In re N.R.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

In re N.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

O.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

S274943

Second Appellate District, Division Five

B312001

Los Angeles County Superior Court

20CCJP06523A

December 14, 2023

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and

Evans concurred.

In re N.R.

S274943

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We granted review in this matter to decide two related

issues associated with the exercise of dependency jurisdiction by

the juvenile court.

The first issue concerns the meaning of “substance abuse”

as used within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,

subdivision (b)(1)(D) (hereinafter section 300(b)(1)(D)).1 The

statutory scheme for dependency proceedings provides that

jurisdiction over a child exists in various scenarios in which the

“child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child

will suffer, serious physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd.

(b)(1).) These circumstances include situations in which serious

physical harm or illness, or a substantial risk of serious physical

harm or illness, results from an “inability of the parent or

guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s

or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or

substance abuse.” (§ 300(b)(1)(D).) We must decide here

whether substance abuse, in this context, requires either a

diagnosis by a medical professional or satisfaction of the

prevailing criteria for a substance use disorder as specified

within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

1

All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to

the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Disorders (DSM), a text developed by the American Psychiatric

Association.

As to this issue, we hold that neither of these showings is

essential under section 300(b)(1)(D). We interpret section

300(b)(1)(D) as assigning the term “substance abuse” its

ordinary meaning — essentially, the excessive use of drugs or

alcohol. Although a professional diagnosis or satisfaction of the

DSM criteria for the pertinent substance use disorder can be

relevant to ascertaining the existence of substance abuse under

this standard, we do not read the statute as requiring such

proof.

We caution, however, that for dependency jurisdiction to

exist due to substance abuse pursuant to section 300(b)(1)(D),

this abuse must render a parent or guardian unable to provide

regular care for a child and either cause the child to suffer

serious physical harm or illness or place the child at substantial

risk of suffering such harm or illness. These additional

requirements function to limit the circumstances in which a

parent’s or guardian’s substance abuse will support the exercise

of dependency jurisdiction under this provision.

The second issue before us relates to how these additional

requirements may be established. Some courts have held that

the existence of substance abuse by a parent or guardian, by

itself, amounts to prima facie evidence of both an inability to

provide regular care for a child and a substantial risk of serious

physical harm when the child is of “tender years,” a term that is

sometimes used by courts to describe young children with

limited ability to care for themselves. We reject this tender

years presumption as inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent,

as manifested in the statutory text. The age of a child may bear

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

upon whether substance abuse renders a parent or guardian

unable to provide that child with regular care, and whether the

child is thereby placed at substantial risk of serious physical

harm or illness. But the statutory scheme does not allow courts

to treat a showing of substance abuse as always being sufficient

on its own to establish these other requirements for dependency

jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D), even when a young child

is involved.

Consistent with these conclusions, we reverse the

judgment below and remand this matter to the Court of Appeal

for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 19, 2020, police officers executed a search

warrant at the residence of N.R.’s mother, S.H. (Mother).2 N.R.

was 12 months old at the time. Mother lived separately from

N.R.’s father, appellant O.R. (Father), with the two parents

sharing custody of N.R.

During the execution of the search warrant, a social

worker employed by the Los Angeles County Department of

Children and Family Services (the Department) spoke with

Mother and inspected the premises. The social worker had

safety concerns regarding N.R.’s living arrangements and asked

Mother if N.R. could stay with Father while the investigation

continued. Mother agreed to contact Father, who soon arrived

to pick up N.R.

The social worker accompanied Father to his apartment

and toured it with him. The social worker’s assessment of

2

The search was directed toward weapons and drugs

believed to be in the possession of Mother’s brother and her

mother’s boyfriend.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Father’s residence was generally positive. N.R. was observed to

be “clean, neat and on target with all developmental

milestones.” In speaking with the social worker, Father denied

that he abused substances, and he agreed to take a drug test.

Father’s drug test, conducted that same day, came back

positive for cocaine metabolite at a measured level of 1441

nanograms per milliliter. The social worker went to Father’s

apartment to discuss the results with him. Father said he had

been scared to reveal his cocaine use in their earlier

conversation. He admitted he had used cocaine the weekend

before the positive test. He said he did not know how much of

the substance he had used. Father denied that he was an active

user of cocaine. He explained that he used the cocaine to

celebrate his birthday and had not expected he would be asked

to take care of N.R. soon thereafter, and that he had not used

drugs since then.

N.R. remained in Father’s care, with no concerns beyond

those described above being noted by social workers, from

November 19, 2020, until the execution of a removal order on

December 8, 2020. Pursuant to this order, N.R. was placed in

the care of a maternal uncle.

Shortly thereafter, a petition was filed in Los Angeles

County Superior Court alleging that N.R. came within the

dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Tracking

language appearing within section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the

petition alleged that N.R. had suffered, or there was a

substantial risk he would suffer, serious physical harm or illness

“as a result of the failure or inability of his . . . parent or legal

guardian to supervise or protect [him] adequately,” “as a result

of the willful or negligent failure of [his] parent or legal guardian

to supervise or protect [him] adequately from the conduct of the

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

custodian with whom [he] has been left,” and “by the inability of

the parent or legal guardian to provide regular care for [him]

due to the parent’s or legal guardian’s mental illness,

developmental disability, or substance abuse.”

The factual allegations in the petition alleged, first, that

Mother had created a dangerous home environment by allowing

her mother (N.R.’s maternal grandmother), who allegedly

abused drugs, to reside with Mother and N.R. According to the

petition, Father failed to protect N.R. from this danger even

though he knew or should have known of the grandmother’s

substance abuse. As a separate factual basis for the assertion

of dependency jurisdiction, the petition alleged that Father “has

a history of substance abuse and is a current abuser of cocaine,”

noting Father’s positive toxicology result. According to the

petition, N.R. was “of such a young age as to require constant

care and supervision and father’s substance abuse interferes

with providing regular care” for him. The petition further

alleged that Mother had failed to protect N.R. from what it

characterized as Father’s substance abuse.

Both parents subsequently spoke to Department staff

regarding Father’s drug use. Mother initially said that although

she had not known that Father used drugs, looking back, she

realized that Father had been using cocaine from before N.R.

was born until recently. In a later interview, however, she said

that Father used cocaine only before N.R. was born. As for

Father, he explained that he had celebrated his birthday by

using cocaine from Thursday, November 12, through Sunday,

November 15. He stated, “All 4 days I used [cocaine]. Maybe it

was a big amount throughout the 4 days, that’s why it came out

positive.” Asked how much cocaine he used, he said he and his

“friends would pitch in 10 dollars each to get something small

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

and that’s it. I don’t know how much we got. I had alcohol too

all 4 days, maybe just 2 tall cans a day.” Father, who was

26 years old at the time of the interview, said he was 21 or 22

when he first tried cocaine. He elaborated, “I never had a

problem with it, I never bought it myself, all these friends did it

together. I used to rave a lot, and when there were big parties,

I’d do it with my friends.” Father said that he used cocaine “once

or twice every two weeks,” adding, “I don’t have an addiction,

otherwise I’d be broke.”

According to Father, N.R. had overnight visits with him

on weekends, and both parents were working well on co-

parenting. Father said that he did not take care of N.R. when

high, and he would not “party” when N.R. was at his residence.

As for the positive test result, Father said, “I’m so upset that

they caught me! My mom was upset too. She was crying when

I told her I tested positive. This cocaine thing is not me! I’m so

upset!” Father said that he formerly smoked marijuana, but no

longer did so. He also reported that he began to drink alcohol at

age 16, but said, “It was never serious, never out of control. I

still go to work and school.”3

A social worker explained to Father what a Child and

Family Team was, as well as its potential benefits. 4 Father said

3

Father had a barber’s license. He had been working at a

barber shop for approximately 20 hours per week until the

COVID-19 pandemic struck, at which time he began working

part-time at a warehouse. He lived with his mother and older

brother, and had no criminal record.

4

A Child and Family Team is “a group of individuals who

are convened by the placing agency and who are engaged

through a variety of team-based processes to identify the

strengths and needs of the child or youth and their family, and

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

that he did not want to participate in the program, explaining,

“I just want the drug testing. It’s too much. It’s already a big

deal I have two kids. I just want it over with.”5 Regarding this

testing, between January and March 2021 Father had three

negative drug tests, two missed tests, and one leaked test. After

the first missed test, Father contacted a social worker to explain

that he had missed the test due to his work schedule. He asked

that the drug tests occur on Mondays and Fridays, a request

that was denied. The other missed test, on February 23, 2021,

was on a Tuesday.

A combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing occurred

in April 2021. After hearing argument from counsel, the court

dismissed the factual allegations involving conditions at

Mother’s former residence 6 but concluded that Father’s

“substantial drug abuse history” warranted findings that N.R.

came within the court’s dependency jurisdiction and should be

removed from Father’s care and custody. The court

interlineated the dependency petition’s factual allegations to

describe Father as a “recent abuser of cocaine,” rather than a

“current” one. N.R. was ordered home with Mother on the

condition that she continue to comply with conditions specified

by the court. Father was given monitored visitation and ordered

to participate in drug- and alcohol-related services, including

random drug testing.

to help achieve positive outcomes for safety, permanency, and

well-being.” (§ 16501, subd. (a)(4).)

