Opinion

Kravitz v. Purcell

  • 87 F.4th 111
Court
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Filed
Nov 27, 2023
Status
Published
Cited by
188 cases
Authority
More cited than 93.3%

recognizing that “[t]o assess a First Amendment free exercise claim, a court must determine (1) whether the practice asserted is religious in the person’s scheme of beliefs, and whether the belief is sincerely held; (2) whether the challenged practice infringes upon the religious belief; and (3) whether the challenged practice . . . furthers legitimate penological objective[s].”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that “[t]o assess a First Amendment free exercise claim, a court must determine (1) whether the practice asserted is religious in the person’s scheme of beliefs, and whether the belief is sincerely held; (2) whether the challenged practice infringes upon the religious belief; and (3) whether the challenged practice . . . furthers legitimate penological objective[s].”
  • holding that the requirement to plead a sincerely held religious belief was met because “[i]t is not in dispute that Kravitz practices Judaism . . . [n]or do the officers dispute that Kravitz observes the holiday pursuant to sincerely held religious beliefs”
  • holding that “[t]he district court properly dismissed the claims against [defendants] because [plaintiff] could not identify admissible evidence that the [defendants] were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff’s] rights”
  • explaining that, to show personal involvement in the free exercise context, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant acted “with at least deliberate indifference in depriving an inmate of the ability to engage in a religious practice”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

22-764

Kravitz v. Purcell

In the

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AUGUST TERM 2022

No. 22-764

JAY S. KRAVITZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SAMUEL PURCELL, ADOLPHUS BAKER, LUIS ANDREU, DAVID

MCCRAY, GREGORY ST. VICTOR, DAVID MCMAHON, JOSEPH

WASSWEILER, AND JOHN ZUPAN,

Defendants-Appellees. *

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

ARGUED: MAY 3, 2023

DECIDED: NOVEMBER 27, 2023

Before: KEARSE, JACOBS, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

Plaintiff-Appellant Jay S. Kravitz, formerly incarcerated,

appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the

defendants-appellees—corrections officers at Downstate Correctional

Facility—on Kravitz’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation

of his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.

According to Kravitz, the corrections officers violated his right to free

exercise by preventing him from observing the Jewish holiday of

Shavuot. The district court held that Kravitz failed to show a

“substantial burden” on his religious beliefs because he was able to

observe some aspects of the holiday. We conclude that a § 1983

plaintiff need not show a substantial burden in order to prevail on a

claim for the violation of the First Amendment. Because Kravitz has

shown that his sincere religious beliefs were burdened by the officers’

conduct, we vacate the judgment of the district court insofar as the

district court decided that Kravitz had failed to establish a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether his right to free exercise was

violated. We affirm the judgment insofar as the district court granted

summary judgment to certain defendants for whom there was no

evidence of personal involvement. We remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jay S. Kravitz, pro se, Earlton, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

MARK S. GRUBE, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D.

Underwood, Solicitor General, and Judith N. Vale,

Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia James,

Attorney General of the State of New York, New York,

NY, for Defendants-Appellees.

2

22-764

Kravitz v. Purcell

MENASHI, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Jay S. Kravitz, proceeding pro se, appeals

from a judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of

New York granting summary judgment to the defendants-appellees,

corrections officers at Downstate Correctional Facility. See Kravitz v.

Purcell, No. 16-CV-8999, 2022 WL 768682 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2022).

Kravitz, who was formerly incarcerated at Downstate

Correctional Facility, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

the officers for violating his First Amendment right to the free exercise

of religion. In his third amended complaint, Kravitz named as

defendants corrections officers Samuel Purcell, Adolphus Baker, Luis

Andreu, David McCray, Gregory St. Victor, David McMahon, Joseph

Wassweiler, and John Zupan. 1 He alleged that the officers violated

his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion by

preventing him from observing the Jewish holiday of Shavuot on two

consecutive evenings. The district court granted summary judgment

to the officers because (1) some named officers were not personally

involved in the alleged violation on the first night of Shavuot, and

(2) Kravitz’s observance of the second night of the holiday was only

shortened, not denied entirely, which did not rise to the level of a

1 Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) ¶¶ 4-11, Kravitz v. Purcell, No. 16-

CV-8999 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2019), ECF No. 80. Kravitz’s complaint misspells

Wassweiler as “Waseiler.” Id. ¶ 10. Kravitz also named as a defendant

Anthony Annucci as the commissioner of the New York State Department

of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”). The district court

dismissed the claims against Annucci following Annucci’s unopposed

motion to dismiss.

“substantial burden” on his religious beliefs. Kravitz, 2022 WL 768682,

at *10.

We vacate in part and affirm in part the judgment of the district

court. The district court erred in holding that Kravitz could not

prevail on his claim because he did not make the threshold showing

of a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs. Such a showing is

not required. Rather, because Kravitz has shown a burden on his

sincere religious beliefs, he has established a genuine issue of material

fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. We vacate

the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary judgment

because of a purported “substantial burden” requirement, and we

affirm the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary

judgment to those officers for whom there was no evidence of

personal involvement. We remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

In this appeal, we consider the factual assertions in the parties’

Local Rule 56.1 statements and the admissible evidence submitted. See

Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001). 2 We

“constru[e] the evidence in the light most favorable” to Kravitz.

Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011).

2 Kravitz did not submit a Rule 56.1 Counter-Statement in response to the

defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement. But given Kravitz’s pro se status, the

district court properly exercised its discretion to review the entire record—

including Kravitz’s Rule 56.1 Statement, affidavit, and deposition

testimony—when deciding the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Kravitz, 2022 WL 768682, at *1.

