Bledsoe v. Willis

Case: 23-30238 Document: 00516979886 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/27/2023

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

November 27, 2023

No. 23-30238 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

Gregory James Bledsoe, on behalf of himself,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Dean Willis, in his individual capacity as Sergeant of the Shreveport Police

Department; David McClure, in his individual capacity as Officer of the

Shreveport Police Department,

Defendants—Appellants.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:21-CV-4367

______________________________

Before Wiener, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Gregory James Bledsoe brought

malicious prosecution claims against Dean Willis and David McClure,

members of the Shreveport Police Department, based on an alleged wrongful

arrest without probable cause, which ultimately led to Bledsoe’s two-year

incarceration for crimes he did not commit. The district court denied Willis

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*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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and McClure’s motion to dismiss Bledsoe’s claims under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We AFFIRM.

I.

On August 4, 2015, McClure responded to a reported burglary at a

residence, the Dalzell Street Property managed by Port City Realty. 1 After

arriving to the scene, McClure interviewed the burglary victim and Dalzell

Street Property tenant Sandra Robinson. Robinson told McClure that she

had not been to the Dalzell Street Property since August 2, 2015, and that

when she arrived back home, she noticed that the front door was unlocked,

the window of the front door was broken, and certain items were missing. At

that time, McClure collected fingerprints from the doorknobs and window.

The fingerprints came back from the lab as “not identifiable.”

Between August 4, 2015, and August 7, 2015, Port City Realty

contracted with Bledsoe to repair the front-door window at the Dalzell Street

Property. Port City Realty had previously contracted with Bledsoe to

complete handyman repair projects at three different sites. Bledsoe alleges

that he was cut by glass while repairing the front door window.

On August 7, 2015, McClure returned to the Dalzell Street Property

to conduct a follow-up interview with Robinson. The window was repaired

before McClure’s follow-up visit. During McClure’s interview, Robinson

said she had noticed blood near the fixed window. The blood had not been

mentioned in McClure’s earlier August 4 narrative report. McClure took a

sample of that blood and submitted it for analysis. The sample came back as

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1

In reciting the following allegations from Bledsoe’s complaint, we “accept all

facts as pleaded and construe them in the light most favorable to [Bledsoe].” See Guerra v.

Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453,

461 (5th Cir. 2022); Vardeman v. City of Hous., 55 F.4th 1045, 1049 (5th Cir. 2022)).

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a match for Bledsoe. Willis later contacted Robinson, who said she neither

knew Bledsoe nor gave Bledsoe permission to enter the property.

Neither Willis nor McClure documented asking Robinson: (1)

whether she owned the Dalzell Street Property; (2) whether she had

personally repaired the broken front-door window, and if not, whether she

knew who had repaired it; or (3) if any other items were damaged during the

burglary.

Willis sought the issuance of an arrest warrant based on the DNA

match to the blood collected. The judge who issued Bledsoe’s arrest warrant

relied on Willis’s affidavit and the facts stated therein from McClure’s

investigation to conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Bledsoe.

Bledsoe was arrested for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling. He

pleaded not guilty. While out on bond, Bledsoe failed to appear for a hearing

on time and was arrested. Bledsoe was incarcerated for two years and spent

an additional year on home confinement while awaiting trial. In January

2021, after the charges were amended to the lesser offense of criminal

trespass, a judge found Bledsoe not guilty because of a lack of evidence.

On December 21, 2021, Bledsoe filed this suit pursuant to § 1983 and

Louisiana state law. He brought several claims against Willis and McClure,

Caddo Parish Assistant District Attorney Brittany Arvie, and Caddo Parish

District Attorney James E. Stewart, Sr. Specifically, Bledsoe brought federal

and state malicious prosecution claims against Willis and McClure, a federal

malicious prosecution claim against Arvie, and two municipal liability claims

against Stewart. Bledsoe contends that Willis and McClure “caused the

arrest and commencement of criminal proceedings against [him] without

sufficient probable cause based on a clearly deficient investigation.”

