Opinion

Clayton Godby v. Department of Labor

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Dec 13, 2023
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 14.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CLAYTON DAY, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DC-0752-18-0675-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DATE: December 13, 2023

Agency.

THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Clayton Day , Washington, D.C., pro se.

Rolando Valdez , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

REMAND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision that

dismissed the appeal of his removal under 5 U.S.C. § 7701, finding that he made

a binding election seeking corrective action with the Office of Special Counsel

(OSC) on the matter before filing his Board appeal. For the reasons discussed

below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

decision, and REMAND this case to the Washington Regional Office for further

adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant worked for the agency as a GS-12 Program Analyst. Initial

Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2. On June 22, 2018, the agency issued the appellant

a decision notice removing him pursuant to chapter 75 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code

for various acts of alleged misconduct. Id. at 8-17. The effective date of the

appellant’s removal was July 8, 2018. IAF, Tab 1 at 15, Tab 4 at 22. At the time

that the agency issued the decision notice, the appellant had at least one

whistleblower complaint pending with OSC. Day v. Department of Labor, MSPB

Docket No. DC-1221-19-0009-W-1, Initial Appeal File (W-1 IAF), Tab 8

at 12-22.

¶3 On July 2, 2018, the appellant provided OSC with a copy of his response to

the proposed removal and removal decision notice. IAF, Tab 19 at 7. OSC then

issued the appellant a preliminary determination on July 11, 2018, advising the

appellant that it intended to close its investigation without further action. W-1

IAF, Tab 1 at 6-11. This determination letter outlined the appellant’s removal as

one of the alleged retaliatory prohibited personnel practices in his complaint that

OSC investigated. Id. at 8-10. 2 The appellant proceeded to file his Board appeal

on July 18, 2018, challenging his chapter 75 removal and raising the affirmative

defense of reprisal for whistleblowing. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 9 at 1, 5.

¶4 OSC closed its investigation into the appellant’s complaint on July 31,

2018, and provided him with his notice of the right to file an individual right of

action (IRA) appeal with the Board. W-1 IAF, Tab 1 at 5. The appellant filed an

IRA appeal on September 30, 2018, which included, inter alia, a claim that the

agency removed him in reprisal for whistleblowing. W-1 IAF, Tab 1. Based on

2

The appellant responded to OSC’s preliminary determination letter on July 23, 2018,

and did not refute the inclusion of his removal as part of his complaint. IAF, Tab 19

at 16-19.

3

his review of the appellant’s IRA appeal, the administrative judge issued a show

cause order in the instant case outlining the statutory election of remedies

provision for an appellant subjected to a Board appealable action that also alleges

reprisal for whistleblowing. IAF, Tab 15 at 1-3.

¶5 After the parties submitted argument and evidence on the issue, the

administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal

of his removal under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. IAF, Tabs 16, 19, 20, Initial Decision

(ID). The administrative judge found that, after receiving notice of his election

of remedies rights, the appellant made a knowing and informed binding election

seeking corrective action with OSC on his removal prior to filing this appeal with

the Board. ID at 1-7. Thus, the appellant could only proceed before the Board

with an IRA appeal over his removal, which the administrative judge already

docketed as a separate appeal. ID at 7; W-1 IAF, Tab 10 at 1. The appellant then

timely filed a petition for review claiming that he never sought corrective action

with OSC over his removal and seeking to move forward with the Board appeal of

his chapter 75 removal under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. Petition for Review (PFR) File,

Tab 1. 3

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶6 An employee subjected to an action appealable to the Board and who

alleges that the contested action was taken in reprisal for whistleblowing may

elect to pursue a remedy through only one of the following processes: (1) an

appeal to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7701; (2) a grievance filed under an

applicable negotiated grievance procedure; or (3) a complaint seeking corrective

action from OSC under 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1222. Edwards v. Department of the

3

The agency’s response to the appellant’s petition for review was filed 11 days beyond

its deadline. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e); PFR File, Tab 3, Tab 4 at 1. Because the agency

failed to show good cause to excuse its untimely filing, we need not consider it on

review. PFR File, Tab 5; see Kemp v. U.S. Postal Service, 44 M.S.P.R. 10, 14 (1990)

(declining to consider the agency’s response to the petition for review because it was

untimely filed without good cause shown); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g).

4

Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 307, ¶ 12 (2013); see 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g); 5 C.F.R.

§ 1209.2(d)(1).

