United States v. Jirard Kincherlow

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11980

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JIRARD KINCHERLOW,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00051-MW-MAF-1

____________________

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11980

LAGOA, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Jirard Kincherlow connected J.D., a fourteen-

year-old girl, with adult men to engage in sexual activity for

money. Through social media messages, Kincherlow also advised

J.D. on how to make more money as a prostitute and negotiated

prices for her to engage in sexual activity with himself and his adult

friend. Following an investigation, Tallahassee Police Department

(“TPD”) officers discovered the messages and arrested Kincherlow.

A jury found Kincherlow guilty of coercing or enticing a minor into

engaging in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

On appeal, Kincherlow challenges the sufficiency of the evi-

dence supporting his conviction, arguing that he could not have

persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced J.D. into engaging in pros-

titution because she was already engaged in prostitution before the

two started messaging. He also argues that the district court erred

in using an overly broad definition of the term “induce” in its in-

structions to the jury. Finally, Kincherlow argues that a variance

between the language of the indictment and the jury charge denied

him due process notice of the charge against him.

After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,

we affirm Kincherlow’s conviction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A federal grand jury indicted Kincherlow for one count of

coercion or enticement of a minor to engage in prostitution, in vi-

olation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Although the statute criminalizes

the actions of one who “knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or

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22-11980 Opinion of the Court 3

coerces” a minor to engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (em-

phasis added), the indictment lists the verbs in the conjunctive, stat-

ing that Kincherlow “did knowingly persuade, induce, entice, and

coerce” a minor to engage in prostitution, (emphasis added). The

case proceeded to trial. In the proposed jury instructions that the

government submitted two weeks beforehand, the government

used the disjunctive formulation, i.e., “knowingly persuaded, in-

duced, enticed, or coerced.” (Emphasis added). And the govern-

ment did the same during its opening statement, telling the jury

that the first element of the charged crime was “that the defendant

knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced J.D. to engage

in prostitution.” (Emphasis added).

Following opening statements, the government called In-

vestigator Elizabeth Bascom, a special victims investigator with the

TPD who was familiar with J.D. based on a list of at-risk children

that TPD had compiled. According to Bascom, J.D. had previously

been sexually abused and there were indications that her “home

life was not safe.” Bascom testified that, on November 6, 2018, she

became aware that J.D. was active on “skipthegames.com,” a web-

site that is used to advertise sex work and includes prices for specific

acts and lengths of time. Bascom also testified that the TPD had

located conversations between J.D. and Kincherlow on Facebook.

Their conversation on November 11, 2018, reads as follows:

J.D.: Aye bae. Do you buy beans?[ 1]

1 Bascom testified that “beans” are a pill drug.

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11980

Kincherlow: Yes

J.D.: You tryna buy some beans?

Kincherlow: You got some? Plus I got a play.[ 2]

White boy, top dollar. This my heavy. Treat him

nice cuz he gonna pay.

J.D.: Okay. When?

Kincherlow: Yeah. I’ll be––I’ll be all of them. How

many?

J.D. W[h]ere?

Kincherlow: Let me set it up.

J.D.: I got six.

I want 30 fa all of em.

Kincherlow: Send pic of you. Plus get cleaned. He

gonna be a great gentleman . . . $$$$.

J.D.: Okay.

I’m ready now.

You gonna buy the beans though?

Bascom understood the messages to show that Kincherlow was

“coaching” J.D. about how the “plays will be set up” and “who is

going to control what.” (Later in the conversation, at a time when

Bascom believed that J.D. was meeting with an adult for sexual ac-

tivity, J.D. told Kincherlow that she “just told him everything bout

2 Bascom testified that “play” is a slang term for the exchange of sexual activity

for some kind of payment.

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me and now he’s telling me bout himself,” and asked about Kinch-

erlow’s whereabouts. Kincherlow messaged that he was “posted

at the front.” Bascom testified that it was common for a person

who is orchestrating sexual activity for money to be nearby the

transaction to ensure that they are paid and the girl is not harmed.

Kincherlow then told J.D. to “handle” her client and to “[g]et our

money.”

The government’s next witness was Investigator Stephen

Osborn, a TPD investigator assigned to the Internet Crimes

Against Children taskforce. Osborn also reviewed messages be-

tween J.D. and Kincherlow and read at trial a November 13, 2018,

conversation:

J.D.: Bae

Bae, what’s up?

