Town of La Grange v. Cnty. of Lenoir

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-495

Filed 2 January 2024

Lenoir County, No. 22CVS756

TOWN OF LA GRANGE,

NORTH CAROLINA, Petitioner,

v.

COUNTY OF LENOIR,

NORTH CAROLINA, and

COPART OF CONNECTICUT, INC., Respondents.

Appeal by petitioner from order entered on 28 December 2022 by Judge Imelda

J. Pate in Lenoir County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 November

2023.

Cauley Pridgen, P.A., by Gabriel Du Sablon, James P. Cauley, III, and Emily

C. Cauley-Schulken, for petitioner-appellant.

Morningstar Law Group, by Keith P. Anthony and William J. Brian, Jr., for

respondent-appellee-Copart of Connecticut, Inc.

Sumrell Sugg, P.A., by David B. Baxter, Jr. and James H. Ferguson, III, for

respondent-appellee-County of Lenoir, North Carolina.

FLOOD, Judge.

The Town of La Grange (the “Town”) appeals from the trial court’s affirmation

of the Lenoir County Planning Board’s (the “Planning Board”) determination that

Copart of Connecticut Inc.’s (“Copart”) land was correctly classified as “Auction Sales”

TOWN OF LA GRANGE V. CNTY. OF LENOIR

Opinion of the Court

under Lenoir County’s (the “County”) Zoning Ordinance. For the reasons discussed

below, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

The pertinent facts of the case before us arise from a land use dispute between

the Town, Copart, and the County. The Town is situated within the County, and

Copart owns a 151-acre tract of land (the “Property”) that abuts the Town’s highest-

producing public water supply wellhead. The Property is not located within the

Town’s municipal limits. An existing junkyard is located across the street.

Copart is in the business of selling damaged and undamaged vehicles on behalf

of insurance companies, licensed dealers, financial institutions, charities, and

municipalities. Copart receives these vehicles from all over the country, and upon

delivery at Copart’s facility, each vehicle is inspected, photographed, and catalogued

in preparation for sale. The vehicles are then sold by auction through an online

website. The vehicles are “never stacked and remain in short-term storage for an

average of only [fifty] to [sixty] days.” While Copart charges a fee to the organization

on behalf of which it is selling the vehicle, Copart itself never holds the title to any

vehicle on its lot.

On 29 December 2020, a zoning official for the County issued a certificate of

zoning compliance to Copart, concluding Copart’s intended use of its land aligned

most closely with “Auction Sales,” which is a permitted use of right within the

County’s Commercial District. Upon learning of the zoning official’s determination

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Opinion of the Court

that Copart’s land use most closely conformed with “Auction Sales,” the Town

appealed the determination to the Planning Board.

In its appeal to the Planning Board, the Town argued Copart’s intended use of

the Property is more akin to a “Junk/Salvage Yard” as defined by the Zoning

Ordinance, and that such a use is not permitted within the County’s Commercial

District. The Town further argued that Copart’s proposed use violated the County’s

separate “Ordinance Regulating Junkyards and Automobile Graveyards” (the

“Junkyard Ordinance”).

On 19 July 2022, following a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the Planning Board

unanimously affirmed the determination by the zoning official that the Property was

appropriately classified as “Auction Sales” and that the “Junkyard Ordinance [was]

inapplicable to the intended use” of the Property.

On 17 August 2022, the Town filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Lenoir

County Superior Court, contending the Planning Board made errors of law, made

findings of fact that were unsupported by substantial evidence in the whole record,

and had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

On 28 December 2022, the trial court entered an order affirming the Planning

Board’s classification of the Property as “Auction Sales.” In its order, the trial court

made, in pertinent part, the following conclusions:

20. [The Town’s] first claim raised . . . is whether the

Planning Board[’]s decision to affirm Copart’s intended use

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as permitted under the Zoning Ordinance was supported

by competent evidence in the record.

....

22. In particular, the Planning Board’s findings in the

written [o]rder based upon the evidence presented and

testimony found that Copart’s intended use of the Property

was correctly classified as “Auction Sales” under the

Zoning Ordinance. The Planning Board made findings,

supported by the record evidence that:

• Copart’s automobiles are only temporarily stored on

the Property prior to auction. (R. Ex.1, p.2 ¶ 9)

• Copart’s automobiles temporarily stored on the

Property are sold to the highest bidder. (R. Ex. 1, p.

2 ¶ 10).

• Copart’s use does not involve dismantling,

demolition, or abandonment of automobiles on the

Property. (R. Ex. 1, p. 2 ¶ 11).

• Copart does not intend to place or store scrap metals,

waste paper, rags, or other scrap materials or used

building materials on the Property. (R. Ex. 1, p.2 ¶

12).

• Copart’s automobiles will be parked in an organized

fashion and [are] not stacked or placed in piles.

