Wynn v. Frederick

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 314PA21

Filed 15 December 2023

PAUL STEVEN WYNN

v.

REX FREDERICK, in his official capacity as a magistrate, and GREAT

AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision

of the Court of Appeals, 278 N.C. App. 596, 863 S.E.2d 790 (2021), affirming an order

entered on 15 January 2020 by Judge John O. Craig III in Superior Court, Orange

County. On 17 August 2022, the Supreme Court allowed plaintiff’s conditional

petition for discretionary review as to an additional issue. Heard in the Supreme

Court on 21 September 2023.

Carlos E. Mahoney and Barry D. Nakell for plaintiff-appellee.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Sarah G. Boyce, Deputy Solicitor

General, Nicholas S. Brod, Deputy Solicitor General, and Lindsay Vance

Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, for defendant-appellant Rex Frederick.

NEWBY, Chief Justice.

In this case we consider whether magistrates can be sued in a statutory bond

action under N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5 based on actions they take in their official capacities

or whether sovereign immunity and/or judicial immunity bars suit. To answer this

question, we must first determine whether magistrates are “other officer[s]” under

WYNN V. FREDERICK

Opinion of the Court

N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. Because the provision’s text, history, and broader statutory

context reveal that section 58-76-5 encompasses only county, rather than state,

officers, magistrates fall outside the scope of “other officer[s]” under the statute and

accordingly retain their sovereign immunity. Additionally, we hold, in accordance

with our established precedent, that judicial immunity applies to official and

individual capacity claims. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff alleges the following facts. In 2016, plaintiff owned two nearby

properties in Mebane, North Carolina. Plaintiff lived at one property and rented the

second property to his sister, Judy Wynn, and her twenty-four-year-old son, Robert

Morris. Morris had suffered from severe mental health issues since he was a teenager

and was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder.

In addition, Morris engaged in significant alcohol and drug use and was diagnosed

with substance abuse disorders. When Morris did not take his medications, his

conditions caused him to become violent towards others. As a result, Morris had been

involuntarily committed to UNC Hospitals on several occasions, including three

separate times during 2016. To monitor Morris’s condition and medication

compliance, Morris received regular visits at his home from the UNC Center for

Excellence in Community Mental Health’s Assertive Community Treatment (ACT)

team. The ACT team provides medical support and treatment to individuals with

severe mental illnesses who live at home in Orange County. Dr. Austin Hall, a

psychiatrist at the UNC Center for Excellence in Community Mental Health, served

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as the ACT team’s Medical Director and provided psychiatric care and treatment to

Morris.

During the week of 12 December 2016, Morris was living with Ms. Wynn at the

Mebane property that she rented from plaintiff. Morris was not taking his

medications, had not slept for three days, and stayed outside at night guarding the

house with a crossbow. In addition, earlier that week, Morris drained Ms. Wynn’s car

battery to prevent her from leaving the house. Accordingly, Ms. Wynn informed the

ACT team and Dr. Hall about Morris’s condition. On the morning of 16 December

2016, Dr. Hall met with Ms. Wynn and Morris at the Mebane property, and upon

evaluating Morris, Dr. Hall determined that Morris needed to be involuntarily

committed. Dr. Hall returned to his office, prepared an Affidavit and Petition for

Involuntary Commitment, and faxed it to the Orange County Magistrate’s Office.

Defendant, a magistrate in Orange County, received the faxed affidavit and petition.

Upon reviewing the affidavit and petition, defendant issued a Findings and

Custody Order for Involuntary Commitment and faxed the custody order to UNC

Hospitals so that Morris could be served and committed at the hospital. Defendant

thought Morris was already at the hospital; however, Morris was still at his home in

Mebane. Therefore, Morris was not served with the custody order on 16 December

2016.

On the morning of 17 December 2016, Dr. Hall called Ms. Wynn to ask if the

Orange County Sheriff’s Office had served Morris with the custody order and taken

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him to UNC Hospitals. Ms. Wynn told Dr. Hall that Morris was still at the Mebane

property. Dr. Hall then called defendant to ask about the status of the custody order,

and defendant informed Dr. Hall that he faxed the custody order to UNC Hospitals.

Dr. Hall explained that Morris was still at his home and accordingly told defendant

he would again fax the documents to defendant so that Morris could be served at the

Mebane property.

At 9:27 a.m., Dr. Hall again faxed the Affidavit and Petition for Involuntary

Commitment to the Magistrate’s Office, and Chief Magistrate Tony Oakley received

the documents. By 11:02 a.m., Chief Magistrate Oakley had also received a copy of

the custody order. He then contacted the Sheriff’s Office and requested a deputy to

serve Morris at his house. Around 11:20 a.m., Deputy Malcolm Hester retrieved the

custody order from the Magistrate’s Office and began driving to the Mebane property.

Meanwhile, around 11:00 a.m., plaintiff went to his sister’s property to

jump-start her car battery. After starting the car, plaintiff went inside Ms. Wynn’s

home not knowing that Morris was off his medication and experiencing a psychotic

episode. After plaintiff entered the house, Morris used a crossbow to shoot plaintiff in

the neck with an arrow, instantly paralyzing plaintiff. Ms. Wynn called 911 at 11:18

a.m. Deputy Hester arrived at the Mebane property with the custody order by 11:36

a.m., and emergency services arrived shortly thereafter. At that time, Morris was

taken into custody.

On 17 September 2019, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, in his official

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capacity as a magistrate, under defendant’s official bond pursuant to N.C.G.S.

§ 58-76-5, and Great American Insurance Company, defendant’s insurer. Plaintiff

alleged defendant was negligent in faxing the custody order to UNC Hospitals rather

than to the Sheriff’s Office so that a deputy could serve Morris with the custody order

at his home. Plaintiff sought damages under the bond in the amount of $100,000.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on 21 October 2019 asserting sovereign

immunity, absolute judicial immunity, public official immunity, and that plaintiff

otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Great American

Insurance Company also filed a motion to dismiss, joining in and adopting

defendant’s motion. On 6 January 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the motions,

in which it heard arguments, reviewed the complaint, and considered briefs

submitted by the parties. On 15 January 2020, the trial court entered an order

denying defendant’s motion to dismiss.1 The trial court determined that the factual

allegations in the complaint establish that defendant is not entitled to sovereign

immunity or judicial immunity for the statutory bond action and that plaintiff stated

a claim upon which relief could be granted against defendant in his official capacity.2

Defendant appealed.

1 The trial court also denied Great American Insurance Company’s motion to dismiss.

Great American Insurance Company, however, withdrew its appeal at the Court of Appeals

and is therefore no longer a party to this appeal.

2 At the hearing on the motion, defendant waived his argument of dismissal based on

public official immunity. Thus, that issue is not before this Court.

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On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s

motion to dismiss. Wynn v. Frederick, 278 N.C. App. 596, 597, 863 S.E.2d 790, 792

(2021). First, the Court of Appeals held that N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5, which waives

sovereign immunity for certain officials covered by a statutory bond, applies to

magistrates. Id. at 601, 603, 863 S.E.2d at 794–95; see N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5 (2021)

(waiving sovereign immunity for a “register, surveyor, sheriff, coroner, county

treasurer, or other officer” to the extent of their respective bonds). The Court of

Appeals explained that while magistrates are not specifically enumerated in the

statute’s list of officers, magistrates nonetheless fall into the statute’s general

category of “other officer[s].” Wynn, 278 N.C. App. at 602–03, 863 S.E.2d at 795. Thus,

according to the Court of Appeals, section 58-76-5 plainly waived defendant’s

sovereign immunity. Id.

The Court of Appeals next addressed the issue of judicial immunity. The Court

of Appeals held that “judicial immunity is [only] an available defense for judicial

officers sued as individuals.” Id. at 603, 863 S.E.2d at 796. According to the Court of

Appeals, because plaintiff sued defendant in his official capacity, rather than in his

individual capacity, defendant could not assert judicial immunity as a defense to suit.

Id. The Court of Appeals thus categorically limited judicial immunity to suits in

which judicial officers are sued in their individual capacity. Id.