5

Father had another child from a different relationship.

6

Mother had moved into her own apartment by the time of

the hearing.

7

In re N.R.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Father appealed. In his briefing before the Court of

Appeal, Father admitted that he had used cocaine, but he

argued that this use did not amount to substance abuse that

supported a jurisdictional finding. Identifying a split of

authority across the Courts of Appeal regarding the meaning of

“substance abuse” as it appears in section 300, subdivision (b),

Father urged the court to adopt the interpretation first

articulated by In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754 (Drake

M.), disapproved on another ground in In re D.P. (2023)

14 Cal.5th 266, 283. Drake M., after observing that

“[d]ependency cases have varied widely in the kinds of parental

actions labeled ‘substance abuse,’ ” concluded that “a workable

definition is necessary to avoid any resulting inconsistencies.”

(Drake M., at p. 765.) The court then opined “that a finding of

substance abuse for purposes of section 300, subdivision (b),

must be based on evidence sufficient to (1) show that the parent

or guardian at issue had been diagnosed as having a current

substance abuse problem by a medical professional or

(2) establish that the parent or guardian at issue has a current

substance abuse problem as defined in the” current version of

the DSM at the time of that decision. (Id. at p. 766.)7

Drake M. also concluded that a finding of substance abuse

under this standard constituted “prima facie evidence of the

inability of a parent or guardian to provide regular care

resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm” to a child of

“ ‘tender years.’ ” (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)

7

At the time the Drake M. decision was rendered in 2012,

section 300, subdivision (b) had not yet been parsed into its

current subdivisions. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1; Stats. 2014,

ch. 29, § 64.)

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Father’s briefing before the Court of Appeal criticized this aspect

of Drake M., observing that the statutory scheme nowhere on its

face treats sufficient proof of substance abuse as prima facie

evidence of an inability to provide regular care or a substantial

risk of physical harm. In any event, Father argued, the evidence

before the juvenile court rebutted any prima facie case that

might have arisen.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court determined, first,

that “[s]ubstantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s

exercise of jurisdiction over very young N.R. because of Father’s

abuse of cocaine.” In so holding, the Court of Appeal did not

discuss the split of authority regarding the meaning of the term

“substance abuse.” In upholding the juvenile court’s assertion

of jurisdiction, the court noted Father’s initial denial of drug use,

the high level of cocaine metabolites recorded in his positive test

result, and his admission to using cocaine once or twice every

two weeks over a four- or five-year period, concluding therefrom

that the record contained substantial evidence of substance

abuse.

The Court of Appeal recognized that a “section 300,

subdivision (b)(1) finding ‘cannot be based on substance abuse

alone; jurisdiction [also] requires a substantial risk of harm to

the child arising from the substance abuse.’ ” But the court then

invoked the tender years presumption, observing that “[w]here

very young children like N.R. are concerned . . . ‘ “the finding of

substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a

parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a

substantial risk of physical harm.” ’ ” The Court of Appeal

determined that Father had not rebutted the prima facie

showing of a substantial risk of serious physical harm

established by his substance abuse, perceiving Father’s reaction

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

to the positive drug test and his refusal to participate in services

beyond random drug testing as further evidence of such risk.

Turning to the juvenile court’s disposition order, the Court

of Appeal determined that this order was supported by

substantial evidence establishing “both that N.R. would be at

substantial danger if returned to Father’s unsupervised care

and there were no reasonable means short of removal to

mitigate the danger to N.R.” The court found that Father’s

“behavior — especially his initial effort to conceal his drug use

and his steadfast denial that his drug use was a problem —

demonstrate he was unable or unwilling to substantively engage

with any efforts that might have prevented the need to remove

N.R. from his custody so as to mitigate the substantial danger

to the very young child from Father’s cocaine abuse.”

We granted review to resolve the split of authority

regarding the meaning of “substance abuse” as used in section

300(b)(1)(D). Some Courts of Appeal have adopted the definition

crafted in Drake M. (see, e.g., In re L.C. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th

646, 652; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 447,

disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B.

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7), whereas others (see, e.g., In re

K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 601) have followed In re

Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210 (Christopher R.), in

which the court “recognize[d] the Drake M. formulation as a

generally useful and workable definition of substance abuse for

purposes of section 300, subdivision (b),” but refused to accept

the argument that substance abuse can be found only when

someone “has been diagnosed by a medical professional or . . .

falls within one of the specific [DSM] categories.” (Christopher

R., at p. 1218.) In ordering review, we also agreed to decide

whether substance abuse by a parent or guardian, when found

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

to exist, should be treated as prima facie evidence of an inability

to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical

harm to a young child. This aspect of the Drake M. decision has

found acceptance even among courts that have rejected its view

that substance abuse requires a professional diagnosis or

satisfaction of the relevant DSM criteria. (See, e.g., Christopher

R., at p. 1219.)

II. DISCUSSION

Both issues before us present questions of statutory

interpretation. After reviewing the juvenile dependency

scheme, we consider whether the Legislature intended for

substance abuse to be recognized only upon evidence

establishing either that the pertinent DSM criteria have been

satisfied or that a parent or guardian has been diagnosed with

a substance use disorder by a qualified professional. We then

address whether a finding of substance abuse is properly

regarded as prima facie evidence of an inability to provide

regular care to a young child and a substantial risk of serious

physical harm to that child.

A. The Statutory Scheme for Dependency

Proceedings

“The purpose of California’s dependency law is ‘to provide

maximum safety and protection for children who are currently

being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being

neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety,

protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children

who are at risk of that harm.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.2,

subd. (a).) In its effort to achieve this overarching goal, the law

balances a number of vital interests: children’s interests in safe

and stable homes; parents’ interests in raising their children;

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

families’ shared interests in each other’s companionship; and

the state’s interest in protecting society’s most vulnerable

members.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609,

623–624 (Michael G.).)

“Dependency proceedings span up to four stages:

jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency.

[Citations.] At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile court

determines whether to declare a child a dependent of the court

because the child is suffering, or at risk of suffering, significant

harm.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 624.) “ ‘A

dependency adjudication is a preliminary step that allows the

juvenile court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over

the endangered child’s care.’ [Citation.] After the juvenile court

takes that preliminary step, the court may impose limitations

on parental authority as necessary to protect the child.

[Citations.] It may also order that the child be removed from a

parent’s physical custody if there is clear and convincing

evidence that removal is necessary to protect the child from a

substantial risk of harm. [Citations.] In some cases, a

dependency adjudication may lead to termination of parental

rights.” (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 876 (I.C.).)

Section 300 enumerates the various ways in which a child

may come within the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile

court. Our focus here is upon section 300, subdivision (b)(1),

which provides that a juvenile may be adjudged a dependent of

the court when “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial

risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness,

as a result of any of the following: [¶] (A) The failure or

inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately

supervise or protect the child. [¶] (B) The willful or negligent

failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom

the child has been left. [¶] (C) The willful or negligent failure

of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate

food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. [¶] (D) The

inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for

the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness,

developmental disability, or substance abuse.” (Italics added.)

Although we have previously considered other aspects of

section 300 (see, e.g., I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th 869; In re R.T. (2017)

3 Cal.5th 622 (R.T.); In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766 (I.J.)), we

have not previously interpreted the statute’s reference to

substance abuse.

B. Neither Satisfaction of the Relevant DSM

Criteria nor a Professional Medical Diagnosis Is

Required To Show Substance Abuse Under

Section 300

The first issue we address is whether a juvenile court may

recognize substance abuse by a parent or guardian under section

300(b)(1)(D) only in circumstances in which the evidence before

it either (1) establishes that the relevant diagnostic criteria in

the current edition of the DSM have been satisfied, as Father

has argued before us, or (2) includes a professional diagnosis of

a current substance use disorder, which the Drake M. court also

contemplated as an alternative method of proving the existence

of substance abuse. We conclude that the Legislature did not

impose either requirement when it added the substance abuse

language to section 300 in 1987 as part of a broader overhaul of

the dependency scheme.

1. Statutory Language

“ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental

task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to

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effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory

language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do

not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the

statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope

and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the

enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow

its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in

absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the

statutory language permits more than one reasonable

interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the

statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’

[Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in

the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of

which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase,

sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative

purpose.’ ” ’ ” (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (2019)

6 Cal.5th 844, 856–857 (Meza).)

a. Applying standard principles of statutory

interpretation, “substance abuse” bears its

ordinary meaning here

Beginning with the statutory text, we observe that neither

section 300 nor any other provision within the statutory scheme

relating to dependency proceedings defines “substance abuse,”

although definitions are provided for other terms relevant to the

exercise of dependency jurisdiction. (E.g., § 300, subds. (b)(4)

[defining “sexually trafficked” by reference to the definition

provided in Pen. Code, § 236.1 and “sexual acts” by reference to

Pen. Code, §§ 236.1 and 11165.1], (d) [explaining that the

statute borrows the definition of “sexual abuse” found in Pen.