(R.Ex.1, p.2 ¶13).

• Copart’s automobiles vary in condition with some

automobiles having no damage or minor damage

while others hav[e] more damage. (R. Ex. 1, p.3 ¶19).

• The majority of Copart’s automobiles will be sold to

end-users and will be restored to operation. (R. Ex.1,

p.3 ¶ 20).

• Copart’s intended use did not pose the same

environmental and safety concerns as a junkyard

poses to the community. (R.Ex.1, p.3 ¶¶ 22-23).

23. [The Town’s] second claim . . . is whether the Planning

Board properly interpreted the County’s relevant

ordinances when it found Copart’s intended use was more

similar to auction sales or automobile sales than a

“junkyard.”

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....

25. The Zoning Ordinance defines a “Junk/Salvage Yard”

as “[t]he use of more than [] (600) square feet of any lot for

storage, keeping or accumulation of material, including

scrap [sic] metals, waste paper, rags, or other scrap [sic]

materials, or used building materials, or for the

dismantling, demolition or abandonment of automobiles or

other vehicles or machinery or parts thereof.

26. The term “auction” is given its ordinary meaning, a sale

of property to the highest bidder.

....

29. Considering the entirety of the record evidence, the

[c]ourt concludes that the Planning Board’s Findings of

Fact in the written [o]rder were supported by competent,

material and substantial evidence and the Board’s findings

supported the Board’s Conclusions of Law in the written

[o]rder wherein the [Planning] Board concluded Copart’s

intended use of the Property as “Auction Sales” and that

the “Junkyard” Ordinance is inapplicable to the intended

use by Copart.

30. [The Town’s] third claim . . . is that the Board’s decision

was arbitrary and capricious because the decision was not

based [o]n “fair and careful consideration.” The [trial c]ourt

applies the whole record test to this claim, examining all

record evidence.

Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the Planning Board’s decision was

“supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence[,]” and that the Town

could not establish that the Planning Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.

The Town timely appealed.

II. Jurisdiction

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This appeal is properly before this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-

27(b)(1) as the trial court’s order affirming the Planning Board’s decision was a final

judgment on the merits. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2021).

III. Analysis

On appeal, the Town argues the trial court (A) applied incorrect standards of

review and (B) erred by upholding the decision of the Planning Board. On both points,

we disagree.

A. Trial Court’s Standard of Review as to Planning Board’s Decision

The Town argues the trial court applied the incorrect standard of review to the

issues on appeal from the Planning Board’s decision.

1. Standard of Review

As to appellate review of a superior court order regarding an agency decision,

“[t]he process has been described as a twofold task: (1) determining whether the trial

court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding

whether the court did so properly.” Amanini v. N.C. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 114 N.C.

App. 668, 675, 443 S.E.2d 114, 118–19 (1994) (citations omitted). Ultimately, upon

review, it is this Court’s duty to conclude whether the trial court applied the correct

standard of review, and if so, whether the appropriate conclusion under the standard

was reached. See Amanini, 114 N.C. App. at 674, 443 S.E.2d at 118.

2. Superior Court’s Standard of Review of Planning Board’s Decision

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“When the Superior Court grants certiorari to review a decision of the Board,

it functions as an appellate court rather than a trier of fact.” Hopkins v. Nash Cnty.,

149 N.C. App. 446, 447, 560 S.E.2d 592, 593–94 (2002) (citation omitted).

When a petitioner “questions (1) whether [a board’s] decision was supported by

the evidence or (2) whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious, then the

reviewing court must apply the ‘whole record’ test.” ACT-UP Triangle v. Comm’n for

Health Servs. of the State of N.C., 345 N.C. 699, 706, 483 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1997)

(quoting In re Appeal by McCrary, 112 N.C. App 161, 165, 435 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1993)).

“When utilizing the whole record test . . . the reviewing court must examine all

competent evidence (the whole record) in order to determine whether the agency

decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cnty.

Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 14, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The ‘whole record’ test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the

[b]oard’s judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the

court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it

de novo.” Thompson v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538,

541 (1977).

If, however, “a petitioner contends the [b]oard’s decision was based on an error

of law, de novo review is proper.” Mann Media, Inc., 356 N.C. at 13, 565 S.E.2d at 17

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under de novo review a reviewing

court considers the case anew and may freely substitute its own interpretation of an

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ordinance for a board[’s] [] conclusions of law.” Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. City of

Bessemer City Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 365 N.C. 152, 156, 712 S.E.2d 868, 871

(2011).

i. The Whole Record Test

In its appeal to this Court, the Town states that the trial court’s “glossing over

most of [the Town’s] contentions[ ] is evidence that the [t]rial [c]ourt nevertheless

applied the improper scope of review to its meager analysis.” To support its

argument, the Town points to the language used in the trial court’s conclusions. The

Town states that the trial court’s use of the phrases, “considering the entirety of the

record evidence,” and “were supported by competent, material, and substantial

evidence” in Conclusion of Law 29 evinces the trial court’s failure to apply a de novo

standard of review.

