State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Goodwin

11/07/2023

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

June 21, 2023 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER LEE GOODWIN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Maury County

No. 27657 Stella L. Hargrove, Judge

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No. M2022-00540-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Lee Goodwin, was convicted by a Maury County

Circuit Court jury of felony murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child

neglect, and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the

Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial

court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police; (3) the aggravated

child neglect statute violates due process with its vagueness; (4) the trial court violated his

right to a fair trial when it overruled the defense objection and allowed the State to present

evidence that the medical examiner in this case lost his medical license; (5) the trial court

erred in sustaining the State’s hearsay objection to his questioning of an investigator about

a statement that a witness allegedly made to him; (6) the trial court erred in not declaring a

mistrial when an investigator testified about a domestic violence incident between the

Defendant and the victim’s mother; and (7) that a single prosecution for felony murder

predicated on both aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect violates double

jeopardy.1 After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which KYLE A.

HIXSON and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Patrick T. McNally, Nashville, Tennessee (on appeal) and Lee Ofman, Franklin, Tennessee

(at trial) for the Appellant, Christopher Lee Goodwin.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Richard D. Douglas, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Brent A. Cooper, District Attorney General; and Jude Santana, Kyle

Dodd, and Jonathan Davis, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of

Tennessee.

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We have reordered these issues for clarity.

OPINION

On January 20, 2001, the fifteen-month-old victim, J.S., while in the sole care of the

Defendant, suffered an occipital skull fracture, a subdural hematoma, and continued

subdural bleeding. Despite these serious injuries, the Defendant waited several hours

before taking the victim to the hospital. Although hospital staff attempted to save the

victim’s life, the victim died from his injuries.

In 2019, a Maury County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of felony

murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and one count of felony

murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect.

Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a Motion in Limine, objecting to the introduction

of evidence that the medical examiner, Dr. Charles Harlan, was incompetent when he

performed the victim’s first autopsy and that Dr. Harlan subsequently lost his medical

license in 2005. As a part of this motion, the Defendant asked the trial court to prevent the

State from introducing proof of the Defendant’s prior domestic assault conviction.

Although the trial court ruled that proof of the Defendant’s prior domestic violence

conviction was inadmissible, it found that evidence of Dr. Harlan’s incompetency and

revoked medical license was relevant and admissible.

Motion to Suppress. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress the

statements he made to law enforcement. Following a hearing, the trial court denied this

motion.

At the suppression hearing, Investigator Charity Roe with the Huntsville Police

Department in Alabama testified that she initially spoke to an investigator at 10:30 p.m. on

January 20, 2001, who told her that the victim, who had sustained multiple head injuries

and was in extremely critical condition, had been flown to the Huntsville Hospital; that the

victim’s injuries involved “possible child abuse[;]” that the victim’s mother and her

boyfriend, the Defendant, were on their way to that hospital; and that the victim was not

expected to survive. She said that officers who were at Maury Regional Hospital were told

that the victim “fell off the bed” and this was relayed to her through dispatch.

Investigator Roe advised Officer Jason Hall with the Huntsville Police Department

to immediately separate the victim’s mother and the Defendant because she “didn’t want

them to realize that the child was dead and for them to have time to make up a story” for

how the victim was injured. She added that it was “normal protocol” to look at the family

members first when a child is injured.

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Investigator Roe said she first spoke to the Defendant at the Huntsville Hospital at

approximately 11:15 p.m. She said the Defendant was with a police officer in a waiting

room of the hospital; however, she did not believe that this officer stayed in the room while

she interviewed the Defendant. She acknowledged that both she and the other officer were

armed. She also said a chaplain was in the room when she interviewed the Defendant.

During the interview, Investigator Roe informed the Defendant that she was an

investigator who was investigating a possible criminal case, although she did not believe

she used those exact words. She had been told by one of the officers that the Defendant

was alone with the victim after the victim’s mother left for work, so she deemed the

Defendant a “possible suspect.”

Investigator Roe stated that anytime she questioned a suspect, the “first thing” she

would do would be to read the suspect his or her Miranda rights. In this case, Investigator

Roe asserted that she read the Defendant his Miranda rights but did not obtain a signed

rights waiver form from him. She acknowledged that at the time of the interview, the

Defendant was detained and not free to leave, and the Defendant was not allowed to

communicate with the people with whom he came to the hospital. Investigator Roe

asserted that the Defendant received the Miranda warnings and then agreed to talk to her.

During the interview, the Defendant told Investigator Roe that the victim “fell out

of the bed,” although he did not see the victim fall out of the bed, and that the victim

“seemed fine.” Investigator Roe said the Defendant never told her that he knew the victim

was injured from the fall off the bed.

Investigator Roe stated the Defendant initially said that the victim’s mother left for

work around 2:20 or 2:30 p.m., and between 2:45 and 3:00 p.m., the victim woke up and

began crying in his playpen. He said he laid the victim “on his chest” until the victim went

back to sleep and about an hour later, he woke the victim up, who “was full of sweat[,]” so

he got a washcloth for the child. He said that while he was getting the washcloth, he heard

“[a] thump” and “assumed” the victim “had fallen out of the bed.” The Defendant claimed

that “by the time he got back” with the washcloth, the victim had gotten “back in the bed”

by himself. He claimed he gave the victim some apple juice at 5:15 p.m. and then tried to

wake the victim at 6:00 p.m. to give him medicine, but he could not wake up the victim.

The Defendant said that the victim was “rubbing his eyes like he was tired” and was

“moving his arms and his legs” but “would not open his eyes.” The Defendant told her

that “he just couldn’t seem to wake the child up” and was checking on the victim “every

ten minutes.”

Investigator Roe said that after she talked to the Defendant, Dr. Pickett came to talk

to her during the middle of surgery on the victim and said that the victim “had multiple

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skull fractures[.]” Dr. Pickett continued that although the victim’s mother had said that the

victim fell off the bed, “the child could not receive that amount of injury from a small fall

off the bed” and that “he did not expect the child to live.” Dr. Pickett also told her that he

generally sees the type of injury that the victim sustained when somebody has been “hit

with a baseball bat.” Investigator Roe said Dr. Pickett told her that “this child was

murdered, plain and simple” and that he would “go to [c]ourt” to do what he needed to do.

When asked if Dr. Pickett told her who abused the victim, Investigator Roe replied:

No. But the time line that was set from the story Dr. Pickett had

got[ten] from falling off the bed and the time line, this child would have been

unconscious and incapacitated. He put the time around [3:00 p.m.] [The

victim’s] mom had left for work at 2:30. The child was up and around. [The

Defendant] said he put him in the bed and he was the one that was watching

the child and home with the child at that time.

Investigator Roe said that the Defendant later told her that after the victim’s mother

left, the victim was up between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. for “20 to 45 minutes” and then went

to sleep after that. She quizzed the Defendant about this large disparity in time because

Dr. Pickett put the victim as injured, incapacitated, and unconscious at 3:00 p.m., which

would mean that the victim would not be up and would not be drinking from a sippy cup.

Investigator Roe said that because the Defendant gave her different stories with

different times, she believed that the Defendant could not keep his time line straight. She

said that after talking to Dr. Pickett, she knew that a fall off the bed could not have caused

the type of head injury that the victim sustained. While she was unable to say what caused

the victim’s injury, Investigator Roe asserted that the victim was with the Defendant when

he was injured.

Investigator Roe did not know how long she interviewed the Defendant in the

waiting room of the Huntsville Hospital. However, at the end of the interview, she had the

Defendant transported in handcuffs to the Huntsville Police Department. She said that she

told Lieutenant Brady and Detective Fogle of the victim’s injuries, the Defendant’s version

of what happened, and Dr. Pickett’s description of the victim’s injuries. She recalled that

Lieutenant Brady and Detective Fogle talked to the Defendant at the police department for

only eight to ten minutes, and she did not recall whether she was in the room when

Lieutenant Brady and Detective Fogle spoke to Defendant at the station. She was surprised

that Lieutenant Brady and Detective Fogle spent such a short time speaking with the

Defendant, whom Investigator Roe believed was the prime suspect in the case, and then let

the Defendant and the rest of the family to go home together and never did anything to

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secure the crime scene. She stated that the only way she got Lieutenant Brady and

Detective Fogle to come to Huntsville was by telling them that “there was a dead baby”

and that “somebody from [their] jurisdiction needed to respond and take possession of that

body.”

Investigator Roe said that she did not feel that Brandy Eddlemon, the victim’s

mother, was a suspect in the victim’s death. She asserted that the Defendant told the units

that transported the victim to Huntsville that the victim fell off the bed around 3:00 p.m.

and that when he checked on the victim at 6:00 p.m., he could not wake the victim. She

noted that this statement conflicted with the Defendant’s statement to her that he was

checking on the victim “every ten minutes.” Investigator Roe stated that she felt like the

Defendant was lying to her about what happened to the victim because he “kept changing

his times” about when the victim “fell off the bed,” when the victim “woke up,” when he

took the victim “out of the playpen,” when he laid down on the bed with the victim, and

when he had the victim “on his chest patting him, giv[ing] him a sippy cup.”