Code, § 11165.1], (e) [defining “severe physical abuse”].)

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The Legislature’s failure to define substance abuse

suggests that legislators intended for this term to bear its

ordinary meaning in this context. (See Valley Circle Estates v.

VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 608–609

[“ ‘Excepting when clearly otherwise intended or indicated,

words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning and

receive a sensible construction in accord with the commonly

understood meaning thereof’ ”]; County of Orange v. Santa

Margarita Water Dist. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 189, 192 [“When a

statute does not define its operative words, ‘courts should give

to the words . . . their ordinary, everyday meaning’ ”]; cf. People

ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 302

(Lungren) [noting of text in an initiative statute that “because

the term is not further defined, it can be assumed to refer not to

any special term of art, but rather to a meaning that would be

commonly understood by the electorate”].)8

In this respect, dictionaries can provide a helpful resource

for ascertaining the common meanings attached to a word or

phrase. (See People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1009.) The

definitions of “substance abuse” appearing within dictionaries

vary to some degree in their specificity and particulars. (See,

e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 2000) p. 1170,

col. 2 [defining “substance abuse” as “excessive use of a drug (as

8

The Legislature has defined “substance abuse” as it

appears in a different provision of the Welfare and Institutions

Code. Section 746, subdivision (b) identifies “substance abuse”

as among the factors that place a “minor at a significantly

greater risk of becoming a chronic juvenile or adult offender,”

and defines “substance abuse” in that context as including “any

regular use of alcohol or drugs by the minor, other than

experimentation.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).)

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alcohol, narcotics, or cocaine): use of a drug without medical

justification”]; American Heritage Dict. of the English Language

(3d ed. 1996) p. 1791, col. 2 [defining “substance abuse” as

“Excessive use of addictive substances, especially alcohol and

narcotic drugs”]; The Random House Dict. of the English

Language (2d ed. 1987) p. 1897, col. 1 [defining “substance

abuse” as “long-term, pathological use of alcohol or drugs,

characterized by daily intoxication, inability to reduce

consumption, and impairment in social or occupational

functioning; broadly, alcohol or drug addiction”].) These

definitions are alike, however, in that they all associate

substance abuse with the excessive use of drugs or alcohol. We

conclude that “substance abuse,” as it appears in section

300(b)(1)(D), is most plausibly understood as bearing this

ordinary meaning. (See Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794,

808 [perceiving no indication within a statute “that would justify

our presuming the Legislature intended a specialized or narrow

usage rather than a general one”].)

While this commonplace understanding of substance

abuse may seem broad and potentially capable of inconsistent

application if read in isolation, nearby language within the

statute clarifies the kind of excessive drug or alcohol use that

section 300(b)(1)(D) is concerned with and limits the

circumstances in which substance abuse will allow for a

jurisdictional finding under this provision. Section 300(b)(1)(D)

allows for dependency jurisdiction based on substance abuse

only when this abuse leads to an “inability” on the part of a

parent or guardian “to provide regular care for [a] child”

(§ 300(b)(1)(D)) that causes the child to suffer, or creates “a

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm

or illness” (id., subd. (b)(1)). Even if a parent’s or guardian’s

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excessive use of drugs or alcohol has other negative

manifestations, it does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under

section 300(b)(1)(D) unless it also has these effects. (Ibid.)9

b. The statutory scheme does not support defendant’s

argument that the Legislature assigned substance

abuse a technical meaning linked to the DSM

Father reads the statutory text differently, but his

interpretation is unpersuasive.

Father asserts that “substance abuse,” as used in section

300(b)(1)(D), “is best understood by consulting the dictionary of

brain disorders: the DSM.” In essence, he contends that section

300(b)(1)(D) uses “substance abuse” in a technical sense that

makes it appropriate to consult the DSM as an authoritative

text in its field. (See In re Smith (1928) 88 Cal.App. 464, 467–

468 [“Technical words when relating to a trade, when used in a

statute or ordinance, dealing with the subject matter of such

trade, are to be taken in their technical sense and will be so

construed unless the context or other considerations show a

contrary intent”]; Mueller v. Psychiatric Security Review Bd.

(Or. 1997) 937 P.2d 1028, 1032 [“Because the phrase

9

In certain circumstances a parent’s or guardian’s

substance-related issues may contribute to a finding that

dependency jurisdiction exists for another reason, such as a

“failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to

adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd.

(b)(1)(A).) Although this case does not require that we construe

section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A), this provision serves to show

that an exercise of dependency jurisdiction that is in some

measure premised on a parent’s or guardian’s involvement with

drugs or alcohol does not necessarily require a judicial finding

of substance abuse under some defined standard.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

‘personality disorder’ [under Oregon statutory law] is a term of

art as to which the DSM-III was the definitive source, this court

has referred to the DSM for guidance in cases involving

individuals with mental diseases or defects”].)

Some background information regarding the DSM is

helpful in evaluating Father’s argument. The DSM, now in its

fifth revised edition (DSM-5-TR),10 “is a classification of mental

disorders that was developed for use in clinical, educational, and

research settings” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 23). The “primary

purpose” of the DSM “is to assist trained clinicians in the

diagnosis of mental disorders as part of a case formulation

assessment that leads to an informed treatment plan for each

individual.” (Id. at p. 21.)

The DSM-5-TR and prior editions of the DSM (including

the DSM-III and the DSM-III-R, which were the most recent

versions of the manual when the substance abuse language was

10

This version of the DSM was published in 2022. ( Am.

Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders (5th ed. text rev. 2022).) The DSM was first published

in 1952. (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders (1952).) A second edition was

published in 1968 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (2d ed. 1968)); a third

edition in 1980 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed. 1980) (DSM-III));

a third revised edition in 1987 (Am. Psychiatric Assn.,

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d rev.

ed. 1987) (DSM-III-R)); a fourth edition in 1994 (Am. Psychiatric

Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

(4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV)); a fourth revised edition in 2000 (Am.

Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders (4th ed. text rev. 2000) (DSM-IV-TR)); and a fifth

edition in 2013 (Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) (DSM-5)).

18

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

added to § 300) have identified an array of disorders involving

substance use and, beginning with the DSM-III, have included

criteria for diagnosing these disorders. The categorization and

specific descriptions of these disorders have evolved over time.

The DSM-III-R distinguished between “Psychoactive Substance

Dependence” (involving the satisfaction of at least three of nine

specified criteria) (DSM-III-R, supra, at p. 166) and a “residual”

disorder, “Psychoactive Substance Abuse,” which would be

diagnosed only if the criteria for substance dependence were not

satisfied (id. at p. 169). (See id. at pp. 165–169; see also DSM-

III, supra, at pp. 164–165 [distinguishing between “substance

abuse” and “substance dependence,” with the latter being

“generally . . . a more severe form of Substance Use Disorder”].)

Within the DSM-5-TR, the previously recognized categories of

substance abuse and substance dependence have been replaced

“with an overarching new category of substance use disorders —

with the specific substance used defining the specific disorders.”

(DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. xxiv.)11

According to the DSM-5-TR, which Father identifies as

supplying the operative criteria at this time for ascertaining

substance abuse under section 300(b)(1)(D), “The essential

feature of a substance use disorder is a cluster of cognitive,

behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that the

individual continues using the substance despite significant

substance-related problems.” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 544.)

Within the array of substance use disorders described by the

11

Notwithstanding the DSM’s revision of its terminology for

substance use disorders, we primarily use the term “substance

abuse” within this opinion to remain consistent with the

language used in section 300(b)(1)(D).

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

DSM-5-TR, stimulant use disorders are characterized as “[a]

pattern of amphetamine-type substance, cocaine, or other

stimulant use leading to clinically significant impairment or

distress, as manifested by at least two” of 11 identified criteria

over a 12-month period. (Id. at p. 632.)12

Upon review of both the statutory text and the DSM, it

does not appear that the Legislature intended for the term

“substance abuse,” as used in section 300(b)(1)(D), to bear the

technical meaning that Father ascribes to it. Neither

section 300 nor any other provision within the statutory scheme

12

The DSM-5-TR criteria for a stimulant use disorder

consist of the following: “The stimulant is often taken in larger

amounts or over a longer period than was intended”; “There is a

persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control

stimulant use”; “A great deal of time is spent in activities

necessary to obtain the stimulant, use the stimulant, or recover

from its effects”; “Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use the

stimulant”; “Recurring stimulant use resulting in a failure to

fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home”;

“Continued stimulant use despite having persistent or recurrent

social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the

effects of the stimulant”; “Important social, occupational, or

recreational activities are given up or reduced because of

stimulant use”; “Recurrent stimulant use in situations in which

it is physically hazardous”; “Stimulant use is continued despite

knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical or

psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or

exacerbated by the stimulant”; “Tolerance, as defined by

either . . . : [¶] a. A need for markedly increased amounts of

the stimulant to achieve intoxication or desired effect. [¶] b. A

markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same

amount of the stimulant”; and “Withdrawal, as manifested by

either . . . : [¶] a. The characteristic withdrawal syndrome for

the stimulant . . . . [¶] b. The stimulant (or a closely related

substance) is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms.”