The correct standard of review, however, is the “whole record test,” given the

allegations made by the Town in its petition for writ of certiorari stated that the

Planning Board’s decision was “unsupported by [] competent, material, and

substantial evidence in view of the entire record.” See ACT-UP Triangle, 345 N.C. at

706, 483 S.E.2d at 392 (stating that the “whole record test” is applied when the issue

at bar is whether an agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence).

Here, under a “whole record test” review, the trial court had to show that it

examined “all competent evidence (the whole record) in order to determine whether

the agency decision [was] supported by substantial evidence.” Mann Media, Inc., 356

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N.C. at 14, 565 S.E.2d at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence that the

trial court reviewed the whole record before determining the Planning Board’s

decision was supported by substantial evidence can be found throughout its order,

but particularly in its conclusions of law. Conclusion of Law 22 lists pieces of evidence

and testimony that support the Property’s classification as “Auction Sales,” indicating

the trial court considered the “whole record” when determining the Planning Board’s

decision was supported by substantial evidence.

In Conclusion of Law 22, the trial court highlighted evidence found throughout

the record that shows: Copart’s vehicles are sold via online auction; the vehicles are

only stored temporarily on the Property and are never dismantled, demolished, or

abandoned; some vehicles have no damage or minor damage; and the vehicles are

never stacked or placed in piles.

For those reasons, our review of the trial court’s order concludes the trial court

applied the whole record test and reached the correct conclusion that the Planning

Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. See ACT-UP Triangle, 345

N.C. at 706, 483 S.E.2d at 392.

ii. De Novo Review

The Town further argues the trial court failed to apply a de novo standard of

review to the question of whether the “Junkyard Ordinance” was applicable to

Copart’s intended land use. To support this contention, the Town suggests the

language used in Conclusion of Law 29, in which the trial court references “record

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evidence” being “competent, material and substantial,” evidences use of the “whole

record test” rather than a de novo review. When read in context with the surrounding

conclusions of law, however, it is clear the trial court intended to convey that it had

reviewed all of the evidence in the Record and that the evidence supported the legal

conclusions.

As stated above, Conclusion of Law 22 recites several findings regarding

Copart’s use of the Property. Further, Conclusion of Law 25 restates the Zoning

Ordinance’s definition of “Junk/Salvage Yard” as being a lot for “the dismantling,

demolition, or abandonment of automobiles or other vehicles or machinery or parts[,]”

while Conclusion of Law 26 states that “[t]he term ‘auction’ is given its ordinary

meaning, a sale of property to the highest bidder.”

For those reasons, we conclude the trial court applied the correct de novo

standard of review to the questions of law raised by the Town and ultimately reached

the correct conclusion. See Amanini, 114 N.C. App. at 674, 443 S.E.2d at 118.

B. Trial Court’s Determination as to Planning Board’s Decision

The second argument the Town makes on appeal is that the trial court erred

by upholding the decision of the Planning Board because (1) it incorrectly concluded

Copart’s land use was appropriately classified as “Auction Sales” and (2) taken in

pari materia, under both the Zoning Ordinance and Junkyard Ordinance, Copart’s

use more closely conformed with a “Junk/Salvage Yard,” or “Automobile Graveyard.”

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With respect to the Town’s first argument, we disagree; accordingly, we need not

address the Town’s second argument.

1. Standard of Review

This Court reviews questions of law presented in challenges to zoning decisions

de novo. See Myers Park Homeowners Ass’n v. City of Charlotte, 229 N.C. App. 204,

208, 747 S.E.2d 338, 342 (2013). When interpreting a local ordinance, the basic rule

is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the municipal legislative body.” Darbo

v. Old Keller Farm Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 174 N.C. App 591, 594, 621 S.E.2d 281, 284

(2005) (citation omitted). Undefined terms are given their ordinary meaning and

significance. See Morris Commc’n Corp., 365 N.C. at 157, 712 S.E.2d at 872. When

the question of law involves interpretation of an ordinance, this Court applies basic

principles of statutory construction, so that “words and phrases of a statute may not

be interpreted out of context, but . . . as a composite whole so as to harmonize with

[the] other statutory provisions and effectuate legislative intent.” Duke Power Co. v.

City of High Point, 69 N.C. App. 378, 387, 317 S.E.2d 701, 706 (1984). Additionally,

when issues of statutory construction arise, “the construction adopted by those who

execute[d] and administer[ed] the law in question” should be given great

consideration. Darbo, 174 N.C. App at 594, 621 S.E.2d at 283.