I’m trying come put this pussy on ya and get 20 to 25

$.

So you tell me what’s up.

???

[A 49 second call goes through from J.D. to Kincherlow]

How long you finna be there?

Bae.

Kincherlow: Come on.

J.D.: I’m OMW

Kincherlow: Make sure you pull in all the way to my

porch.

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11980

J.D.: Okay. You gotta condom?

Kincherlow: [responded with a “thumbs up”]

J.D.: [responded with a “thumbs up”]

Osborn also described a conversation between Kincherlow

and J.D. from December 3, 2018. The messages read:

Kincherlow: WYA––I got gas.[ 3]

J.D.: Home?

Kincherlow: Me and my homie.

In and out.

J.D.: Who is yo homie?

Kincherlow: We want to play.

Cody.

J.D.: And how much you talm bout?

Kincherlow: I got you.

J.D.: That’s not telling me none.

Kincherlow: We gonna hit you in gas. Real shit.

You good? What up?

J.D.: How much gas?

Kincherlow: Just move, BIH

J.D.: Really?

Kincherlow: Damn.

3 Osborn testified that “gas” meant marijuana.

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J.D.: [responded with a “thumbs up”]

Kincherlow: You do too much.

J.D.: I need at least 30$.

Kincherlow: Can we slide in?

J.D.: Yes.

10 mins a piece.

Kincherlow: Come on, bae. A nut and out. Enjoy.[ 4]

The government also called J.D. as a witness. She testified

that she used to take drugs every day and meet with men to engage

in sexual activity for money. When shown a photograph of Kinch-

erlow, J.D. recognized him as someone she had engaged in sexual

activity with when she was fourteen-years-old and as someone

who had connected her with other men to engage in sexual activity

with for money and drugs. She also testified that no one else ever

had control over her social media accounts.

After the close of the government’s case, Kincherlow moved

for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-

dure 29, arguing that the government “[had not] proven a prima

facie case.” The district court denied the motion. Kincherlow then

indicated to the district court that he would not testify and renewed

the motion for judgment of acquittal, which the district court once

again denied.

4 Osborn testified that “nut” is slang for ejaculation.

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11980

Before closing arguments, the district court discussed the

proposed jury instructions with the parties. The government re-

quested that both coercion and enticement be used with the dis-

junctive “or.” Kincherlow objected to the government’s request

and asked for the conjunctive “and,” arguing that the conjunctive

list “tracks the language of the statute.” After noting that both the

text of § 2422(b) and Pattern Jury Instruction 092.2 list the verbs in

the disjunctive, the district court denied Kincherlow’s objection

and used the disjunctive “or” in its instructions to the jury.

The jury found Kincherlow guilty of having violated 18

U.S.C. § 2422(b), and the district court sentenced him to 180

months of imprisonment. Kincherlow timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

As a general matter, we review “the sufficiency of the evi-

dence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the government and drawing all reasonable inferences . . . in favor

of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232, 1239

(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 845

(11th Cir. 1998)). We are required to affirm Kincherlow’s convic-

tion if “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Hunt, 187 F.3d 1269, 1270 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Jackson v. Vir-

ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

However, “[a] motion for a new trial based on the weight of

the evidence is ‘not favored’ and is reserved for ‘really exceptional

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22-11980 Opinion of the Court 9

cases.’” United States v. Moore, 76 F.4th 1355, 1363 (11th Cir. 2023)

(quoting United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th Cir.

2019)). It is true that “[a] district court may grant a new trial based

on the weight of the evidence even if the evidence is sufficient to

convict in the rare case in which the evidence of guilt although le-

gally sufficient is thin and marked by uncertainties and discrepan-

cies.” Id. (emphasis in original); accord United States v. Witt, 43 F.4th

1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[T]o warrant a new trial, the ‘evidence

must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it would

be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.’” (quoting United

States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1313 (11th Cir. 1985))). But our

review is not plenary for a new trial claim based on the weight of

the evidence. See Moore, 76 F.4th at 1363. Instead, we review such

claims for an abuse of discretion and give denials of those claims

“greater deference.” Id.