Defendant filed a petition for discretionary review with this Court on 24

August 2021, and plaintiff filed a conditional petition for discretionary review on 3

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September 2021. On 17 August 2022, this Court allowed defendant’s petition for

discretionary review and allowed in part plaintiff’s conditional petition for

discretionary review.3

In this case we consider whether sovereign immunity and judicial immunity

are available defenses in a statutory bond action for a magistrate sued in his official

capacity under N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion

to dismiss that raises immunity as a ground for dismissal. White v. Trew, 366 N.C.

360, 362–63, 736 S.E.2d 166, 168 (2013).

This Court has long recognized the doctrine of sovereign immunity,

acknowledging that “[i]t is an established principle of jurisprudence . . . that a state

may not be sued . . . unless by statute it has consented to be sued or has otherwise

waived its immunity from suit.” Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 6, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787

(1952). Unless waived, this protection extends to public officials of the State sued in

their official capacities. White, 366 N.C. at 363, 736 S.E.2d at 168. “Waiver of

sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred[,] and [s]tate statutes waiving this

immunity, being in derogation of the sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly

construed.” Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 538–39, 299 S.E.2d 618,

627 (1983).

Section 58-76-5 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides a limited

3 The issue allowed in plaintiff’s conditional petition for discretionary review is

substantially the same as the judicial immunity issue we allowed in defendant’s petition for

discretionary review. We therefore address two primary issues on appeal.

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waiver of sovereign immunity for certain officials covered by statutory bonds.

Specifically, section 58-76-5 provides that “[e]very person injured by the neglect,

misconduct, or misbehavior in office of any register, surveyor, sheriff, coroner, county

treasurer, or other officer, may institute a suit . . . against said officer . . . upon their

respective bonds.” N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. Prior to 21 July 2023, magistrates were

statutorily required to hold a bond “conditioned upon the faithful performance of the

duties of the office of magistrate.”4 N.C.G.S. § 7A-174 (2021) (repealed 2023).

Therefore, we must determine whether N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5 waives sovereign

immunity for magistrates sued under their official bond. To do so, we examine the

text and structure of section 58-76-5, its broader statutory context, and the provision’s

statutory history.

Our primary goal in construing a statute is “to ensure that the purpose of the

legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.” Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v.

Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991) (citing Hunt v.

Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1981)). When

4 The General Assembly repealed the statutory bond requirement for magistrates in

N.C.G.S. § 7A-174 effective on 21 July 2023. See An Act to Make Various Changes and

Technical Corrections to the Laws Governing the Administration of Justice, As

Recommended by the Administrative Office of the Courts and to Allow for the Expunction of

the Offense of Breaking and Entering of a Building with Intent to Commit a Felony or

Larceny and Amend the Conditions that Result in a Petition for Expunction Being Denied,

S.L. 2023-103, § 5(b), https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2023-

2024/SL2023-103.pdf. Because plaintiff initiated this statutory bond suit against defendant

prior to the repeal of N.C.G.S. § 7A-174, plaintiff’s rights have vested. Accordingly, we

consider the issues presented in the appeal.

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construing a statute, we first examine “the plain words of the statute,” id. (citing

Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990)), as

“[t]he best indicia of [legislative intent is] the language of the statute” itself, Coastal

Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 299 N.C. 620, 629, 265 S.E.2d 379, 385

(1980). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, we “apply the statute[ ]

as written.” N.C. Dep’t of Correction v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 202, 675 S.E.2d

641, 649 (2009). If the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, however, we then

look to other methods of statutory construction such as the broader statutory context,

“the structure of the statute[,] and certain canons of statutory construction” to

ascertain the legislature’s intent. Elec. Supply Co. of Durham, 328 N.C. at 656, 403

S.E.2d at 294; see Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 106, 489 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1997)

(“Where words of general enumeration follow those of specific classification, the

general words will be interpreted to fall within the same category as those previously

designated.” (quoting Turner v. Bd. of Educ., 250 N.C. 456, 463, 109 S.E.2d 211, 216

(1959))); State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244, 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970) (“[G]eneral words

[that] follow a designation of particular subjects or things . . . includ[e] only things of

the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.” (quoting State

v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694, 697–98, 140 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1965))). Additionally, the

legislature’s intent may be revealed from the legislative history of the statute in

question, Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001), as

changes the legislature makes to a statute’s text over time provide evidence of the

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statute’s intended meaning, Elec. Supply Co. of Durham, 328 N.C. at 656, 403 S.E.2d

at 295.

Here we must determine whether N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5 applies to state and

county officials or only county officials. We start with the text of the statute. The plain

language of section 58-76-5 provides a right of action against “any register, surveyor,

sheriff, coroner, county treasurer, or other officer” under their respective bonds.

N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. The text of section 58-76-5 reveals that magistrates are not

specifically included in the statute’s enumerated list of officers. Therefore, we next

examine section 58-76-5’s internal structure and its broader statutory context to

determine whether the legislature intended magistrates to fall within the statute’s

scope of “other officer[s].”

We often utilize canons of statutory construction to aid in discerning the

legislature’s intent. In Meyer, this Court invoked the canon ejusdem generis to

determine whether a local entity fell within the scope of the general terms

“departments, institutions, and agencies” in the State Tort Claims Act. 347 N.C. at

106, 489 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Turner, 250 N.C. at 462–63, 109 S.E.2d at 216).

According to that canon, “[w]here words of general enumeration follow those of

specific classification, the general words will be interpreted to fall within the same

category as those previously designated.” Id. (quoting Turner, 250 N.C. at 463, 109

S.E.2d at 216). Thus, in Meyer, we concluded that the local entity fell outside the

scope of those general terms because all of the “departments, institutions, and

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agencies” specifically enumerated within the statute were state entities. Id. at 104,

489 S.E.2d at 884.

Here a closer reading of the enumerated list of officers in section 58-76-5

reveals that five specific categories of officers—registers, surveyors, sheriffs,

coroners, and county treasurers—precede the more general phrase “or other

officer[s].” See N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. Significantly, each of the five

specifically-enumerated officers are county officers rather than state officers such as

magistrates.5 Under the canon of ejusdem generis, “other officer[s]” fall “within the

same category as those previously [and expressly] designated” in section 58-76-5.

Meyer, 347 N.C. at 106, 489 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Turner, 250 N.C. at 463, 109

S.E.2d at 216). Because the specifically-enumerated officers preceding the general

phrase in section 58-76-5 are all county officers, the structure of section 58-76-5

counsels in favor of reading “other officer[s]” to include only other county officers. A

contrary reading of the statute to include any “other officer” required to be bonded

would render the statute’s specific reference to registers, surveyors, sheriffs, coroners,

and county treasurers unnecessary. See id. (“[I]f the legislative body had intended the

general words to be used in their unrestricted sense the specific words would have

been omitted.” (quoting Turner, 250 N.C. at 463, 109 S.E.2d at 216)); see also Midrex

Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 N.C. 250, 258, 794 S.E.2d 785, 792 (2016)

(“Courts should ‘give effect to the words actually used in a statute’ . . . .” (quoting

5 The parties do not contest that magistrates are state officials.

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Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 623, 766 S.E.2d 297, 301 (2014))).

Reading section 58-76-5 to include only county officers is also consistent with

how the General Assembly structured the provisions governing official bonds over

one hundred years ago. In the early 1900s, Chapter 9 of the Revised Code contained

all of the statutes governing official bonds. See N.C. Revised Code of 1905, ch. 9

(1905). Chapter 9 consisted of eleven articles, one of which was entitled “State

Officers” and another of which was entitled “County Officers.” See id. §§ 287–306. The

two articles regulated the official bonds for the state and county officers specifically

enumerated within each article. The “State Officers” article included state officials,

such as the secretary of state, treasurer, insurance commissioner, clerk of supreme

court, and public printer. See id. §§ 287–88, 290, 292–94. Alternatively, the “County

Officers” article expressly included officials such as county treasurers, sheriffs,

coroners, registers of deeds, and county surveyors. Id. §§ 297–303. Most notably, each

of the officers identified in the “County Officers” article of Chapter 9 of the Revised

Code are the same officers that are specifically enumerated in section 58-76-5 today.

None of the officers listed in the “State Officers” article are found in section 58-76-5.

The General Assembly has therefore historically categorized the enumerated officers

in section 58-76-5 as county officers. This historical classification reflects the General

Assembly’s intent that the statute provide a right of action against only bonded

county officers, which necessarily excludes magistrates as state officers.