(DSM-5-TR, supra, at pp. 632–633.)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

mentions the DSM. The absence of any such references counsels

against Father’s position. It would be unusual for the

Legislature to have delegated to a specific body such as the

American Psychiatric Association the authority to define such a

consequential term appearing in a statute. Had the Legislature

placed such reliance upon a text developed and maintained by a

nongovernmental entity, which could change its terminology or

redefine the relevant criteria in a manner wholly outside of the

Legislature’s control (see Conservatorship of Roulet (1979)

23 Cal.3d 219, 234, fn. 14 [observing that “the American

Psychiatric Association frequently alters its definitions of what

constitutes a mental disorder”]), one would expect to see some

acknowledgement of that delegation on the face of the statute.

(See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, former § 813 [specifying that

the term “mental disorder,” as formerly used within the

Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000 et seq.), was “limited to

those disorders listed by the American Psychiatric Association

in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”];

cf. Pub. Resources Code, § 48620.2, subd. (a)(2) [referencing an

American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard

within a definition].) Yet no such explanation appears here,

suggesting that the Legislature did not intend for the meaning

of “substance abuse” to hinge entirely upon the criteria

articulated in the DSM.

Nor can we infer, based on usage at the time of section

300(b)(1)(D)’s enactment, that the Legislature regarded the

term “substance abuse” as so obviously referring to the pertinent

DSM criteria as to make any explanation unnecessary. To the

contrary, contemporaneously enacted statutes commonly

assigned the term “substance abuse” a more conventional,

nontechnical meaning. (See, e.g., Stats. 1987, ch. 1291, § 1,

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

p. 4618, adding Ed. Code, § 44049, subd. (b) [conferring limited

immunity upon school principals and their designees who

inform parents of instances in which a pupil engaged in “alcohol

or controlled substance abuse”]; Stats. 1987, ch. 879, § 1,

p. 2778, adding Pen. Code, § 1203.1ab [providing for “drug and

substance abuse testing” of certain probationers]; Stats. 1986,

ch. 1441, § 1, p. 5146, adding Welf. & Inst. Code, § 502, subd.

(a)(4) [referencing “crimes of . . . substance abuse”].)

It is notable too that the Legislature departed from the

classification scheme and terminology that the DSM-III and the

DSM-III-R applied to substance use disorders. These

departures also suggest that legislators did not intend to limit

findings of substance abuse to situations in which the pertinent

DSM criteria had been satisfied. Section 300(b)(1)(D) avoids the

distinction that the DSM-III and DSM-III-R drew between

“Substance Dependence” and “Substance Abuse.” (DSM-III-R,

supra, at pp. 166, 169; DSM-III, supra, at pp. 164–165.) In doing

so, the statute does not explain whether the condition described

as substance dependence in those editions of the DSM should be

regarded as substance abuse for purposes of applying the

statute. Section 300(b)(1)(D) also departs from the DSM’s

approach insofar as the statute distinguishes between

“substance abuse” and “mental illness” (itself a term the DSM

has long rejected, in favor of “mental disorder”), rather than

treating the former as a subset of the latter. Had the

Legislature intended for the prevailing DSM criteria to provide

the sole reference point for recognizing substance abuse by a

parent or guardian, section 300 presumably would have

reconciled or at least acknowledged these differences in

terminology and categorization.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

We therefore do not perceive in the language of section 300

any persuasive indication that the Legislature intended for the

relevant DSM criteria to supply the exclusive definition of

substance abuse. This conclusion is not altered by section

300(b)(1)(D)’s grouping of substance abuse together with

“mental illness” and “developmental disability.” Father asserts

that the Legislature would have perceived all three of these

circumstances as capable of being shown only through the

satisfaction of professionally developed criteria. His position

relies upon the noscitur a sociis canon of statutory construction,

whereby “ ‘ “[a] word of uncertain meaning may be known from

its associates and its meaning ‘enlarged or restrained by

reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is

used.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hernandez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 192, 200

(Hernandez).)

When applicable, the noscitur a sociis canon favors “ ‘ “ ‘a

restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a more

expansive meaning would make other items in the list

unnecessary or redundant, or would otherwise make the item

markedly dissimilar to the other items in the list.’ ” ’ ”

(Hernandez, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 200, italics added.)

There are some threshold hurdles to the application of this

principle here. It is not clear that section 300(b)(1)(D)’s

recitation of “mental illness, developmental disability, or

substance abuse” implicates this canon at all. (See American

Bankers v. National Credit Union Admin. (D.C. Cir. 2019)

934 F.3d 649, 665 [terms in a list found within a statute may be

treated differently when their “ ‘fit’ ” is neither tight nor self-

evident].) Moreover, the case law casts doubt on the premise,

essential to Father’s argument, that satisfaction of a specific

professionally developed standard analogous to the DSM

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

criteria for substance use disorders is required to show a mental

illness or developmental disability in the dependency context.

(See Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 202

(Laurie S.) [finding expert testimony unnecessary to assess, at

the jurisdictional stage of dependency proceedings, whether a

parent’s mental health issues placed her child at substantial

risk of serious physical harm]; In re Khalid H. (1992)

6 Cal.App.4th 733, 736 (Khalid H.) [noting that section 300,

subdivision (b)(1) “does not contain a described formal procedure

to determine if a parent suffers from a mental illness,” and

declining to read such a procedure into the statute].)

But Father’s argument would fail even if we were to

regard the noscitur a sociis canon as relevant and further

assume for sake of argument that the Legislature intended for

findings of mental illness and developmental disability under

section 300(b)(1)(D) to require the satisfaction of objective

criteria commonly relied upon by professionals in the relevant

fields. It would not make mental illness and developmental

disability on the one hand, and substance abuse on the other,

“ ‘ “ ‘markedly dissimilar’ ” ’ ” (Hernandez, supra,

10 Cal.App.5th at p. 200) if the same kind of showing were not

strictly necessary to establish substance abuse. The Legislature

could well have grouped mental illness, developmental

disability, and substance abuse together as circumstances that

all may lead to an inability to provide a child with regular care,

while at the same time appreciating that each could involve

somewhat different kinds of proof. (See Lungren, supra,

14 Cal.4th at p. 308 [rejecting an invocation of the noscitur a

sociis principle because when viewed in light of the relevant

statute’s broader purpose, “the seeming dissimilarities between”

24

In re N.R.

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

two subjects of legislation “become less significant than their

similarities”].)

In short, the mere fact that the terms “mental illness,”

“developmental disability,” and “substance abuse” are in close

proximity to one another within section 300(b)(1)(D) does not

establish that the Legislature intended that similar showings

would be required to prove them.

Father also argues that references to substance abuse

treatment programs (§§ 300.2, subd. (a), 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A))

and substance abuse treatment facilities (e.g., §§ 366.21, subd.

(e)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)(1)) appearing elsewhere within the

statutory scheme connote a focus upon substance use severe

enough to require treatment, and that the DSM criteria provide

the appropriate framework for determining whether substance

abuse exists under this standard.

This argument reads too much into these provisions,

which concern the significance to be accorded at different stages

of the dependency process to a parent’s or guardian’s enrollment

in a substance abuse treatment or facility (e.g., §§ 361.5, subd.

(a)(3)(A), 366.21, subd. (e)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)(1)) or to the

successful completion of, or failure to complete, a substance

abuse treatment program (e.g., § 300.2, subd. (a); § 364, subd.

(c) [referring to a “court ordered treatment program”]). These

scattered references to treatment in varied contexts do not

establish that the Legislature regarded substance abuse as

present under section 300(b)(1)(D) only when the relevant DSM

criteria for a substance use disorder have been satisfied. The

Legislature could have recognized the existence of substance

abuse treatment programs and facilities, and further sought to

explain the relationship between enrollment in a program or

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

facility and decisions that must be made at different stages of

the dependency process, without also perceiving the close

connections among substance abuse, treatment, and the DSM

that Father advances in his interpretation of section

300(b)(1)(D). Indeed, as we have explained, the weight of

evidence of legislative intent that can be gleaned from the

statutory text indicates that these connections were not

intended. Instead, the term “substance abuse” carries its

ordinary meaning as used in section 300(b)(1)(D), with other

language within the statute harmonizing this definition with

the overarching goals of the dependency scheme by clarifying

that, to supply grounds for dependency jurisdiction, substance

abuse must make the parent or guardian unable to provide

regular care for a child and lead to serious physical harm to the

child, or a substantial risk of such harm.