Investigator Roe acknowledged that when she was questioning the Defendant, she

did not know how long he had been awake. She agreed that the Defendant had “just come

from Columbia to the hospital where his girlfriend’s child was in dire straits.” Investigator

Roe said that she asked the Defendant about the time line of when the Defendant was

present, what the victim was doing at the time, and what the Defendant did from when he

got home until the Defendant and his father took the victim to Maury Regional Hospital.

When asked what the difference in all of that time would make if the fall off the bed was

not the cause of the victim’s injuries, Investigator Roe said,

Because it locks [the Defendant] into a time line of what he has done,

what the child was doing, . . . which they can put together with the doctor’s

knowledge of when that child was injured and . . . lock[s the Defendant] into

a statement in case he chooses to change it once he gets back to their

jurisdiction.

Investigator Roe noted that the Defendant claimed the victim “[f]ell off the bed, [was]

crawling back in bed by himself at 15 months old with a cast from his hip to his ankle from

a previous broken leg, but he crawled back in bed by himself[.]”

On cross-examination, Investigator Roe stated that she had been in law enforcement

for twenty-seven years and had first become an investigator in 1999. She said that when

she was promoted to investigator, she shadowed other experienced investigators. She

stated that whenever you had a suspect that may have committed a crime, it was appropriate

to read the suspect his or her Miranda rights because “it protects them” and “it protects [the

officers].” She said that when it is not clear that a crime has been committed and the

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individual is not in custody, then an investigator does not read the individual his or her

Miranda rights. She asserted that she had received adequate training about when it is was

necessary to provide Miranda warnings to an individual.

Investigator Roe asserted that the Defendant was detained and not free to leave

while he was at the Huntsville Hospital and at the Huntsville Police Department; therefore,

it was appropriate for the Defendant to be read his Miranda rights, which she did. She said

that she read the Defendant’s Miranda warning from a card that listed the full Miranda

warning on it and that she “always” used the card to ensure that the Miranda warning was

given “word for word.” She said that after providing the Miranda warning to the

Defendant, the Defendant agreed to talk with her. She stated that she talked to the

Defendant at around 11:30 or 11:45 p.m. on January 20, 2001, for approximately fifteen

minutes at the Huntsville Hospital, and then the Defendant was transported at her request

to the Huntsville Police Department. She said that Lieutenant Brady and Detective Fogle

arrived at the Huntsville Police Department around 6:00 a.m. on January 21, 2001, and that

she briefly spoke to them before they spoke to the Defendant. She did not recall whether

she was present during Lieutenant Brady’s and Detective Fogle’s interview with the

Defendant, but she said that she would have allowed them to take the lead in that interview

because the crime took place in their jurisdiction. She said that the Defendant and Brandy

Eddlemon were kept separated at both the Huntsville Hospital and the Huntsville Police

Department.

Investigator Roe stated that during the time she spoke to the Defendant, the

Defendant never confessed to a crime and never confessed to intentionally or accidentally

hurting the victim. She said the Defendant “just remained shaky and started to put his head

down” and would not look at her. She also said the Defendant “[s]tarted to cry at different

times.”

Investigator Roe said that she expected Lieutenant Brady and Detective Fogle to

follow up with her because they told her that she would hear from them. However, she

never heard from them. “[Y]ears later,” Investigator Roe was contacted by a female agent

at the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI), who told her that the TBI was trying to

bring criminal charges against the Defendant for the death of the victim. Investigator Roe

explained that the victim had been pronounced dead before she ever left the Huntsville

Hospital.

Investigator Roe said that although the Defendant gave a written statement that

night, the Defendant never confessed to a crime. When asked if the Defendant’s written

statement departed from what he had told her verbally, Investigator Roe stated that the

Defendant originally told her that he “thought [the victim] had fallen off the bed because

he heard the thump” and that the victim must have “crawled in” the bed “by himself”;

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however, the Defendant asserted in his written statement that his nephew Cody “had

walked in and told him that [the victim] had fallen off the bed” and then the Defendant

“went into the bedroom” and saw the victim “on the floor.” She noted that Cody was six

years old and the victim was fifteen months old at the time.

On redirect examination, Investigator Roe acknowledged that she did not have the

Defendant sign a Miranda waiver and did not make a note about reading the Miranda

warnings to the Defendant. However, she insisted that as a part of her “protocol,” she

“always” read Miranda to potential suspects. She asserted that she read the Miranda

warnings to the Defendant at the Huntsville Hospital and the Huntsville Police Department.

Investigator Roe said that in addition to the Defendant, she also talked to Brandy

Eddlemon, Vernon Goodwin, and Dr. Pickett at the hospital. She acknowledged that the

Defendant was being held in an isolated room at both the hospital and the police department

and that he was not free to leave. She also agreed that there was no question that the

Defendant was in custody at the time that she read him his Miranda rights.

Detective Jason Fogle of the Maury County Sheriff’s Department testified that he

first became aware of this case around 6:00 p.m. on January 20, 2001. He said that

Investigator Roe informed him and Lieutenant Jim Brady of what the victim’s mother and

the Defendant had said about the incident involving the victim. He was not aware that the

Defendant was being held alone at the Huntsville Police Department until he got there,

which was around 5:00 a.m. He said that it took them so long to get to Huntsville because

they did not find out that the victim was injured in Maury County, rather than at the victim’s

mother’s residence in Lewis County, until 1:00 a.m.

Around 2:00 a.m., Investigator Roe called and informed him and Lieutenant Brady

that she had the family detained at the police station and that the Defendant had said that

the victim had fallen off the bed and landed on the floor around 3:00 p.m. on January 20,

2001. Investigator Roe also said that she had spoken to Dr. Pickett, the neurosurgeon in

this case, who said he did not believe that the victim’s injury could have been caused by

falling off the bed onto carpet.

Detective Fogle asserted that he and Lieutenant Brady first spoke to the Defendant

at the police station, where the Defendant was sitting in an interview room handcuffed and

not free to leave. He said that Investigator Roe was not with them when they conducted

the interview with the Defendant. Detective Fogle said they read the Defendant his

Miranda rights before asking him any questions because the Defendant was in custody.

They then asked the Defendant to start his written statement of events from the time that

Brandy Eddlemon left for work because the Defendant indicated that the victim’s injury

occurred after Brandy left for work. He said the Defendant told them that he was watching

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the victim after Brandy Eddlemon left for work and that the victim had a cold. The

Defendant said that at some point, he had gotten up to get a washcloth or to get something

for the victim and when he returned he found the victim sitting up in the floor crying.

Detective Fogle said the Defendant said that he thought the victim had fallen from

the bed, but he did not recall the Defendant saying anything about whether the victim had

hurt his head or was injured from this fall. Detective Fogle acknowledged that he had no

evidence showing that a weapon was used to cause the victim’s injury or that the victim’s

injury occurred in that bedroom. However, he asserted that if a child falls off the bed and

is lying on the floor screaming, “anybody would assume that they were hurt.”

Detective Fogle said that they took the handcuffs off the Defendant right after they

read him his Miranda rights but before the Defendant wrote out his statement. He noted

that the Defendant’s verbal and written statements were “fairly consistent.” Detective

Fogle said that he and Lieutenant Brady were with the Defendant at the police station for

less than an hour. At the conclusion of the interview, the Defendant was free to go. At

that point, Detective Fogle and Lieutenant Brady went to the Defendant’s home on Gene

Fitzgerald Road and took a statement from six-year-old Cody, although Detective Fogle

said Cody was not extremely communicative.

On cross-examination, Detective Fogle acknowledged that Lieutenant Brady was

his “boss” in 2001, although Lieutenant Brady passed away three or four years prior to this

trial. He said that the security guard at Maury Regional Hospital notified him that the

victim had died while at the Huntsville Hospital. He asserted that Investigator Roe did not

tell him and Lieutenant Brady what to ask the Defendant during their interview.

Detective Fogle agreed that Lieutenant Brady told the Defendant to forget about

anything he had said to anyone else and to tell them the truth. He said that during the

interview, he and Lieutenant Brady were not going back and referencing what the

Defendant had or had not told Investigator Roe. He said that they did not have Investigator

Roe’s notes to use as reference when questioning the Defendant and were not comparing

what the Defendant said to them against what he had said to Investigator Roe.

Detective Fogle asserted that the Defendant acted like he understood his Miranda

rights and did not seem drunk or high at the time of questioning. He stated that at the end

of the interview they released the Defendant and did not bring any Maury County charges

against him that day.

When they went to the home on Gene Fitzgerald Road, Detective Fogle and

Lieutenant Brady took some photographs but did not speak to the Defendant again and did

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not remember the Defendant being present. He said that January 21, 2001, at the Huntsville

Police Department was the last time he ever spoke to the Defendant.

Detective Fogle said that the Defendant never confessed to a crime during his

interview with him in Huntsville. He confirmed that the Defendant’s two-page written

statement was taken by him and Lieutenant Brady.