Moreover, he seeks relief under § 1983 “based on the wrongful arrest, and

reckless filing of a warrant without probable cause.” As it relates to this

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appeal, Bledsoe’s complaint provides the following regarding his malicious

prosecution claims:

Neither Defendant McClure nor Defendant Willis wrote in

their official narrative reports that the broken front door

window had been repaired when Defendant McClure went to

the Dalzell Street Property on August 7, 2015, during which

visit he was directed to blood near the front door window.

Neither Defendant McClure nor Defendant Willis wrote in

their official narrative reports that Robinson was merely a

rental tenant at the Dalzell Street Property.

Neither Defendant McClure nor Defendant Willis contacted

the Dalzell Street Property owner or property management

company to inquire whether anyone, including Mr. Bledsoe,

had permission to enter the Dalzell Street Property.

Defendant Willis submitted an affidavit for an arrest warrant

directed to Mr. Bledsoe based on the investigation by

Defendant McClure and Defendant Willis.

The affidavit omitted the key facts described above, specifically

that Robinson was merely a rental tenant of the Dalzell Street

Property, that a property management company was

authorized to make repairs at the Dalzell Street Property, and

that the broken window had been repaired between the dates

Defendant McClure visited the Dalzell Street Property.

Those omissions resulted from the wanton and reckless

disregard by Defendant Willis and Defendant McClure for Mr.

Bledsoe’s constitutional rights.

Those omissions were material and were recklessly,

intentionally, or knowingly omitted from the affidavit for

arrest warrant.

But for those omissions, an arrest warrant was issued for Mr.

Bledsoe for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, Louisiana

R. S. 14:62.2.

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The day trial began, the burglary charge was dropped and

replaced with criminal trespassing, Louisiana R.S. 14:63, and

misdemeanor theft, Louisiana R.S. 14:67B(4).

Mr. Bledsoe was found not guilty on both charges at trial.

The actions of Defendant Willis and Defendant McClure

directly and proximately caused compensable injury to Mr.

Bledsoe.

Willis and McClure moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds. The district court

denied the motion. And Willis and McClure timely appealed. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

“This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant or denial of a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278,

284 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Crane v. City of Arlington, Texas, 50 F.4th 453, 461

(5th Cir. 2022)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Martinez v. Nueces

County, Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we must

accept all facts as pleaded and construe them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.” Guerra, 82 F.4th at 284 (quoting Crane, 50 F.4th at 461).

A plaintiff may bring a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for

malicious prosecution, even in the absence of “some affirmative indication

of innocence.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022). “[T]he gravamen

of the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution . . . is the wrongful

initiation of charges without probable cause.” Id. at 43. For decades, “it has

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been clearly established that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are

violated if (1) the affiant, in support of the warrant, includes ‘a false statement

knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth’ and (2)

‘the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’”

Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). After Thompson, this court clarified

the six elements for a claim of malicious prosecution, including: “(1) the

commencement or continuance of an original criminal proceeding; (2) its

legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant

in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present

plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice;

and (6) damages.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 278–79 (5th Cir. 2023)

(citation and quotation omitted).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from

liability for civil damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.’” Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2011).

The issue of whether qualified immunity applies “should be resolved

‘at the earliest possible state in the litigation.’” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440,

445 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

We undertake a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a government

official is entitled to qualified immunity, inquiring “(1) whether the officer’s

alleged conduct has violated a federal right and (2) whether the right in

question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged violation, such

that the officer was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.”

Bailey v. Iles, 78 F.4th 801, 807 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Cole v. Carson, 935

F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019)). An officer is entitled to qualified immunity

“if there is no violation, or if the conduct did not violate law clearly

established at the time.” Id. (quoting Cole, 935 F.3d at 451).