2. Legislative History

Although the lack of textual support for Father’s position

is compelling, we also consider Father’s argument that his

interpretation of section 300(b)(1)(D) is grounded in the

legislative history of, and purposes behind, the dependency

scheme. We conclude this contention is no more persuasive than

Father’s textual arguments.

The legislative history materials surrounding the 1987

amendments to the dependency scheme do not mention the DSM

at all. The absence of any such discussion provides a persuasive

indication that the Legislature did not intend to restrict judicial

findings of substance abuse to circumstances in which the DSM

criteria have been satisfied. (See, e.g., Larkin v. Workers’ Comp.

Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 166 [assigning significance

to the absence of discussion of an issue within legislative history

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

materials]; Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008)

42 Cal.4th 1158, 1169 [same].)

Father nonetheless argues that linking findings of

substance abuse to the prevailing DSM criteria for substance

use disorders would advance the enacting Legislature’s goals of

clarifying the grounds for dependency jurisdiction (see R.T.,

supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 631) and distinguishing between

substance use and substance abuse. Our review of the pertinent

legislative history materials, set out below, corroborates

Father’s understanding that the Legislature had these general

aims in mind when it added the substance abuse language to

section 300 in 1987. But we do not believe the Legislature

implemented these goals by defining substance abuse in the

manner Father proposes.

As background, the legislation that added the substance

abuse language to section 300 (Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988

Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 243)) was developed by a task force

that had been charged by statute with reviewing the laws

relating to child abuse reporting, dependent children, and child

welfare services, and had been directed to “identify problem

areas in the law” and recommend “statutory revisions to

strengthen and compliment the child welfare system in

California.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 1122, § 24, p. 3995.) Among its

findings, the task force determined that section 300, as it existed

prior to 1987, provided “very little guidance to investigating and

petitioning agencies, to judges, attorneys or to parents as to

what actions or harms justify state intervention. Existing law

states that a child that comes within any of the following

descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court: is in

need of proper and effective parental care and control; is

destitute; is dangerous to the public; [or] lives in a home which

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

is an unfit place for him or her. Because there is little legislative

guidance, different agencies and individuals employ different

standards, and cases are inappropriately brought into the

system.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 243

(1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 27, 1987, p. 3.) The

Legislature hoped that legislation developed by the task force

would “more clearly define the conditions under which a child

could be removed from the family home.” (Ibid.; see also Sen.

Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of

Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 10,

1987, p. 1 [describing the proposed legislation as “[c]learly

defin[ing] the conditions under which a child can be removed

from the family and/or the court can exercise jurisdiction”];

Legis. Analyst, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg.

Sess.) as amended May 26, 1987, p. 1 [observing that the

measure “[n]arrows the definition of abuse for purposes of

dependency proceedings”]; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis

of Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 17,

1987, pp. 1, 3.)

As originally introduced in the Legislature, Senate Bill

No. 243 provided for dependency jurisdiction in circumstances

such as where “[t]he minor has suffered, or there is a substantial

risk that he or she will imminently suffer, physical harm

causing disfigurement, impairment of bodily functioning,

protracted impairment of physical health, or other serious

physical injury, as a result of . . . the inability of the parent or

guardian to provide regular care for the minor due to the parent

or guardian’s use of drugs or alcohol or mental illness or

deficiency.” (Sen. Bill No. 243 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as

introduced Jan. 26, 1987, § 6, italics added.) This language was

amended soon after the bill’s introduction so that its last clause

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

described an “inability of the parent, guardian, or primary

caretaker to provide regular care for the minor due to the

parent’s, guardian’s, or primary caretaker’s mental illness,

developmental disability, or substance abuse.” (Sen. Bill No. 243

(1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 30, 1987, § 6, italics

added; see also Sen. Bill No. 1195 Task Force, Minutes (Feb. 19–

20, 1987), p. 1 [recording the task force’s approval of this

change].) This “substance abuse” terminology was eventually

codified. (Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 4.5, p. 5606.) Nothing within

the legislative history materials before us specifically explains

why the original “use of drugs or alcohol” language within the

proposed legislation was replaced by the term “substance

abuse,” or otherwise communicates a prevailing view regarding

what the term “substance abuse” meant.

It is apparent from these and other legislative history

materials that the Legislature sought to clarify the grounds for

assertion of dependency jurisdiction through the revisions to the

dependency scheme that were enacted in 1987. But it is also

evident that the Legislature implemented its intent in a manner

that would “provide maximum protection for children who are

currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused,

being neglected, or being exploited, and to protect children who

are at risk of that harm,” albeit also being mindful not to

“disrupt the family unnecessarily or . . . intrude inappropriately

into family life.” (Former § 300; Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 4.5,

p. 5608.) Insofar as some bases for dependency jurisdiction

could be precisely specified without depriving children of this

protection, they were. But as a matter of necessity, some

grounds for jurisdiction had to be phrased in more general

terms. (See Sen. Bill No. 1195 Task Force, Child Abuse

Reporting Laws, Juvenile Court Dependency Statutes, and

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Child Welfare Services (Jan. 1988) pp. 4–5 [“The task force spent

a great deal of time on the wording of each section and several

legislative committees reviewed the specific language in lengthy

hearings,” and “it is not possible to give a highly specific

definition of the phrase ‘serious’ [as used in § 300] without being

too restrictive”].)

For instance, section 300 has since 1987 provided for the

exercise of dependency jurisdiction when a child “has been

subjected to an act or acts of cruelty by the parent or guardian

or a member of the child’s household.” (§ 300, subd. (i); see

Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, § 4.5, p. 5608.) The Legislature did not

further define “act or acts of cruelty” (§ 300, subd. (i)) due to the

myriad forms such conduct may take. Instead, what constitutes

an “act or acts of cruelty” is a “factual determination that the

juvenile court makes based upon the common meaning of the

phrase and the totality of the child’s circumstances.” (In re D.C.

(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.)

On balance, the available evidence of legislative intent

indicates the Legislature took a similar approach insofar as

substance abuse was concerned, and declined to recognize

substance abuse only in situations involving the satisfaction of

DSM criteria. Nor did it otherwise limit the ordinary meaning

of substance abuse when these constraints might fail to capture

the various ways in which substance abuse can render a parent

or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child and place

a child at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.

Meanwhile, the substitution of “substance abuse” for “use of

drugs or alcohol” during the legislative process may have simply

reflected an appreciation that, as a practical matter, only the

excessive use of drugs or alcohol would lead to an “inability of

the parent or guardian to provide regular care for [a] child.”

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(§ 300(b)(1)(D).) The legislative history therefore does not

provide significant support for Father’s interpretation of the

statute.

3. Statutory Purpose and Public Policy

Father, supported by several amici curiae, also argues

that his interpretation of the statute is necessary to vindicate

important policy interests that motivated the above-discussed

changes to section 300. Echoing the reasoning in Drake M.,

supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at page 765, he asserts that the

definition of substance abuse that he proposes is necessary to

ensure consistency across dependency findings and guarantee

they are premised on sufficient showings of substance abuse, as

opposed to mere substance use. Father describes the alternative

approach, in which substance abuse is defined by reference to

conventional understandings of the term, as “nothing more than

‘you’ll know it when you see it.’ ” These policy arguments do not

persuade us to adopt Father’s interpretation of the statute.

At the outset, it is unclear whether Father’s proposed

definition of substance abuse would avoid the problems he

perceives with assigning this term its usual meaning. Recall

again that Father regards the DSM-5-TR as the touchstone for

the necessary analysis today, under the theory that the enacting

Legislature intended for the meaning of substance abuse to

evolve in step with developments in professional expertise. The

DSM-5-TR regards a diagnosis of a stimulant use disorder as

appropriate upon satisfaction of two or more out of 11 identified

criteria. (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 632.) Some of these criteria

are susceptible to expansive and potentially inconsistent

application, particularly in the hands of untrained laypeople,

e.g., “[t]he stimulant is often taken in larger amounts or over a

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

longer period than was intended”; “[t]here is a persistent desire

or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control stimulant use”; “[a]

great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the

stimulant, use the stimulant, or recover from its effects”; and

“[c]raving, or a strong desire or urge to use the stimulant.”

(Ibid.) Connecting substance abuse under section 300(b)(1)(D)

to the relevant DSM criteria is therefore not the obvious

panacea that Father makes it out to be.13

Nor are the findings required for dependency jurisdiction

under section 300(b)(1)(D) as elastic as Father asserts.

Significantly, as previously alluded to, the recognition of

substance abuse by a parent or guardian does not by itself

establish that the other requirements for the exercise of

dependency jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D) have been

satisfied. Even with sufficient proof of substance abuse, the

government also bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence (see § 355, subd. (a)) that this

abuse makes the parent or guardian unable to provide regular

care for a child, and that this inability has caused a child to

suffer serious physical harm or illness or places the child at

substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness. (See, e.g.,

13

Father asserts that premising findings of substance abuse

on satisfaction of the relevant DSM criteria would comport with

prevailing best practices among social workers. Whatever

relevance these practices may have to the central question of

legislative intent, we do not perceive a significant tension

between standards calling for social workers to stay abreast of

current knowledge regarding substance use disorders and how

we conclude “substance abuse” should be interpreted as it

appears in section 300(b)(1)(D). Such knowledge may be

pertinent to an assessment of what amounts to excessive use of

drugs or alcohol.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999, 1003 (Destiny S.)