4

I

Kravitz practices Judaism and as part of that practice he

celebrates the holiday of Shavuot. Shavuot “is one of the three major

festivals in Judaism,” and it “celebrate[s] the giving of the Torah or

Law on Mount Sinai.” Affidavit of Plaintiff ¶ 7, Kravitz v. Purcell,

No. 16-CV-8999 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021), ECF No. 140. Kravitz

considers Shavuot to be “the most important holiday of the Jews.”

Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript (“Kravitz Dep.”) at 64, Kravitz v.

Purcell, No. 16-CV-8999 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 129-1. He

observes the holiday by praying and eating together with other Jews

for two consecutive evenings. In 2014, Kravitz requested that his

name be added to the list of inmates who would participate in

Shavuot observances at Downstate Correctional Facility for the

evenings of June 3 and June 4.

A

On June 3, 2014, Kravitz was released from his housing unit—

Block 3a in Complex 3—at approximately 8:00 pm to attend Shavuot

services. Kravitz and other Jewish inmates walked to what Kravitz

calls a “staging area” and what the defendants identify as the East

Lobby of Complex 3. But rather than allowing the inmates to continue

to the dining hall for the scheduled prayer and meals, corrections

officers threw paper bags containing peanut butter sandwiches, apple

sauce, pudding, and juice at the inmates, “laughing and say[ing], here

is your kosher meal. You Jew, blah, blah, and F-U.” Kravitz Dep. at

67. The officers then announced that “everyone got their big holiday

dinner, now go back to your cages.” Id. at 68. The inmates complained

to the officers that they were supposed to receive a “very good festive

meal” and time to gather as a community, and Kravitz asked if the

5

inmates could at least eat the sandwiches together. Id. at 69. The

officers responded, “[F]uck you. Shut up.” Id. Kravitz’s time in the

staging area lasted about five minutes. Id. at 70. At approximately 8:25

pm, he walked back to his housing block, where he ate, prayed, and

studied religious texts alone in his cell. Id. at 83.

At the time, Kravitz did not know the officers’ names. In his

complaint and affidavit, he alleged that the officers present in the

staging area were Officers Andreu, Baker, McCray, Purcell, and

St. Victor. These officers testified that they were not involved in the

events underlying Kravitz’s complaint; they either did not work on

June 3 and 4 or they worked in different areas of the prison at the

relevant times. On appeal, Kravitz instead identifies McMahon and

Wassweiler “as the religious services officers [who] completely

prevented him from observing Shavuot on the first night of the

holiday.” Appellant’s Br. 17.

That night, Kravitz wrote a letter to prison officials

complaining about his experience. A prison chaplain visited Kravitz’s

housing block and assured him that he would be permitted to observe

the second night of the holiday.

B

On June 4, 2014, at around 7:50 pm, officers escorted Kravitz

from his housing block to a dining area that Kravitz calls an “auxiliary

dining hall,” Supp. App’x 17, and the defendants call the “#4 Dining

Room,” id. at 10.

About ten inmates sat at a table, and the “cadre”—an inmate

who ran the Jewish programs—asked Kravitz to lead the prayer

services in Hebrew. Kravitz Dep. at 89-90. After only twenty or thirty

6

seconds, a corrections officer stopped the prayers. The “minute

[Kravitz] started to speak in Hebrew and [pray],” the officer who was

“running the meals” “put his hands between [Kravitz and the cadre],

and like weaseled in between [them], and got in [Kravitz’s] face and

said, I don’t want to hear that. You need to stop and get eating that

food. I got things to do.” Id. at 92. The corrections officer said, “yo, yo,

stop that crap. I don’t want to hear it. ... [L]ook, just shut the fuck up

and get to eating. I got things to do.” Id. at 94.

Kravitz attempted to resume his prayers, but after a few

seconds the officer started “screaming” and “hit the table.” Id. at 95.

The officer “really got in [Kravitz’s] face, nose to nose ... he was an

inch from [him]. And he said, maybe you didn’t hear me ... shut the

fuck up, get to eating. All of you’s now. I got things to do.” Id. at 94-

95.

Kravitz rushed to say a blessing over the bread so that the

group could eat. He skipped the customary blessing and drinking of

grape juice because, according to Kravitz, “I didn’t want to piss him

off. I seen guys in a puddle of blood there every day.” Id. at 96. The

inmates ate, but the same officer repeatedly returned to the table over

the next ten minutes, ordering them, “Let’s go. Let’s go. Hustle,

hustle.” Id. at 97. Other officers directed the inmates to hurry and said

that they did not have “time for your crap.” Id. at 97. About twenty

minutes after the inmates arrived in the dining area, they finished

their meals and were escorted back to their blocks. Id. at 100. Kravitz

returned to his housing block at about 8:45 pm.

Kravitz again did not know the officers’ names. The defendants

represented to the district court that on June 4, the “officers assigned

to the Jewish holiday services were Officers D. McMahon and

7

Wassweiler” and that “Zupan was the area supervisor.” Valentin

Order Response (“Valentin Response”) at 1, Kravitz v. Purcell, No. 16-

CV-8999 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2017), ECF No. 11. Based on that

representation, Kravitz alleged in his complaint that these officers

escorted the inmates to the dining hall and interfered with the

religious observance. Zupan testified, however, that he was not in the

dining hall on June 4. Accordingly, Kravitz now maintains that

McMahon and Wassweiler “directly participated in the thwarting of

his religious observance as the religious service officers throughout

the holiday of Shavuot.” Appellant’s Br. 18.

II

On November 18, 2016, Kravitz commenced this § 1983 action

alleging the violation of his right to the free exercise of religion under

the First Amendment as well as his rights under the Eighth

Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the New York State

Constitution. The initial complaint was brought against New York

State, the DOCCS, Anthony Annucci as commissioner of the DOCCS,

and “unknown members” of the DOCCS. Complaint, Kravitz v.

