Veronica Marquand v. Department of Defense

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

VERONICA MARQUAND, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, PH-0752-14-0636-B-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: December 14, 2023

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Veronica Marquand , Hamden, Connecticut, pro se.

Norman Thompson , Esquire, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

Mark E. Stopa , Esquire, and Adam Janeczek , Esquire, East Hartford,

Connecticut, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,

which sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only

in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

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A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

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or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of

discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and

material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the remand initial

decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

¶2 On September 27, 2010, the agency appointed the appellant to a GS-12

Contract Price/Cost Analyst position with the Defense Contract Management

Agency (DCMA), Sikorsky Aircraft, in Stratford, Connecticut. Marquand v.

Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-14-0636-I-1, Initial Appeal

File (IAF), Tab 57 at 56. This position falls within the DCMA’s Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) Workforce. IAF, Tab 58 at 8. Effective

March 28, 2014, the agency removed the appellant for failing to meet a condition

of employment, namely, achieving Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement

Act (DAWIA) Level II Certification within 40 months of her entrance on duty.

Id. at 25-36, 50-54.

¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal, contesting the merits of her removal and

raising affirmative defenses of harmful procedural error and violation of due

process. IAF, Tabs 1, 14. She waived her right to a hearing. IAF, Tab 42. The

administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining the appellant’s removal.

IAF, Tab 65, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 52. She found that the agency proved its

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charge, the appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses, and the appellant’s

removal promoted the efficiency of the service. ID at 4-52.

¶4 The appellant filed a petition for review, Petition for Review File, Tab 7,

which the Board granted, Marquand v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No.

PH-0752-14-0636-I-1, Remand Order (July 7, 2016). The Board agreed with the

administrative judge that the agency proved its charge and affirmed that portion

of the initial decision as modified. Remand Order, ¶ 1 n.2, ¶¶ 15-3. However, the

Board disagreed with one of the administrative judge’s discovery rulings, so it

remanded the appeal for further adjudication, to include permitting the appellant

additional discovery about the agency’s treatment of other employees who failed

to meet a condition of employment. Remand Order, ¶¶ 31-41.

¶5 After further proceedings on remand, the administrative judge issued a new

initial decision again sustaining the appellant’s removal. Marquand v.

Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-14-0636-B-1, Remand

Appeal File (RAF), Tab 52, Remand Initial Decision (RID). She found that the

agency did not unjustifiably treat the appellant any differently than any similarly

situated employees and that removal was a reasonable penalty. RID at 7-11. The

administrative judge further found that the appellant failed to prove a due process

violation in connection with the comparator evidence submitted on remand. RID

at 11-13.

¶6 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision

and a supplemental petition for review. Marquand v. Department of Defense,

MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-14-0636-B-1, Remand Petition for Review (RPFR)

File, Tabs 6, 10. The agency has filed a response in opposition to the petition for

review, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. RPFR File,

Tabs 12-13.

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ANALYSIS

The appellant’s motion for leave to submit additional briefing is denied.

¶7 After the close of the record on review, the appellant requested “leave to

reference and apply” precedent that has been issued by the Board and the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit during the pendency of the petition for

review. RPFR File, Tab 28. We have considered the appellant’s pleading, but we

find that the decisions that she cites would be immaterial to the outcome of this

appeal. We therefore deny the appellant’s motion. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k).

Notwithstanding this ruling, in arriving at our decision, to the extent that there

have been relevant developments in the case law after the remand initial decision

was issued, we have considered them in arriving at our decision.

The scope of the issues before the Board on remand was limited to the issues

discussed in the Remand Order.

¶8 On review, the appellant asserts that she is renewing all of the arguments

she has made throughout her appeal. RPFR File, Tab 6 at 4. Pursuant to the

Board’s Remand Order, however, the issues before the Board on remand were

limited to the penalty analysis and a related due process issue. Remand Order,

¶ 40. We therefore do not address the appellant’s arguments regarding issues that

are beyond the scope of the Board’s Remand Order. See Zelenka v. Office of

Personnel Management, 110 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 15 n.3 (2008) (declining to address

the appellant’s arguments because they exceeded the scope of the issues to be

addressed on remand), rev’d on other grounds, 361 F. App’x 138 (Fed. Cir.