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For a right to be “clearly established,” “[t]he contours of the right

must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640,

(1987). The right can be clearly established either by the Supreme Court’s

precedent or our own. Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir.

2018). Ultimately, “[t]he central concept is that of ‘fair warning’: The law

can be clearly established ‘despite notable factual distinctions between the

precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior

decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated

constitutional rights.’” Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004)

(en banc) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)).

When confronted with a qualified-immunity defense at the pleadings

stage, the plaintiff must plead “facts which, if proved, would defeat [the]

claim of immunity.” Guerra, 82 F.4th at 285 (quoting Waller v. Hanlon, 922

F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019)) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

The pleading standards remain “the same when a motion to dismiss is based

on qualified immunity.” Id. “‘The crucial question is whether the complaint

pleads facts that, if true, would permit the inference that Defendants are

liable under § 1983, and would overcome their qualified immunity defense.’”

Id. at 285 (quoting Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021)). At

the motion-to-dismiss stage, “[i]t is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate

that qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Terwillinger, 4 F.4th at 280

(alteration in original).

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III.

A.

First, we consider whether Bledsoe sufficiently alleged facts for his

malicious prosecution claims against Willis and McClure. 2 Turning to the

six elements required for malicious prosecution, Willis and McClure argue

that Bledsoe fails on the fourth and fifth elements, but they do not discuss the

other elements. We agree with the district court’s determination that:

When accepted as fact, [Bledsoe’s] allegations plausibly

demonstrate that a criminal proceeding was commenced (the

first element), the criminal proceeding was the direct result of

information that Willis and McClure gathered during their

investigation (the second element), and that the proceeding

came to a natural conclusion (the third element).

Furthermore, Bledsoe adequately pleads the sixth element by

alleging that he has suffered economic damages, which include

the loss of his social security benefits and the loss of his job,

among others. The Court also finds that Bledsoe pleads the

fourth element of probable cause with sufficient plausibility.

On the absence of probable cause (the fourth element), Willis and

McClure argue that the independent intermediary doctrine insulates them

from liability. But as the district court explained, that doctrine does not apply

here because the trial judge who issued the warrant for Bledsoe’s arrest relied

on a defective affidavit. The independent-intermediary doctrine provides

that “if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent

intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision

breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.”

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2

Because the elements for the federal and Louisiana state malicious prosecution

claims run coextensively, we analyze them simultaneously. See, e.g., Armstrong, 60 F.4th

at 279.

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Anokwuru v. City of Hous., 990 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Guerra,

82 F.4th 278. However, “[a]n officer can still be liable if the officer

deliberately or recklessly provides false, material information for use in an

affidavit or makes knowing and intentional omissions that result in a warrant

being issued without probable cause.” Id. at 964 (emphasis added) (citations

omitted); see also Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 494; Mayfield v. Currie, 976 F.3d 482,

487 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised (Sept. 23, 2020) (clarifying that the

independent-intermediary doctrine “is not absolute”). 3 “If the facts omitted

from an affidavit are ‘clearly critical’ to a finding of probable cause, then

recklessness may be inferred from the proof of the omission itself.” Hale v.

Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 400 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

Here, Bledsoe argues that Willis’s and McClure’s actions and

omissions “tainted” the judge’s evaluation of whether to issue the warrant

for Bledsoe’s arrest. See, e.g., Arizmendi v. Gabbart, 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th

Cir. 2019) (explaining that the independent intermediary doctrine does not

apply “if . . . the ‘deliberations of the intermediary were in some way tainted

by the actions of the defendant.’”) (quoting McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 689

(5th Cir. 2017)). Specifically, Bledsoe’s complaint alleges, among other

things: (1) failure to document who owned the Dalzell Street Property; (2)

failure to document that Robinson was merely a tenant; (3) failure to

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3

Our sister circuits have similarly considered whether the absence of probable

cause defeats qualified immunity. See, e.g., Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999)

(“An officer contemplating an arrest is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence,

even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing by itself) suggests that probable cause

exists.”); Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (“[P]robable

cause may be defeated if the officer deliberately disregards facts known to him which

establish justification.”); Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1023–24 (9th Cir.