Purcell, No. 16-CV-8999 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016), ECF No. 2. Pursuant

to Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997), in which this court

recognized that a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance in identifying

defendants, the district court ordered the New York State Attorney

General to identify the officers who were involved in the alleged

incidents. In response, the Attorney General identified Purcell, Baker,

Andreu, McCray, and St. Victor as the escort officers assigned to the

gym and lobby in Complex 3 at Downstate Correctional Facility. The

prison advised that these spaces may have been the “staging area” in

which the alleged June 3 incident occurred. In addition, the Attorney

8

General identified McMahon and Wassweiler as the “officers

assigned to the Jewish holiday services” and Zupan as the “area

supervisor.” Valentin Response at 1.

Kravitz amended his first amended complaint to identify these

officers as defendants. On March 29, 2019, the district court dismissed

all of Kravitz’s claims in his second amended complaint except for his

free exercise claims against Purcell, Baker, Andreu, McCray,

St. Victor, McMahon, Wassweiler, and Zupan. 3 On December 5, 2019,

Kravitz filed a third amended complaint that included only his free

exercise claims. The parties proceeded to discovery and filed motions

for summary judgment.

The district court granted the officers’ motion and denied

Kravtiz’s motion. For the evening of June 3, 2014, the district court

determined that Kravitz had not shown the personal involvement of

the officers as required to establish liability under § 1983. The

“undisputed evidence demonstrates that Zupan, Purcell, Baker,

St. Victor, McCray, and Andreu were not personally involved in the

alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s free exercise rights.” Kravitz, 2022

WL 768682, at *6. McMahon and Wassweiler, moreover, were not

alleged to have been personally involved in the events of that

evening. Id. at *9. For the evening of June 4, 2014, the district court

concluded that Kravitz had not met “his burden of demonstrating

that his religious beliefs were substantially burdened.” Id. at *10.

“[T]he undisputed facts demonstrate that [Kravitz’s] Shavuot

3 The district court dismissed Kravitz’s claim against Annucci without

prejudice. After filing his third amended complaint, Kravitz submitted an

affidavit informing the district court that he did not oppose Annucci’s

motion to dismiss the third amended complaint.

9

celebration was only shortened, not denied,” because he was able to

“congregate, pray, and eat a festive kosher meal with a group of other

Jewish inmates until approximately 8:45 pm.” Id. Kravitz “was able to

observe the Shavuot holiday, albeit in a shortened and perhaps

substandard manner,” the district court said. Id. For that reason, he

suffered only “a de minimis burden” on his free exercise rights. Id.

(quoting Hamilton v. Countant, No. 13-CV-669, 2016 WL 881126, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2016)).

This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013).

“Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the non-movant, ‘there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.’” Doninger, 642 F.3d at 344 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a)).

Pro se litigants receive “special solicitude” when “confronted

with motions for summary judgment.” Graham v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d

342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988). “We liberally construe pleadings and briefs

submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the

strongest arguments they suggest.” Publicola v. Lomenzo, 54 F.4th 108,

111 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court has explained that inmates “retain

protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive

10

that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate

of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted). In the prison

context, alleged violations of the right to free exercise are “judged

under a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily

applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional

rights.” Id. at 349. Therefore, “[w]hen a prison regulation impinges on

inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. (quoting Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); see also Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567,

570 (2d Cir. 1989) (“A prisoner’s first amendment right to the free

exercise of his religious beliefs may only be infringed to the extent

that such infringement is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not reach the question of whether the

officers’ actions were justified by legitimate penological interests.

Instead, the district court granted the officers’ motion for summary

judgment on two grounds: the lack of a substantial burden on

Kravitz’s religious beliefs on June 4 and the lack of personal

involvement by certain defendants on June 3. We address each issue

in turn.

I

The defendants argue that Kravitz cannot show that the events

of June 4 amounted to a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs

because Kravitz “received a substantial kosher group meal,” “prayed

to bless the food,” and “led the group in congregate prayers.”

Appellees’ Br. 13-14.

11

The religion clauses of the First Amendment, applicable to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provide that “Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” In prior cases, we have

assumed—without holding—that to state a free exercise claim under

§ 1983, a “prisoner must show at the threshold that the disputed

conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.”

Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir. 2006). 4 This

“substantial burden test,” we have explained, “requires courts to

distinguish important from unimportant religious beliefs” in order to

decide whether a “belief or practice is so peripheral to the plaintiff’s

religion that any burden can be aptly characterized as constitutionally

de minimis.” Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 593 (2d Cir. 2003). The

“relevant question” under the test is whether engaging in the

religious observance “is considered central or important to [the

plaintiff’s] practice of [his religion].” Id. at 593-94.

The substantial burden test originated in the Supreme Court’s

decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). After a Seventh-day

Adventist was fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath, she was

denied unemployment benefits under a law that disqualified

claimants who “failed, without good cause ... to accept available

suitable work.” Id. at 401. The Court explained that a state must justify

“any incidental burden on the free exercise … of religion” by showing

that the law serves a compelling state interest. Id. at 403. The Court

4 See also Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 275 n.5 (“Resolution of this appeal does not

require us to address Salahuddin’s argument that a prisoner’s First

Amendment free-exercise claim is not governed by the ‘substantial burden’

threshold requirement.”).

12

decided that the denial of benefits amounted to a “substantial

infringement” of the plaintiff’s free exercise rights and was not

justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 407.