Additionally, we review the denial of a motion for judgment

of acquittal under Rule 29 based on the sufficiency of the evidence

de novo, United States. v. Pirela Pirela, 809 F.3d 1195, 1198 (11th Cir.

2015), viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the

prosecution and all reasonable inferences and credibility choices

are drawn in its favor,” Moore, 76 F.4th at 1363.

Further, “[w]e review jury instructions challenged in the dis-

trict court ‘de novo to determine whether the instructions misstated

the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.’”

United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1275 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting

United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009)).

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11980

III. ANALYSIS

Kincherlow raises four arguments on appeal. First, he ar-

gues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of violating

§ 2422(b) and that he is entitled to a new trial based on the weight

of the evidence. Second, he argues that the district court erred in

denying his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. Third, he

argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury on the

definition of “induce” as meaning “to stimulate the occurrence of

or to cause.” Fourth, he argues that the variance between the in-

dictment and the jury instructions denied him due process notice

of the charge against him. We address each argument in turn.

A. The Sufficiency and the Weight of the Evidence

The statute under which Kincherlow was charged, 18 U.S.C.

§ 2422(b), makes it illegal for an individual to knowingly persuade,

induce, entice, or coerce any individual under the age of eighteen

to engage in illicit sexual activity. “[T]he four elements that must

be proven to show a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) [are]: (1) use

of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly persuade, in-

duce, entice, or coerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18;

(4) to engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be

charged with a criminal offense, or attempting to do so.” 5 United

States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005).

5 In this case, Kincherlow was convicted of the substantive offense proscribed

by § 2422(b) and not of attempting to violate § 2422(b). To sustain a conviction

for the crime of attempt, the government must show that a defendant (1) acted

with the specific intent to engage in the criminal conduct for which he is

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Kincherlow argues that the evidence presented at trial does

not support a guilty verdict, primarily based on the theory that Kin-

cherlow did not persuade, induce, entice, or coerce J.D. into pros-

titution, but was rather providing an opportunity to an individual

already engaged in prostitution. Kincherlow’s argument lacks

merit.

First, the record makes clear that a reasonable juror could

find that Kincherlow persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced J.D.

into prostitution. J.D. was a sexually abused minor who was strug-

gling with drug addiction and who had no secure home life or

school structure. She had a life that was in flux, and the fact that

she had already engaged in prostitution does not mean that she, by

definition, could not be persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced

into doing the same at a later point. By finding Kincherlow guilty,

the jury implicitly determined that J.D. had been in a state where

Kincherlow persuaded, enticed, coerced, or induced her into pros-

titution. And contrary to Kincherlow’s suggestion, J.D.’s ultimate

willingness to engage in prostitution was not proof that she was

incapable of being persuaded to do so, but rather evidence that Kin-

cherlow’s efforts to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce J.D. were

successful.

Second, to the extent that Kincherlow argues that merely

presenting the opportunity or paying money for a minor to engage

in prostitution is not persuasion, inducement, enticement, or

charged; and (2) took a substantial step toward the commission of the crime.

United States v. Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 2007).

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12 Opinion of the Court 22-11980

coercion, that argument is foreclosed by this Court’s precedent.

United States v. Rutgerson, 822 F.3d 1223, 1234 (11th Cir. 2016). “We

have held that the terms persuade, induce, and entice in § 2422(b)

should be given their ordinary meaning.” Id. at 1232. Therefore,

“offering or agreeing to pay money in exchange for engaging in

various sex acts qualifies as inducement within the meaning of”

§ 2422(b). Id. at 1234 (recognizing that “offering or agreeing to pay

money in exchange for engaging in various sex acts . . . was the

necessary element” in causing the minor to engage in prostitution).

That reading is not affected by the fact that the minor may have

already been engaged in prostitution. Id. at 1233 (“To the extent

that [the defendant] suggests that an underage prostitute who

holds herself out for sex cannot be induced within the meaning of

§ 2422(b) as a matter of law, he is mistaken.”). This reasoning is

both binding precedent and common sense. Acts of prostitution,

especially by minors, are not naturally occurring, spontaneous

events. Moreover, Kincherlow’s actions went beyond merely of-

fering an opportunity to engage in prostitution; he instructed J.D.,

a fourteen-year-old girl, on how to best make money as a prosti-

tute, including by telling her to clean her body and meet clients

through him.

