STEPHAN CRAIG BUTLER AND CAROLE MARIE BUTLER vs CLARK F. BROWN, JR. AND SHAUNA KAREN BROWN

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

STEPHAN CRAIG BUTLER AND

CAROLE MARIE BUTLER,

Appellants,

v. Case No. 5D21-1494

LT Case No. 2019-CA-037290

CLARK F. BROWN, JR. AND

SHAUNA KAREN BROWN,

Appellees.

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Opinion filed April 8, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Brevard County,

David Dugan, Judge.

Elizabeth Siano Harris, of Harris

Appellate Law Office, Mims, for

Appellants.

James Ippoliti and Scott Widerman, of

Widerman Malek, P.L., Melbourne, for

Appellees.

NARDELLA, J.

Stephan and Carole Butler (collectively, the “Butlers”) appeal the

trial court’s final judgment enjoining their use of rope lights along their

dock. The Butlers raise two issues on appeal, but we find merit in only

one, namely that the trial court erred by ordering the final judgment

against the Butlers to “run with the land.”

BACKGROUND

This is a dispute between neighbors about rope lights the Butlers

installed along the northern and eastern sides of their two-hundred-foot

dock in the Indian River. The Butlers’ neighbors, Clark and Shauna

Brown (collectively, the “Browns”) filed a complaint against the Butlers

claiming that the rope lights running the length of the Butlers’ dock

constituted a private nuisance because the lights disturbed the Browns’

ability to use and enjoy their property. Important here, the Browns

asserted a claim for injunctive relief, requesting the trial court “enter an

injunction against the Butlers enjoining [them] from lighting their Dock

brightly throughout the night and having the light reflect upon the water

and onto the Browns’ Property and into Browns’ home.”

After a two-day bench trial, the trial court concluded that the “lights

on the side of the dock facing the [Browns] constitute a private nuisance

to the Browns’ Property and to the Browns.” As a result, the trial court

granted the Browns injunctive relief by ordering the Butlers to do one of

the following within thirty days of the final judgment: 1) “permanently and

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completely remove the rope lights from the north and east portions of

their dock,” or 2) “permanently replace or modify the dock lights with

lighting that shall be so placed, shielded, covered or guarded such that

no direct or reflected light rays or beams are projected or radiated onto

or upon, or are visible from, any part of the Brown’s property lying

landward and upland of mean high water mark on the shoreline to which

the dock is attached.” The trial court further ordered that the final

judgment “run with the land, i.e., the Butler Property[.]”

ANALYSIS

The Butlers contend that the trial court violated their right to

procedural due process by ordering the final judgment to “run with the

land” because no such relief was requested in the complaint, noticed for

a hearing, or argued by the parties. 1 This Court reviews a claim that one

has been deprived procedural due process de novo. Jenkins v. M.F.,

280 So. 3d 507, 510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).

“[C]ourts are not authorized to award relief not requested in the

pleadings . . . [t]o grant unrequested relief is an abuse of discretion . . .

and reversible error.” Abbott v. Abbott, 98 So. 3d 616, 617–18 (Fla. 2d

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We do not reach in this opinion whether, if properly pled, such in

rem relief could have been granted.

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DCA 2012) (internal citations omitted). “Additionally, a court should not

grant such relief absent proper notice to the parties.” Worthington v.

Worthington, 123 So. 3d 1189, 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (citing Sinton

v. Sinton, 749 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). “Granting

unrequested relief absent proper notice is a violation of due process.”

Stover v. Stover, 287 So. 3d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citing

Buschor v. Buschor, 252 So. 3d 833, 834–35 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)

(concluding that the trial court violated former wife’s due process rights

when it awarded unrequested relief without proper notice)).

We agree with the Butlers that the trial court’s ruling that the final

judgment “run with the land” violated their right to procedural due

process. The Browns’ complaint did not contain a request that the

injunction be against the Butlers’ property or run with the land. Instead,

the Browns requested that the trial court “enter an injunction against the

Butlers enjoining them from lighting their Dock brightly throughout the

night and having the light reflect upon the water and onto the Browns’

Property and into Browns’ home.” In short, the Browns sought only to

enjoin the Butlers’ activity.

Since the Browns did not request to enjoin the land, the Butlers

were deprived of the ability to challenge the propriety of such relief and,

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thus, the trial court’s entry of that relief violated their right to procedural

due process. In light of the foregoing, we reverse in part with instructions

that the trial court enter an amended final judgment that does not run

with the land.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part, with instructions.

WALLIS and TRAVER JJ., concur.

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