While Sherbert did not expressly create a substantial burden

requirement, subsequent decisions identified the requirement as part

of the Sherbert framework of applying strict scrutiny to general laws

that burden religious belief. “A regulation neutral on its face may, in

its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for

governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of

religion,” the Court explained. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36

(1972) (emphasis added). “The free exercise inquiry asks whether

government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a

central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling

governmental interest justifies the burden.” Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490

U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (emphasis added). 5

Later, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held

that the Sherbert framework did not apply when the challenged law

was “neutral” and “generally applicable,” even if the law incidentally

burdened religious exercise. 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990); see also Holt v.

Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 357 (2015) (“Smith largely repudiated the method

5 See also Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18

(1981) (“Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon

conduct proscribed by a religious faith ... thereby putting substantial pressure

on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden

upon religion exists.”) (emphasis added); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals

Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 143 (1987) (“The immediate effects of

ineligibility and disqualification [for unemployment benefits] are identical,

and the disqualification penalty is substantial.”) (emphasis added).

13

of analysis used in prior free exercise cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder and

Sherbert v. Verner.”) (citations omitted). Smith explained that the “right

of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to

comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the

ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his

religion prescribes (or proscribes).” 494 U.S. at 879 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

In rejecting the Sherbert approach, Smith “took issue with the

premise that courts can differentiate between substantial and

insubstantial burdens.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 592. “It is no more

appropriate for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of religious beliefs

before applying a ‘compelling interest’ test in the free exercise field,

than it would be for them to determine the ‘importance’ of ideas

before applying the ‘compelling interest’ test in the free speech field,”

the Court said in Smith. 494 U.S. at 886-87. “What principle of law or

logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a

particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith?” Id. at 887.

After Smith, Congress adopted the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act (“RFRA”) to “restore the compelling interest test as

set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (emphasis

added). RFRA expressly adopts a substantial burden requirement. See

id. § 2000bb-1 (providing that the “Government shall not substantially

burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability” unless “application of the burden”

furthers “a compelling governmental interest” through “the least

restrictive means”) (emphasis added). In light of the statute, “we

dutifully applied RFRA’s substantial burden test to prisoners’ free

exercise claims” while RFRA “was still good law” as applied to state

14

governments. Ford, 352 F.3d at 592. RFRA no longer applies to state

governments, 6 but we have continued to assume that the substantial

burden test applies to prisoners’ free exercise claims.

Despite doing so, we have acknowledged that applying the

substantial burden test is “a task for which … courts are particularly

ill-suited” and raises “the danger that courts will make conclusory

judgments about the unimportance of the religious practice to the

adherent rather than confront the often more difficult inquiries into

sincerity, religiosity and the sufficiency of the penological interest

asserted to justify the burden.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 593. And we have

recognized that, since Smith, the legal validity of the substantial

burden test remains an open question. “It has not been decided in this

Circuit whether, to state a claim under the First Amendment’s Free

Exercise Clause, a ‘prisoner must show at the threshold that the

disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious

beliefs.’” Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting

Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274-75). “Whenever the question has arisen in

our Circuit, the panel has avoided answering it by noting either that

the parties did not brief the issue or that the requirement, even if

applied, would have been satisfied.” Brandon v. Kintner, 938 F.3d 21,

32 n.7 (2d Cir. 2019). 7

6 In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that “[b]road as the

power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain

separation of powers and the federal balance.” 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).

7 See also Ford, 352 F.3d at 592 (proceeding “on the assumption that the

substantial burden test applies”); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 203

15

The district courts of this circuit have followed our example by

proceeding “on the assumption that the substantial burden test

applies.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 592. Thus, despite the Second Circuit

having “expressed doubt as to whether a prisoner is required to make

this threshold showing,” the “[d]istrict courts within this circuit

continue to apply the substantial burden test when addressing free

exercise claims.” Nicholson v. Ferreira, No. 20-CV-1214, 2021 WL

327529, at *5 n.3 (D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2021). 8 That is what the district

(2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]e need not, at this stage, consider whether the plaintiff

must demonstrate that the burden on his beliefs was ‘substantial’ in order

to state a constitutional claim.”); Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 275 n.5 (declining

“to address [the] argument that a prisoner’s First Amendment free-exercise

claim is not governed by the ‘substantial burden’ threshold requirement”);

Holland, 758 F.3d at 221 (declining to address the “continued vitality of the

substantial burden requirement”); Williams v. Does, 639 F. App’x 55, 56 (2d

Cir. 2016) (“[a]ssuming that the substantial burden requirement applies”);

Brandon, 938 F.3d at 32 n.7 (“assum[ing], without deciding, that [the

plaintiff’s] free exercise claim is subject to the substantial burden

requirement”).

8 See, e.g., McLeod v. Williams, No. 18-CV-115, 2020 WL 2512164, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2020) (“Absent any contrary instruction from the Second

Circuit, and because neither party argues that the substantial burden test is

inapplicable to Plaintiff's claims here, the Court will proceed—as other

courts in the district repeatedly have—by assuming the substantial burden

requirement continues to apply.”); Lombardo v. Freebern, No. 16-CV-7146,

2018 WL 1627274, at *8 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (“The Second Circuit

chose not to confront this question—or rather, not to alter the previous

assumption that the substantial burden test is a threshold question. This

Court has already chosen to follow the analysis in Holland and thus will

proceed under the assumption that the substantial burden test is still

valid.”) (citation omitted); Jones v. Annucci, No. 16-CV-3516, 2018 WL

16

court did in this case. “To succeed on a free exercise claim,” the

district court explained, “an inmate must show at the threshold that

the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held

religious beliefs,” meaning that “participation in the religious

activity, in particular, is considered central or important to the

inmate’s religious practice.” Kravitz, 2022 WL 768682, at *8 (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted).