Finally, “the law favors uninhibited free use of private property over

governmental restrictions.” Byrd v. Franklin City, 237 N.C. App. 192, 201, 765 S.E.2d

805, 811 (2015) (Hunter, J., concurring in part). The general rule is that a zoning

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ordinance, being in derogation of common law property rights, should be construed

in favor of the free use of property. See Yancey v. Heafner, 268 N.C. 263, 266, 150

S.E.2d 440, 443 (1966); see City of Sanford v. Dandy Signs, Inc., 62 N.C. App. 568,

569, 303 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1983).

2. Superior Court’s Conclusion that Copart’s Business is Auction Sales

On appeal, the Town does not challenge any findings of fact, but rather argues

that by concluding Copart’s business and land use is more closely aligned with

“Auction Sales,” rather than a “Junk/Salvage Yard,” the trial court “has elevated form

over substance, ignoring the manner in which the land itself was to be used.” The

Town claims that because the term “Auction Sales” is not defined within the Zoning

Ordinance, it should be given its ordinary and plain meaning, which here, should be

taken to mean a place “where goods are sold to the public who are assembled in one

place for the auction.” In essence, the Town argues that Copart’s land use cannot be

accurately described as “Auction Sales” because the buyers of Copart’s vehicles do not

physically assemble in one place to bid. This argument cherry-picks one

understanding of the term “auction” while excluding the even further simplified

definition—“a sale of property to the highest bidder.” Auction, MERRIAM-WEBSTER

DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2022).

Under our de novo review, while applying the basic principles of statutory

construction, this Court seeks to ascertain the intention of the legislative municipal

body, while also favoring the uninhibited free use of property. See Darbo, 174 N.C.

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App at 594, 621 S.E.2d at 283; see Byrd, 237 N.C. App. at 201, 765 S.E.2d at 811.

Here, the Town does not challenge the sufficiency of the trial court’s findings of fact

regarding Copart’s land use; rather, the Town challenges the conclusion that Copart’s

proposed use was classified as “Auction Sales,” rather than a “Junk/Salvage Yard.”

While the term “Auction Sales” is undefined in the Zoning Ordinance, the term

“Junk/Salvage Yard” is defined as,

[t]he use of more than [] (600) square feet of any lot for the

storage, keeping or accumulation of material, including

scrap metals, waste paper, rags, or other scrap materials,

or used building materials, or for the dismantling,

demolition or abandonment of automobiles or other

vehicles or machinery or parts thereof. ALL

Junk/Salvage Yards must also comply with Lenoir

County’s Junkyard and Automobile Graveyard

Ordinance.”

The Junkyard Ordinance defines a “junkyard” as “an establishment or place of

business, which is maintained[,] operated[,] or used for storing[,] keeping[,] buying[,]

or selling junk[,] or for the maintenance of an automobile graveyard.” Further, an

“automobile graveyard” is defined as,

[a]ny establishment or place of business which is

maintained[,] used[,] or operated for storing[,] keeping[,]

buying[,] or selling wrecked[,] scrapped[,] ruined[,]

dismantled[,] or inoperable motor vehicles and which are

not being restored to operation regardless of the length of

time which individual motor vehicles are stored or kept at

said establishment or place of business.

The facts in the Record tend to show Copart: sells vehicles through an online

auction system; temporarily stores the vehicles on the Property prior to auction; sells

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vehicles that are both damaged and undamaged; and does not dismantle, demolish,

or abandon any vehicles on the Property. Conspicuously absent from the Record are

any facts to indicate Copart intends to use the Property to keep or accumulate scrap

metals, waste papers, rags or building materials. Further, no facts in the Record tend

to show that Copart intends to use the Property to store abandoned vehicles or parts

of vehicles.

Our de novo review of the Record reveals a mismatch between the Zoning

Ordinance’s definition of “Junk/Salvage Yard” and how Copart intends to use the

Property. Given the facts in the Record, we conclude that Copart’s business model—

selling vehicles with varying degrees of damage via online auction and their removal

within sixty days—aligns more closely with the common definition of “auction” than

the Zoning Ordinance’s definition of a “Junk/Salvage Yard.” Further, even if we

considered the Zoning Ordinance and Junkyard Ordinance in pari materia, we still

reach the same conclusion, because the facts in the Record do not demonstrate Copart

used the Property to accumulate abandoned vehicles that are not being restored to

operation.

We therefore hold that both the Planning Board and the trial court correctly

upheld the zoning official’s classification of Copart’s intended use of the Property as

“Auction Sales.” Having concluded the Planning Board and trial court were correct

in upholding the zoning official’s determination that Copart’s land use was

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appropriately classified as “Auction Sales,” we need not address the Town’s second

argument.

IV. Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold the trial court applied the correct

standards of review, made the correct conclusion under the standards of review, and

did not err when upholding the Planning Board’s determination. The trial court’s

order is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Judges TYSON and ZACHARY concur.

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