for viewpoint-neutrality and reasonableness.

Compounding the confusion, Jones, our Circuit’s first case to

address forum analysis—and dealing with a city commission

meeting to boot—treated that meeting as a designated, rather than

a limited, public forum, and accordingly reviewed a content-

neutral decision for narrow tailoring to a significant governmental

interest. Jones, 888 F.2d at 1331. So, between Jones, Rowe, and

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Bloedorn, we have three combinations of labels and tests here: Jones,

a designated public forum with heightened scrutiny; Rowe, a

limited public forum with heightened scrutiny; and Bloedorn, a

limited public forum with reasonableness review. 8

C.

So where does that leave us? Both parties agree that the

trespass order here was content neutral. McDonough, citing to

Jones, argues that the Homestead city council meetings are a

designated, or even traditional, public forum. If so, the trespass

order would need to be narrowly tailored in service of a significant

governmental interest and leave open ample alternative channels

of communication. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46. McDonough argues

that this is the appropriate standard. For the City’s part, it prefers

Rowe’s characterization of the meetings as a limited public forum.

8 One more of our decisions merits mention. In Barrett v. Walker County School

District, we analyzed a restriction on the public’s access to the “public-

comment portions of” a school board’s meetings. 872 F.3d 1209, 1219 (11th

Cir. 2017). Barrett concluded, citing to Rowe, that the public-comment sessions

are limited public forums. Id. at 1225 (citing Rowe, 358 F.3d at 802). But while

Rowe would have required even content-neutral restrictions to meet narrow

tailoring in service of a significant governmental interest, Barrett required

content-based restrictions to be only “viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light

of the forum’s purpose.” Id. (footnote omitted); see Rowe, 358 F.3d at 802–03.

Moreover, Barrett never cited Jones—which called the public-comment period

of a city-council meeting a designated public forum—even though Jones was

directly on point. Perhaps that was because the parties had already agreed that

the public-comment portion of the school board meeting was a limited, not

designated, public forum. Barrett, 872 F.3d at 1224. But Barrett did not address,

and thus could not resolve, the conflict in our precedents.

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

Even so, the City declines to endorse any particular standard for

limited public forums, arguing that its actions did not violate the

law no matter which test we apply.

The parties’ uncertainty reflects the fact that our caselaw

does not offer an easy answer. Under the Supreme Court’s current

framework, because the city council’s meeting procedures limit the

public comment period to matters “pertinent to the City,” it would

appear that the city council meeting is a limited public forum. See

Walker, 576 U.S. at 215. In such a forum, the less exacting

reasonableness analysis should apply, whether for content-based or

content-neutral restrictions, so long as those restrictions are

viewpoint neutral. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07.

Jones, however, short-circuits our analysis. The city

commission meeting there, which we deemed a designated public

forum, was identical in all relevant respects to the one here,

including that the public was invited to a city facility to speak only

“on agenda items.” Jones, 888 F.2d at 1331. Given that it was a

designated public forum, we went on to apply the standards used

for that kind of forum—content-based restrictions were subject to

strict scrutiny, while content-neutral restrictions needed to be

narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and

leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Id.

The prior-panel precedent rule directs one course: it is “the

firmly established rule of this Circuit that each succeeding panel is

bound by the holding of the first panel to address an issue of law,

unless and until that holding is overruled en banc, or by the

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22-11421 Opinion of the Court 21

Supreme Court.” United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th

Cir. 1993). Yes, “a subsequent panel is not obligated to follow a

prior panel’s decision where an intervening Supreme Court

decision establishes that the prior panel decision is wrong.” Id. But

we cannot comfortably say that Jones and Crowder were abrogated

by the Supreme Court’s subsequent change in its treatment of

limited public forums, finalized in Good News Club.