On redirect examination, Detective Fogle acknowledged that “almost all” of the

information he and Lieutenant Brady knew about the incident involving the victim came

from Investigator Roe. He agreed that the case concerning the victim was closed, meaning

that they were not going to investigate any further, the day after his interview with the

Defendant. Detective Fogle said that there was no question in his mind that the Defendant

was in custody and not free to leave at the time of their interview, which was why they read

the Miranda warning to the Defendant prior to questioning him.

Investigator Tommy Goetz with the 22nd Judicial District Attorney’s Office

testified that he talked to the Defendant three different times as a part of his investigation.

Investigator Goetz did not read the Defendant his Miranda rights before the first two

interviews on February 24, 2015, and March 12, 2015, because the Defendant was not in

custody and he did not feel he had enough information to charge the Defendant with a

crime. He said that while he knew slightly more information at the time of the second

interview, he did not have enough proof to make the Defendant a suspect. On March 26,

2015, the Defendant called him and advised that while he had decided not to take a

polygraph test, he would help the district attorney’s office in any other way he could.

Investigator Goetz said he read the Defendant his Miranda rights before the third

interview at the district attorney’s office on June 18, 2019, because he treated the Defendant

like a suspect, even though he was not in custody, and believed beyond a reasonable doubt

that he was guilty of murder. He acknowledged, however, if the Defendant had tried to

leave, he would have let him go. He stated that TBI Agent Leslie Purvis was present during

this interview, but he was unsure whether she was wearing a weapon. He acknowledged

that he was wearing a weapon during the Defendant’s June 18, 2019 interview.

Detective Goetz said that during the June 18, 2019 interview with the Defendant, he

went over a lot of his evidence and made it clear to the Defendant that he believed the

Defendant committed the crimes against the victim. He said that during the interview, the

Defendant never requested an attorney, so they talked. Detective Goetz believed he had

enough evidence to prove that the Defendant committed the crime after talking with Dr.

Pickett, Dr. Lowen, and Dr. Lewis, after listening to the 9-1-1 call, and after reviewing the

2001 interviews of the Defendant, Vernon Goodwin, and Brandy Eddlemon. He concluded

that the victim’s injury occurred around 3:00 p.m. on January 20, 2001, because the

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Defendant asserted in his 2001 statement that he went to the bathroom and the victim fell

off the bed around 3:00 p.m. and that he picked up the victim and consoled him and had

no reason to believe the victim was hurt. Investigator Goetz said he reached the conclusion

that the victim’s injury occurred at 3:00 p.m. because that was “the only time that the child

could have been injured,” according to the Defendant. He said he never discovered any

information indicating that the victim’s injury did not occur at 3:00 p.m.

Detective Goetz acknowledged that Amy Harless had given a statement to the TBI

in 2001, stating that Brandy had told her that the victim was hurt before Brandy went to

work. However, when Detective Goetz interviewed Harless about that statement, Harless

said she did not recall saying that. Detective Goetz said that he interviewed Linda

Goodwin, Vernon Goodwin, Cody, and the Defendant, and no one indicated that there was

an injury or incident involving the victim, but Vernon said he heard “a thump” around 3:00

p.m. on January 20, 2001. He also said that based on what the medical experts said, the

victim could not have been hurt before Brandy went to work because the child would not

have been conscious or eating and drinking and because everyone would have known

something was wrong with the victim.

Detective Goetz acknowledged that Brandy said that when the Defendant returned

home from Lowe’s on January 20, 2001, the victim was asleep. He agreed that the victim

was never described as playing or being normal when the Defendant returned home.

Detective Goetz said that although the Defendant claimed that the victim was sitting up

two feet from the armoire, Detective Goetz did not believe that the victim hit the armoire

because he was sitting up, crying, and the Defendant claimed he picked him up, consoled

him, and began watching television. Detective Goetz claimed that Dr. Lowen, Dr. Pickett,

Dr. Podgarski, and Dr. Lewis said that the victim would not have been able to sit up or cry

given the victim’s injuries. He added that all the medical experts said the victim either

would have been unconscious or if not, everyone in the room would have known there was

something wrong with the victim. Detective Goetz said that he believed the victim was

slammed to the floor or into the bed post or was hit with a fist to the back of the head; he

asserted that “[i]t took something with a whole lot of force” to cause the victim’s injuries.

He acknowledged that the victim did not have an open wound to the head but asserted that

he knew the victim’s injuries “didn’t happen by falling off a bed that’s 22 inches to a carpet

floor.” Detective Goetz acknowledged that no medical experts told him that the victim’s

injury had to have happened at 3:00 p.m. when the Defendant was alone with him. He also

acknowledged that the Defendant never mentioned that the victim had a head injury on the

9-1-1 call but that the Defendant did state a couple of times that the victim acted like he

had been “knocked out.”

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Detective Goetz said that during the June 18, 2019 interview he accused the

Defendant of committing a crime against the victim. He had determined that the Defendant

was guilty several weeks before the June 18 interview.

On cross-examination, Detective Goetz said he administered the Miranda warnings

to the Defendant at the June 18, 2019 interview because he knew he was going to accuse

him of committing crimes against the victim. He said the Defendant waived his Miranda

rights and did not ask for an attorney at any point during the interview. When he asked the

Defendant about the victim drinking from a sippy cup after his fall, the Defendant said that

he had given the victim the sippy cup but the victim may not have taken a drink from it,

which was different from what the Defendant had previously told him. Detective Goetz

confirmed that the Defendant never confessed to committing a crime in any of the three

interviews. He agreed that a bedpost could be a weapon with a young victim.

Detective Goetz said that he was present during the victim’s second autopsy and the

victim had a massive fracture starting at his spine and going up and over and all the way

around the victim’s skull. He agreed that the victim sustained a “massive blow to the

head.” Detective Goetz said that Dr. Pickett opined that in order for the victim to sustain

an injury like this, he would had to have been “pitched out of a second story window” or

“off of an upper deck” or “down a flight of stairs.” In addition, Dr. Lowen told Investigator

Goetz that the victim would had to have been thrown out a second story window, and Dr.

Levy told him that the victim would had to have been hit with a baseball bat to sustain this

type of injury.

On redirect examination, Detective Goetz said that because the victim did not have

an open head wound, there was no blood on anything in the room that could have been

used as a weapon. He acknowledged that a forensic team never investigated the bedroom

to try to collect evidence.

Detective Goetz said that Dr. Lauridson told him to be careful using the digestive

theory as a way to determine the timing of the victim’s injury because you cannot always

tell how much the child ate or how much the child threw up.

Detective Goetz said that the recording of the January 21, 2001 interview between

Lieutenant Brady, Detective Fogle, and the Defendant showed that Lieutenant Brady told

the Defendant to write down everything, and the Defendant chose to start his written

statement at 2:30 p.m. on January 20, 2001.

Detective Goetz stated that he never implied that nothing was going to happen to

the Defendant at the time he provided his Miranda rights to him. He said that he did not

have the Defendant sign a waiver at the June 18, 2019 interview because of the fact that he

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advised him of his Miranda rights was audio and video recorded. He said there was “no

doubt” the Defendant was advised in full of his Miranda rights that day.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court found that Investigator

Roe’s testimony that she provided Miranda warnings twice to the Defendant prior to

questioning, both at the hospital and at the police station, was credible. Consequently, the

trial court concluded, and defense counsel agreed, that Seibert v. Missouri was not

applicable to the Defendant’s case.2 The trial court also agreed with the State that while

Investigator Roe did detain the Defendant in Huntsville, this was not an illegal detention

because she informed the Defendant of his Miranda rights prior to any questioning.3

Ultimately, the trial court held that it was “going to overrule [the] Motion to Suppress.”

Trial. The State offered the following proof at trial. Brandy Eddlemon, the victim’s

mother, testified that she was a registered nurse and had a master’s degree in business. She

stated that she met the Defendant when the victim was eleven months old, and she and the

Defendant began dating in September 2000. The Defendant, who did not have children of

his own, lived with his parents, Vernon and Linda Goodwin. She said Vernon and Linda

Goodwin had custody of Defendant’s nephew Cody, who also lived with them.

Eddlemon stated that in December 2000, the victim broke his leg at her apartment

while Eddlemon and her mother were present. She said the victim broke his leg by falling

into an oven drawer and that the victim had a cast on his leg at the time of this incident.

She also said that in the days preceding January 20, 2001, the victim had caught a cold and

was taking antibiotics.

On the morning of January 20, 2001, the Defendant’s mother, Linda Goodwin, was

already at work when Eddlemon awoke. She went into the living room and observed the

Defendant and the victim sitting in a recliner in the living room. She said the Defendant

later left to go to Lowe’s at 12:30 p.m.

At 1:00 p.m., Eddlemon fed the victim spaghetti with mushrooms and tomatoes, and

the victim finished all of his food. At the time, Eddlemon, the victim, Vernon Goodwin,

and Cody were present in the home. She stated that the victim was “fine” and was acting

normally. Around 1:30 p.m., Eddlemon laid down with the victim in a king size bed to

take a nap, but she got up a short time later because she had to go to work. She put the

victim in his playpen in the bedroom, and the victim was asleep when the Defendant

returned and when she left for work around 2:20 p.m.