The evidence in this case, e.g., witness testimony, message

records, and J.D.’s own testimony, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the government, is more than sufficient to support the

jury’s finding that Kincherlow knowingly persuaded, induced, en-

ticed, or coerced J.D. to engage in prostitution. And based on the

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evidence presented at trial, we conclude that a reasonable jury

could find that Kincherlow violated § 2422(b).

We further conclude that the weight of the evidence does

not preponderate against a guilty verdict in this case, as Kincherlow

has not shown that the evidence of guilt against him was “thin and

marked by uncertainties and discrepancies.” See Moore, 76 F.4th at

1363. Accordingly, Kincherlow is not entitled to a new trial.

B. Denial of the Rule 29 Motion

Kincherlow next argues that the district court erred in deny-

ing his motion for judgment of acquittal because the government

failed to present a prima facie case that he persuaded, induced, en-

ticed, or coerced J.D. to engage in prostitution.

We will uphold the district court’s denial of a motion for

judgment of acquittal “if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude

that the evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reason-

able doubt.” United States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir.

2016) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th

Cir. 2000)). And “[w]e will not overturn a jury’s verdict if there is

‘any reasonable construction of the evidence that would have al-

lowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016)

(quoting United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 587 (11th Cir. 2015)).

The evidence presented at trial, however, need not exclude every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence for a reasonable jury to find

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773

F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Indeed, the jury is free

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14 Opinion of the Court 22-11980

to choose among alternative, reasonable interpretations of the evi-

dence. Id.

In arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion

for judgment of acquittal, Kincherlow repeats the same reasoning

from his arguments on the sufficiency of the evidence, urging this

Court to conclude that J.D.’s decision to engage in prostitution was

her own “independent decision[]” such that Kincherlow could not

have persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced her. For similar rea-

sons as to why the weight of the evidence was sufficient for a jury

to convict Kincherlow of violating § 2422(b), these arguments fail.

Again, the evidence presented at trial established that Kincherlow

negotiated prices, enforced tactics, and arranged meet ups for J.D.

to engage in prostitution. We thus conclude that the district court

did not err in denying Kincherlow’s motion for judgment of acquit-

tal and affirm the denial of Kincherlow’s Rule 29 motion.

C. Jury Instructions

Kincherlow next argues that the district court erred by in-

structing the jury that the definition of “induce” means “to stimu-

late the occurrence of or to cause.” Kincherlow’s defense was that

he did not unduly influence her because she was already a prosti-

tute, and that the court’s instructions foreclosed his defense by in-

cluding the phrase “to cause,” broadening the scope of the statute

to include behavior that doesn’t overcome the will of a minor. This

argument, however, is foreclosed by this Court’s precedent in

United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004). Because the

Murrell court disfavored a definition of induce that was “essentially

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22-11980 Opinion of the Court 15

synonymous with the word ‘persuade,’” see id. at 1287, the district

court did not err in using the jury instructions that used the same

definition in Murrell.

This argument, however, is squarely foreclosed by this

Court’s precedent in United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir.

2004), which held that “induce” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 2422 is

properly defined as “to stimulate the occurrence of; cause.” Id. at

1287. We will not conclude that a district court erred for adhering

to the holding of a decision of this Court that is on point. See United

States v. Gonzalez, 834 F.3d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 2016) (“When a jury

instruction accurately expresses the applicable law, ‘there is no rea-

son for reversal . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256,

1275 (11th Cir. 2013))); see also United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173,

1206 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court did not err when

defining a term in a jury charge when the definition “was consistent

with the definition . . . provided by the Supreme Court”).

D. Indictment Variance

Finally, Kincherlow argues that a variance between the in-

dictment language and the government’s proof at trial deprived

him of due process notice of the charge against him. We find his

arguments without merit.

The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be

held to answer for capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on

a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S. Const. amend.

V. “It would be fundamentally unfair to convict a defendant on

charges of which he had no notice.” United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d

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16 Opinion of the Court 22-11980

628, 633 (11th Cir. 1990). However, if the rights of the defendant

were not substantially prejudiced by a variance between the indict-

ment and the proof, then it is immaterial. United States v. Ard, 731

F.2d 718, 725 (11th Cir. 1984).