This case requires us to resolve this open question. Over the

thirty years that the question has remained open, its irresolution has

compelled courts to make questionable religious determinations that

we must review on a standardless basis. See Wiggins v. Griffin, No.

21-533, 2023 WL 8009312, at *10 (Menashi, J., concurring) (“Three

decades is too long for federal judges to be telling litigants which of

their religious beliefs are ‘unimportant.’”) (quoting Ford, 352 F.3d at

593). Today we hold that a prisoner claiming a violation of the right

910594, at *13 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2018) (same); Washington v. Chaboty,

No. 9-CV-9199, 2015 WL 1439348, at *9 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (“In

Ford, the court assumed that the substantial burden test applies, because the

plaintiff had not argued otherwise. Similarly here, because [the plaintiff]

has not argued that the substantial burden test is inapplicable, this Court

has assumed that it applies.”) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and

citation omitted); Rossi v. Fishcer, No. 13-CV-3167, 2015 WL 769551, at *6 n.8

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015) (“[T]he Second Circuit and judges in this district

have continued to require ... a threshold showing [of a substantial burden],

particularly in cases where the parties have not argued otherwise.”); Vann

v. Fischer, No. 11-CV-1958, 2014 WL 4188077, at *8 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25,

2014) (“It is customary in this District, absent any contrary instruction from

the Second Circuit, to assume that the substantial burden test survives.”).

17

to the free exercise of religion under § 1983 need not make a showing

of a substantial burden.

A

We have expressed “reluctance to measure the devotional

import of certain religious practices” because “passing judgment on

the ‘centrality of different religious practices’” is “a misguided

enterprise that the Supreme Court has called ‘akin to the unacceptable

business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious

claims.’” McEachin, 357 F.3d at 202 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 887). In

a non-prison context, we have even explained that “[b]ecause the free

exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and

profess whatever religious doctrine one desires, courts are not

permitted to inquire into the centrality of a professed belief to the

adherent’s religion.” Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York,

293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (internal quotation

marks and alteration omitted). For that reason, “[a]n individual

claiming violation of free exercise rights [under § 1983] need only

demonstrate that the beliefs professed are ‘sincerely held’ and in the

individual’s ‘own scheme of things, religious.’” Id. (quoting Patrick v.

LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984)). There is no reason why this

same standard should not apply to a prison inmate alleging a

violation of his free exercise rights under § 1983.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that courts should not

inquire into the centrality of a litigant’s religious beliefs. It is not

“appropriate for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of religious

beliefs,” and indeed the Court has “warned that courts must not

presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion.”

Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. It is simply “not within the judicial ken to

18

question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or

the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Id.

(quoting Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699).

Smith held that neutral laws of general applicability are not

subject to strict scrutiny based, at least in part, on the recognition that

a regime of exemptions from generally applicable laws requires some

type of substantial burden inquiry. “[I]f general laws are to be

subjected to a ‘religious practice’ exception, both the importance of the

law at issue and the centrality of the practice at issue must be

reasonably considered.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 n.4. The Smith Court

rejected that view.

But opposition to the centrality inquiry was not limited to the

Smith majority. The concurrence in the judgment “agree[d] with the

Court” that “our determination of the constitutionality of Oregon’s

general criminal prohibition cannot, and should not, turn on the

centrality of the particular religious practice at issue.” Id. at 906-07

(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). And the dissent similarly

“agree[d]” that “courts should refrain from delving into questions

whether, as a matter of religious doctrine, a particular practice is

‘central’ to the religion.” Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). All nine

justices in Smith agreed that courts cannot inquire into the centrality

or importance of a free exercise plaintiff’s religious beliefs.

That broad agreement was based on longstanding precedent.

See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 (“[I]t is not within the judicial function

and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner … more

correctly perceived the commands of [his] … faith.”); Serbian E.

Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720

(1976) (explaining that civil courts may not decide “quintessentially

19

religious controversies”); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary

Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969)

(noting that, “[p]lainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts”

from evaluating “the interpretation of particular church doctrines and

the importance of those doctrines to the religion”). 9

The Supreme Court has reiterated this principle since Smith. 10

Indeed, the “consistent and resounding theme echoed throughout

9 “The notion of judicial incompetence with respect to strictly ecclesiastical

matters can be traced at least as far back as James Madison, ‘the leading

architect of the religio[n] clauses of the First Amendment.’” Fratello v.

Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 203 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Arizona Christian

Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 141 (2011)); see James Madison,

Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in

5 The Founders’ Constitution 82, 83 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,

1987) (rejecting the notion that “the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge

of Religious Truth”); see also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of

Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 933, 959 (1989)

(“[A]ny imaginable process for resolving disputes over centrality creates

the spectre of religious experts giving conflicting testimony about the

significance of a religious practice, with the state’s decisionmaker

authoritatively choosing among them. A horary and well-respected line of

cases, concerning disputes over property between warring factions within

a church, strongly suggests that judicial resolution of theological

controversy is both beyond judicial competence and out of constitutional

bounds.”).

10 See, e.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049,

2055 (2020) (“Judicial review of the way in which religious schools

discharge [religious] responsibilities would undermine the independence

of religious institutions in a way that the First Amendment does not

tolerate.”); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565

U.S. 171, 185 (2012) (“[I]t is impermissible for the government to contradict

20

many Supreme Court opinions” is that courts may not purport to

evaluate the centrality or importance of religious beliefs. DeHart v.

Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 56 (3d Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, since Smith the Supreme Court has treated a

showing of the plaintiff’s sincerity to be sufficient to establish a prima

facie free exercise violation and has not referenced a substantial

burden requirement. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct.

2407, 2421-22 (2022) (“Under this Court’s precedents, a plaintiff may

carry the burden of proving a free exercise violation … by showing

that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice

pursuant to a policy that is not ‘neutral’ or ‘generally applicable.’”)

(quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 879); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct.

1868, 1877 (2021) (“[T]he City has burdened the religious exercise of

[the plaintiff] through policies that do not meet the requirement of

being neutral and generally applicable.”); Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-47

(noting that no party has “questioned the sincerity of petitioners’”

religious beliefs and addressing the free exercise violation without

considering whether the burden was substantial).

When we are considering government policies that are not

neutral and generally applicable—that is, policies that discriminate

against religion rather than burden it incidentally—there is no

justification for requiring a plaintiff to make a threshold showing of

substantial burden. “The indignity of being singled out for special

burdens on the basis of one’s religious calling is so profound that the

a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”); Mitchell v. Helms,

530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“It is well established, in

numerous … contexts, that courts should refrain from trolling through a

person’s or institution’s religious beliefs.”).

21

concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstantial. The

Court has not required proof of ‘substantial’ concrete harm with other

forms of discrimination.” Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 731 (2004)

(Scalia, J., dissenting).

B

Courts that apply the substantial burden test have reached

puzzling conclusions. In Levitan v. Ashcroft, for example, the district

court granted summary judgment to the prison officials on the

ground that “consuming wine during Communion is not an essential

aspect of [the Catholic inmates’] religious practice.” 281 F.3d 1313,

1315 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In Ford, the district court decided that the denial

of a religious meal to a Muslim inmate celebrating Eid al-Fitr was not

a substantial burden because the postponed feast was “devoid of

religious significance under the tenets of Islam” and the prison

officials should not be required to “accommodate [the inmate’s]

particularized view of Islam, after having been advised of Islam’s

actual requirements by religious experts.” Ford v. McGinnis, 230

F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated and remanded, 352 F.3d

582 (2d Cir. 2003). In Thompson v. Holm, the district court decided that

a Muslim inmate who was denied Ramadan meal bags for two days—

and therefore did not receive a meal he could consume consistent

with his religious obligations for fifty-five hours—did not suffer a

substantial burden because he was still able to fast, pray, and read the

Koran. Thompson v. Holm, No. 13-CV-930, 2015 WL 1478523, at *6 (E.D.

Wis. Mar. 30, 2015), vacated and remanded, 809 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2016).

The district court’s decision in this case marks another entry in

this line of troubling decisions. The admissible evidence indicates

that, on June 4, 2014, a corrections officer terminated Kravitz’s holiday

22

prayer after about thirty seconds. The officer said “I don’t want to

hear that. You need to stop [praying] and get eating that food. I got

things to do” and “stop that crap. I don’t want to hear [prayers]. …

[J]ust shut the fuck up and get to eating.” Kravitz Dep. at 92-94.

Nevertheless, the district court concluded that Kravitz did not suffer

a substantial burden on his religious beliefs because Kravitz managed

to pray for thirty seconds and to eat a communal meal. Kravitz, 2022

WL 768682, at *10. The district court determined that thirty seconds

of prayer and a hurried meal meant that Kravitz was “able to observe

the Shavuot holiday.” Id. How did the district court reach that

determination? It did not rely on Kravitz’s beliefs about Shavuot or

on authoritative statements of Jewish law. Evidently, the district court

relied on its own authority to determine what the observance of

Shavuot requires.

The Supreme Court long ago recognized that “no jurisdiction

has been conferred” on civil courts to adjudicate “a matter which

concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical

government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the

standard of morals required of them.” Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733

(1871). In the context of an inmate’s § 1983 action, however, we have

persisted in the “misguided enterprise” of “measur[ing] the

devotional import of certain religious practices.” McEachin, 357 F.3d

at 202.

We now join those circuits that have held that an inmate does

not need to establish a substantial burden in order to prevail on a free

exercise claim under § 1983. See Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217

(3d Cir. 2003) (“The Prison Officials argue that it is also a prerequisite

for the inmate to establish that the challenged prison policy

23

‘substantially burdens’ his or her religious beliefs. There is no support

for that assertion.”) (citation omitted); Butts v. Martin, 877 F.3d 571,

585 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[T]his Court has not required a preliminary

showing that a regulation substantially interferes with an inmate’s

religious rights before assessing whether the regulation is reasonably

related to a penological interest.”); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 885

(9th Cir. 2008) (“Given the Supreme Court’s disapproval of the

centrality test, we are satisfied that the sincerity test … determines

whether the Free Exercise Clause applies.”). 11

When adjudicating claims under RFRA, courts must conduct a

substantial burden inquiry because the statute requires it. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. This difference between RFRA and § 1983

makes sense because RFRA authorizes “a ‘religious practice’

exception” from generally applicable laws while First Amendment

11 We disagree with those circuits that continue to apply the substantial

burden test. See Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 168 (4th Cir. 2017) (“In order

to state a claim for violation of rights secured by the Free Exercise Clause,

an inmate … must demonstrate that … a prison practice or policy places a

substantial burden on his ability to practice his religion.”); Mbonyunkiza v.

Beasley, 956 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2020) (“We agree with the district

court’s interpretation and application of the substantially burdens

requirement in this case.”); Williams v. Hansen, 5 F.4th 1129, 1133 (10th Cir.

2021) (“To state a valid constitutional claim, a prisoner must allege facts

showing that officials substantially burdened a sincerely held religious

belief.”); Levitan, 281 F.3d at 1319 (“[T]he First Amendment is implicated

when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to

inconsequential, burden on the litigant’s religious practice.”).