For one thing, Rowe, a decision this Court issued after

Rosenberger and Good News Club, applied the stricter legal test of

Jones, rather than reasonableness review, to speech restrictions at a

city council meeting. Rowe, 358 F.3d at 802–03. And no

intervening Supreme Court precedents since Rowe explain the

subsequent shift in the tests this Circuit has applied either to limited

and designated public forums generally, or to speech restrictions in

city council meetings specifically. For another, Jones and Good News

Club agree on the test to be applied in a designated public forum—

strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions, narrow tailoring in

service of a significant governmental interest for content-neutral

restrictions—even if they might disagree on what types of

government-owned spaces fall under that label. Last but not least,

neither Good News Club nor Rosenberger dealt with a city council

meeting—unlike both Jones and Rowe.

That means all of our not-quite-reconcilable precedents are

not-quite-overruled. There is no way to chart a new path through

our caselaw consistent with all of our precedents unless we twist

“a case in such a way as to avoid the more troublesome prospect of

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22 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

dealing with the conflict of authority.” Hogan, 986 F.2d at 1369.

Because “we cannot distinguish the facts” of Jones, we are obligated

to apply it as “the precedent of the first panel to address the relevant

issue.” Devengoechea v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 889 F.3d 1213,

1227 (11th Cir. 2018).

D.

According to Jones, the city council meeting here is a

designated public forum, so we apply the standards relevant to

such a forum. We see no reason to upset the parties’ consensus

that the trespass order was content neutral, because we conclude

that the order fails even the test applied to content-neutral

restrictions in a designated public forum.

Jones held that the government has a significant interest “in

conducting orderly, efficient meetings of public bodies.” 888 F.2d

at 1332–33. Even assuming that the City’s trespass order pursued

this interest, it was not narrowly tailored to do so. Nor did it leave

open ample alternative means for McDonough to speak.

By its terms, the order indefinitely barred McDonough from

city hall, preventing him from attending all future city council

meetings. 9 Wright informed McDonough that his ability to return

9 McDonough at one point in his brief describes this order as a “prior restraint”

on his speech, a characterization that the City challenges. In support,

however, he cites only a Sixth Circuit case dealing with a citywide nighttime

noise ordinance. See Polaris Amphitheater Concerts, Inc. v. City of Westerville, 267

F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit found that the challenged

regulation was not a prior restraint because it was content neutral, narrowly

tailored, and did not vest any city officials with unbridled discretion—rejecting

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22-11421 Opinion of the Court 23

and speak depended on his writing a letter—unmentioned were to

whom the letter should be sent and what it should say. This

sweeping, indefinite ban on McDonough’s attendance is not

narrowly tailored—it “burden[s] substantially more” of

McDonough’s speech “than is necessary to further” the City’s

interest in avoiding disruption at its meetings. Ward, 491 U.S. at

799. The City was permitted to remove McDonough from the July

meeting after he behaved disruptively. See Jones, 888 F.2d at 1333–

34. It was not permitted, however, to ban him from all future

meetings, offering relief and readmission only if he “wrote a

letter”—an action described in such vague terms as to be

functionally meaningless.

Nor were the City’s proposed alternative channels for

contacting the city council—email, physical mail, and phone

calls—enough to preserve McDonough’s First Amendment rights.

Public city council meetings are just that—public. An attendee’s

interest in speaking may be as much to rally or inform other

members of the public as to address the council members

themselves. And it is certainly easier to hold the city council

accountable in a public forum rather than a private one. The City’s

trespass order against McDonough thus fails the scrutiny applicable

a challenge often brought in the permitting or licensing context. Id. at 509.

McDonough does not raise a similar substantive challenge in this appeal. In

any event, we need not decide what amounts to a labeling dispute because

prior restraint analysis already maps onto the tough standards that apply in

traditional and designated public forums.

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24 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

to content-neutral regulations for a designated public forum. 10 We

reverse the district court on Count 2.

IV.

Moving to McDonough’s other claims, Counts 4 and 7 are

state-law false arrest claims against the City of Homestead for his

August disorderly conduct arrest and his September cyberstalking

arrest. For these claims, “probable cause constitutes an absolute

bar.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998).