[jurisdiction under § 300 cannot be premised on drug use alone,

without evidence of serious physical harm or illness or a

substantial risk of such harm or illness].)

On this subject, although we reject the Drake M. court’s

interpretation of the term “substance abuse,” we agree with its

conclusion that the facts before the juvenile court in that case

did not support the exercise of dependency jurisdiction due to

parental substance abuse. The father in Drake M. used

marijuana pursuant to a medical recommendation four or five

times a week, mostly early in the day, to ease pain in his hands

and knees. (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 760–761.)

He smoked the substance in a detached garage, away from his

young child, and otherwise kept it in a locked box that the child

could not access. (Ibid.) When the father smoked marijuana

with his wife, another adult watched over their child. (Id. at

pp. 758, 759.) The father stated that at least four hours would

pass between when he smoked marijuana and when he saw his

child after day care, and that by that time he no longer felt any

problematic effects of the drug. (Id. at p. 761.) No evidence was

offered before the juvenile court, in the form of expert testimony

or otherwise, to establish that the father would still be feeling

such effects upon resuming supervision of the child (id. at

pp. 761, 767–768), and no other substantial issues were reported

in connection with the child’s care (id. at p. 758). Viewing the

record as a whole, even though Drake M.’s reasoning was flawed

with respect to how it defined substance abuse, we believe that

its ultimate conclusion rejecting the exercise of dependency

jurisdiction under what is today section 300(b)(1)(D) was

nonetheless correct. (Drake M., at p. 768.) The record before

that court did not contain substantial evidence of substance

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

abuse that made the father unable to provide regular care for

his child and placed the child at substantial risk of serious

physical harm or illness.

Meanwhile, there are substantial countervailing policy

considerations that counsel against regarding the DSM criteria

for substance use disorders as providing the exclusive yardsticks

for assessments of substance abuse for purposes of section

300(b)(1)(D). These include the fact that DSM criteria are

designed for clinical application and assume the availability of

information relevant to a diagnosis. Several of the DSM-5-TR

criteria for substance use disorders, such as the presence of

cravings, tolerance, and withdrawal symptoms (e.g., DSM-5-TR,

supra, at pp. 632–633), rely on information that might

commonly be divulged by a patient interested in obtaining an

accurate diagnosis, but may not be as readily forthcoming from

a parent or guardian during the dependency process. Courts

therefore may lack the information necessary to apply the DSM

criteria in their intended manner.

Also, Father’s approach gives short shrift to the DSM’s

warnings that its criteria should not be mechanically applied by

laypeople and may not capture all of the considerations relevant

to a legal question that may come before a court. Cautionary

statements regarding the DSM’s use have appeared in versions

of the manual dating back to the DSM-III.14 The statement

14

DSM-5-TR, supra, at page 29; DSM-5, supra, at page 25;

DSM-IV-TR, supra, at page xxxvii; DSM-IV, supra, at

page xxvii; DSM-III-R, supra, at page xxix. The statement in

the DSM-III, which bore the title, “CAUTIONS,” provided in

full: “The purpose of DSM-III is to provide clear descriptions of

diagnostic categories in order to enable clinicians and

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

within the DSM-III-R, for example, advised that the proper use

of the manual’s “criteria requires specialized clinical training

that provides both a body of knowledge and clinical skills” and

warned that the DSM-III-R’s inclusion, “for clinical and

research purposes, of a diagnostic category such as Pathological

Gambling or Pedophilia does not imply that the condition meets

legal or other nonmedical criteria for what constitutes mental

disease, mental disorder, or mental disability.” (DSM-III-R,

supra, at p. xxix.) The statement within the DSM-5-TR

acknowledges that, “Although the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and

text are primarily designed to assist clinicians in conducting

clinical assessment, case formulation, and treatment planning,

DSM-5 is also used as a reference for the courts and attorneys

in assessing the legal consequences of mental disorders. As a

result, it is important to note that the definition of mental

disorder included in DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of

clinicians, public health professionals, and research

investigators rather than the technical needs of the courts and

legal professionals.” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 29.) Following

additional warnings, the statement continues, “Use of DSM-5 to

assess the presence of a mental disorder by nonclinical,

nonmedical, or otherwise insufficiently trained individuals is

not advised.” (Ibid.) Elsewhere, the DSM-5-TR warns that it

should “not be applied mechanically by individuals without

clinical training” and that the text’s diagnostic criteria “are not

investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study, and treat

various mental disorders. The use of this manual for non-

clinical purposes, such as determination of legal responsibility,

competency or insanity, or justification for third-party payment,

must be critically examined in each instance within the

appropriate institutional context.” (DSM-III, supra, at p. 12.)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

meant to be used in a rigid cookbook fashion.” (Id. at p. 23.) Yet

Father’s approach runs a high risk of exactly that type of

application, even assuming the best efforts of judges and others

involved in the juvenile dependency process to faithfully apply

the manual.

Rote application of the DSM criteria would be particularly

inappropriate within a statutory scheme for dependency

proceedings that is intended “to provide maximum safety and

protection for children who are currently being physically,

sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being

exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and

emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.”

(§ 300.2, subd. (a).) As the Department observes in its answer

brief, as a diagnostic resource the DSM is not designed to “assess

risk to a third party, much less a child.” To identify one example

of the disconnects that exist between the DSM criteria and the

statutory scheme for juvenile dependency proceedings, if a

parent or guardian engages in frequent stimulant use “resulting

in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or

home” (DSM-5-TR, supra, at p. 632) that relate to the care of a

child, it is unclear why another of the remaining 10 criteria for

a stimulant use disorder enumerated within the DSM-5-TR —

with any of these criteria sufficing — would also have to be

satisfied to recognize substance abuse under section

300(b)(1)(D). And although the DSM-5-TR recognizes that a

positive diagnosis may be rendered in some situations in which

fewer than the normal number of required criteria are satisfied

(DSM-5-TR, at p. 23), that allowance merely serves to

underscore that the standard criteria-based requirements for

diagnosis under the DSM do not and should not supply the

definition of substance abuse in this setting.

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4. Our Interpretation Harmonizes with Prior Case

Law Construing Section 300

Our interpretation of the substance abuse language

within section 300(b)(1)(D) as concerned with the excessive use

of drugs or alcohol aligns with the analysis in our previous

decisions that have declined to read implicit limitations into

other grounds for the exercise of dependency jurisdiction. In In

re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610 (Ethan C.), we concluded that

the Legislature intended for the word “ ‘neglect,’ ” as used in

section 300, subdivision (f) to carry its “commonly understood

meaning” (Ethan C., at p. 627), rather than describing only

situations in which a parent or guardian acted with criminal

negligence. (Id. at pp. 627–631.) Likewise, in I.J., supra,

56 Cal.4th 766, we rejected the position that “scientific

authority or empirical evidence” were required to establish a

substantial risk of harm to a father’s sons based on sustained

allegations that the father had sexually abused one of his

daughters. (Id. at p. 778; see id. at pp. 778–779.) We held

instead that “the juvenile court is supposed to use its best

judgment to determine whether or not the particular

substantial risk exists.” (Id. at p. 779.) Finally, in determining

that the invocation of dependency jurisdiction under section 300,

subdivision (b)(1)(A) due to the failure or inability of a parent or

guardian to adequately supervise a child did not require a

finding of parental culpability, our decision in R.T., supra,

3 Cal.5th 622 noted, “Because the Legislature has made

parental culpability (based on either willful or negligent

conduct) a requirement in some, but not all, grounds for

asserting dependency jurisdiction under section 300, we may

conclude that the omission of a culpability requirement in the

first clause of section 300(b)(1) ‘was purposeful.’ ” (R.T., at

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p. 630.) Similarly here, in contrast with the definitions that

have been provided for other terms within the statute, there is

no persuasive indication on the face of section 300 or otherwise

that the Legislature intended to deviate from the ordinary

understanding of the term “substance abuse.”

5. Substance Abuse Under Section 300 Does Not

Require a Medical Diagnosis in Lieu of a Showing

That the DSM Criteria Have Been Satisfied

Although Father’s briefing concentrates on the DSM

criteria, he also acknowledges Drake M.’s position that a

professional medical diagnosis of current substance abuse may

suffice in lieu of a showing that these criteria have been

satisfied. (See Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.)

Considerations similar to those discussed above also foreclose

this interpretation of section 300’s substance abuse language.