The broader statutory context of the articles governing official bonds today

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similarly confirms that section 58-76-5 is limited to county officials. Articles 72

through 76 of Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes address official

bonds today. Many of the provisions throughout the five articles include the same list

of officers provided in section 58-76-5. See N.C.G.S. § 58-72-10 (2021) (governing the

condition and terms of official bonds for “[e]very treasurer, sheriff, coroner, register

of deeds, surveyor, and every other officer of the several counties who is required by

law to give a bond for the faithful performance of the duties of his office” (emphasis

added)). None of the provisions specifically address magistrates or magistrates’

bonds. Additionally, many of the provisions within the five articles consistently

reference county commissioners, who are heavily involved in the bond process for

county officials. See N.C.G.S. § 58-72-25 (2021) (tasking the board of commissioners

with filling vacancies if an officer fails to renew his bond); N.C.G.S. § 58-72-60 (2021)

(declaring every commissioner who approves an official bond that he knows to be

insufficient liable as if he were a surety thereto). Conversely, county commissioners

play no role in the process surrounding magistrates’ bonds. 6 The differing

procurement procedures for magistrates’ bonds as compared to the procedures for

bonds for county officers reflect the legislature’s intent that magistrates are excluded

from the scope of “other officer[s]” in section 58-76-5. Thus, not only has the General

Assembly historically categorized the officers enumerated in section 58-76-5 as

6 Magistrates’ bonds are overseen by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, a state

officer, who determines the amount by which magistrates shall be bonded and procures such

bonds from the indemnity or guaranty company. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-174.

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county officers, but the broader statutory context today also indicates that the

General Assembly has intended to continue to limit section 58-76-5 to county officers.

The statutory history of section 58-76-5 further reinforces that the statute

applies only to claims against county officers and does not extend to claims against

state officials. In 1965, the General Assembly enacted the Judicial Department Act,

which reorganized our state court system into its current structure. See An Act to

Implement Article IV of the Constitution of North Carolina by Providing for a New

Chapter of The General Statutes of North Carolina, ch. 310, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws

369, 369–420. The changes transformed the State’s more local, county-centric court

system into one unified statewide system divided into an Appellate Division, a

Superior Court Division, and a District Court division. Id. at 370 (codified at N.C.G.S.

§ 7A-4). As a necessary corollary of this transition “to a uniform system completely

operational in all counties of the State,” id. at 370, the General Assembly eliminated

several local judicial offices, such as justices of the peace and constables,7 and created

several state judicial offices, such as magistrates, id. at 380–82 (codified at N.C.G.S.

§§ 7A-170 to -176).

Because of this reorganization, the General Assembly twice revised section

7 Constables were elected county officers who generally served under the justices of

the peace in a specific township. N.C. Revised Code of 1905, ch. 9, § 302. They shared similar

duties to the county sheriffs and could make arrests and enforce criminal laws throughout

the county that their township covered. See State v. Corpening, 207 N.C. 805, 178 S.E. 564

(1935). Constables also often served as “collecting agent[s].” Morgan v. Horne, 44 N.C. (Busb.)

25, 26 (1852).

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58-76-5. Both revisions reflect the statute’s local focus on county officers. First, in

1973, the General Assembly deleted a reference to constables in an earlier version of

section 58-76-5 (then codified at N.C.G.S. § 109-34) because the legislature had

eliminated that office with the passing of the Judicial Department Act. See Act of

Mar. 28, 1973, ch. 108, § 59, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 84, 88.8 Notably, the General

Assembly did not simultaneously add magistrates to section 58-76-5’s enumerated

list of officers. In the same session law, however, the General Assembly specifically

added “magistrates” to several other provisions throughout the General Statutes.

These deliberate decisions support the conclusion that “magistrates” fall outside the

scope of “other officer[s]” in section 58-76-5.

Subsequently, the General Assembly deleted the office of “clerk of the superior

court” from section 58-76-5’s list of enumerated officers. See An Act to Make Technical

Corrections to the General Statutes as Recommended by the General Statutes

Commission and to Make Various Other Technical Changes to the General Statutes

and the Session Laws, S.L. 2010-96, § 29, 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 377, 385. This change

was also a warranted consequence of the enactment of the Judicial Department Act

and reflects section 58-76-5’s local focus on county officers. Before 1965, superior court

8 Constables were expressly classified as county officials in Chapter 9 of the N.C.

Revised Code of 1905. This classification reinforces section 58-76-5’s local focus and the

General Assembly’s historic consideration of the statute as encompassing only county

officers. The deletion of constable—a county officer—from the list does not detract from the

county-specific nature of the list. Rather, the deletion was necessary because the office no

longer existed.

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clerks were considered county officials, consistent with the local nature of our state’s

court system prior to the reorganization. Upon the enactment of the Judicial

Department Act, however, superior court clerks became classified as state officials.

See N.C.G.S. § 7A-101(a) (2021) (“The clerk of superior court is a full-time employee

of the State . . . .”). Therefore, because superior court clerks were no longer classified

as county officers, the General Assembly’s deletion of superior court clerks from the

statute was necessary in order to retain section 58-76-5’s county focus.9

A broad reading of section 58-76-5 to include all bonded officials would render

the legislature’s deletion of superior court clerks from the statute’s enumerated list

of officers futile. Under this reading, superior court clerks would seemingly qualify

as “other officer[s]” even after their express deletion from the statute simply because

they were statutorily required to hold a bond. Such a reading, however, would fail to

give effect to the legislature’s specific amendment to the statute. See Town of Pine

Knoll Shores v. Evans, 331 N.C. 361, 366, 416 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1992) (“[W]e follow the

maxim[ ] of statutory construction that . . . [statutory] amendments are presumed not

to be without purpose.”). The changes the legislature has made to section 58-76-5

reflect the legislature’s continued intention to confine the statute to county officers.

9 Similar to constables, clerks of superior court were expressly classified as county

officials in Chapter 9 of the N.C. Revised Code of 1905. The deletion of superior court clerks

from the enumerated list of officers does not detract from the county-centric nature of the

list. Instead, the deletion likewise reinforces the statute’s local focus. The deletion was

necessary in order to reflect superior court clerks’ conversion from county officers to state

officers with the enactment of the Judicial Department Act.

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Section 58-76-5’s internal structure, broader statutory context, and statutory

history make clear that the General Assembly intended to limit section 58-76-5 to

statutory bond actions against bonded county officers. We therefore hold that

magistrates are not included within the scope of “other officer[s]” under N.C.G.S.

§ 58-76-5. Accordingly, N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5 does not waive defendant’s sovereign

immunity.

We next consider whether defendant may assert judicial immunity as a defense

to plaintiff’s official capacity bond claim. Because judicial immunity protects judicial

officials from litigation arising out of acts performed in their judicial capacity, we

conclude that judicial immunity applies to official capacity and individual capacity

claims. The essential question is whether the judicial officer acted in a judicial

capacity, or in the discharge of his official duties. The availability of judicial immunity

as a defense does not hinge upon whether the plaintiff decided to bring an official

capacity or individual capacity claim against a judicial officer.

It has long been recognized that judicial immunity is “a general principle of the

highest importance to the proper administration of justice.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.

(13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871). “[A] judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in

him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of

personal consequences to himself.” Id. Recognizing this principle, this Court has

broadly held that a “judge of a court of this State is not subject to civil action for errors

committed in the discharge of his official duties.” Town of Fuquay Springs v.

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Rowland, 239 N.C. 299, 301, 79 S.E.2d 774, 776 (1954); see also Hedgepeth v.

Swanson, 223 N.C. 442, 444, 27 S.E.2d 122, 123 (1943) (“[O]fficers acting in a judicial

capacity or quasi-judicial capacity are exempt from civil liability and cannot be called

upon to respond in damages to private individuals for the honest exercise of [their]

judgment though [the] judgment may have been erroneous . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).

Only when a judicial or quasi-judicial officer “acts corruptly or of malice” rather than

“in . . . honest exercise of his judgment . . . is he liable in such a suit instituted against

him.” Id.