2

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).

3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

- 12 -

While she was at work, Eddlemon spoke to the Defendant around 5:00 p.m. to

remind the Defendant to give the victim his antibiotic medicine. She called again at 6:00

p.m. to make sure the Defendant gave the victim his antibiotic, and the Defendant told her

that the victim “was acting a little bit unusual” and that he “couldn’t get him awake[.]”

Eddlemon told the Defendant to bring the victim to Maury Regional Hospital where she

was working. At the time, the Defendant did not tell Eddlemon anything about the victim

falling off the bed or the victim having fallen.

A short time later, Eddlemon’s supervisor told her that the Defendant and the victim

were in the emergency room. When she got there, Eddlemon saw the victim, who was

unconscious, lying “on a stretcher being ventilated” with the help of “a respiratory

therapist.”

Eddlemon stated that during a conversation they had after the victim died, the

Defendant told her he had taken the victim out of the playpen and laid down with the victim

on the bed. The victim fell asleep on the Defendant’s chest and drooled on him, so the

Defendant placed the victim on the bed while he went to get a wet rag. The Defendant said

that while he was in the bathroom, he heard the victim fall from the bed around 3:00 p.m.

He came back to the bedroom and observed the victim crying on the floor. Eddlemon said

the victim was later “life flighted” to a hospital in Huntsville, Alabama, where the victim

passed away.

Eddlemon eventually reviewed the victim’s autopsy report that was prepared by Dr.

Charles Harlan and spoke to Dr. Harlan regarding the victim’s autopsy. She noted that

after the victim’s death, Dr. Harlan was accused of malpractice, and she had questions

about Dr. Harlan’s conclusion that the cause of the victim’s death was “an accident.” She

stated that in 2001, no one from the medical examiner’s office, the sheriff’s department, or

the district attorney’s office told her anything other than that the victim’s death was an

accident. Two months after the victim’s death, Eddlemon married the Defendant while

pregnant with their son, Braden. They divorced in 2006, and during their marriage the

Defendant never told her anything different about the circumstances of the victim’s death.

Eddlemon said that the investigation into the victim’s death resumed in 2014, with

the election of a new district attorney. The victim’s body was later exhumed in order to do

a second autopsy.

Eddlemon stated that two or three years prior to trial, Investigator Goetz asked her

to call the Defendant on a recorded line. She asked the Defendant about the victim, and

the Defendant repeated what he had previously said about the victim being on his chest,

that he had a little bit of vomit, and that the Defendant got up to go to the bathroom and

heard a thud.

- 13 -

Eddlemon said that she first met the Defendant through Amy Harless, who was the

Defendant’s friend. While Eddlemon denied being close friends with Harless, she

acknowledged that they were friends who had mutual acquaintances. Eddlemon did not

recall calling Harless the day of or the day after the victim’s death, and she asserted that

Harless probably would not have been someone she would have called for consolation or

support because they had only recently become friends at the time of the victim’s death.

Eddlemon denied telling Harless or anyone else that the victim had already suffered a head

injury before she left for work on January 20, 2001. She claimed that such a statement

would be false because the victim was not injured before she left for work. Eddlemon

denied doing anything to the victim to cause his injuries.

On cross-examination, Eddlemon said that she had known the Defendant for four or

five months at the time of the victim’s death. She acknowledged that the Defendant “was

kind” to the victim and would change his diaper and feed him. She also said that she was

not aware of the Defendant hitting the victim. She said that the victim called the Defendant

“Daddy” and that they had discussed the Defendant adopting the victim.

Eddlemon acknowledged that Cody, often played with the victim. She noted that

Cody had a “severe speech impediment” that made communication with him difficult.

She said the Defendant told her that when he went to the bathroom to get a wet rag,

he heard “a thump” and when he returned to the bedroom, he saw that the victim had fallen

off the bed and was on the floor crying. The Defendant told her that he picked up the

victim, checked on him, and put him back on the bed. She did not recall the Defendant

telling her that he saw anything wrong with the victim. She found out later that the victim

had vomited up some of the spaghetti he had eaten earlier. Eddlemon acknowledged that

she was not presented with new evidence at the time that she agreed to a second autopsy

of the victim.

Vernon Goodwin, the Defendant’s father, testified that at 12:45 p.m. on January 20,

2001, he and Cody got home and saw Brandy and the victim, whose face was “red and kind

of puffy” and whose eyes were swollen like he had “been crying for some time.” Vernon

said that although the victim was usually “happy, loving,” the victim was not himself that

day.

Later, after Brandy had gone to work and while the Defendant was alone with the

victim in the bedroom, Vernon “heard a thump” and he and Cody went to check on the

victim around 2:20 p.m. on January 20, 2001. When they entered the bedroom, the victim

was sitting on the floor, and the Defendant “was in the bathroom getting a wash rag.”

- 14 -

Vernon said he “assumed” the victim fell off the bed in light of the “thump” he heard and

the victim’s presence on the floor.

Vernon said that “nothing” seemed to be “wrong” with the victim. He noted that

the victim was not crying and he “looked okay.” Vernon and the Defendant did not say

anything to one another, and Vernon returned to the living room to watch television.

Later, Vernon was informed by the Defendant that the victim “would wake up but

not all the way.” Vernon said that his mother held the victim while the Defendant called

9-1-1 and that he, his mother, and the Defendant together decided to take the victim to the

hospital. The next morning, Vernon said he was interviewed by Detective Jim Brady from

the Maury County Sheriff’s Department in Huntsville.

Vernon recalled being interviewed by Investigator Tommy Goetz on February 23,

2015. During this interview, Vernon agreed that he stated that when he got home, the

victim was crying, and he appeared to have been crying for a while. He also told

Investigator Goetz that Brandy was attempting to feed the victim spaghetti, and it was clear

that the victim did not want to eat. In addition, Vernon also stated that Brandy was “mad

as hell” that the Defendant was not home because she had to be at work. Vernon said that

although he had told Investigator Goetz that he saw the victim on the bed after hearing the

“thump,” the victim was actually on the floor as the Defendant was in the bathroom getting

a wash rag. He acknowledged telling Investigator Goetz that he believed the victim was

fine at that time. Vernon also told Investigator Goetz in 2015 that he believed then, and

still currently believed, that the victim was already injured when he saw Brandy with the

victim when he came home from work that day around 12:30 or 12:45 p.m. because the

victim’s “behavior was different.”

Vernon acknowledged that, during his 2001 interview with Detective Brady, he

never mentioned that the victim was upset or crying when he got home from work and

never said anything about the victim appearing to be injured or hurt when he got in from

work. He admitted that he asserted those specific details about the victim being upset and

injured for the first time during his interview with Investigator Goetz in 2015. He claimed

he thought he said those things to Detective Brady in 2001 but apparently did not. He also

said he told Detective Brady in 2001 that the floor of the mobile home where the victim

was injured was a wooden floor with carpet on top. Vernon reiterated that after Brandy

left and the Defendant returned, he heard a “thump” and a little cry and when he went to

check on the victim, he heard the Defendant talking to the victim, who seemed okay, and

the Defendant told Vernon that he had everything under control. Vernon acknowledged

telling Detective Brady in 2001 that Cody was not in the room with the victim.

- 15 -

Vernon said he assumed that the victim fell off the bed because he “heard a thump,”

even though no one told him that was what happened. He also reiterated his testimony at

trial that he believed the victim was on the floor.

Vernon acknowledged that he did not have an explanation for why he just testified

that the victim was upset, fussy, and would not eat when Vernon got home from work but

only told Detective Brady in 2001 that Brandy fed the victim spaghetti and did not mention

that the victim as upset, hurt, or fussy. Vernon said, “I don’t know why I missed that.”

On cross-examination, Vernon claimed that Detective Brady never asked him in

2001 whether the victim was fussy that day. Vernon stated that after hearing the thump,

he never saw any bleeding or any indication that the victim had gotten hit in the head. He

also never heard any sound like the crack of a skull when the thump occurred. Vernon

claimed that Cody went into the bedroom just before he did, and the victim was sitting on

the floor and appeared to be fine while the Defendant was in the bathroom.

Vernon said that although the victim ate the spaghetti that Brandy was feeding him,

the victim did not act like he wanted it because he was “trying to spit it back up,” which

was not normal for him. He stated that he was concerned when the Defendant later

informed him that he could not get the victim to wake up. Vernon said that although he

and his mother tried to awaken the victim, they were unable to do so. He asserted that the

Defendant loved the victim and that he had never observed the Defendant being mean to

the victim in his presence. Vernon acknowledged that while he was in Huntsville, he had

no idea that the police were investigating a possible murder of the victim. He said the

detectives in Huntsville just asked him what happened and asked only a few follow-up

questions. He said these detectives came to his home later the same morning, but they

never put up any crime scene tape to keep people out of that room and never told him to

stay out of that room. He said the detectives never arrested anyone in his family that day.

On redirect examination, Vernon said that while Brandy was feeding the victim, the

victim “was crying a lot” and was resting his head on Brandy’s shoulder, and Brandy said

that the victim had “got[ten] in trouble earlier.” He said that, when questioned in

Huntsville, neither he nor the Defendant felt that the detectives were treating them as

suspects.