¶7 If an employee first elects to timely file an appeal with the Board under

5 U.S.C. § 7701 after being subjected to an action under chapters 43 or 75 of

Title 5 of the United States Code, the burden of proof rests with the agency to

provide evidentiary support for its decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1); Gonzalez

v. Department of Homeland Security, 114 M.S.P.R. 318, ¶ 11 (2010). An

employee may also raise affirmative defenses, such as a claim that the action

appealable to the Board was taken in reprisal for whistleblowing. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 7701(c)(2)(B); Campbell v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 11

(2016). This is because 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(B) states that an action appealable

to the Board may not be sustained if it is shown “that the decision was based on

any prohibited personnel practice described in [5 U.S.C. §] 2302(b).”

Section 2302(b)(8) prohibits reprisal against a whistleblower for making a

protected disclosure, while section 2302(b)(9) prohibits reprisal for engaging in

other protected activity. In contrast, if an employee who is subjected to an action

otherwise appealable to the Board and claims whistleblower reprisal first elects to

seek corrective action with OSC regarding the action, any subsequent appeal to

the Board on the matter is limited to an IRA appeal, resolving only the claim of

reprisal for whistleblowing activity. Corthell v. Department of Homeland

Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 16 (2016); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.2(c), (d)(2).

¶8 The remedy first sought by an aggrieved employee is deemed an election of

that procedure and precludes pursuit of the matter in another forum. Sherman v.

Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 644, ¶ 12 (2015). For adverse

actions taken under chapters 43 and 75 that are appealable to the Board, an

employee’s election of remedies under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) must be knowing and

informed in order to be binding. Agoranos v. Department of Justice,

119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶ 16 (2013). To be knowing and informed, an employee must

have notice of the avenues of relief available and the preclusive effect the first

5

filing has on the other remedial options. See id., ¶¶ 16 n.6, 17; 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.21(d). Relevant to this case, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.21(d)(4) requires an agency

to include in a decision notice to an employee on a matter appealable to the Board

the effect an election to seek corrective action with OSC under 5 U.S.C.

§ 7121(g) has on an employee’s appeal rights before the Board.

¶9 Here, the administrative judge erred when concluding that the appellant

made a knowing and informed binding election seeking corrective action with

OSC on his removal before he filed this Board appeal contesting his removal

under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. 4 ID at 5-7. The record reflects that the appellant did not

receive adequate notice of the preclusive effect that challenging his removal

through the OSC complaint process had on his other remedial options,

particularly any future Board appeal. Specifically, while the removal decision

notice correctly advised that the appellant could only seek relief on his removal in

one forum, it did not outline that, if he first sought corrective action with OSC,

than any subsequent Board appeal would be limited to an IRA appeal resolving

only the whistleblower reprisal claim. IAF, Tab 1 at 15-17. Thus, the decision

notice on the appellant’s removal issued by the agency did not comply with

5 C.F.R. § 1201.21(d)(4). There is no indication in the record that the appellant

received notice through any other means. The absence of such notice prevented

the appellant from making a knowing and informed binding election pursuant to

Agoranos. See Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 17 (finding that the appellant’s

decision to seek corrective action with OSC did not preclude him from filing an

adverse action appeal where the appellant did not receive notice of his appeal

rights in a decision letter and there was no evidence that he received notice

through any other means); Edwards, 120 M.S.P.R. 307, ¶ 13 (holding that, even if

the appellant’s OSC complaint was filed before his Board appeal, any such

election was not knowing and informed because the separation notice did not

4

The appellant’s removal is appealable to the Board under chapter 75. 5 U.S.C.

§§ 7512(1), 7513(d).

6

inform him of the preclusive effect of first filing an OSC complaint). Such an

error warrants remanding the case to the administrative judge for adjudication of

the appellant’s appeal of his chapter 75 removal under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. 5 See

Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶¶ 18, 22 (2015) (holding

that the appellant’s election to OSC was not binding because it was not knowing

and informed, resulting in a remand to adjudicate her appeal as a chapter 75

action), overruled in part by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget ,

2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25.

ORDER

¶10 For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the Washington

Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

5

As previously noted, the appellant’s claim that his removal was in reprisal for

whistleblowing was adjudicated by the Board in Day v. Department of Labor, MSPB

Docket No. DC-1221-19-0009-W-1. W-1 IAF, Tab 23, Initial Decision. The

administrative judge issued an initial decision in that matter, denying corrective action,

on May 28, 2019. The initial decision became the final decision of the Board after

neither party filed a petition for review.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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