Just as we assigned significance to the absence of any

reference to the DSM in the statutory scheme, we believe that

had the Legislature intended to require a medical diagnosis of

substance abuse, it would have said so. (See Khalid H., supra,

6 Cal.App.4th at p. 736.) The Legislature certainly knew how to

draw such a connection. A different provision within the

statutory scheme for dependency proceedings assigns special

significance to testimony from professionals. Under section

355.1, subdivision (a), “Where the court finds, based upon

competent professional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or

detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as

would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the

unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent,

the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody of the

minor, that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section

300.” (Italics added.)

Other flaws with Father’s arguments regarding the DSM’s

applicability also carry over to the position that substance abuse

requires a medical diagnosis. Among these shortcomings, there

is no indication within the legislative history that legislators

contemplated such a close connection between a medical

diagnosis and judicial recognition of substance abuse. With

good reason; information that could be critical to a diagnosis by

a medical professional may not be available at the

prejurisdictional stage of a dependency proceeding, particularly

given the limited powers of the court at that early stage of the

dependency process. (See Laurie S., supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at

p. 202 [“At the prejurisdictional stage, an allegation by the

Department that a parent is mentally ill or the fact of mental

illness alone does not justify a psychological examination of that

parent”].) Also, the considerations that may inform a medical

diagnosis of substance abuse may be misaligned with legislative

intent, in that these diagnostic criteria may not capture the

aspects of abuse most relevant to a determination of whether a

parent’s or guardian’s issues with drugs or alcohol render that

person unable to provide regular care for a child and place that

child at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.

Consistent with the discussion above, we conclude that a

professional medical diagnosis is not required, whether on its

own or as an alternative to satisfaction of the relevant DSM

criteria, in order to establish the existence of substance abuse

under section 300(b)(1)(D).

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6. Due Process Considerations Do Not Justify Father’s

Interpretation of Section 300

Finally, Father argues that unless his proposed definition

of substance abuse is adopted, the term is so indefinite that it

violates constitutional due process guarantees. (See U.S.

Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)

“The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘ “a statute

which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so

vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess

at its meaning and differ as to its application.” ’ ” (In re Sheena

K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) Yet “ ‘ “a statute is not void

simply because there may be difficulty in determining whether

some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by its language.” ’ ”

(People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 606.) “ ‘[F]ew words

possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes

must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual

situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the

business of government inevitably limit the specificity with

which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no

more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded.

Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes

perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the

risk that he may cross the line.’ ” (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna

(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117, quoting Boyce Motor Lines v.

United States (1952) 342 U.S. 337, 340.)

Due process considerations do not compel us to adopt

Father’s interpretation of section 300(b)(1)(D) or else find the

statute unconstitutional. Section 300(b)(1)(D) provides

adequate notice regarding the conduct that will support a

jurisdictional finding based on a parent’s or guardian’s

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

substance abuse. As we have explained, the statute does not

premise dependency jurisdiction on substance abuse alone, but

requires that substance abuse, as commonly understood, makes

a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child

and results in either serious physical harm or illness or a

substantial risk of such harm or illness to the child. (See, e.g.,

Destiny S., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003.) Even

acknowledging the existence of borderline cases, this standard

is sufficiently concrete and intelligible that it avoids due process

concerns. (See Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 570

[rejecting a due process vagueness challenge to Pen. Code, § 272

because Welf. & Inst. Code “[§] 300 provides guidelines

sufficiently specific to delineate the circumstances under which

a child will qualify for dependent status and thus to define the

parental duty of care and protection that would prevent the

occurrence of those circumstances”]; In re Mariah T. (2008) 159

Cal.App.4th 428, 435–438 [rejecting the argument that the

phrase “ ‘serious physical harm,’ ” as it appears in § 300, subd.

(a), is unconstitutionally vague]; accord, Johnson v. United

States (2015) 576 U.S. 591, 603–604 [“As a general matter, we

do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the

application of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to

real-world conduct”].)

7. Conclusion

For the reasons provided above, we hold that under section

300(b)(1)(D), “substance abuse” bears its ordinary meaning of

excessive use of drugs or alcohol, and that substance abuse by a

parent or guardian may be established without a professional

medical diagnosis of current substance abuse or satisfaction of

the pertinent DSM criteria. In so holding, we recognize that a

professional diagnosis, or evidence bearing upon whether DSM

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

criteria have been met, may be helpful in evaluating the

existence of substance abuse at the jurisdictional stage of

dependency proceedings or at another step in this process. (See,

e.g., Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322,

1346 [concluding that the government failed to meet its burden

of showing that returning children to their mother would create

a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or

physical or emotional well-being (see § 366.22, subd. (a)) for

reasons including, but not limited to, the absence of a medical

diagnosis of substance abuse or proof that the mother satisfied

the DSM’s description of substance abuse].) Our decision today

is not intended to discourage the presentation or consideration

of such evidence in appropriate circumstances.15

Our holding also recognizes the significance of a

jurisdictional finding. Dependency adjudication “allows the

juvenile court, within specified limits, to assert supervision over

the endangered child’s care” (Ethan C., supra, 54 Cal.4th at

p. 617), and is therefore a weighty determination with

important consequences. Yet it is also true that a jurisdictional

finding is “a first step, and the system includes many

subsequent safeguards to ensure that parental rights and

authority will be restricted only to the extent necessary for the

child’s safety and welfare.” (Ibid.; see also R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th

15

As a matter of course, the Legislature remains free to

redefine the term “substance abuse” as it appears within section

300(b)(1)(D) if it finds Father’s arguments, or the arguments

raised by amici curiae who have filed briefs in support of Father,

to be compelling.

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

at p. 637; In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 410–411.)16 These

safeguards apply to cases involving substance abuse, just as

they extend to other dependency matters.

Furthermore, as we have emphasized, dependency

jurisdiction under section 300(b)(1)(D) requires more than just

the identification of substance abuse by a parent or guardian. A

court must also find that the parent or guardian is unable to

provide regular care for a child and that as a result, the child

has suffered serious physical harm or illness or is at significant

risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. The second

issue presented for review, which we turn to next, concerns the

relationship between a finding of substance abuse and these

additional requirements.

C. The Tender Years Presumption Conflicts with

Legislative Intent and Must Be Rejected

We reject the position that a “finding of substance abuse

is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian

to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical

harm” to a child of “ ‘tender years.’ ” (Drake M., supra,

211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)17 Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)

16

These safeguards “include representation by counsel to

assist parents at every stage of the proceedings [citation], notice

of all hearings and rights [citations], clear and convincing

evidence for removal from custody [citation], reunification

services [citation], and review hearings at which services and

progress are reviewed.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295,

307–308.)

17

The rule announced in Drake M. expanded upon a more

generic discussion appearing in In re Rocco M. (1991)

1 Cal.App.4th 814, abrogated on another ground by R.T., supra,

3 Cal.5th at p. 629. That earlier decision had observed, “Cases

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

recognizes that substance abuse may make a parent unable to

provide regular care, which in turn may create a substantial risk

of serious physical harm or illness. But the rule articulated in

Drake M. improperly short-circuits this analysis insofar as it

regards substance abuse by a parent or guardian as always

amounting to sufficient, though not conclusive, evidence of an

inability to provide regular care to a young child and a

substantial risk of serious physical harm to that child.

As a threshold matter, the parties’ briefing reflects some

uncertainty regarding whether this judicially created principle

amounts to an inference or a presumption. To repeat, the

relevant language in Drake M. provides that a “finding of

substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a

parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a

substantial risk of physical harm.” (Drake M., supra, 211

Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) “A statute providing that a fact or group

finding a substantial physical danger [under section 300,

subdivision (b)] tend to fall into two factual patterns. One group

involves an identified, specific hazard in the child’s

environment — typically an adult with a proven record of

abusiveness. [Citations.] The second group involves children of

such tender years that the absence of adequate supervision and

care poses an inherent risk to their physical health and safety.”

(In re Rocco M., at p. 824, italics omitted.) The Drake M. court

explained that “in cases involving the second group [discussed

in In re Rocco M.], the finding of substance abuse is prima facie

evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide

regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical harm.”

(Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) Although there is

no strict age cut-off after which a child is regarded as being

beyond “tender years,” this presumption has generally been

applied in cases involving children of ages six or younger at the

time of a jurisdiction hearing. (See, e.g., Christopher R., supra,

225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219.)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

of facts is prima facie evidence of another fact establishes a

rebuttable presumption” (Evid. Code, § 602), which is a kind of

“assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from

another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in

the action” (id., § 600, subd. (a)), subject to rebuttal. A

“judicially created nonstatutory ‘inference,’ if it meets the test of

a presumption, should be regarded as, and given the effect of, a

presumption.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Evid. (6th ed. 2023) Burden,

§ 107.) It follows from the above that, as articulated in Drake

M., the tender years rule amounts to a presumption.

To assess this presumption, we apply the standard

approach to statutory interpretation and begin our review with

the text of the statute. (See Meza, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 856.)