2009) (citation omitted) (holding that courts cannot ignore “facts tending to dissipate

probable cause” because probable cause is a totality-of-the-circumstances determination).

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document that the broken front-door window initially observed had been

fixed before McClure returned to the scene; (4) failure to determine who

fixed the broken front-door window; and (5) failure to contact the Dalzell

Street Property owner or the property management agent to inquire whether

anyone, including Bledsoe, had permission to enter the Dalzell Street

Property. Further, Bledsoe contends that “[t]hose omissions were material

and were recklessly, intentionally, or knowingly omitted from the affidavit for

arrest warrant.”

At this stage of the proceedings, Bledsoe has sufficiently alleged that

the officers deliberately or recklessly omitted relevant information. Willis

and McClure neither dispute that several pieces of information were absent

from the officers’ reports and affidavit, nor provide copies of the warrant or

affidavit to rebut Bledsoe’s allegations. Moreover, his allegations suggest

that Willis and McClure had several chances to identify information that was

“clearly critical” to a finding of probable cause. Hale, 899 F.2d at 400.

“[R]ecklessness may be inferred from the proof of the omission itself.” Id.

For example, when McClure returned to the Dalzell Street Property on

August 7, he failed to note in his report that the broken window had been

repaired. McClure only noted the “splatch” of blood that he and Robinson

saw three days after the initial report. Then, eight months later, Willis made

a supplemental report that again failed to include that the window was fixed.

And, a month after that, Willis failed again to include this information in his

supplemental report. Subsequently, Willis signed an affidavit for an arrest

warrant identifying the broken window and Bledsoe’s blood sample.

We construe Bledsoe’s complaint “in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Guerra, 82 F.4th at 284. “If proven, [Bledsoe’s] allegations

would demonstrate the willful omission of exculpatory facts and statements

that should have been presented.” Guidry v. Cormier, No. 20-1430, 2021 WL

3824129, at *5 (W.D. La. Mar. 8, 2021). Thus, the independent-

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intermediary doctrine does not apply when, as here, “the Affidavit contained

so many relevant omissions that it did not accurately present the probable

cause issue to [the] Judge.” Id.

On malice (the fifth element), Willis and McClure argue that Bledsoe

must allege that the officers either knowingly or intentionally omitted

exculpatory information from their incident report, or that their conduct

arose from hate or private advantage. Willis and McClure contend that

Bledsoe has not pleaded either and that his allegation concerning their

“clearly deficient investigation” amounts to mere “negligence.” While it is

true, at least at this preliminary stage, that Bledsoe has no allegations

detailing how the officers knew of exculpatory information, one could still

reasonably conclude that the officers failed to make the most basic inquiries

that would have yielded such information, or recklessly disregarded the truth.

We hold officers liable for “the intentional or reckless omission of material

facts from a warrant application[.]” See, e.g., Hale, 899 F.2d at 400; Wilson

v. Stroman, 33 F.4th 202, 211–12 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Reyna

v. Wilson, 143 S. Ct. 425 (2022), and cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 426 (2022). And

we have extended that liability to any “officer who has provided information

for the purpose of its being included in a warrant application” and therefore

“has assisted in preparing” it. Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 262 (5th Cir.

2017) (en banc). Based on Bledsoe’s allegations, there is a plausible inference

of reckless omission—and that is all he must show. Bledsoe therefore alleges

with sufficient specificity at the 12(b)(6) stage that Willis and McClure acted

recklessly by omitting facts material to the finding of probable cause.

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B.