2010).

The agency did not violate the appellant’s right to due process.

¶9 On review, the appellant argues that the agency violated her due process

rights when the deciding official considered aggravating penalty factors that were

not contained in the proposal notice. RPFR File, Tab 6 at 5-7. For a tenured

public employee facing removal from her position, minimum due process requires

prior notice and an opportunity to respond. Cleveland Board of Education v.

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Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). An agency violates an employee’s due

process rights when the deciding official relies upon new and material ex parte

information as a basis for his decision. Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d

1274, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,

179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In Ward, the court held that, if an

employee has not been given “notice of any aggravating factors supporting an

enhanced penalty,” an ex parte communication with the deciding official

regarding such factors may constitute a due process violation. Ward, 634 F.3d

at 1280. Consistent with Ward, the Board has held that, when a deciding official

considers aggravating factors that were not included in the proposal notice, the

appellant is no longer on notice of portions of the evidence relied upon by the

agency in imposing the penalty, resulting in a possible violation of her right to

due process. See Lopes v. Department of the Navy, 116 M.S.P.R. 470, ¶ 8 (2011).

¶10 Nevertheless, not all ex parte communications rise to the level of due

process violations; rather, only ex parte communications that introduce new and

material information to the deciding official will violate the due process

guarantee of notice. Ward, 634 F.3d at 1279; Stone, 179 F.3d at 1376-77; Solis v.

Department of Justice, 117 M.S.P.R. 458, ¶ 8 (2012). Ultimately, the inquiry is

whether the ex parte communication is so substantial and so likely to cause

prejudice that no employee can fairly be required to be subjected to a deprivation

of property under such circumstances. Ward, 634 F.3d at 1279; Stone, 179 F.3d

at 1377; Solis, 117 M.S.P.R. 458, ¶ 8.

¶11 In analyzing the penalty factors set forth in Douglas v. Veterans

Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the deciding official referred to

“the need for employees similarly situated to meet the condition of employment.”

IAF, Tab 57 at 35. In its Remand Order, the Board directed the administrative

judge to address the appellant’s due process claim related to these “similarly

situated” but unidentified employees. Remand Order, ¶ 39. The Board found that

further discovery regarding potential comparators might yield relevant evidence

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regarding that claim. Id. On remand, the agency submitted a declaration from the

deciding official, in which he stated that he “did not consider any other specific

employee but considered that allowing an employee not to meet a condition of

employment in the manner that occurred here would prospectively cause other

employees to believe they did not have to meet the condition of employment.”

RAF, Tab 45 at 65. In light of this unrebutted evidence, the administrative judge

found that the appellant did not prove a due process violation. RID at 13 (citing

Norris v. Securities and Exchange Commission , 675 F.3d 1349, 1353-54 (Fed.

Cir. 2012) (finding no due process violation when the deciding official testified

that the information in question played no role in her consideration of the

Douglas factors or her ultimate decision to remove the appellant)). We agree

with the administrative judge’s analysis.

The appellant is not entitled to additional discovery.

¶12 On remand, the chief issue in terms of penalty was whether the agency

treated the appellant more harshly than it treated other similarly situated

employees. Remand Order, ¶ 40. As directed by the Board, the administrative

judge permitted the appellant’s discovery request for the disciplinary records of

all DCMA AT&L employees who were charged with the same or similar offenses

for the 5-year period preceding her removal. Remand Order, ¶ 40; RAF, Tab 2

at 2. The agency provided the appellant this information, but only from July 8,

2012, onward (approximately 21 months prior to the appellant’s removal). The

agency explained that employee disciplinary records predating July 8, 2012, had

been destroyed pursuant to its records retention schedule. RAF, Tab 22 at 18-20.