Despite this precedent, the Court of Appeals held that judicial immunity is a

categorically unavailable defense to an official capacity claim against a judicial

officer.10 Wynn, 278 N.C. App. at 603, 863 S.E.2d at 795–96. The Court of Appeals

reasoned, and plaintiff here similarly contends, that judicial immunity applies to

individuals, while sovereign immunity applies to the State and its public officials in

their official capacity. Id. at 603, 863 S.E.2d at 795. Therefore, according to the Court

of Appeals, “[t]hese differences show that the doctrines of sovereign immunity and

judicial immunity are not intended to be parallels applicable under the same

circumstances.” Id. at 603, 863 S.E.2d at 796.

Our case law, however, clearly establishes that judicial immunity protects

10 In an official capacity claim, the plaintiff “seeks recovery from the entity of which

the public servant defendant is an agent.” Meyer, 347 N.C. at 110, 489 S.E.2d at 887. An

official capacity claim therefore seeks damages from the State itself. Id. Alternatively, in an

individual capacity claim, the plaintiff “seeks recovery from the defendant directly” and

personally. Id.

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Opinion of the Court

judicial officers from liability when they perform judicial acts and presents a complete

and absolute bar to recovery regardless of whether the plaintiff brings an official or

individual capacity claim. In Fuquay Springs, for instance, this Court specifically

held that a judge could assert judicial immunity as a defense to an official capacity

claim. In that case, the town of Fuquay Springs filed suit against a judge in his official

capacity, alleging the judge had instructed the clerk of court to refrain from taxing

certain fees in select cases. 239 N.C. at 299–300, 79 S.E.2d at 775–76. The judge,

however, contended that the complaint failed to state a valid claim because the town

could not sue him in his official capacity. Id. at 300, 79 S.E.2d at 775. This Court

agreed and held that “[a] judge of a court of this State is not subject to civil action for

errors committed in the discharge of his official duties.” Id. at 301, 79 S.E.2d at 776.

Accordingly, judicial immunity barred the plaintiff’s official capacity claim against

the judicial official.11

Similarly, in Hedgepeth, the plaintiff brought an official capacity claim against

a county sheriff who “procur[ed] [a] search warrant for the plaintiff’s premises and

11 The Court of Appeals has consistently relied on Fuquay Springs in holding that

public officials may assert judicial or quasi-judicial immunity when they engage in judicial

acts pursuant to the discharge of their official duties. See Price v. Calder, 240 N.C. App. 190,

192–95, 770 S.E.2d 752, 754 (2015) (court-appointed commissioner had judicial immunity

when overseeing a real property partition proceeding); Bare v. Atwood, 204 N.C. App. 310,

314–15, 693 S.E.2d 746, 750–51 (2010) (clerk of court had judicial immunity for acts in

connection with partition of real property); Sharp v. Gulley, 120 N.C. App. 878, 880, 463

S.E.2d 577, 578 (1995) (family court-appointed referee had judicial immunity regarding

equitable distribution determination for a marital estate); Foust v. Hughes, 21 N.C. App. 268,

270, 204 S.E.2d 230, 231–32 (1974) (magistrate had judicial immunity when issuing a

warrant).

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Opinion of the Court

[a] warrant for [the plaintiff’s] arrest.” 223 N.C. at 445, 27 S.E.2d at 123. At the time,

county sheriffs could enforce the law and also act in a judicial or quasi-judicial

capacity in certain circumstances. Although the specific official capacity claim at

issue ultimately involved a sheriff, we first noted the general rule that public officers

acting in a judicial capacity may assert judicial immunity as a defense “for the honest

exercise of [their] judgment though [the] judgment may have been erroneous.” Id. at

444, 27 S.E.2d at 123. Therefore, in both cases, rather than basing our analysis on

whether the plaintiff brought an official or individual capacity claim, we instead

began with the general rule that officers are judicially immune from suit for acts

performed in their judicial capacity and then considered whether the officer

“committed [the error] in the discharge of his official duties,” Fuquay Springs, 239

N.C. at 300, 79 S.E.2d at 776, or “act[ed] in a judicial capacity,” Hedgepeth, 223 N.C.

at 444, 27 S.E.2d at 123.

Here plaintiff sued defendant in his official capacity as a magistrate.

Magistrates are judicial officers of the State. See Foust v. Hughes, 21 N.C. App. 268,

270, 204 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1974). Accordingly, under our precedent in Fuquay Springs

and Hedgepeth, judicial immunity is an available defense to defendant. Because

plaintiff’s claim is independently barred by sovereign immunity, however, we need

not consider whether defendant performed a judicial act in faxing the custody order

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Opinion of the Court

to UNC Hospitals.12

In sum, section 58-76-5’s text, structure, and history make clear that the

statute encompasses only county, rather than state, officers. Magistrates therefore

fall outside the scope of “other officer[s]” under the statute and accordingly retain

their sovereign immunity in a statutory bond action under section 58-76-5. Judicial

immunity is also an available defense because judicial immunity applies to both

official and individual capacity claims. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of

Appeals is reversed.

REVERSED.

Justices DIETZ and ALLEN did not participate in the consideration or decision

of this case.

12 It should be noted that we discuss judicial immunity to correct a mistake made by

the Court of Appeals which had limited the defense of judicial immunity. The dissent would

go much further and summarily find defendant’s conduct as not the type of conduct normally

performed by a judicial officer, without the benefit of full briefing or argument on the issue.

In fact, this Court specifically declined to consider how judicial immunity applies to the facts

of this case by denying this very issue in plaintiff’s conditional petition for discretionary

review. Additionally, both parties concede in their briefs that this issue is not properly before

the Court and would need to be remanded for its initial consideration.

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

Justice EARLS concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Across North Carolina, public officers at every level of government do their jobs

with care and caution. Within their role, those officers are entrusted with “some

portion of the sovereign power.” State v. Hord, 264 N.C. 149, 155 (1965). But that

“power, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used.”

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392

(1971). While most public servants faithfully discharge their duties, some do not. And

even the best-intentioned officials make mistakes.

Recognizing that truth, our legislature granted citizens a path to relief: Bond

actions. Before many public officers assume their role, they must secure bonds

conditioned on the “faithful performance of the[ir] duties.” See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 7A-

174 (2021) (requiring magistrates to secure bonds as a condition of office). And in

practice, those bonds protect “the public from any injuries caused by the public

official” while “in office.” See Jeffrey S. Price et al., The Public Officials Bond—A

Statutory Obligation Requiring “Faithful Performance,” “Fidelity,” and Flexibility, 11

Fid. L. Ass’n J. 151, 160 (2006). When an officer’s misfeasance causes harm, Section

58-76-5—the bond-action statute—allows injured citizens to sue that officer and his

surety on the official bond. N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5 (2021).

By its terms, Section 58-76-5 sweeps broadly. It allows “[e]very person injured”

to seek relief from an officer for “all acts” done “by virtue or under color” of his office.

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

Id. The statute also lists some officials within its ambit, authorizing suits against

“any register, surveyor, sheriff, coroner, county treasurer, or other officer.” Id. The

precise question is whether magistrates are “other officer[s]” liable on their official

bonds. If they are, then sovereign immunity does not bar Mr. Wynn’s claim against

Magistrate Frederick. At stake, then, is whether Mr. Wynn may have his day in court.

Whatever the merits of his suit, he cannot raise it at all if the bond-action statute

does not apply and sovereign immunity remains intact.

But despite the provision’s broad scope and broad purpose, the majority reads

“other officer[s]” to include just county officials. And since magistrates are state

officers, the majority exempts them from liability on their bonds. But that county-

officer limit is missing from Section 58-76-5’s text. It also clashes with the rest of the

statute’s language and the provisions surrounding it. And most importantly, it runs

counter to the purposes of official bonds and bond actions: To make citizens “secure

in their rights” and provide “adequate remedy for wrongs” flowing from official

misconduct. See State ex rel. Kivett v. Young, 106 N.C. 567, 569 (1890). Because the

majority improperly extinguishes Mr. Wynn’s access to the courts and chance for

relief, I respectfully dissent.

I. Judicial Immunity Does Not Shield Magistrate Frederick for

Nonjudicial Acts

Analytically, I would address judicial immunity first. I agree with the majority

that judicial immunity is at play when a magistrate is sued in both his individual or

official capacity. But capacity itself is not the key focus—what matters instead is the

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

nature of the magistrate’s challenged conduct.