Nothing within the statutory scheme suggests that the

requirements for the exercise of dependency jurisdiction under

section 300(b)(1)(D) can be collapsed through a tender years

presumption. The statute does not provide that a “finding of

substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a

parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a

substantial risk of physical harm” to a young child (Drake M.,

supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767), or anything similar. Rather,

the relevant statutory text makes it clear that the government

must establish, as separate elements, that (1) substance abuse

(2) makes a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care

for a child and (3) this inability has caused the child to suffer

serious physical harm or illness or creates a substantial risk of

such harm or illness. Just as courts have routinely rejected the

equation of mental illness with a significant risk of serious harm

(see, e.g., In re A.G. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 675, 684; In re

Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318), we find the

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

tender years presumption adopted by Drake M. objectionable

because it oversimplifies the necessary analysis.

Significantly, at several other junctures within the

dependency scheme the Legislature has expressly identified

situations in which specific proof will constitute prima facie

evidence of a particular fact. For example, as previously

observed, section 355.1, subdivision (a) provides that certain

“competent professional evidence” shall be regarded as “prima

facie evidence that the minor is a person described by

subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300.” Several other

examples of a particular fact being cast as prima facie evidence

of another fact appear elsewhere within the statutory scheme.

(§§ 355.1, subd. (d), 361, subd. (c)(1), 364, subd. (c), 366.21,

subds. (e)(1), (f)(1)(B), 366.22, subd. (a)(1), 366.25, subd. (a)(1).)

The Legislature’s manifested ability to assign such significance

to certain facts or evidence in proving another fact suggests that

it did not intend for courts to presume a similar relationship

when not expressly provided for within the statutory text. (See

R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 630.)

The Department asserts that the tender years

presumption is a commonsense rule based on the well-

understood needs of young children and still allows courts to

fully consider all evidence presented on the question of whether

a parent’s or guardian’s substance abuse places a young child at

substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.

This argument fails to fully grapple with the fact that the

fundamental problem with the tender years presumption is not

that it robs courts of discretion; it is that the presumption

threatens to oversimplify the analysis required under section

300(b)(1)(D). It is reasonable for courts to infer that very young

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

children require a substantial degree of close supervision. But

it is inappropriate to regard a parent’s or guardian’s excessive

use of alcohol or an addictive drug as always being sufficient, by

itself, to show that the parent or guardian is unable to provide

regular care for a young child and that the child is therefore at

substantial risk of serious physical harm. Even granting that

this presumption may be rebutted, it still distorts the necessary

inquiry under section 300(b)(1)(D) by treating one established

fact (a parent’s or guardian’s substance abuse) as always

amounting to sufficient proof of other facts (an inability to

provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious physical

harm to a child of tender years) without any indication that the

Legislature approved of such conflation. We conclude that to

uphold the Legislature’s intent, an inability to provide regular

care and a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness

must be established on the facts of each case, without relying on

a categorical rule providing that a “finding of substance abuse is

prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to

provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of physical

harm” to a child of “ ‘tender years.’ ” (Drake M., supra,

211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.)

In this respect, the basic task before the juvenile court is

similar regardless of the age of the child involved. Substance

abuse, when shown to exist, should not be regarded as

automatically amounting to prima facie evidence of the other

facts required for dependency jurisdiction. Courts must

undertake a further inquiry to ascertain whether the

government has met its burden as to each of the elements

involved, without shifting the burden to a parent or guardian to

rebut a presumption created by a finding of substance abuse.

(See, e.g., In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 830,

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

abrogated on another ground by R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at

pp. 628–629 [even accepting the existence of substance abuse by

a parent, the evidence before the juvenile court failed to show

that this abuse led to a significant risk of serious physical

harm].) Courts may in appropriate circumstances discern an

inability to provide regular care and a substantial risk of serious

physical harm or illness from the evidence that has been

introduced in a particular case, including evidence relating to

substance abuse, and the reasonable inferences that can be

drawn from this evidence. (See, e.g., In re L.W. (2019)

32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848–850 [mother’s two arrests for driving

under the influence, one of which led to a reckless driving

conviction, adequately established a substantial risk of serious

physical harm to her 13-year-old daughter].) In this respect, a

child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon the care that the

child may require and whether a parent’s or guardian’s

substance abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious

physical harm. Courts can properly take these facts regarding

a child into account, together with all other relevant evidence,

in deciding whether the government has met its burden at the

jurisdictional stage. But courts may not shortcut the inquiry

envisioned by the Legislature by regarding substance abuse as

constituting prima facie evidence of an inability to provide

regular care to a young child and a substantial risk of serious

physical harm to that child, and then look to the parent or

guardian to rebut this presumption.

For the foregoing reasons, we reject the tender years

presumption and disapprove the Court of Appeal decisions that

have relied upon it, along with the Court of Appeal decisions

that have regarded a professional medical diagnosis or

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

satisfaction of the relevant DSM criteria as necessary for a

finding of substance abuse under section 300(b)(1)(D).18

D. Remand to the Court of Appeal

Father argues that the evidence before the juvenile court

did not support a jurisdictional finding based on his drug use.

The Department argues that substantial evidence supported the

juvenile court’s finding. Rather than decide this question

ourselves, the better course is to remand this case to allow the

Court of Appeal to revisit its analysis in light of our decision.

18

We disapprove the following decisions insofar as each

regarded a medical diagnosis of substance abuse or satisfaction

of the relevant DSM criteria as necessary to a finding of

substance abuse, recognized the tender years presumption, or

both: In re L.C., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th 646; In re Alexzander C.,

supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 438; In re Kadence P. (2015)

241 Cal.App.4th 1376; In re Christopher R., supra,

225 Cal.App.4th 1210; and In re Drake M., supra,

211 Cal.App.4th 754. We also disapprove In re K.B., supra,

59 Cal.App.5th 593 insofar as its assertion that “[w]hen a child

is of tender age, a parent’s substance abuse can be prima facie

evidence of a risk of serious physical harm or illness” (id. at

p. 603, italics added) might be read as broadly relieving the

government of its full burden under section 300(b)(1)(D).

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

III. DISPOSITION

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and

remand the cause to that court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

50

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re N.R.

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published)

Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 4/29/22 – 2d Dist.,

Div. 5

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S274943

Date Filed: December 14, 2023

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: Martha A. Matthews

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for

Defendant and Appellant.

Duke Law School, Allison E. Korn; UCLA School of Law and Alicia

Virani for W. David Ball, Barton Child Law and Policy Center, Paul

Bennett, Leo Beletsky, Taleed El-Sabawi, Matthew I. Fraidin,

Stephanie K. Glaberson, Cynthia Godsoe, Crystal Grant, Josh Gupta-

Kagan, Julia Hernandez, Alex Kriet, Sarah Lorr, Laura Matthews-

Jolly, Jennifer D. Oliva, Dorothy Roberts, Shanta Trivedi and Vivek

Sankaran as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Proskauer Rose, Jonathan M. Weiss, Justin B. Cohen, Michelle K.

Moriarty and Bradley M. Presant for Association for Multidisciplinary

Education and Research in Substance Use and Addiction and

California Society of Addiction Medicine as Amici Curiae on behalf of

Defendant and Appellant.

Leslie A. Barry for Persons with Lived Experience in the Child Welfare

System as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Martin Schwarz, Public Defender (Orange), and Brian Okamoto,

Deputy Public Defender, for California Dependency Trial Counsel and

California Appellate Defense Counsel as Amici Curiae on behalf of

Defendant and Appellant.

Minouche Kandel; Elizabeth Gill, Faride Perez-Aucar; Brenda Star

Adams and Jean Strout for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation

of Southern California, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation

of Northern California, the National Center for Youth Law and

Children’s Rights, Inc. as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and

Appellant.

Kellen Russoniello for Drug Policy Alliance, Any Positive Change,

Beyond Do No Harm Network, California Coalition for Women

Prisoners, Children’s Defense Fund-California, CLARE Matrix,

Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto, Elephant Circle,

Immigrant Legal Resource Center, JMACforFamilies, Law For Black

Lives, Legal Action Center, Legal Momentum, Women’s Legal Defense

and Education Fund, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children,

National Harm Reduction Coalition, National Health Law Program, A

New Path (Parent for Addiction Treatment & Healing), Pregnancy

Justice, San Francisco AIDS Foundation and Sidewalk Project as

Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

The Hill Law Firm and Tasha Alyssa Hill for Professor Alan J. Dettlaff

and Professors of Social Work and Social Workers as Amici Curiae on

behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva and Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim

Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky and David Michael

Miller, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jennifer Hearing; David Chiu, City Attorney (San Francisco), Kimiko

Burton and Elizabeth McDonald Muniz, Deputy City Attorneys, for

California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of

Plaintiff and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Sean Angele Burleigh

Attorney at Law

PO Box 1976

Cortaro, AZ 85652

(415) 692-4784

David Michael Miller

Deputy County Counsel

500 West Temple Street, Suite 648

Los Angeles, California 90012

(213) 808-8777