The appellant filed a motion to compel, but the administrative judge denied it,

finding that the agency had already provided all of the responsive information

within its possession. 2 RAF, Tab 21 at 4, Tab 23, Tab 26 at 2-3.

2

The appellant’s motion extended to other information that the agency destroyed

pursuant to its records retention schedule, and the administrative judge denied those

portions of the appellant’s motion for the same reason. RAF, Tab 2 at 2, Tabs 23, 26.

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¶13 On review, the appellant argues that, by denying her motion to compel, the

administrative judge effectively limited discovery about comparators to a 2-year

period, rather than the 5-year period specified by the Board. RPFR File, Tab 6

at 17-19. However, we agree with the administrative judge’s decision not to

order the agency to produce information that was no longer in its possession. 3

RAF, Tabs 23, 26. As the administrative judge explained, pursuant to the DCMA

records retention schedule, employee disciplinary records are not permanent

records and must be destroyed between 4 and 7 years after they are created. RAF,

Tab 22 at 53, 108, Tab 26 at 2-3. Furthermore, the agency submitted unrebutted

evidence to show that the records in question were actually destroyed after

4 years. RAF, Tab 22 at 132-34; cf. Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, 27 M.S.P.R.

442, 445 n.3 (“The agency has not specifically alleged that records beyond three

years have been destroyed pursuant to its record retention guidelines.”).

¶14 We see nothing improper with the agency’s records retention schedule and

no indication that the agency destroyed the records knowing that they would be

subject to discovery in the instant appeal. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d

1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that an adverse inference for spoliation of

evidence requires proof that evidence was destroyed “with a culpable state of

mind” and that it was “relevant to the party’s claim or defense”). Therefore, to

the extent that the appellant is seeking an adverse inference or other sanction

against the agency, we find that no sanction is warranted.

¶15 The appellant also appears to contest the Board’s prior ruling that she

should be able to discover the disciplinary records of similarly situated DCMA

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On November 27, 2018, the appellant filed a motion requesting leave to issue

subpoenas to obtain evidence that she claims was “wrongly denied” during discovery.

RPFR File, Tab 18 at 4. In support of her motion, the appellant argues that the

requested subpoenas are necessary because the administrative judge abused her

discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to compel. For the reasons discussed

above, however, we find that the administrative judge did not abuse her discretion

regarding discovery. Therefore, we deny the appellant’s motion.

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AT&L employees; she argues that the Board should have expanded the scope of

discovery to the entire Department of Defense acquisition workforce. RPFR File,

Tab 6 at 17-19. However, the Board will not reconsider issues that have already

been decided in an appeal unless there is new and material evidence, controlling

authority has made a contrary decision of law, or the prior decision was clearly

erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. O’Connell v. Department of the

Navy, 73 M.S.P.R. 235, 240 (1997). We find that none of these circumstances are

present here, and we therefore decline to revisit the Board’s previous ruling on

the scope of discovery. This is particularly so in light of the Board’s intervening

decision in Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 13, in which it held

that the universe of potential comparators may, depending on the circumstances,

be limited to other employees in the same work unit as the appellant. 4

The administrative judge correctly found that removal is a reasonable penalty.

¶16 When the agency’s charge is sustained, as in this case, the Board will

review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all

the relevant factors and exercised management discretion within tolerable limits

of reasonableness. Penland v. Department of the Interior, 115 M.S.P.R. 474, ¶ 7

(2010). In making this determination, the Board must give due weight to the

agency’s primary discretion in maintaining employee discipline and efficiency,

recognizing that the Board’s function is not to displace management’s

responsibility, but to ensure that managerial judgment has been properly

exercised. Id. The Board will modify or mitigate a penalty only when it finds

that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the penalty clearly

exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. Id. The deciding official need not show

that he considered all the mitigating factors, and the Board will independently

weigh the relevant factors only if the deciding official failed to demonstrate that

4

To the extent that the appellant argues that the administrative judge should have

certified some discovery issues for interlocutory review, RPFR File, Tab 6 at 24 n.14,

we find that the issue is now moot. See Herman v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R.

642, ¶ 11 n.3 (2013).