Detective Jason Fogle with the Maury County Sheriff’s Department testified that he

and Lieutenant Jim Brady interviewed the Defendant, Vernon Goodwin, and Brandy

Eddlemon around 5:00 a.m. on January 21, 2001. The following Monday, Dr. Charles

Harlan informed Detective Fogle that he was ruling that the victim’s death was accidental.

By mid-afternoon, the case was closed because it was determined to be an accidental fall.

- 16 -

Detective Fogle said that the Defendant was detained and interviewed on January

21, 2001, at the Huntsville Police Department. He noted that the Defendant’s interview

was recorded. Detective Fogle said the Defendant told them that he had come home around

2:00 p.m. on January 20, 2001, that around 2:30 p.m. Brandy Eddlemon left for work and

left the victim in the care of the Defendant, that the Defendant laid the victim down with

him in the bed around 3:00 p.m., that the victim began sweating so the Defendant went to

the bathroom to get a rag to wash his head, that the Defendant heard a thump, and that

Cody came around the corner and said that the victim had fallen off the bed. The Defendant

said that he found the victim sitting on the floor crying so he picked him up, checked him

out, and they laid down on the bed together and went back to sleep. The Defendant later

woke up and put the victim in his playpen. Later, the Defendant said that Brandy called to

remind him to give the victim medicine for his cold and when the Defendant attempted to

wake up the victim, he was unable to do so. The Defendant called his father in the

bedroom, and they both had difficulty waking up the victim. They called 9-1-1, and after

getting Vernon’s mother to check on the victim, they all decided that the victim needed to

go to the hospital. Detective Fogle said the Defendant told him they did not have time to

wait for the ambulance, so they drove the victim in their own car to the Maury Regional

Hospital.

Detective Fogle also said that he and Lieutenant Brady interviewed Vernon

Goodwin and that this interview was also recorded. Vernon told them he had come home

from work at noon or 12:30 p.m. and Brandy was getting ready to leave for work and was

trying to feed the victim some lunch. Vernon said that his grandson Cody was also present.

Vernon said he and Cody had lunch and then laid down in a recliner to watch television.

Around mid-afternoon, Vernon said that he heard a thump and the victim whimper, and he

heard the Defendant talking. Vernon got up, went into the bedroom, and saw the Defendant

lying back down on the bed with the victim. He said that when the Defendant attempted

to give the victim his medicine, the Defendant called to him because he could not get the

victim awake. When they were unable to get the victim awake, they called Vernon’s

mother to come down to check on the victim, they called 9-1-1, and then they later brought

the victim to the hospital in their own vehicle.

Deputy Fogle said they also interviewed the victim’s mother, Brandy Eddlemon, in

Huntsville. He and Lieutenant Brady then drove to the Goodwins’ and the Defendant’s

home located on Gene Fitzgerald Road in Maury County, Tennessee, although they did not

find anything notable there. Deputy Fogle said that the following Monday morning, he

and Lieutenant Brady met with Dr. Harlan. They showed him the photographs they had

taken of the home on Gene Fitzgerald Road, and Dr. Harlan reviewed some of the

statements that had been made before he ultimately concluded that the victim’s death was

“an accident from an accelerated fall.” When Lieutenant Brady informed Dr. Harlan that

the victim’s fall was never really described that way, Dr. Harlan began giving him different

- 17 -

formulas and explaining “how acceleration creates so much force.” He said that after

meeting with Dr. Harlan, Detective Fogle and Lieutenant Brady returned to the home on

Gene Fitzgerald Road because Linda Goodwin had informed them of some dust

displacement on the top of the dresser. Several photographs that were taken at this address

were admitted into evidence. After leaving the home the second time, Lieutenant Brady

called the assistant district attorney and talked to him about what Dr. Harlan had said, about

the witness statements, and about their investigation, and the assistant district attorney

made the decision to close this case by Monday afternoon.

Detective Fogle said that while he was “surprised at the autopsy result,” he had “a

lawyer, a doctor, and [his] boss of [twenty] years of experience . . . giving [him] direction

on closing the case and so that’s what was done.” However, Detective Fogle believed that

“more work should have been done” with the case. He stated, “Knowing everything that I

know now, both with experience and things that have happened with Dr. Harlan . . . I would

keep working the case and find a way . . . around . . . an autopsy I didn’t agree with.” He

added, “At that time, . . . I didn’t know you could do that.”

On cross-examination, Detective Fogle said that after the district attorney’s office

recommended that Dr. Harlan conduct the victim’s autopsy, he called Detective Roe in

Huntsville, who had been conducting her own investigation. Detective Fogle

acknowledged that he and Lieutenant Brady had already formed an opinion, based on the

inconsistent statements they had obtained, that the Defendant committed a crime against

the victim, but they did not have enough proof to arrest the Defendant. A recording of

Brandy Eddlemon’s statements to Detective Fogle was played for the jury and admitted as

an exhibit.

Detective Fogle acknowledged that he allowed the Defendant, the Defendant’s

parents, and Brandy Eddlemon to return to Tennessee and never told the Defendant to stay

out of the bedroom, which was a crime scene. At the time, he and Lieutenant Brady did

not believe the victim hit the bedrail on the way down to the floor. He said that while they

did not believe that the victim sustained his head injury from the short fall from the bed,

they did not know how or when the victim’s injury occurred.

Detective Fogle said that in 2015, Investigator Goetz asked him about his

participation in the victim’s case, and Detective Fogle told him that he believed the

Defendant was guilty because Dr. Harlan’s autopsy was incorrect. He admitted there was

no evidence that the Defendant, Vernon Goodwin, Linda Goodwin, or Brandy Eddlemon

could tell the victim had suffered a head injury.

On redirect examination, Detective Fogle identified the Defendant’s written

statement, and this statement was admitted into evidence. He asserted that he did not have

- 18 -

enough evidence to charge the Defendant in this case because after a day and a half the

district attorney’s office ordered him to close his investigation. Detective Fogle stated that

Lieutenant Brady was not present to testify at this trial because he passed away three years

prior.

Investigator Tommy Goetz, the chief criminal investigator with the district

attorney’s office for the 22nd judicial district, testified that he began working on the

victim’s case in December 2014 when General Brent Cooper gave him the file from the

TBI and asked him to re-look at the investigation in this case. Thereafter, Investigator

Goetz spoke with Dr. Podgorski and then reviewed medical records from Dr. Podgorski

and Dr. Pickett. He also reviewed the victim’s medical records from Maury Regional

Hospital and Huntsville Hospital but was unable to review any x-rays, CT scans or MRIs

because those hospitals had purged that imagery. He then attempted to speak to Brandy

Eddlemon in early 2015, but she declined to meet with him. He then interviewed Vernon,

Linda, and Cody Goodwin at their home in 2015 and later spoke to Vernon one or two

more times. A few days later, Investigator Goetz interviewed the Defendant and then later

spoke to the Defendant two more times.

Investigator Goetz then contacted Dr. Lowen and Dr. Lewis and asked them to

review the files in this case to determine if a second autopsy for the victim was warranted.

Eventually, the victim’s body was exhumed and the second autopsy performed, which

Investigator Goetz witnessed. He also talked to Dr. Li following the second autopsy and

reviewed Dr. Li’s autopsy report.

Investigator Goetz focused on Brandy and the Defendant as his primary suspects in

the victim’s death because they were the only two individuals who could have caused the

victim’s injuries. He said he eventually shifted his focus away from Brandy after the

medical evidence suggested that the victim’s injuries occurred after Brandy left for work

on January 20, 2001. He stated that several doctors he spoke to indicated that the

Defendant’s statements were “not possible, plausible.”

Investigator Goetz asserted that the Defendant provided a statement in 2015 that

was mostly consistent with his 2001 statement. In both statements, the Defendant said he

was not in the room when he heard a thump and that Cody, who was standing in the

doorway to the bedroom, told him the victim fell off the bed. Thereafter, Investigator

Goetz then confronted the Defendant with the differences between his statement and

Vernon’s statement, specifically that Vernon said the Defendant was alone in the room

with the victim when the “thump” occurred, and the Defendant once again denied being in

the room with the victim when the victim allegedly fell. Investigator Goetz said it was

very common for a suspect to claim that they were outside the room when an incident

occurred.

- 19 -

Investigator Goetz later obtained a wiretap for the Defendant’s phone and

Eddlemon’s phone. He said that while there were no pertinent calls from Eddlemon’s

phone, there were pertinent calls between the Defendant and his parents.

On June 17, 2019, Investigator Goetz interviewed the Defendant and advised him

of his Miranda rights. During this interview, he told the Defendant what the doctors were

saying about the case, what the statements showed, and what the autopsy reports

established. When Investigator Goetz accused the Defendant of being responsible for

hurting the victim, the Defendant denied it. Although Vernon put the Defendant in the

room with the victim after the thump, the Defendant claimed during the June 17, 2019

interview that he was outside the bedroom when the victim apparently fell. He said he was

deliberately putting pressure on the Defendant during the interview so that the Defendant

would later make some incriminating statements on the phone that was being wiretapped.