Judicial immunity attaches to acts, not offices. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,

227 (1988). Under that doctrine, a judicial officer is absolutely immune for his judicial

conduct. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). Magistrates are “judicial

officers.” Bradshaw v. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 320 N.C. 132, 134 (1987); see also id.

(“Our legislature has prescribed by statute many of the functions performed by

magistrates, most of which require such independent judgment by a judicial officer.”).

And so here, the question is whether Mr. Wynn has sued Magistrate Frederick for a

judicial act. If so, judicial immunity bars Mr. Wynn’s claim. If not, we then ask

whether sovereign immunity applies and whether the state has waived it.

At its core, judicial immunity safeguards the “independent and impartial

exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508

U.S. 429, 435 (1993). Still, an absolute bar to liability is “strong medicine.” Forrester,

484 U.S. at 230 (cleaned up). So rather than woodenly insulating judicial officers,

judicial immunity “is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not

by the person to whom it attaches.” Id. at 227; see also id. at 224 (explaining that

immunity turns on “the nature of the functions with which a particular official or

class of officials has been lawfully entrusted”). Courts have thus drawn a firm “line

between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply

happen to have been done by judges.” Id. at 227. And so a judge’s acts as a judge are

distinct from “the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

on occasion be assigned by law to perform.” Id.; see also Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers

Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980). Anchoring judicial immunity in judicial

acts aligns the doctrine with its purpose and historical roots. See Antoine, 508 U.S. at

432–36.

The “touchstone” of a judicial act is whether the officer performs the “function

of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private

rights.” Id. at 435–36 (cleaned up); accord Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227 (describing

“paradigmatic judicial acts” as those “involved in resolving disputes between parties

who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court”). Courts also consider whether an act

“is a function normally performed by” a judicial officer. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; see

also Ex parte Va., 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879) (declining to apply judicial immunity for

conduct that “might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding

the office of a judge”). Relevant, too, is the officer’s discretion in carrying out the

conduct. See Hedgepeth v. Swanson, 223 N.C. 442, 444–45 (1943) (explaining that

immunity protects “public officers acting in a judicial capacity or quasi-judicial

capacity” when they are “engaged in official acts involving the exercise of judgment

and discretion”); Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436 (withholding judicial immunity from court

reporters transcribing proceedings because they are “afforded no discretion” in that

task and must simply “record, as accurately as possible, what transpires in court”).

But the key point is clear: A judicial officer is only immune for the “kind of

discretionary decisionmaking that the doctrine of judicial immunity is designed to

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

protect.” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435; see also Peavey v. Robbins, 48 N.C. 339, 341–42

(1856) (granting immunity to election inspectors who were “acting judicially under a

public law” and exercising “judicial power to adjudge upon the right of every man to

vote at that precinct”). The reverse is true, too—judicial immunity does not extend to

“such acts as are not judicial.” See Furr v. Moss, 52 N.C. 525, 526–27 (1860).

Under that framework, Magistrate Frederick is immune for his judicial acts in

considering and issuing the custody order for Mr. Morris. That decision required him

to exercise discretion in “adjudicating private rights”—whether to involuntarily

commit Mr. Morris. See Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436 (cleaned up); see also N.C.G.S. §

122C-281(b) (2021) (allowing a designated officer to issue a custody order if he “finds

reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged in the affidavit are true and that

the respondent is probably a substance abuser and dangerous to self or others”). And

custody determinations are “normally performed by” a judicial officer. Stump, 435

U.S. at 362; see also id. at 364 (explaining that “controversial” decisions about the

“liberty and character of the parties” are “being constantly determined in . . . courts”

(cleaned up)).

But judicial immunity does not shield Magistrate Frederick for negligently

faxing the custody order to the wrong place. Sending a fax—unlike resolving a

custody request—is not the “kind of discretionary decisionmaking that the doctrine

of judicial immunity is designed to protect.” See Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435. In fact, it

requires virtually no discretion at all. See City of Bayou La Batre v. Robinson, 785 So.

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

2d 1128, 1133 (Ala. 2000) (withholding judicial immunity from a magistrate because

she was “executing an administrative duty that did not involve the exercise of

judgment” when she faxed a “warrant-recall order to the police department upside

down”). Sending a fax does not invoke a magistrate’s “judicial or adjudicative” power,

see Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229, nor require him to “exercise the kind of judgment”

inherent in judicial decision-making, see Antoine, 508 U.S. at 437. Any person—

whether a Supreme Court justice or a part-time secretary—goes through the same

mechanical actions to fax a document. Because that conduct is not normally

performed by a judicial officer, it “might as well have been committed to a private

person,” Ex parte Va., 100 U.S. at 348; see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228. Mr. Wynn

thus seeks relief from Magistrate Frederick for an “administrative” function beyond

the embrace of judicial immunity. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228.

Since Magistrate Frederick is not judicially immune for nonjudicial acts, the

next question is whether sovereign immunity bars Mr. Wynn’s claim. When a plaintiff

sues a state officer in his official capacity, the state itself is the true party in action.

See Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 110 (1997) (explaining that an official capacity claim

“seeks recovery from the entity of which the public servant defendant is an agent”).

But the state—as a sovereign—is absolutely immune from suit unless it consents. See

Corum v. Univ. of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 785–86 (1992). Thus, Mr. Wynn may

sue Magistrate Frederick in his official capacity for nonjudicial acts only if the state

waived sovereign immunity from that claim.

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

II. The Bond-Action Statute Waives Magistrates’ Sovereign Immunity from

Suit on their Official Bonds

Everyone agrees that the bond-action statute allows suit against covered

officers when they cause injury through “neglect, misconduct, or misbehavior in

office.” See N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. Mr. Wynn alleges that Magistrate Frederick

“neglect[ed]” to send Mr. Morris’ custody order to a proper law enforcement officer,

thereby causing Mr. Wynn’s injuries “by virtue or under the color” of his office as

magistrate. See id. The question is whether the bond-action statute applies to

Magistrate Frederick at all. If it does, then the state—by rendering magistrates liable

on their official bonds—consented to claims like Mr. Wynn’s. If it does not, then

sovereign immunity remains intact. Because I would hold that a magistrate is an

“officer” covered by the bond-action statute, I would allow Mr. Wynn to sue

Magistrate Frederick on his official bond.

A. Statutory Text

1. Ordinary and Legal Meaning

Like the majority, I start with the statute’s text. See Correll v. Div. of Soc.

Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144 (1992). The bond-action provision, as the majority notes,

does not expressly list magistrates. After mentioning some public officials, it reaches

further, including “other officer[s]” within its compass. That language is broad, but

intentional. In practice, that catch-all clause is a statutory safety net. By including

it, the legislature expanded the provision beyond the specific officers it lists.

Otherwise, there would be no reason to mention “other officer[s]” at all. And to

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

underscore the provision’s breadth, the legislature did not attach any qualifier or

limit to the term “officer.”

When the legislature has not supplied a definition, we generally give a term

its ordinary meaning. Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes, 370 N.C. 540, 550 (2018).

In common use, an “officer” is “a person holding public office under a national, state,

or local government, and authorized by that government to exercise some specific

function.” See Officer, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Magistrates fit that

description. The legislature created their position, see N.C.G.S. § 7A-170(a) (2021),

set qualifications on it, see N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-171, -171.2, 171.3, 173, 177 (2021), and

fixed the functions magistrates perform, see, e.g., N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-211, 211.1, 213

(2021). So in ordinary language, magistrates are “officers.”

That common meaning fits with common legal use. Other provisions of law

classify magistrates as “officers.” Our Constitution designates magistrates as

“officers of the District Court” where they sit. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 10. Our statutes

say the same. N.C.G.S. § 7A-170(a) (“A magistrate is an officer of the district court”);

see also N.C.G.S. § 14-230(a) (listing magistrate as one “such officer” who is subject

to criminal penalties for willfully failing to discharge official duties). And this Court

has drawn on those provisions in labeling magistrates “judicial officers.” Bradshaw,

320 N.C. at 134.

In reading statutes, this Court presumes that the legislature acts with

awareness of the law. We presume that it chooses its words with care. We presume,

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

too, that it intends language to have its ordinary meaning unless it says otherwise.

