Janey Brown v. Duringer Law Group Plc

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JANEY BROWN; BING GUO; No. 22-55700

JUNXIAN ZHANG,

D.C. No.

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 2:20-cv-10971-

DOC-AGR

v.

DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC; OPINION

STEPHEN C. DURINGER; PETER

WONG; JUDY WONG,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

DOES, 1-10,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 11, 2023

Pasadena, California

Filed November 21, 2023

2 BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC

Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., MICHELLE T.

FRIEDLAND, and ERIC D. MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

SUMMARY *

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The panel reversed the district court’s summary

judgment, which held that an action under the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act was barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings.

Janey Brown and other tenants filed suit against the

Duringer Law Group, PLC, and Stephen C. Duringer,

alleging that Duringer violated the Act by filing a

memorandum of costs in state court proceedings concerning

an unlawful-detainer judgment.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, by vesting

jurisdiction over state-court appeals in the U.S. Supreme

Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 precludes a federal district court

from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action

asking the court to overturn an injurious state-court

judgment. The panel held that the doctrine is limited to cases

(1) brought by state-court losers (2) complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments (3) rendered before the

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC 3

district court proceedings commenced and (4) inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.

The panel concluded that the tenants’ action did not

challenge a memorandum of costs on which the state court

already had rendered judgment, but rather a later

memorandum. Because there was no relevant state-court

judgment purporting to adjudicate the validity of the costs in

the later memorandum, Rooker-Feldman did not apply.

COUNSEL

Louis P. Dell (argued), Law Office of Louis P. Dell,

Burbank, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Edward L. Laird II (argued) and Stephen C. Duringer, The

Duringer Law Group PLC, Anaheim Hills, California; Curtis

T. Greer IV, Kimball Tirey & St John LLP, Irvine,

California; for Defendants-Appellees.

4 BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Janey Brown, Bing Guo, and Junxian Zhang

(collectively, Tenants) filed suit against the Duringer Law

Group, PLC, and Stephen C. Duringer (collectively,

Duringer) in the United States District Court for the Central

District of California. In their complaint, Tenants allege that

Duringer violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p, by filing an October

2020 memorandum of costs pursuant to § 685.070(b) of the

California Code of Civil Procedure (the Code). In Tenants’

view, the October 2020 filing sought duplicative interest on

their back rent as well as unreasonable attorneys’ fees in

connection with Duringer’s debt collection efforts. The

district court concluded that Tenants’ federal suit constituted

an improper appeal of a state-court judgment and thus was

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We disagree.

Tenants’ FDCPA action does not attack any state-court

judgment regarding the October 2020 memorandum of

costs, and therefore the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not

bar the action. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2005, Peter and Judy Wong (the Wongs) leased an

apartment to Tenants. The lease agreement stated that “[i]n

the event of a default by Tenant hereunder, Tenant shall pay

to Landlord all costs incurred by Landlord . . . including

attorneys’ fees.” In 2010, Tenants breached the lease

agreement by failing to pay rent, and the Wongs hired

Duringer to initiate an unlawful-detainer action pursuant to

§ 1161(2) of the Code. On June 21, 2010, the California

Superior Court entered judgment in favor of the Wongs for

BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC 5

$2,705, composed of $1,785 in back rent and incidental

damages, $500 in attorneys’ fees, and $420 in other costs.

For over nine years, Duringer did not attempt to enforce

the judgment on behalf of the Wongs. Then, in February

2020, Duringer filed an application for renewal of the

judgment pursuant to § 683.120 of the Code, as well as a

memorandum of costs. In the memorandum of costs,

Duringer sought $2,570 in post-judgment interest and

$2,592 in post-judgment costs, including attorneys’ fees

incurred from June 2018 to December 2019. Tenants did not

object to the claimed costs within the ten days required under

state law, and thus the claimed costs were added to the

judgment. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 685.070(c), (d).

In July 2020, the Wongs applied for a writ of execution.

See id. § 699.510(a). The clerk of the court issued the writ,

levying Janey Brown’s bank account. Brown then requested

that the court quash the writ of execution. The Superior

Court denied Brown’s request, explaining that her filing did

not comply with California’s procedural requirements and

rejecting Brown’s assertions that Duringer committed fraud

and that she “knew nothing of this lawsuit and was never

served.” Three days later, Brown filed a claim of exemption

pursuant to § 703.520(a) of the Code. In the filing, Brown

reported a monthly income of $1,215 and argued that the

levy “robs [Brown of her] chance to live” due to, in part, her

mother’s significant medical costs. The Superior Court

denied the exemption.

In November 2020, Duringer received the levied funds

on behalf of the Wongs, which fully satisfied the writ

stemming from the renewal of judgment and the February

2020 memorandum of costs. However, shortly before

receiving those levied funds, Duringer filed a second

6 BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC

memorandum of costs, seeking $2,750 in accrued interest

and $3,780 in costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in litigating

the first memorandum of costs. Duringer never applied for

a writ of execution to enforce this second memorandum of

costs, and thus the court never took any further action

regarding the claimed costs.