Later in the day on June 17, 2019, the Defendant had a telephone conversation with

Linda Goodwin, wherein the Defendant told her that he and Vernon were “not telling the

same story,” and Linda said that she was going to talk to Vernon.” During another

telephone conversation, Linda told the Defendant that she had talked with Vernon and that

Vernon “agrees” with the Defendant. Vernon then got on that telephone call and said he

was going to speak with Investigator Goetz and “set [him] straight” so the Defendant did

not need “to worry about it.”

On June 18, 2019, Investigator Goetz met with Vernon Goodwin. During this

interview, Vernon’s explanation for what happened at the home differed from the story he

had provided to Investigator Goetz several months earlier. In this second interview,

Vernon asserted that he “heard the thump” and went into the bedroom and saw the

Defendant sitting on the bed holding the victim, who was facing outward, while the victim

played with a toy. Vernon said that “everything was fine[,]” and he left the bedroom.

Investigator Goetz said the details of Vernon’s account of what happened changed

from the first to the second interview. He said that Vernon had previously told him that

when he pushed the door to the bedroom open, the Defendant was standing, holding the

victim and consoling him and Vernon believed everything was okay, and he and Cody

returned to the living room. During the interview on June 18, 2019, Vernon said the victim

was “more alert and responsive,” and the Defendant was sitting on the bed rather than

standing. In addition, during the second interview, the Defendant was not consoling the

victim, and the victim was faced out and playing with a toy. Investigator Goetz asserted

that Vernon’s testimony at trial was a third version of events that Investigator Goetz had

never heard before, which included Vernon seeing the victim unable to hold his head up at

the table with Eddlemon, later hearing a thump, Cody going in the bedroom before Vernon,

- 20 -

and Vernon observing the victim on the floor, sitting up, and that the victim turned and

looked at Vernon while the Defendant was in the bathroom getting a rag.

On cross-examination, Investigator Goetz stated that during the July 30, 2019

controlled call between Eddlemon and the Defendant, the Defendant somewhat reiterated

his earlier version of events, wherein he claimed he thought the victim injured himself by

falling off the bed. During this controlled call, the Defendant claimed the victim made “a

hell of a thump” when he fell.

Investigator Goetz said that during the 9-1-1 call on January 20, 2001, the operator

asked what was wrong, and the Defendant did not say the victim fell out of the bed; he only

said he could not wake the victim up and that it was like the victim was knocked out. At

the end of this phone call, the Defendant said that they were going to take the victim to the

hospital. He confirmed that the victim arrived at Maury Regional Hospital at 7:06 p.m.

and that at 8:32 p.m., the victim arrived at Huntsville Hospital. Detective Goetz said that

by 12:50 a.m. on January 21, 2001, the victim had died. Detective Goetz said that he

reached a conclusion in 2019 that the Defendant had committed crimes against the victim

based on the medical proof and the statements of the Defendant and Vernon Goodwin.

Dr. James Lauridson, a medical doctor board certified in internal medicine,

anatomic pathology, and forensic pathology, was accepted as an expert in the field of

forensic pathology. Dr. Lauridson said that Brandy Eddlemon asked him to be present for

the victim’s exhumation and second autopsy. He noted that all of the victim’s internal

organs, including the brain, were removed during the first autopsy but that the victim’s

head was surprisingly well-preserved. He was able to observe where bruising occurred

under the victim’s scalp and where an impact had occurred. He stated that the victim had

a “complex fracture . . . where there was an impact and the skull broke radiating out from

that impact.” He said this would happen if a skull was “struck in a certain place hard

enough.” Dr. Lauridson agreed with Dr. Li that the victim sustained a blunt injury to the

skull and that the manner of the victim’s death was homicide. He also agreed with Dr. Li

that the circumstances of the victim’s death were “[a]ssault by other(s).” Although Dr. Li

opined that the victim suffered multiple blunt trauma as his cause of death, Dr. Lauridson

concluded that the victim’s fracture occurred as a result of “one strike” to the skull with

“radiating fractures from this one point.”

Dr. Lauridson disagreed with many of Dr. Harlan’s conclusions in the first autopsy.

He disagreed with Dr. Harlan’s opinion that the victim’s cause of death was a subdural

hematoma. Instead, Dr. Lauridson opined that the victim’s cause of death was the “injury

to the brain itself” and that the subdural hematoma “is an indicator that there ha[d] been a

big enough strike to the head that the brain, the interior of the brain, [wa]s injured” and this

injury caused the brain to swell.

- 21 -

Dr. Lauridson also disagreed with Dr. Harlan’s finding that the manner of the

victim’s death was accidental. Dr. Lauridson explained that “falls in [fifteen]-month-old

children don’t cause these kind[s] of fractures.” Instead, Dr. Lauridson concluded that the

victim’s manner of death was homicide.

Dr. Lauridson noted that Dr. Harlan had found that the victim had “tan mush” in the

stomach, which contained sliced mushrooms, ground beef, and bread. He asserted that a

child with a complex skull fracture would not be able to eat after sustaining that injury

because the child had suffered a “severe enough trauma to break the bone of the skull and

to disrupt brain function.”

Special Agent Nathan Neese with the TBI testified he met several times with the

district attorney’s investigator, Tommy Goetz, to review the facts and circumstances of this

case before becoming, on June 13, 2019, the affiant on a wiretap certification for the

Defendant’s phone and Brandy Eddlemon’s phone.

On cross-examination, Special Agent Neese acknowledged that the victim’s body

was exhumed in 2017 and that following this exhumation, no one was arrested. He stated

that the 2019 wiretapping, which included calls and text messages between the Defendant

and his mother, between the Defendant and his current wife, and between the Defendant

and Brandy Eddlemon was done as a last-ditch effort to exhaust investigative leads.

Dr. Gary Podgorski, a diagnostic radiologist at Maury Regional Medical Center,

was accepted as an expert in the field of diagnostic radiology. He testified that he examined

X-rays and a CT scan of the victim at the hospital on January 20, 2001, and determined

that the victim had an “extensive” occipital fracture that began at the base of his skull and

continued to the top of his skull. He noted that the victim had “an obvious bleed” on his

brain, which was a brain hemorrhage, as well as a subdural hematoma, which is “a

collection of blood that can put pressure on the brain.”

Dr. Podgorski stated that a subdural hematoma occurs when there is a pooling of

blood in the brain, which pushes and puts “pressure on the brain.” He explained that a

subdural hematoma indicates a “traumatic injury.” Dr. Podgorski asserted that an occipital

fracture on a fifteen-month-old child was “highly unusual” because such fractures rarely

occurred by accident, which made him suspicious that this injury resulted from abuse. He

opined that a fall from a bed would have been unlikely to cause an occipital fracture.

On cross-examination, Dr. Podgorski acknowledged that he was not able to tell

based on the X-rays and CT scan how the incident involving the victim occurred, when it

occurred, or who was responsible for it. He said that the process of the blood pooling in

- 22 -

the brain could take hours but “would start promptly.” Dr. Podgorski stated that the

victim’s emergency room medical records indicated that two law enforcement officers

were notified that the victim’s injuries were the result of “possible child abuse.”

Dr. Joel Pickett, the neurosurgeon who operated on the victim at the Huntsville

Hospital, was accepted as an expert in the field of pediatric neurosurgery. He said he

received information from the pediatric intensivist that the victim had fallen from a bed to

the floor and that although the victim “initially seemed okay,” the victim became

“unresponsive” a couple of hours later. Dr. Pickett said that he was told the victim fell

from the bed at 3:00 p.m. and that Dr. Pickett began treating the victim close to 11:00 p.m.

Dr. Pickett said the victim was intubated and had “no signs of brain function.” The

victim was not breathing, had a body temperature of eighty-nine degrees, had very low

blood pressure, had “just the faintest of pulses,” and was “barely alive.” After examining

the victim’s CT scan, he saw that the victim had a “large subdural hematoma.” He

immediately took the victim to the operating room, where he removed a portion of the

victim’s skull and removed the blood from the hematoma. During surgery, he observed

that the victim’s brain “did not appear normal” and was “very blanched[,]” which indicated

that it was not receiving any blood flow at all.

Dr. Pickett said that after the victim was resuscitated and given epinephrine, the

victim’s blood pressure rose, and the victim’s brain began to “swell profusely,” which

required Dr. Pickett to quickly suture the victim’s scalp. He stated that he had to leave part

of the skull unattached under the scalp to allow the victim’s brain to continue to swell.

Dr. Pickett stated that the victim’s heart went into “electromechanical dissociation”

following surgery and was no longer pumping blood, which caused the victim to pass away.

He recorded the victim’s time of death at 12:50 a.m. on January 21, 2001. In completing

the victim’s death certificate for the state of Alabama, Dr. Pickett identified the victim’s

manner of death as “[p]ending investigation.” Dr. Pickett noted that there were no cuts or

noticeable injuries on the outside of the victim’s head.

Dr. Pickett identified the victim’s death certificate from Tennessee, wherein Dr.