Wilkie, 370 N.C. at 550. Since a magistrate is an “officer”—both in common speech

and broader legal parlance—I would give that word its “natural, approved, and

recognized meaning.” Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 638 (1985).

2. The Other Language in the Bond-Action Statute

All the same, we do not interpret language in a vacuum. We read a statute

with an eye towards its context and internal structure. See Smith v. United States,

508 U. S. 223, 229 (1993). But here, text, structure, and context point the same way:

Throughout the bond-action statute, the legislature chose broad language to reinforce

the provision’s broad sweep. In defining the scope of a bond action, for instance, the

provision focuses on the nature of the injuring act rather than the title of the injuring

officer. It grants a right of action to “[e]very person injured” by an officer’s “neglect,

misconduct, or misbehavior in office.” N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. The “person injured” may

sue the officer and the surety on the bond “for the due performance of their duties in

office in the name of the State.” Id. The provision closes with a broad statement of its

purpose: An officer and his surety “shall be liable to the person injured for all acts

done by said officer by virtue or under color of that officer’s office.” Id.

So the statute does not distinguish between state and county officers.

Throughout, it refers to “every such officer,” “the officer’s official bond,” and “that

officer’s office” without limiting these terms. And so taken as a whole, the text focuses

on whether an officer caused injury “by virtue or under color” of his position and

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

official authority. This Court has recognized the language’s sweep. The bond-action

statute, we have explained, is “very comprehensive in its terms, scope and purpose.”

Kivett, 106 N.C. at 569. By enacting it, the legislature “enlarge[d] the compass of the

conditions of official bonds and their purpose.” Id. And rightfully so—that scheme

tracked “serious” concerns of “justice and policy.” Id. So the thrust of the statute’s

text and the principles animating it reach beyond the majority’s cramped

interpretation. See id. (“[S]uch officers, indeed all public officers, should be held to a

faithful discharge of their duties as such. . . . So that now official bonds and the

conditions of them embrace and extend to all acts done by virtue or under color of

office of the officer giving the bond.”).

3. The Language of the Statute Requiring Magistrates to Secure Bonds

Consider, too, the text of Section 7A-174—the provision mandating that

magistrates secure a bond in the first place. N.C.G.S. § 7A-174. Starting in 1965, the

General Assembly required magistrates to obtain bonds before taking office. See An

Act to Implement Article IV of the Constitution of North Carolina by Providing for a

New Chapter of The General Statutes of North Carolina, ch. 310, 1965 N.C. Sess.

Laws 369, 382.1 And the legislature conditioned those bonds “upon the faithful

1 Just this year, the legislature repealed the statute requiring magistrates to secure

bonds. See An Act to Make Various Changes and Technical Corrections to the Laws

Governing the Administration of Justice, As Recommended by the Administrative Office of

the Courts and to Allow for the Expunction of the Offense of Breaking and Entering of a

Building with Intent to Commit a Felony or Larceny and Amend the Conditions that Result

in a Petition for Expunction Being Denied, S.L. 2023-103, § 5(b),

https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2023-2024/SL2023-103.pdf.

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

performance of the duties of the office.” Id. If that language sounds familiar, it is—

the bond-action statute uses parallel phrasing. That provision—echoing Section 7A-

174—allows “[e]very person injured” to sue an officer on his bond “for the due

performance of [the officer’s] duties in office.” N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. So a citizen may

recover on a bond for the same reason a magistrate must obtain one: To ensure the

“due” or “faithful” performance of his official duties.

I think that shared language signals a shared meaning. See United Savings

Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that may

seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory

scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its

meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a

substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” (cleaned up)). It also

triggers a cardinal rule of construction: When statutes cover the same “matter or

subject,” this Court must construe them together in pari materia. DTH Media Corp.

v. Folt, 374 N.C. 292, 300 (2020) (cleaned up). That requires us to harmonize the

legislature’s language, giving “effect, if possible, to all provisions without destroying”

their meaning. Id. (cleaned up).

And here, reading Section 7A-174 in pari materia with the bond-action statute

undercuts the majority’s narrow construction. Because of his public office, a

Because that repeal took effect on 21 July 2023, the majority’s holding applies to a narrow

universe of claims—those filed before the repeal of N.C.G.S. § 7A-174.

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

magistrate—just like a county officer—wields heightened power. To ensure

responsible use of that power and the faithful performance of his official duties, a

magistrate—just like a county officer—must secure a bond. When a magistrate—just

like a county officer—engages in “neglect, misconduct, or misbehavior in office,” he

deviates from “due performance of [his] duties.” See N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. And when

those actions injure a person, a magistrate—just like a county officer—effected that

harm “by virtue or under color of [his] office.” See id.

In that case, allowing injured citizens to seek relief realizes the purpose of a

magistrate’s bond and the purpose of a bond action. And so reading “officer” to cover

magistrates harmonizes overlapping statutes, giving effect to what the legislature

enacted and the language it used. By coupling magistrates’ bond requirement with a

broadly phrased waiver of immunity on those bonds, the legislature designed a

principled scheme. One that anchors magistrates, like other public officers, to the

people they serve.

But in its reading of the bond-action statute, the majority shunts aside Section

7A-174, effectively nullifying that provision’s text and its purpose in requiring

magistrate bonds. If, as the majority says, no one may sue a magistrate on his bond,

then that bond is but a piece of paper. It has no function but to enrich bond companies

who receive payment without ever needing to compensate injured people. And

without any recourse under it, a magistrate’s bond cannot—as the legislature

intended and enacted—ensure “faithful performance of the duties of the office.”

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

N.C.G.S. § 7A-174. It is, in a word, surplusage. I do not think the General Assembly

intended for magistrates’ bonds to be a ticket to nowhere.

In short, I would give “other officer[s]” its ordinary meaning—a meaning that

fits with its broader legal use and the rest of the statute’s language. I think it

significant that the statute says “officer” without qualifying that label or limiting its

reach to specific strata of government. Other textual clues underscore that broad

sweep. We know that the legislature included a catch-all phrase to widen the statute’s

aperture. We know, too, that the statute does not focus on an officer’s precise job title,

but on whether he caused injury “by virtue or under color” of his office. And we know

that a magistrate’s bond ensures the “faithful performance” of his duties—language

echoed by the bond-action provision and consonant with its purpose. See N.C.G.S. §

7A-174.

More fundamentally, the majority’s interpretation of the bond-action statute

bleeds Section 7A-174 of meaning. If the General Assembly ordered magistrates to

secure bonds but barred citizens from suing on them, then those bonds and the

statute requiring them were little more than inkblots. And so on the majority’s view,

Section 7A-174 meant nothing—not when the legislature enacted it in 1965 and not

in the nearly 60 years since. I cannot afford the bond-action statute such a piecemeal,

disjointed interpretation.

Thus, giving “officer” its straightforward interpretation with an eye toward

context and structure, the bond-action statute covers magistrates. For that reason, I

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

would rely on “the words actually used in [the] statute” and decline to “insert words

not used in the relevant statutory language during the statutory construction

process.” Midrex Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 N.C. 250, 258 (2016)

(cleaned up).

B. The Ejusdem Generis Canon

In constricting the bond-action statute, the majority relies on the ejusdem

generis canon. When general words follow specific ones, it reasons, the latter must

cabin the former. And since the bond-action statute lists county officials before “other

officers,” the majority restricts that phrase to county officials, too.

But ejusdem generis—like every interpretive canon—is but a tool for divining

legislative intent. See State v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694, 698 (1965); Connecticut Nat’l

Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (explaining that “canons of

construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning

of legislation” (cleaned up)). It is a fallback means of construction rather than an

unflinching “limitation in scope” of a statute’s “general words or terms.” Fenner, 263

N.C. at 698. For that reason, ejusdem generis does “not warrant the court subverting

or defeating the legislative will.” Id. And so it does not control “when the whole

context dictates a different conclusion.” Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train

Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 732 (1983)

(explaining that courts should not use a canon of construction “when application

would be tantamount to a formalistic disregard of congressional intent”). As discussed

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above and below, I think the “whole context” of the bond-action statute cuts against

the majority’s cramped reading.