Probable cause exists when “a reasonable officer could conclude

that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.” Garcia v.

Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 2023) (alteration adopted and

quotation omitted).

A.

The first question is whether the officers had probable cause

to arrest McDonough for disorderly conduct. Florida law

criminalizes conduct that constitutes “a breach of the peace or

disorderly conduct.” Fla. Stat. § 877.03. But the Florida Supreme

Court has limited that law’s application to unprotected speech—

10 One issue related to the trespass order remains. The City argues that it

cannot be held liable under Section 1983 because the order did not represent

an official policy of the City. As the district court found, either Chief of

Homestead Police Alexander Rolle made the decision to bar McDonough

under the final policymaking authority vested in the police department by city

ordinance, or Chief Rolle had delegated this authority to Sergeant Wright,

who made the final call. Either way the City is liable under Section 1983

because a single decision by a final policymaker is sufficient for municipal

liability. Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 1989).

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22-11421 Opinion of the Court 25

words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite

an immediate breach of the peace.” State v. Saunders, 339 So. 2d

641, 644 (Fla. 1976) (alteration adopted and quotation omitted).

Neither of those things even came close to happening.

McDonough was arrested for swearing at Wright, flipping him the

bird, and allegedly grabbing his crotch in the presence of a handful

of peaceful onlookers, none of whom showed any reaction to his

outburst.

Our disorderly conduct precedents instruct that assessing

the existence of probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest is a

highly fact-intensive inquiry. But a few through lines in the

doctrine dictate the outcome here. To start, mere words of anger,

including profanity, directed at a police officer are not enough to

sustain a disorderly conduct arrest. See Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d

1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2020); Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442,

1446 (11th Cir. 1997). Nor are obscene gestures, whether alone or

combined with verbal antagonism. Raising one’s middle finger or

the equivalent is simply another way of saying “fuck you”—rude,

but not illegal. Davis v. Williams, 598 F.2d 916, 919 n.5 (5th Cir.

1979); 11 see Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1252, 1255 (6th Cir.

1997); Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990).

Finally, the presence of bystanders does not transform

otherwise lawful conduct and speech into incitement. As Florida

11 Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981

are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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26 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

courts have explained, “the mere fact that other people come

outside or stop to watch what is going on is insufficient to support

a conviction for disorderly conduct.” Barry v. State, 934 So. 2d 656,

659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Gonzales v. City of Belle Glade,

287 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1973)). Incitement requires more: “some

evidence that the crowd is actually responding to the defendant’s

words in some way that threatens to breach the peace.” Id.

McDonough’s actions may not have been a particularly

polite or respectful way to behave in public. But his behavior,

standing alone, does not provide probable cause for a disorderly

conduct arrest. We reverse the district court on Count 4.

B.

By contrast, at the time of McDonough’s second arrest, this

time for cyberstalking, the City did have probable cause to believe

that he had committed the crime. Cyberstalking is defined by Fla.

Stat. § 784.048(1)(d) as conduct communicating “words, images, or

language” to a particular person through email or other electronic

communication, “causing substantial emotional distress to that

person and serving no legitimate purpose.” The statute omits

“constitutionally protected activity such as picketing or other

organized protests” from its ambit. Id. § 784.048(1)(b). Here, the

City argues that McDonough’s three blog posts—which identified

and taunted a specific police officer, threatened to respond “swiftly

and harsly [sic]” to further perceived provocations, and promised

to “blast” the officer’s home address—were enough to arrest him

for cyberstalking.

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22-11421 Opinion of the Court 27

An officer has probable cause for an arrest where the

interpretation of an applicable criminal statute is “objectively

reasonable,” even if erroneous. United States v. Braddy, 11 F.4th

1298, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2021). And that standard falls well short

of what is required for a conviction. Though a close call, it was not

unreasonable for these officers to regard McDonough’s internet

posts as threats against the named officer.