Next, we address whether Willis and McClure are entitled to qualified

immunity based on clearly established law. 4 As we must, we acknowledge

this court’s recent decision in Guerra, 82 F.4th 278, that was issued after the

district court’s decision. In Guerra, this court affirmed a district court’s

12(b)(6) dismissal of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim “because this

court’s caselaw explicitly disclaimed the existence of a constitutional claim

for malicious prosecution at the time of [plaintiff’s] alleged conduct in 2018

and 2019 [i.e., before Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022)].” Id. at 288-

89. Nonetheless, as Guerra explained, this court has stated repeatedly that

the “Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause

is clearly established.” Id. at 286 (citing Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 286). Indeed,

this court has found that an officer was “not entitled to qualified immunity”

because the plaintiff alleged that the officer “violated the Fourth

Amendment by signing objectively unreasonable arrest-warrant affidavits.”

Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 491 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Winfrey v. San Jacinto County,

481 Fed. App’x 969, 979 (5th Cir. 2012)). Long before the conduct at issue

in this case, it was “clearly established that a defendant’s Fourth

Amendment rights are violated if (1) the affiant, in support of the warrant,

includes ‘a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless

disregard for the truth’ and (2) ‘the allegedly false statement is necessary to

the finding of probable cause.’” Id. (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.

154, 155-56 (1978)). Accepting Bledsoe’s complaint as true, and determining

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4

Bledsoe claims, pursuant to § 1983, that Willis and McClure violated his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Willis and McClure

moved for dismissal before the Supreme Court issued Thompson v. Clark and did not seek

to revise their motion once that opinion was issued. Furthermore, on appeal, Willis and

McClure do not discuss whether a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution

under § 1983 is clearly established law for purposes of qualified immunity.

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that Willis and McClure are not shielded by qualified immunity, the district

court found the following:

[T]he crux of Bledsoe’s claim is that the trial court judge was

not privy to the full scope of information available during the

criminal investigation and that this incomplete information was

the direct result of Willis and McClure’s recklessness and

failure to disclose material information. Bledsoe plausibly

alleges that an arrest warrant would not have been issued but

for the reckless investigation that omitted exculpatory

evidence regarding the source of the blood and Bledsoe’s

contract with Port City Realty.

We agree with the district court based on the prevailing precedent in

the Supreme Court and this circuit. Although this court did not recognize a

“freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution” at

the time of Willis’s and McClure’s investigation, we must recognize that

“‘the initiation of criminal charges without probable cause may set in force

events that run afoul of explicit constitutional protection—the Fourth

Amendment if the accused is seized and arrested, for example.” Winfrey,

901 F.3d at 491 (quoting Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945, 953 (5th Cir.

2003) (en banc), overruled by Thompson, 596 U.S. at 36). 5

Even before Thompson, the Supreme Court considered whether a

plaintiff had plausibly stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he was

arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance

based on false reports written by a police officer and an evidence technician.

See, e.g., Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 360 (2017). There, the

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5

See, also e.g., Caskey v. Fenton, No. 22-3100, 2022 WL 16964963, at *11 (6th Cir.

Nov. 16, 2022) (rejecting the qualified immunity defense regarding clearly established law

for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims); Crider v. Williams, No. 21-13797, 2022 WL

3867541, at *8 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2022) (same).

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Court said the plaintiff’s “claim fits the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth

Amendment fits [the plaintiff’s] claim, as hand in glove.” Id. at 364. And

the Court held “that the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful

pretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” Id. at 369. Here,

Bledsoe’s claim turns on the Fourth Amendment because he alleges that

Willis and McClure “caused the arrest and commencement of criminal

proceedings against [him] without sufficient probable cause based on a

clearly deficient investigation.” Thus, the Supreme Court’s and our court’s

precedent clearly establish Bledsoe’s alleged constitutional violation for

purposes of qualified immunity.

IV.

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Bledsoe plausibly

alleges federal and state claims of malicious prosecution against Willis and

McClure, and that at the motion to dismiss stage, Bledsoe overcomes the

qualified immunity defense.

AFFIRMED.

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