Start with the linchpin of the majority’s analysis: Our decision in Meyer. In

that case, as the majority explains, we considered whether a county agency fell

“within the scope of the general terms ‘departments, institutions, and agencies’ in the

State Tort Claims Act.” But as the majority tells it, this Court applied ejusdem generis

“because all of the ‘departments, institutions, and agencies’ specifically enumerated

within the statute were state entities.” From that, the majority extracts a general

rule: When a statute lists entities within a specific strata of government, that limit

applies to any general terms that follow.

But that rendition of Meyer omits key distinctions between that case and this

one. Reproduced in full, the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) allowed suits “against the

State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments,

institutions, and agencies of the State.” Meyer, 347 N.C. at 105 (emphasis omitted)

(quoting N.C.G.S. § 143-291(a) (1996)). So unlike the bond-action statute, the STCA

expressly limited its scope to a specific sphere of government.

That state-specific qualification mattered to Meyer’s analysis. Relying on the

statute’s textual limit and its mention of particular state entities, Meyer read the

STCA to “appl[y] only to actions against state departments, institutions, and

agencies.” Id. at 107. By its terms, the statute waived immunity for “the State

departments and agencies” but did “not include local units.” Id. at 106 (quoting

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

Turner v. Gastonia City Bd. of Educ., 250 N.C. 456, 463 (1959)). And though a county

department of social services is an agent of North Carolina’s Department of Human

Resources, we explained that an “agent of the State and a state agency are

fundamentally different and are treated differently by the [STCA].” Id. at 107. The

provision only authorized “a claim against the State agency.” Id. at 105 (quoting

Wirth v. Bracey, 258 N.C. 505, 507–08 (1963)). And since a county entity was “not a

state agency,” the STCA did not waive its immunity. Id. at 104.

Placed in context, Meyer did not announce the flat rule the majority wrings

from it. Our reasoning in that case tracked the precise statute before us. And since

the STCA differs sharply from the bond-action statute, I would not pluck Meyer’s

analysis from its context. Unlike the provision here, the STCA lacks a catch-all

clause. And more importantly, the STCA expressly limited its application to state

government entities. In other words, the legislature signaled its intent to treat state

and county actors differently. Those textual guardrails shaped how we applied

ejusdem generis. We did not bar STCA claims against local entities simply because

the parties “specifically enumerated within the statute were state entities,” as the

majority contends. Instead, the provision expressly limited liability to subdivisions

“of the State,” drawing the very state-local distinction the majority imports into the

bond-action statute. So for Meyer’s analysis to map onto this case, the bond-action

provision—paralleling the STCA—would have to narrow liability to “other officers of

the county.” It does not.

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In more applicable cases, however, this Court has flagged ejusdem generis as a

particularly poor tool for reading public-officer statutes. In Ross, for instance, we

considered whether the phrase “any other fiduciary” enlarged the “scope of the

embezzlement statute.” State v. Ross, 272 N.C. 67, 71 (1967) (emphasis omitted). The

defendant, a commissioner, urged us to narrow the provision via ejusdem generis. Id.

The statute did not mention commissioners “by name,” he noted. Id. And

commissioners were “not in the same class” as the enumerated officers—officers like

a “guardian, administrator, executor, [or] trustee.” Id. That meant, he contended, that

ejusdem generis excluded him from the statute’s sweep. See id.

We rejected that narrow reading. By mentioning “any other fiduciary,” we

explained, the General Assembly broadened the statute’s aperture. Id. That language

“cannot be ignored.” Id. And so to carry out the legislature’s intent, we focused on the

power an officer wielded rather than their job title. See id. at 71–72. Like a receiver,

we explained, a commissioner functions as “an arm or hand of the court.” Id. at 71

(cleaned up). Acting “under authority of and subject to the orders of the clerk of the

superior court,” a commissioner collects and distributes money. Id. Since a

commissioner wields the authority of the law, “[s]pecial confidence and trust is

imposed in him.” Id. at 72. And so commissioners—like the other officers in the

statute—were “fiduciaries whose duties are prescribed by law and who act under the

supervision and orders” of a higher power. Id. at 71. We thus declined to narrow the

statute through ejusdem generis. In view of the commissioner’s official duties and the

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“special confidence” attached to his position, a functional analysis was more faithful

to legislative intent. See id. at 71–72.

I would take the same approach with the statute here. In my view, the key

metric is the power wielded by an officer rather than the label attached to the office.

A magistrate—like the other officers listed in the bond-action statute—is clothed with

the state’s authority. And because of that power, a magistrate—like the other

officers—is entrusted with “[s]pecial confidence and trust.” Cf. id. at 72. Recognizing

that fact, the legislature required magistrates—like the other officers—to secure a

bond conditioned on the “faithful performance” of their official duties. And because of

their official power and the “[s]pecial confidence” placed in them, cf. id., magistrates—

like the other officers—should be liable on their bond for their misfeasance in office.

Woodenly deploying ejusdem generis would yield an unduly narrow reading,

converting a tool for discerning intent into one that defeats it.

According to the majority, however, interpreting “other officer[s]” to cover

magistrates would nullify the statute’s “specific references” to certain officials. If the

General Assembly intended to give those “general words” their “unrestricted sense,”

the majority reasons, it would have deleted the statute’s specific enumerations.

But the reverse is true, too. If the legislature wished to adopt the majority’s

narrow construction, it would have axed the broad reference to “other officer[s].” It

could have also inserted the county-level limitation the majority adds to the text.

Indeed, the legislature has done just that in neighboring provisions. And as the

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majority documents, the legislature has reshuffled and revised the bond-action

statute, removing some officers from its scope and restructuring the provisions

around it. But the phrase “other officer[s]” has weathered each round of revision. I

think its retention is an important clue of legislative intent.

C. Statutory Context

Statutory context supports what the text says: That magistrates are “officer[s]”

liable on their official bonds. In neighboring statutes, the legislature made clear its

intent to guarantee citizens a remedy for official misconduct. To advance that goal,

other provisions close loopholes to officers’ liability on their bonds.

Section 58-72-1, for instance, prevents an officer from escaping suit based on a

technical error in his bond or an “irregularity or invalidity in the conferring of the

office or making of the appointment.” N.C.G.S. § 58-72-1 (2021). The statute

specifically applies to bonds issued by a county’s board of commissioners—a

restriction only relevant for county officials. But that provision—like the bond-action

statute—then reaches further, covering “any person or persons acting under or in

virtue of any public authority.” Id. Even if an officer did not properly assume his role

and even if the bond itself contains mistakes, those technicalities do not defeat the

officer’s liability. So long as the bond “purport[ed] to be a bond executed to the State

for the performance of any duty belonging to any office or appointment,” it provides

a “valid” right of action “for the benefit of the person injured by a breach of” its

conditions. Id.; accord N.C.G.S. § 58-72-5 (2021) (imposing a $500 penalty for “[e]very

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person or officer of whom an official bond is required” who “presumes to discharge

any duty of his office before” securing a required bond).

Against that backdrop, the omission of a county-officer limit from the bond-

action statute is especially striking. For when the General Assembly wants to cabin

bond provisions to a particular class of officials, it can—and will—do so.

Some provisions focus on state officers. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 58-73-1 (2021)

(permitting state officials to name an “indemnity or guaranty company” as surety for

official bond); N.C.G.S. §§ 58-73-5, -15, -20, -25 (2021) (parsing how a surety company

may secure a state officer’s bond and the liability that a company may incur on that

bond). Other provisions zero in on county officers. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 20-114(a)

(2021) (providing that the “lawful officers of any county” may be “liable on his official

bond” for neglecting or refusing to perform statutory duties).

And most relevant to the bond-action statute, provisions in the same chapter

contain the very county-officer limit that the majority adds. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. § 58-

72-10 (2021) (“Every treasurer, sheriff, coroner, register of deeds, surveyor, and every

other officer of the several counties who is required by law to give a bond for the

faithful performance of the duties of his office, shall give a bond for the term of the

office to which such officer is chosen.”) (emphasis added); N.C.G.S. § 58-72-15 (2021)

(authorizing the commissioners “of the county in which said officer or officers are

elected” to pay the premiums on the bonds of county officers as well as the “assistants,

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deputies or other persons regularly employed in the offices of any such county officer

or officers”) (emphasis added).