“True threats are serious expressions conveying that a

speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence,” and they

have never been protected by the First Amendment. Counterman

v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 74 (2023) (alteration adopted and quotation

omitted). Disseminating a target’s address, in conjunction with

other evidence that the speaker intends harm to befall the target,

can amount to such a threat. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 720

F.3d 411, 418–25 (2d Cir. 2013) (posts of several judges’ photos and

work addresses on extremist-linked website, alongside text saying

the judges deserved to die, constituted true threats); cf. United States

v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1013–16 (7th Cir. 2012) (post on a white

supremacist website included a juror’s photo, home address, and

phone number); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc.

v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1071–80, 1085–86 (9th

Cir. 2002) (en banc) (wanted-style posters sharing targets’ photos

and addresses). Regardless of whether McDonough’s posts

actually qualified as true threats, it was not unreasonable for the

City’s officers to believe that they did. And we agree with the

district court’s conclusion that his posts—especially the promise to

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28 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

reveal the officer’s home address—could objectively inspire

substantial emotional distress in their target.

McDonough’s last and best argument against his

cyberstalking arrest is that three posts, made within fifteen

minutes, do not constitute a “course of conduct” under the

cyberstalking statute. The statute defines a “course of conduct” as

“a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of

time, however short,” and McDonough argues that his three posts

should count as only one act. Fla. Stat. § 784.048(1)(b).

Florida courts have considered a similar issue—but not until

four years after McDonough’s arrest. In Krapacs v. Bacchus, a

Florida appellate court found that tagging a target in repetitive

social media posts over the span of four hours constituted a single

act, rather than a series of acts. 301 So. 3d 976, 978–79 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 2020). By that standard, McDonough may be correct that

his three rapid-fire posts should be considered a single act rather

than a course of conduct. But whether probable cause exists

depends on “the facts and circumstances within” the arresting

officers’ knowledge “at the moment the arrest was made.” Beck v.

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). As of 2016, without the benefit of

Krapacs, we cannot say that the City’s view that McDonough’s

three separate posts constituted “a pattern of conduct composed of

a series of acts over a period of time, however short,” was objectively

unreasonable. Fla. Stat. § 784.048(1)(b) (emphasis added). We

affirm the district court on Count 7.

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22-11421 Opinion of the Court 29

V.

We now turn to the individual claims against the officers

involved in McDonough’s arrests. Count 3 alleges that Wright

violated McDonough’s First Amendment rights by issuing the

trespass order barring McDonough from future city council

meetings. Counts 5 and 6 allege that Wright and Garcia

respectively violated McDonough’s Fourth Amendment rights by

falsely arresting him for disorderly conduct without probable

cause. The district court granted summary judgment against

McDonough on the basis of qualified immunity on all three counts.

We affirm on Count 3 but reverse on Counts 5 and 6.

“Qualified immunity offers protection for government

officials, acting within their discretionary authority, who are sued

in their individual capacities as long as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Collier v.

Dickinson, 477 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th Cir. 2007) (footnote and

quotation omitted). Once the official has established that he was

acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to show that there was a violation of a

constitutional right and that the right at issue was clearly

established when the violation occurred. Gilmore v. Hodges, 738

F.3d 266, 272 (11th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiffs can make that showing in one of three ways. First,

they can point to a materially similar decision, whether from the

Supreme Court, this Court, or the supreme court of the state in

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30 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

which the case arose. Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920 (11th Cir.

2022). Second, they can show that a “broader, clearly established

principle should control the novel facts of the case.” Id. (quotation

omitted). Third, they can convince us—though this happens only

rarely—that the alleged conduct “so obviously violates the

constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Id. (alteration

adopted and quotation omitted). Under the second and third

methods, we look for obvious clarity: “a principle or provision so

clear that, even without specific guidance from a decision involving

materially similar facts, the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is

apparent.” Id.

A.