On December 2, 2020, Tenants filed suit against

Duringer, alleging violations of the FDCPA. Tenants moved

for partial summary judgment on the issue of Duringer’s

liability for these violations. Duringer cross-moved, arguing

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the district court

of jurisdiction and that, in any event, Tenants’ FDCPA

claims failed on the merits as a matter of law. The district

court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Tenants’

claims and granted Duringer’s cross-motion for summary

judgment without reaching the merits of those claims. It did

not adjudicate Tenants’ motion for partial summary

judgment. Tenants timely appealed.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo a district court’s ruling on a summary

judgment motion. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 769 (9th

Cir. 2008). We also determine de novo whether a district

court had subject-matter jurisdiction over an action. Singh

v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 925 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir.

2019).

ANALYSIS

Section 1257 of Title 28 authorizes the U.S. Supreme

Court to hear appeals from “[f]inal judgments or decrees

rendered by the highest court of a State” if they raise a

federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman

BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC 7

doctrine provides that § 1257, by vesting jurisdiction over

state-court appeals in the Supreme Court, necessarily

“precludes a United States district court from exercising

subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be

empowered to adjudicate under a congressional grant of

authority,” if the action asks the federal district court to

“overturn an injurious state-court judgment.” Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92

(2005). The doctrine occupies “narrow ground” and applies

only in “limited circumstances.” Id. at 284, 291; see also

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (per curiam)

(“[O]ur cases since Feldman have tended to emphasize the

narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule.”). Namely, it “is

confined to . . . cases [1] brought by state-court losers [2]

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments [3]

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced

and [4] inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284.

In this case, the district court interpreted Tenants’

FDCPA claims as attacking the validity of the costs Duringer

claimed in its February memorandum of costs, on which the

Superior Court already rendered judgment. We disagree

with the district court’s interpretation. A fair reading of

Tenants’ complaint and the subsequent record shows that

Tenants seek to remedy the harms caused by Duringer’s

filing of the October memorandum of costs, not the February

memorandum, as the district court assumed. For instance, in

their complaint, Tenants allege that the October

memorandum “claimed duplicat[ive] interest and

unreasonable collection costs.” At summary judgment,

Tenants conceded that the Superior Court had already

rejected Brown’s motions relating to the costs in the

February memorandum.

8 BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC

Once we properly construe Tenants’ action as

challenging the October memorandum, our Rooker-Feldman

analysis becomes straightforward. There is no relevant

state-court judgment purporting to adjudicate the validity of

the costs in the October memorandum. Brown never filed a

motion to tax costs, so the state court never used that vehicle

to decide the accuracy of the costs. Moreover, Duringer did

not apply for a writ of execution, so Brown never moved to

quash—giving the state court no opportunity to assess the

costs claimed in the memorandum. Simply put, the October

memorandum was not the subject of any state-court

judgment.

Duringer’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First,

Duringer argues that we should broadly interpret “judgment”

in our Rooker-Feldman analysis to include the original 2010

unlawful-detainer judgment and that because Tenants

“undoubtably lost the state court Eviction Action,” they are

state-court losers. However, even if we were to adopt

Duringer’s broad conception of “judgment” at prong one of

our analysis, Duringer would still fail to meet prongs two

and four. Since the 2010 unlawful-detainer judgment does

not purport to rule on the accuracy of the costs claimed in

the October memorandum (as would have been impossible

given that the judgment was entered over a decade earlier),

Tenants would be neither complaining of injuries caused by

the state-court judgment (i.e., prong two) nor inviting district

court review and rejection of that judgment (i.e., prong four).

Second, Duringer posits that Tenants’ claims

“necessarily require[] the [federal] court to determine the

accuracy of the amount approved by the state court on the

Writ of Execution” enforcing the February memorandum of

costs. However, Tenants’ claims assume the accuracy of the

costs obtained through the February memorandum and

BROWN V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC 9

accompanying writ; Tenants challenge only the allegedly

duplicative interest and unreasonable attorneys’ fees

Duringer claimed in the October memorandum. Because

there is no relevant state-court judgment addressing those

issues to improperly appeal, we reverse the district court’s

holding that Rooker-Feldman precludes it from exercising

jurisdiction over Tenants’ FDCPA claims.

After this appeal was briefed, we sua sponte raised the

question whether Tenants have Article III standing to pursue

their claims. Because the question of standing was not

addressed by the district court and because Tenants may

wish to submit evidence in support of their claimed injuries,

we remand so the district court can address this issue in the

first instance. See Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884,

891 (9th Cir. 2004). 1

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s summary

judgment order is REVERSED, and this case is

REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

1

We may consider the appeal of the Rooker-Feldman issue without first

reaching the standing issue. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping

Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (“[T]here is no mandatory sequencing

of jurisdictional issues.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).