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he considered any specific, relevant mitigating factors before deciding on a

penalty. Batara v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 278, ¶ 5 (2016).

¶17 The Board has held that, in an adverse action resulting from an employee’s

failure to maintain a condition of employment, the most relevant Douglas factors

generally are (1) the nature of the offense; (2) its effect on an appellant’s

performance of the job; and (3) the availability and effect of alternative sanctions.

Penland, 115 M.S.P.R. 474, ¶ 8. Regarding the first two factors, the deciding

official considered that the appellant was required to achieve Level II

Certification in Contracting because she occupied an acquisition position and that

her failure to do so disqualified her from membership in the Acquisition Corps.

IAF, Tab 46 at 17-18. He also considered that the appellant’s failure to achieve

Level II Certification resulted in a lack of professional development that

diminished her ability to serve in an acquisition position. IAF, Tab 57 at 34.

¶18 As for the availability and effectiveness of alternative sanctions, the record

indicates that the deciding official did not seek a waiver of the deadline for

obtaining the required certification due to the appellant twice cancelling courses

she was scheduled to take and her lack of cooperation when the agency attempted

to ensure her compliance with the certification requirement. Id. at 33-34.

Further, the deciding official sought to place the appellant in a non-acquisition

position as an alternative to removal; however, no such positions were available

at Sikorsky. IAF, Tab 46 at 21, Tab 57 at 36.

¶19 As explained above, the parties in this case also filed extensive evidence

and argument concerning the consistency of the penalty with those previously

imposed on other employees for the same or similar offenses. In her initial

decision, the administrative judge considered evidence pertaining to 11 other

DCMA AT&L employees who failed to attain a required DAWIA certification,

but she found that none of them were similarly situated to the appellant for

purposes of the penalty analysis. RID at 9-10. She further found that, even if the

agency had treated the appellant more harshly than another similarly situated

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employee, considering the Douglas factors as a whole, removal was still a

reasonable penalty. RID at 10 n.8.

¶20 On petition for review, the appellant argues that, regarding this Douglas

factor, the administrative judge incorrectly placed the burden of proof on her.

RPFR File, Tab 6 at 9-11. However, we find that, regardless of the language that

the administrative judge used to describe her analysis of this issue, the record is

fully developed, and the appellant’s substantive rights have not been prejudiced.

See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984). The

record shows that, of the 11 DCMA AT&L employees who failed to attain a

required DAWIA certification, 3 of them were removed, 2 retired or resigned

before receiving a final decision on a proposed removal, 3 were downgraded to

vacant positions that did not require DAWIA Certification, and 3 received

proposed downgrades to such positions. RID at 9; RAF, Tab 22 at 133. We find

that this evidence shows that the agency’s treatment of the appellant was

consistent with its treatment of other employees who failed to attain a DAWIA

certification. Removal is the standard penalty in such cases when, as here, there

are no non-acquisition positions available to which the employee could be

demoted or reassigned.

¶21 For these reasons, we agree with the administrative judge that the deciding

official properly considered the relevant Douglas factors and that removal did not

exceed the bounds of reasonableness. RID at 10-11; ID at 52.

The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge was biased .

¶22 Finally, the appellant raises a claim of adjudicatory bias on review. RPFR

File, Tab 6 at 13-14, 23 n.3. She alleges that, throughout the appeal, the

administrative judge has “spoken on behalf of” and demonstrated a bias for the

agency, and has not acted reasonably. Id. at 13. In making a claim of bias or

prejudice against an administrative judge, a party must overcome the presumption

of honesty and integrity that accompanies administrative adjudicators. Oliver v.

Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980). An administrative

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judge’s conduct during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new

adjudication only if her comments or actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism

or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department

of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)); Smets v. Department of the Navy, 117 M.S.P.R.

164, ¶ 15 (2011), aff’d, 498 F. App’x 1 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The appellant’s

allegations on review, which do not relate to any extrajudicial conduct by the

administrative judge, do not rise to this level.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

5

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

13

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

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(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

6

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

15

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.