First, we consider whether Sergeant Wright was shielded by

qualified immunity when he barred McDonough from city hall.

Whatever else you could say about our earlier excavation of this

Circuit’s public forum precedents, it would be impossible to assert

that any of it was “clearly established.” We thus affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to Wright on Count 3—

McDonough’s First Amendment claim—on the basis of qualified

immunity.

B.

The answer looks different for the claims against the officers

responsible for McDonough’s disorderly conduct arrests. For

qualified immunity, “an officer need not have actual probable

cause, but only ‘arguable’ probable cause.” Brown v. City of

Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). Officers can show

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22-11421 Opinion of the Court 31

that arguable probable cause exists when “a reasonable officer,

looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could

have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests.” Garcia, 75 F.4th

at 1186 (quotation omitted). The “arguable probable cause inquiry

in a false arrest case is no different from the clearly established law

inquiry.” Id. at 1187.

Here, however, even that standard is not met. First,

Sergeant Wright’s arrest of McDonough for disorderly conduct

was based on cursing, flipping the bird, and crotch-grabbing.

Eleventh Circuit caselaw has long established that directing

profane language toward police officers, whether or not in the

presence of witnesses, does not constitute disorderly conduct.

Alston, 954 F.3d at 1319; Gold, 121 F.3d at 1446.

What’s more, expression remains protected by the First

Amendment whether communicated through words or their

physical equivalent. Davis, 598 F.2d at 919 n.5. That goes for

raising the middle finger as well as other profane gestures like

grabbing one’s crotch. See id. Based on this Circuit’s precedent,

any reasonable officer would know that raising the middle finger is

speech protected by the First Amendment.

Finally, as explained above, Florida law has clearly

established that the mere presence of bystanders is not enough to

provide probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest without

evidence that the actions “were more than annoying to those

around them.” Gonzales, 287 So. 2d at 670; see Barry, 934 So. 2d at

659. So the fact that there were bystanders does not rescue

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32 Opinion of the Court 22-11421

Wright’s qualified immunity claim. For all these reasons, Wright

did not have even arguable probable cause to arrest McDonough

for disorderly conduct.

For his part, Garcia objects to being lumped in with Wright.

After all, he says, he arrived on the scene only after McDonough

had already been arrested. It’s true—an officer who participates in

an arrest but lacks “the requisite information to put him on notice

that an unlawful arrest was occurring or had occurred” cannot be

held secondarily liable. Wilkerson v. Seymour, 736 F.3d 974, 980

(11th Cir. 2013). The problem for Garcia is that he was not a bit

player. He authored McDonough’s arrest report, attesting that he

had “just and reasonable grounds to believe and does believe” that

McDonough had committed the crime of disorderly conduct. To

support the charge, he wrote that McDonough “grabbed his

genitals,” “raised his right middle finger” and “yelled, ‘fuck you’!”

And the basis for Garcia’s knowledge? He spoke to Wright and

personally reviewed the City’s surveillance tapes, which captured

the incident (and show, to be candid, even less of a ground for

arrest than Wright’s already insufficient description of the events).

In other words, Garcia’s understanding of McDonough’s

conduct was identical to Wright’s. If Wright should have known

that there was no probable cause to arrest McDonough, the same

goes for Garcia. But Garcia nevertheless participated in the arrest

and wrote the report while “fully aware” that the basis for the

arrest was insufficient. See Wilkerson, 736 F.3d at 980. We thus

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22-11421 Opinion of the Court 33

reverse the district court’s qualified immunity dismissal on Counts

5 and 6.

* * *

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to the City on Count 7—the cyberstalking false arrest claim—and

to Wright on Count 3—the First Amendment claim. We reverse

the grant of summary judgment to the City on Counts 2 and 4, the

First Amendment and disorderly conduct false arrest claims,

respectively. We also reverse the grants of summary judgment to

Wright and Garcia on Counts 5 and 6, the Fourth Amendment

claims. Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN

PART.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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