The legislature also provided county-specific enforcement mechanisms for

county-specific bonds. Section 58-72-20 requires that county officers’ bonds be

“carefully examined on the first Monday in December of every year” to ensure

sufficient collateralization. N.C.G.S. § 58-72-20 (2021). If a county officer fails to

renew his bond, the county’s board of commissioners must “declare his office vacant”

and “appoint a successor.” N.C.G.S. § 58-72-25 (2021). The citizens of a county also

have statutory recourse. If they reasonably suspect that “the bond of any officer of

such county” is inadequately secured, those citizens may request—and a judge may

require—that the county officer appear in court and prove the validity of his bond.

N.C.G.S. § 58-72-35 (2021).

Those examples underscore the same point: The General Assembly is well-

versed in the legal regimes surrounding state and county officials. And when it

intends to limit a bond provision to one strata of government, it can—and will—add

that restriction in the text. But the bond-action statute—unlike the provisions

surrounding it—contains no such limit. I would not insert a constraint where the

legislature has not.

D. History

Though the majority offers a thoughtful survey of the statute’s evolution, I

think the history is less clear-cut than the majority suggests.

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

A century ago, North Carolina’s bond statutes looked quite different. As the

majority recounts, the chapter dealing with public officer bonds once contained

separate provisions listing “State Officers” and “County Officers.” N.C. Revised Code

of 1905, ch. 9, §§ 287–306 (1905). In current form, the bond-action statute mentions

some of the county-level positions it did a century ago. Per the majority, that

continuity shows that the legislature has “historically categorized” those positions “as

county officers.” And that “historical classification,” the majority contends, reflects

the legislature’s intent to limit suits to “only bonded county officers.” By drawing that

line, the majority concludes, the legislature “necessarily exclude[d]” state officers—

like magistrates—from liability on their bonds.

I take different lessons from that history. While the 1905 code parceled out

which state and county officers needed to secure bonds, it provided a single cause of

action on those bonds. See N.C. Revised Code of 1905, ch. 9, § 281. And the bond-

action statute of 1905 is nearly identical to the one we have today, including the catch-

all phrase “or other officer[s].” See id. More tellingly, the legislature inserted that

broadly phrased cause of action before the provisions listing state and county officers.

In other words, though some portions of the code distinguished state officers from

county ones, the bond-action statute then—like the bond-action statute now—did not

draw the same lines. See id.

That was not an oversight. Like the statutory scheme we have today, the 1905

code prescribed specific rules for specific classes of public officers. Section 308, for

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example, required the officers “of the several counties” to examine their bonds on the

first Monday of each December. Id. § 308. Even more, the code set separate rules for

who could serve as sureties for the bonds of state officers versus officers in a “county,

city, town or township in this state.” Compare id. § 272 (addressing state officials),

with id. § 273 (addressing local officials).

The point is that the 1905 code—like the regime we have today—is replete with

examples of the legislature expressly distinguishing between and dictating separate

rules for state and local officers. But that differential language never made its way

into the bond-action statute. Then, as now, the legislature kept the broad reference

to “other officer[s].” To now restrict that phrase to county officers would stray from

history, not follow it.

In broader perspective, too, the statute’s history suggests a shift towards

inclusion. Though earlier laws split state officers from local ones, the General

Assembly scrubbed that divide from the current statutory regime. Compare N.C.

Revised Code of 1905, ch. 9, with N.C.G.S. §§ 58-73 to -76 (2021). By puncturing the

wall between state and local officers, the modern bond-action statute emphasizes the

common thread between public servants. Whether an official serves the state or a

county, he is entrusted with power greater than his own. And with that power comes

the potential to misuse it and cause harm. By retaining the broadly phrased cause of

action while erasing the once-strict barriers between state and county officers, the

legislature has signaled that an officer’s public position—not their place in the

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government hierarchy—dictates the need for both a bond and a bond action.

While reasonable minds can extract different insights from history, one lesson

is irrefutable: Throughout the life of the bond-action statute, the General Assembly

has revised it when it saw fit. It has excised some positions, renamed the provision,

and restructured the broader statutory scheme. The legislature does not need this

Court to tinker with the language it has enacted and retained for well over a hundred

years. If it wanted to restrict bond suits to county officials, it would have done so.

E. Purpose

Ultimately, statutory analysis must embrace “the spirit of the act” and what it

“seeks to accomplish.” Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664 (2001) (cleaned up).

And here, the legislature enacted the bond-action statute to secure citizens’ rights,

furnish a remedy for injuries, and hold public officers accountable to the people they

serve. See Kivett, 106 N.C. at 569.

To that end, this Court has read the bond statute against the backdrop of

contract law, specifically principles of third-party beneficiaries. A statute created for

the public “must be considered as in contemplation of the parties in making a

contract.” State ex rel. Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 281 (1940). And when the

legislature addresses “the liability of the parties to the public,” the provision “becomes

an enforceable part of the contract made for their benefit.” Id.; see also State ex rel.

Williams v. Adams, 288 N.C. 501, 504 (1975); State ex rel. Cain v. Corbett, 235 N.C.

33, 39 (1952) (construing bond-action statute by drawing on the principle “that where

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Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

a contract between parties is made for the benefit of a third party, the latter is entitled

to maintain an action for its breach”).

On that view, official bonds provide both a sword and a shield. They shield

citizens by incentivizing public officers to “du[ly] perform[]” their duties and

responsibly wield their power. See N.C.G.S. § 58-76-5. And when an officer misuses

his office, bonds provide a sword, allowing a person to recover for injuries flowing

from that malfeasance. On both scores, bonds recognize that public officers are—and

should remain—officers of the public. Because they wield the people’s sovereign

authority, those officers must act with awareness and accountability.

By allowing bond suits, the legislature also recognized a practical truth: That

a private citizen and a public official are “not on equal terms.” State ex rel. Price v.

Honeycutt, 216 N.C. 270, 276 (1939). When an officer acts, he does so under “color of

an authority which” a citizen is “bound to respect.” Id. And practically speaking,

citizens have little choice but “to accept the official services of such officers.” Kivett,

106 N.C. at 569. Citizens must thus “rely on the restraint which the law throws

around” a public officer while “at the same time it clothes him with power.” Price, 216

N.C. at 276.

For that reason, courts may not turn a blind eye when an officer “begins to

violate his duty and inflict injury under color of his office.” Id. For a government

official “possesses a far greater capacity for harm” than a citizen “exercising no

authority other than his own.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392. And at its most basic, the

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“guaranty provided by law” is that “official duty shall not be disregarded” nor “the

delegated power abused.” Price, 216 N.C. at 276. The bond-action statute realizes that

principle. By converting an officer’s bond into a cause of action to remedy official

malfeasance, the statute leaves citizens “secure in their rights,” furnishes an

“adequate remedy for wrongs done,” and holds public servants “to a faithful discharge

of their duties as such.” Kivett, 106 N.C. at 569.

More broadly, the bond-action statute taps into principles of legitimacy and

justice. As this Court once recognized, the “law is never more definitely on trial” than

“when it comes in contact with the public in its execution.” Price, 216 N.C. at 276.

Faced with that friction, courts should “preserve the respect the people have for [the

law] as an instrument of justice” and forestall “the spirit of just resentment against

oppression, which often flares into rebellion.” Id. The bond-action statute prefigures

that problem and provides one solution: It grants citizens a mechanism to ensure that

“official duty shall not be disregarded” nor “delegated power abused.” Id. And so when

a public official acts “under color of his office down to the point where he is remiss in

his duties,” courts may not bury their head in the sand. Id. In those cases, justice

requires what the bond-action statute authorizes: When a public officer abuses his

power, he may not shed “his official character” and escape “into the first person

singular, to the relief of his surety.” Id.

For these reasons, I would hold that magistrates are “officer[s]” covered by the

bond-action statute. That reading aligns with the provision’s text, structure, purpose,

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and context. Though I agree with the majority that judicial immunity applies to

official capacity claims, I would decline to immunize Magistrate Frederick for his

nonjudicial acts. On sovereign immunity grounds, I think that the state consented to

suit on a magistrate’s official bond. I would thus give Mr. Wynn his day in court and

hold that the bond-action statute allows him to seek relief from Magistrate Frederick

on the magistrate’s bond.

Justice RIGGS joins in this concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion.

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