24

doctrine—and by extension § 1983—does not. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887

n.4. 12

Even in the RFRA context, however, the substantial burden

inquiry does not authorize courts to determine the centrality of the

burdened practice to the plaintiff’s religion. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) (defining “religious exercise” to include “any

exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a

system of religious belief”); id. § 2000bb-2(4) (providing that, for

purposes of RFRA, “the term ‘exercise of religion’ means religious

exercise, as defined in section 2000cc-5 of this title”). Instead, RFRA

requires an objective inquiry into the extent of the governmental

pressure on the plaintiff’s exercise of religion. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76

F.3d 468, 477 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that a substantial burden

under RFRA “exists where the state ‘put[s] substantial pressure on an

adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs’”) (quoting

Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718); see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.

682, 719-20 (2014) (deciding that a mandate “‘substantially burdens’

the exercise of religion” because it imposes “severe” and “substantial

economic consequences” on the plaintiffs’ adherence to their “sincere

religious belief”) (alteration omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000bb-1(a)); Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.

Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2383 (2020) (explaining that “under

12 The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUPIA”),

which applies to inmates such as Kravitz and authorizes religious

exemptions, also requires a substantial burden inquiry. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-

1(a). RLUIPA “allows prisoners to ‘seek religious accommodations

pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA.’” Holt, 574 U.S. at 358

(quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniõ do Vegetal, 546 U.S.

418, 436 (2006)).

25

RFRA, the Departments must accept the sincerely held complicity-

based objections of religious entities” and could not decide that “the

connection between what the objecting parties must do and the end

that they find to be morally wrong is simply too attenuated”) (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted). 13

In the context of a § 1983 claim for a violation of the First

Amendment, there is no requirement to show that the governmental

burden on religious beliefs was “substantial.” Rather, “a plaintiff may

carry the burden of proving a free exercise violation ... by showing

that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice

pursuant to a policy that is not ‘neutral’ or ‘generally applicable.’”

Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2421-22 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 880).

C

Courts that apply the substantial burden test suggest that it

disposes of free exercise claims that “find [no] support in the religion

to which [plaintiffs] subscribe” or that are “self-serving.” Levitan, 281

F.3d at 1321. For a claim under § 1983, the “threshold question of

sincerity” serves that function. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185

13 See also Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. Ill.

L. Rev. 1771, 1775 (“[I]n order to determine whether a burden is substantial,

courts must examine the substantiality of the civil penalties triggered by

religious exercise. By focusing on the substantiality of civil penalties—as

opposed to the substantiality of religious or theological burdens—courts

can avoid Establishment Clause concerns, while still enforcing the

threshold inquiry required by RFRA. In this way, courts can both avoid

allocating government burdens on the basis of a judicial inquiry into

theology, while still ensuring that RFRA’s protections are not granted

simply on the say so of claimants who assert that the burdens they have

experienced are substantial.”).

26

(1965). A court’s inquiry into sincerity “properly extends to

determining ‘whether the beliefs professed by a claimant are sincerely

held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.’”

Patrick, 745 F.2d at 157 (quoting Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185). The sincerity

test “provides a rational means of differentiating between those

beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that are

animated by motives of deception and fraud.” Id.

While “the judiciary is singularly ill-equipped to sit in

judgment on the verity of an adherent’s religious beliefs,” id., courts

“are clearly competent to determine whether religious beliefs are

‘sincerely held,’” Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 321 (2d Cir. 1999).

Such an inquiry is “largely a matter of individual credibility” rather

than an examination of “applicable religious tenets.” Davis v. Fort

Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 485-86 (5th Cir. 2014). And the inquiry can

dispose of claims that are “so clearly nonreligious in motivation” as

not to merit First Amendment protection. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.

“The distinction between questions of centrality and questions of

sincerity and burden is admittedly fine, but it is one that is an

established part of our free exercise doctrine and one that courts are

capable of making.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (O’Connor, J., concurring

in the judgment) (citation omitted).

D

Although Kravitz was incarcerated, “prisoners do not forfeit all

constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and

confinement in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).

“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,

including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of

religion.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Indeed,

27

“[p]risoners have long been understood to retain some measure of the

constitutional protection afforded by the First Amendment’s Free

Exercise Clause.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 588.

In the prison context, however, “the right to free exercise of

religion” is balanced against “the interests of prison officials charged

with complex duties arising from administration of the penal

system.” Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990).

Therefore, an infringement of the free exercise of religion is

permissible only if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.” Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). 14 In short, “[t]o assess

a free exercise claim, a court must determine (1) whether the practice

asserted is religious in the person’s scheme of beliefs, and whether the

belief is sincerely held; (2) whether the challenged practice of the

prison officials infringes upon the religious belief; and (3) whether the

challenged practice of the prison officials furthers ... legitimate

penological objective[s].” Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir.

1988).

In this case, the district court addressed only the threshold

substantial burden test without proceeding to consider the

relationship to legitimate penological interests. The district court

14 In Turner, the Supreme Court identified four factors to be considered in

assessing whether a regulation is reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests: (1) “whether there is a rational relationship between

the regulation and the legitimate government interests asserted,”

(2) “whether the inmates have alternative means to exercise the right,”

(3) “the impact that accommodation of the right will have on the prison

system,” and (4) “whether ready alternatives exist which accommodate the

right and satisfy the governmental interest.” Benjamin, 905 F.2d at 574

(citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).

28

reasoned that, “had McMahon and Wassweiler caused Plaintiff to

miss the Shavuot prayers and meal on June 4, 2014, that single missed

celebration would have constituted a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s

free exercise given Shavuot’s central importance.” Kravitz, 2022 WL

768682, at *9 (emphasis added). According to the district court,

however, Kravitz’s “Shavuot celebration was only shortened, not

denied” because he was able to “congregate, pray, and eat a festive

kosher meal.” Id. at *10.