Charles Harlan stated that the victim’s manner of death was “accident.” Dr. Pickett said

that Dr. Harlan contacted him regarding the victim’s autopsy. At that time, Dr. Harlan told

him he believed the victim’s death was accidental and that the victim’s injuries were

consistent with a fall from the bed. However, Dr. Pickett told Dr. Harlan that a fall from a

bed did not provide “enough acceleration to cause this kind of head injury.” He added that

the victim’s injuries would not happen to a child that age from a short fall from the bed to

the floor, even if the child hit his head on a metal bed frame. Dr. Harlan asked Dr. Pickett

to change the death certificate, which Dr. Pickett refused to do because he disagreed with

- 23 -

Dr. Harlan’s conclusion that the manner of the victim’s death was accidental. Thereafter,

Dr. Harlan completed a Tennessee death certificate for the victim showing that the victim’s

manner of death was “accident.”

Dr. Pickett opined that the victim had “a severe and extensive head injury.” He said

that what bothered him about the victim’s case was “the height of the fall as it was reported

to [him],” which was “all secondhand[,]” and the fact that a fall from a bed “was not

sufficient to result in this magnitude of a head injury.” He asserted that the victim’s injury

was consistent with “a high impact injury, such as falling off the top bunk of a bunk bed or

being hit by a car.”

Dr. Pickett asserted that this injury would have “immediately” affected the victim.

He said the victim would have been unable to eat or to drink from a sippy cup following

this injury. He added the victim would have been unable to play following this injury and

would probably have been unconscious. Dr. Pickett said the trauma from a subdural

hematoma generally would “immediately” incapacitate an individual, but the individual

could “get worse.”

Dr. Pickett opined that “time is of the essence with an acute subdural hematoma”

and that there was a very small window in which to treat this injury. He asserted that “the

longer that . . . time goes on, the less likely someone is to survive an injury of that nature.”

He noted that because he did not “have a crystal ball,” he could not “say with certainty”

whether operating on the victim or treating the victim earlier would have saved the victim’s

life. However, he asserted that had the victim been seen within an hour of his injury and

had he been operated on quickly, this “certainly would have improved his outcome and his

chances of survival.” Dr. Pickett said, “[A]ny time that exceeds four hours with a large

acute subdural hematoma in human beings, the chances of survival [were] almost nil.” He

added that the victim was treated “well beyond that four[-] hour mark.” Then Dr. Pickett

stated,

And so[,] would [the victim’s] chances have been better if he had been

seen within an hour of his injury and operated on very quickly? It certainly

would have improved his outcome[,] and his chances for survival would be

much higher. But can I guarantee you that he would have been okay today?

No, I can’t do that.

Dr. Pickett acknowledged that he testified in Hickman County in 2001 at the hearing

to exhume the victim’s body for a second autopsy. He recalled testifying that the victim

had “considerable swelling in the left hemisphere of the brain, more so that the mass effect

of the subdural hematoma would account for,” which denoted “a severe and extensive head

injury.” When asked if, now twenty years later, he still believed that the victim had

- 24 -

suffered a severe and extensive head injury, Dr. Pickett replied, “Unquestionably.” Dr.

Pickett also said that he testified during the 2001 hearing that the victim’s skull was sent

to pathology, and it was confirmed that the victim had a normal skull. He also agreed that

he testified at the 2001 hearing that the victim’s head injury was not consistent with a fall

from a bed. In addition, during his 2001 testimony, Dr. Pickett referenced one study where

ninety percent of children who had a subdural hematoma were found to be “non-accident

trauma” and a second study from Wales that concluded that eighty-two percent of children

two years of age or less who had subdural hematomas were determined to be caused by

child abuse. Dr. Pickett agreed he testified at the 2001 hearing, “If you have a child that’s

less than two years of age and [suffers] non-vehicular trauma and they have a subdural

hematoma without a clear, high-impact fall, then I think the injury deserves investigation.”

Dr. Pickett agreed that acceleration would be needed to cause the victim’s injury and that

a fall of a foot and a half from a bed is “not that much distance to accelerate.”

Dr. Pickett agreed that he provided the following testimony at the 2001 hearing:

Yes, I am an expert. I see kids with head injuries all the time. And I

can tell that based on my experience that kids that fall off of Jungle Gyms,

kids that fall off the back of pickups, kids that fall off the porch, roll off the

bed, it’s unusual for a kid to come in with a head injury of this nature with

anything less than a high impact energy, such as falling off the top bunk of a

bunk bed or being hit by a car.

Dr. Picket then explained what causes an acute subdural hematoma:

[A]n acute subdural hematoma occurs when the head is either traveling at a

high rate of speed and suddenly stops, or something else traveling at a high

rate of speed suddenly hits the head. In either case, the skull, traveling at a

relatively high speed is suddenly stopped but the brain doesn’t stop. The

brain continues to try to move inside the skull. And it can’t because it’s

contained. So it rolls. And as it rolls inside the brain, it’s tearing. And it

tears the brain microscopically throughout the brain and it tears little blood

vessels that connect the brain to the veins that drain the blood from the

[b]rain. And those [to]rn blood vessels begin to bleed and that causes a

subdural hematoma. And as it bleeds, [it] takes up more and more space and

begins to compress the brain.

And so it’s a massive injury. And there’s also a great deal of trauma

to the brain besides the bleeding because it tears the brain and causes trauma

to the brain. That’s why the brain swells underneath the blood clot.

- 25 -

So it’s a devastating injury and that’s why the mortality from acute

subdural hematomas and trauma is so high. And it is because of that not only

the blood clot and the pressure on the brain but the swelling of the brain.

So that’s one end of the spectrum of head injuries. It’s the extreme

end.

The other end, the concussion, is the very mild end. It would be like

comparing a very mild sunburn to being doused in gasoline and set ablaze.

Dr. Pickett stated that he testified in 2001 that the things that could have caused the

victim’s severe injury were falling off the top bunk of a bunk bed, falling down a flight of

stairs, being in a car crash, or falling out of a second story window. He reiterated, “Based

on the information that was given to me, the mechanism of injury and the degree of insult

that the child had, . . . it did not appear to be an accidental injury to me at all.” Dr. Pickett

explained that the “magnitude of [the victim’s] injury that I saw, I think it would have

affected him immediately.” He also said that he would not have expected the victim to be

able to eat food or drink from a sippy cup after suffering this injury. Dr. Pickett asserted

that he would have expected the victim to be unconscious.

On cross-examination, Dr. Pickett stated that with a severe, large subdural

hematoma, as in this case, “the trauma renders the person incapacitated immediately” and

the person “can get worse” by not breathing. At a minimum, such an injury would render

the person “at least stuporous and hard to arouse.”

Dr. Pickett stated that both the pediatric intensivist from the Maury County Hospital

and the victim’s mother told him that she had been informed that the victim had a fall from

the bed while she was not present. He did not believe that the victim could have suffered

his severe head injury that way and he asked the victim’s mother if the victim could have

suffered some other trauma during the day, but the victim’s mother said she did not know

of any other trauma. He explained that “if you have a child that doesn’t have a history of

high-impact trauma and they have a severe head injury, then it warrants further

investigation because the most likely diagnosis, the most likely manner of death under

those circumstances is non-accidental trauma.” When defense counsel asked if the victim’s

fall six feet to the ground hitting concrete blocks would have caused the victim’s injuries,

Dr. Pickett replied, “I wouldn’t expect him to be fine after that. I think they would have

noticed that he was unconscious and brought him in earlier if that had been the case.”

Dr. Pickett acknowledged that given the “magnitude of injury,” he would expect the

victim “to be unconscious at the time of impact” and “[a]t the very most, very stuporous”

and “very hard to arouse.” He stated that he did not believe the victim “would [have been]

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alert enough to be irritable”; instead, he believed the victim would be “very solemn, if you

could arouse him.” Dr. Pickett opined that the subdural hematoma and the resulting closed

head brain injury caused the victim’s death. However, he acknowledged that the subdural

hematoma alone could have caused the victim’s death. He confirmed that there was no

way to determine the exact time of the victim’s injury at this point.

On redirect examination, Dr. Pickett reiterated that there was no other explanation

for the victim’s subdural hematoma, other than a high-impact situation. He confirmed that

“a light blow to the head or a simple tumble and a roll off the bed” would not produce the

type of injury sustained to the victim’s head. He acknowledged that the victim had no cuts,

punctures, or noticeable damage to the victim’s head at the impact site.

On recross-examination, Dr. Pickett acknowledged that he did not think a layperson

examining the victim’s head would think anything was wrong “if the child were awake.”

Dr. Feng Li, the chief medical examiner for Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson

County, was accepted as an expert in the field of forensic pathology. He stated that

although Dr. Harlan completed the victim’s first autopsy in 2001, the TBI reopened the

case and requested the county to exhume the victim’s body and perform a second autopsy

in 2017, which Dr. Li completed. He testified that he disagreed with several portions of

Dr. Harlan’s autopsy on the victim. He also noted the victim’s organs, including the brain,

had been removed during Dr. Harlan’s 2001 autopsy. Dr. Harlan’s and Dr. Li’s autopsy

reports of the victim were admitted into evidence. Dr. Li noted that Dr. Harlan’s autopsy

report showed that Dr. Harlan found tan mush containing sliced mushrooms, ground beef,

and bread in the victim’s digestive system. Dr. Li stated that his examination of the outside

of the victim’s body revealed “no trauma.”