Here, the variance between the indictment and the proof did

not affect Kincherlow’s substantial rights and his ability to defend

himself. The text of the statute, the pattern jury instructions, and

the proposed jury instructions submitted by the government two

weeks before trial all list the verbs “persuade,” “induce,” “entice,”

and “coerce” with the disjunctive “or.” Kincherlow therefore had

sufficient notice that he could be convicted for having engaged in

any one of those acts and enough time to prepare his defense ac-

cordingly. 6 And, in any event, our precedent clearly establishes

that where a statute lists multiple means of committing the offense

and the government’s indictment against the defendant charges

two or more of them conjunctively, the government may prove

one or more of them at trial in the disjunctive. See United States v.

Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2014). So, even if Kincherlow

did not have notice, his argument would still fail.

Accordingly, we conclude that the variance between Kinch-

erlow’s indictment and the proof was not prejudicial.

6 Even if any doubt remained when trial commenced, the government again

used the disjunctive “or” during its opening statement.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we affirm Kincherlow’s conviction for

coercion or enticement of a minor to engage in prostitution in vio-

lation of § 2422(b).

AFFIRMED.

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22-11980 [ED CARNES, J., Concurring] 1

ED CARNES, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

I join all of the majority opinion and write separately to add

to its discussion of the conjunctive-disjunctive issue involving the

indictment’s allegations and the proof at trial. Kincherlow con-

tends that he and his counsel did not have sufficient notice he could

be convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422 if the government

proved any one of the four means of committing the crime that

were charged in the indictment. The majority opinion rejects that

contention on the ground that “the text of the statute, the pattern

jury instructions, and the proposed jury instructions submitted by

the government” gave Kincherlow notice of what the government

needed to prove to convict. The majority then states “in any

event” that our decision in United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271,

1284 (11th Cir. 2014), held that where an indictment alleges multi-

ple means conjunctively it is sufficient to convict if any one of them

is proven. That is what Mozie held. From that, the majority con-

cludes “even if Kincherlow did not have notice, his argument

would still fail,” and the variance between Kincherlow’s indictment

and the proof was not prejudicial.

I would put it somewhat differently. Kincherlow’s argument

fails at the first premise. That essential premise is that he did not

have notice he could be convicted by proof of any one of the con-

junctively alleged means. The premise fails because our binding

precedent put him and his counsel on notice that he could be.

Since we are talking about notice, it is worth pointing out

that while Mozie was enough to provide any necessary notice of the

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2 [ED CARNES, J., Concurring] 22-11980

conjunctive-disjunctive rule, it was far from the only precedent

providing loud and clear notice of the rule. See United States v. Ma-

her, 955 F.3d 880, 886 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Because the statute specifies

in the disjunctive several means of committing the offense, [the de-

fendant’s] indictment could allege those means in the conjunctive

and the Government was only required to prove one of them.”)

(cleaned up); United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1344 n.3 (11th

Cir. 2014) (“Prosecutors can and frequently do, however, charge al-

ternative elements in the conjunctive and prove one or more of

them in the disjunctive, which is constitutionally permissible.”);

United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2000)

(recognizing the “well established” law that the government can in-

dict the defendant in the conjunctive and present proof of just one

means of committing the crime); United States v. Cornillie, 92 F.3d

1108, 1110 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Where the language of a statute pro-

scribes several means by which the defendant might have commit-

ted a violation, the government may plead the offense conjunc-

tively and satisfy its burden of proof by any one of the means.”);

United States v. Burton, 871 F.2d 1566, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Where

a penal statute . . . prescribes several alternative ways in which the

statute may be violated and each is subject to the same punish-

ment, . . . the indictment may charge any or all of the acts conjunc-

tively . . . and the government may satisfy its burden by proving

that the defendant, by committing any one of the acts alleged, vio-

lated the statute.”); United States v. Acosta, 748 F.2d 577, 579 (11th

Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Griffin, 705 F.2d 434, 436 (11th Cir.

1983) (“The law is well established . . . that where an indictment

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22-11980 [ED CARNES, J., Concurring] 3

charges several means of violation of the statute in the conjunctive,

proof of only one of the means is sufficient to convict.”); United

States v. Brooks, 670 F.2d 148, 153 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); United

States v. Figueroa, 666 F.2d 1375, 1378 n.1 (11th Cir. 1982) (same);

United States v. Haymes, 610 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1980) (“It is well-

established in this Circuit that a disjunctive statute may be pleaded

conjunctively and proved disjunctively.”); United States v. Quiroz-Car-

rasco, 565 F.2d 1328, 1331 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v.