Kravitz can prevail on his claim because he has shown a burden

on his sincere religious beliefs. It is not in dispute that Kravitz

practices Judaism and considers the observance of Shavuot with

communal prayer to be a religious practice. Nor do the officers

dispute that Kravitz observes the holiday pursuant to sincerely held

religious beliefs. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment at 5, Kravitz v. Purcell, No. 16-CV-8999 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 128; see also Oral Argument Audio Recording

at 8:09 (“[W]e are not questioning the sincerity of his religious

beliefs.”). The admissible evidence shows that Kravitz was unable to

observe his religious holiday due to the abusive conduct of

corrections officers. On the first night, corrections officers obstructed

all communal prayer and threw paper bags at the inmates, “laughing

and say[ing], here is your kosher meal. You Jew, blah, blah, and F-U.”

Kravitz Dep. at 67. On the second night, an officer interrupted

Kravitz’s prayer after approximately thirty seconds, stating, “I don’t

want to hear that. You need to stop and get eating that food. I got

things to do.” Id. at 92.

The district court erred in deciding that the burden on Kravitz’s

observance was insufficient to establish an infringement of his right

29

to free exercise under the First Amendment. The district court could

reach that conclusion only by deciding that thirty seconds of prayer

or a blessing over bread suffices for Shavuot observance. 15 But what

the observance of Shavuot entails is beyond the competence of a

federal court. Kravitz has produced evidence showing that his sincere

religious beliefs were burdened, and that is enough to survive a

motion for summary judgment.

II

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of

any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State …

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States …

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws” is “liable to the party injured.”

To “establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit brought

under § 1983, a plaintiff must show ... the defendant’s personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City

of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). To do so, “a plaintiff

must plead and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant,

through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.’” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). “The factors

necessary to establish a § 1983 violation will vary with the

15 To the extent that the district court thought that the blessing over bread

constituted a Shavuot prayer rather than a component of the meal, the

district court misunderstood Kravitz’s observance. See Kravitz Dep. at 94

(“[B]efore you eat, ... you pray over the meal, the bread. ... Well, first the

wine, and then the bread, and then we eat.”).

30

constitutional provision at issue because the elements of different

constitutional violations vary.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

alteration omitted). In the context of the Free Exercise Clause, we have

explained that liability depends on an officer-defendant acting with

at least deliberate indifference in depriving an inmate of the ability to

engage in a religious practice. Wiggins, 2023 WL 8009312, at *8.

Officers Zupan, Purcell, Baker, St. Victor, McCray, and Andreu

testified that they did not participate in the alleged incidents. They

either did not work on the evenings of June 3 and 4 or they worked in

different areas of the prison at the relevant times.

Although Kravitz stated in an affidavit that these officers were

present on the evening of June 3, he conceded in deposition testimony

that this statement was not based on personal knowledge. When a

party relies on an affidavit to establish facts on summary judgment,

“the statements ‘must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts

that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant … is

competent to testify on the matters stated.’” DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d

226, 230 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)). The district

court properly dismissed the claims against these officers because

Kravitz could not identify admissible evidence that the officers were

personally involved in the alleged deprivation of Kravitz’s rights.

Kravitz does not challenge that determination on appeal. He

now claims that McMahon and Wassweiler were involved in the

events of both nights of Shavuot, rather than only those of June 4.

McMahon and Wassweiler were the “religious services officers [who]

completely prevented him from observing Shavuot on the first night

of the holiday and on the second night stopped the prayer service at

its inception.” Appellant’s Br. 17 (emphasis omitted).

31

The district court did not err in recognizing that Kravitz’s

claims against McMahon and Wassweiler did not extend to the events

of June 3. See Kravitz, 2022 WL 768682, at *9 (“In the TAC, Plaintiff

alleges that Purcell, Baker, Andreu, McCray, and St. Victor were

responsible for the deprivation of Plaintiff’s free exercise rights via

the incident on June 3, 2014, and McMahon, Wassweiler, and Zupan

were responsible for the deprivation of Plaintiff’s free exercise rights

via the incident on June 4, 2014.”). Kravitz’s complaint and Rule 56.1

Statement do not state that McMahon and Wassweiler were involved

in the June 3 incident. 16 But to identify the defendants involved in

each incident, Kravitz relied on the Attorney General’s response to

the district court’s Valentin order. As it turns out, the Attorney

General identified officers who were not involved in the events of

June 3. On remand, the district court may decide to issue a new

Valentin order, permit additional discovery, or permit leave to amend.

In other words, “[t]he district court may pursue any course that it

deems appropriate to a further inquiry into the identity” of the

defendants. Valentin, 121 F.3d at 75; see also Lurch v. Doe Officers, No.

22-CV-2324, 2022 WL 17617837, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2022) (noting

that a district court may take additional steps when the “accuracy or

sufficiency” of a Valentin response is in question).

16 The record as a whole is ambiguous as to whether McMahon and

Wassweiler participated in the events of June 3. The record does not contain

declarations from McMahon or Wassweiler. The Attorney General,

however, represented that McMahon and Wassweiler were the “officers

assigned to the Jewish holiday services.” Valentin Response at 1. While

Kravitz testified that he interacted with different officers on the two

evenings, he also testified that the officers “all look the same to me” and

that he was careful not to look directly at them. Kravitz Dep. at 79-80.

32

CONCLUSION

Kravitz has sufficiently demonstrated a burden on his sincere

religious beliefs such that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment to the defendants. We vacate the judgment insofar as the

district court granted summary judgment because Kravitz did not

show a substantial burden. We affirm the judgment insofar as the

district court granted summary judgment based on the lack of

personal involvement of Zupan, Purcell, Baker, St. Victor, McCray,

and Andreu. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

33

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