McCann, 465 F.2d 147, 162 (5th Cir. 1972) (“Where a statute specifies

several alternative ways in which an offense may be committed, the

indictment may allege the several ways in the conjunctive, and this

fact [does not] preclude[] a conviction if only one of the several

allegations linked in the conjunctive in the indictment is proven.”);

United States v. Ippolito, 438 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding

that government was not required to prove violation of “the laws

of the United States and the laws of Florida” as stated in the indict-

ment because “[p]leading in the conjunctive is correct, and proof

of either is sufficient to support a verdict”); Fields v. United States,

408 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1969) (“Where a statute specifies several

alternative ways in which an offense can be committed, the indict-

ment may allege the several ways in the conjunctive, and a convic-

tion thereon will stand if proof of one or more of the means of

commission is sufficient.”); United States v. Minchew, 417 F.2d 218,

220 n.4 (5th Cir. 1969) (same); United States v. Duran, 411 F.2d 275,

278 (5th Cir. 1969) (“Where a crime is denounced disjunctively in

the statute but charged conjunctively in the indictment, proof of

any one of the several allegations is all that need be proved.”);

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4 [ED CARNES, J., Concurring] 22-11980

Cunningham v. United States, 356 F.2d 454, 455–56 (5th Cir. 1966)

(holding the government was not required “to prove that appellant

assaulted, impeded and interfered with the Immigration officer,”

even though that was the language in the indictment because “only

one of the several allegations linked in the conjunctive” needed to

be proved); Smith v. United States, 234 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1956)

(“We have held that it is proper to charge in the conjunctive the

various allegations in the accused pleading where a statute specifies

several means or ways in which an offense may be committed in

the alternative. A corollary to the rule of pleading in such matters

is the rule that only one of the several means or ways of commit-

ting the offense need be proved.”) (citations omitted); Price v. United

States, 150 F.2d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 1945) (“When several acts speci-

fied in a statute are committed by the same person, they may be

coupled in one count as together constituting one offense although

a disjunctive word is used in the statute, and proof of any one of

the acts joined in the conjunctive is sufficient to support a verdict

of guilty.”).

The conjunctive/disjunctive rule is not just the law of this

circuit; it is the law of in every other circuit with a criminal caseload

as well. Howard, 742 F.3d at 1344 n.3 (noting that every federal cir-

cuit allows charging in the conjunctive and proving in the disjunc-

tive); see also Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 636 (1896) (“We

perceive no sound reason why the doing of the prohibited thing in

each and all of the prohibited modes may not be charged in one

count, so that there may be a verdict of guilty upon proof that the

accused had done any one of the things constituting a substantive

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22-11980 [ED CARNES, J., Concurring] 5

crime under the statute.”); United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136

(1985) (citing Crain as holding that an “indictment count that al-

leges in the conjunctive a number of means of committing a crime

can support a conviction if any of the alleged means are proved”).

Even if Kincherlow and his counsel were unaware of that

fundamental and universally accepted rule of federal criminal law,

it would not matter. It wouldn’t because ignorance of the law is no

excuse. See McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 192 (2015)

(“[I]gnorance of the law is typically no defense to criminal prose-

cution . . . .”). That ignorance of the law is a no-go in the law is not

a new notion or minor matter. Instead, “[t]he general rule that ig-

norance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal

prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.” Cheek

v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). “This common-law rule

has been applied by the [Supreme] Court in numerous cases con-

struing criminal statutes.” Id.; see also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,

Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 581 (2010); United States v.

Hastie, 854 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2017).

Because of the presumption that everyone knows the law,

Kincherlow and his counsel were on notice that under well-estab-

lished law when a statute and indictment list multiple means of

committing a crime, proof of any one of them is enough to con-

vict. The fact that the statute itself, the pattern jury instructions,

and the proposed instructions in this case listed the means of com-

mitting the crime in the disjunctive provided notice that proof of

any one of those means was enough, but even if they hadn’t our

long line of emphatic precedent does and did give notice of that.