While Dr. Harlan found only one skull fracture on the left side of the back of the

head, Dr. Li found “multiple skull fractures” on the left and right side of the victim’s head.

In addition, although Dr. Harlan found that there was a single injury that resulted in the

victim’s death, Dr. Li opined that the victim’s cause of death was “multiple blunt force

injuries” on the left and right side of the skull. Moreover, Dr. Li disagreed with Dr.

Harlan’s determination that the victim’s manner of death was an “accident” based on “an

accelerated fall” from a shorter distance where the victim struck his head on the edge of a

bed rail. Dr. Li said Dr. Harlan based his conclusion of the victim’s accidental death on

general medical literature and “the Discovery Channel,” although Dr. Li asserted that he

had never seen a doctor cite the Discovery Channel in an autopsy report. Dr. Li, however,

concluded that the victim’s manner of death was “homicide” because the trauma suffered

by the victim was the result of a “considerable amount of force,” not a short fall. Dr. Li

opined that the circumstances of the victim’s death were from being “assaulted by

other(s).”

- 27 -

On cross-examination, Dr. Li acknowledged that the fractures on the victim’s skull

could have been caused by one impact or more than one impact. Dr Li stated that it was

“[v]ery unlikely” that a simple fall from the bed to the bed rail could have generated the

“considerable amount of force” necessary to cause the victim’s injuries. Dr. Li agreed that

he relied on information in Dr. Harlan’s first autopsy report that the victim fell from the

bed to the bed rail and did not know who had actually given Dr. Harlan this information.

Dr. Li also opined that the victim’s fall from the back porch to rocks below would not cause

this type of injury because such a fall would cause “some skin damage” based on the

irregular shape of the rock. When asked why he did not see skin damage on the victim,

Dr. Li explained that “if you fall onto [a] flat, hard surface” or you are “hit with a flat, hard

surface,” sometimes you do not see damage to the skin.

Dr. Li said that the victim’s family hired a board-certified forensic pathologist to be

present as he conducted the second autopsy on the victim. Dr. Li agreed to the presence of

the pathologist hired by the family because he wanted to be “open and transparent” and as

a medical examiner, he was “independent.” Dr. Li acknowledged that not having the

victim’s brain for the second autopsy “somewhat” hindered his work, although he said the

“trauma [he] examined [was] still there[.]” Although he acknowledged that he could not

say when the victim’s injury occurred, where the injury occurred, or how it occurred, Dr.

Li said that the victim’s trauma was “inconsistent” with a fall “from a short distance to the

bed rail.” He asserted that the “skull factures [he] observed [were] not consistent with the

simple fall” and “the force needed to inflict such trauma” was typically caused by “child

abuse.” He said that he concluded the victim’s death was a homicide because he did not

have “others say[ing] [the victim] fell from the tree” or was “involved in a motor vehicle

accident.” Dr. Li acknowledged that he did not know how many times the victim’s skull

had been cut during surgery.

On redirect examination, Dr. Li said he could tell a difference between a surgical

cut through bone and a fracture. In this case, he stated that the surgical cut occurred “away

from the skull fracture” and did not go through any part of the victim’s multiple fractures.

Dr. Li reiterated that he personally observed the victim’s multiple skull fractures during

the second autopsy.

On recross-examination, Dr. Li said that while the victim had fractures on the left

and right of his skull, he did not know whether there was one impact or more than one

impact.

Dr. Adele Lewis, the state chief medical examiner for Tennessee, was accepted as

an expert in the field of forensic pathology. She testified that she was asked in 2016 to

render an opinion as to whether an exhumation of the victim’s body would be of use in

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determining the cause and manner of the victim’s death. In order to form her opinion to

grant the exhumation, Dr. Lewis reviewed the victim’s medical records from Maury

Regional Hospital and Huntsville Hospital as well as Dr. Harlan’s autopsy report. She

noted that at the time of Dr. Harlan’s death, he had lost his license to practice medicine in

Tennessee. Dr. Lewis opined that Dr. Harlan’s autopsy of the victim was “inadequate”

because he should have checked the victim for bleeding around his eyes, because there

were no records of any X-rays being performed or the victim’s leg cast being removed, and

because there were no photographs taken of the autopsy. Dr. Lewis said that while she

disagreed with Dr. Harlan’s conclusions in his autopsy report, she agreed with Dr. Li’s

conclusions in his autopsy report.

Based on the severity of the victim’s injuries, especially with the victim’s skull

fractures, Dr. Lewis expected something like a car crash, a fall from a second- or third-

story window, or the victim being forcibly struck by an object to be the cause of the victim’s

injuries. She said the victim’s injuries were not consistent with a “non-catastrophic

accident.” Dr. Lewis opined that “ordinary household falls don’t cause injuries this severe

or complex” and that the victim’s injuries were consistent with an abusive act. Dr. Lewis

stated that it was “not plausible” that the victim sustained his injuries from falling two feet

from a bed and striking his head on the bed rail on the way down.

Dr. Lewis agreed that time was of the essence when treating brain injuries like the

ones sustained by the victim in this case. She referred to the hour between injury and

medical intervention as “the golden hour,” which is “one of the most important intervals.”

When asked to consider a hypothetical scenario about the chances of survival for two

fifteen-month-old children who received identical injuries to those sustained by the victim

but one of these children was taken immediately to Maury Regional Hospital and the other

was put back to bed for three-and-a-half hours before being taken to the same hospital, Dr.

Lewis said the chances of survival for the child who received immediate medical treatment

were higher because “the sooner someone gets medical intervention . . . and relieves the

pressure on the brain, the better that is.” Dr. Lewis asserted that a child who did not receive

treatment for three-and-a-half hours would “[d]efinitely” have bled more into a skull than

the child who was treated thirty minutes or even two hours after receiving the injury.

Dr. Lewis opined that a child who received an injury like the victim’s would have

immediately exhibited physical symptoms. She asserted that a child who received such

injuries “would not have appeared normal to even a layperson after sustaining an injury of

this severity.” She said the child would usually lose consciousness, or their eyes would

roll around in their head, or the child would be vomiting, or the child would be sleepy and

they could not be awakened.” Dr. Lewis maintained that an injury of this severity would

affect a child’s motor skills, including the ability to reach and pick things up, to eat, and to

- 29 -

drink. She asserted that all of her opinions had been expressed consistent with her

experience, her education, and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

On cross-examination, Dr. Lewis admitted that she did not know when the victim’s

injury occurred and did not know how long it took for the victim in this case to be taken to

the hospital. She acknowledged that she did not know how many blood vessels in the

victim’s brain broke or partially tore. She said that because she did not know the rate of

how much blood was going into the brain area, she had no way of determining when the

victim’s injury occurred.

Dr. Lewis said a child receiving this type of injury would be lethargic, sleepy,

irritable, or vomiting. However, she acknowledged that a viral infection or the child eating

something that did not agree with him could also cause the child to vomit. A child could

also be sleepy or lethargic because he had a severe infection or was dehydrated. However,

she asserted that in this case the victim’s sleepiness or lethargy was caused by his subdural

hematoma.

Dr. Lewis said that the medical evidence showed that the victim’s head was forcibly

struck by an object, the “impact injury,” which caused “the bleeding underneath the scalp

and the broken bones of the skull.” She opined that the victim’s “head hit something or

something hit the [victim’s] head.” She asserted that a baseball bat or a wooden board

would not necessarily crack open the victim’s skin. She claimed that the victim could not

have sustained injuries this severe from a fall of six feet because “statistically that just

doesn’t happen.” She added, “We have studied, we have gone back and looked at child

abuse injuries and common household fall type injuries[,] and children just don’t sustain

injuries this severe and extensive from common household falls.” However, she

acknowledged seeing injuries of this type when a heavy television fell two or three feet

onto a child’s head.

On redirect examination, Dr. Lewis acknowledged that other than having a massive

skull fracture and massive subdural hemorrhaging, a fifteen-month-old child might be

occasionally sleepy or irritable or cranky because of their age.

Dr. Deborah Lowen, the Deputy Commissioner of Child Health for the Department

of Children’s Services and the former director at the child abuse program at Vanderbilt

Hospital, was accepted as an expert in the field of child abuse pediatrics. Dr. Lowen first

became involved in this case when the district attorney’s office asked her to give an opinion

about whether it would be appropriate to exhume the victim’s body “given the uncertainty

and confusion about what was initially done shortly after his death.” She reviewed the

victim’s medical records from both hospitals, Dr. Harlan’s autopsy report, and Dr. Li’s

- 30 -

autopsy report. Ultimately, Dr. Lowen’s June 17, 2015 letter to the district attorney’s office

was admitted into evidence, which stated:

Having reviewed all of the information provided to me, I have great

concerns that this child’s death was not the accident it was initially classified

as; rather, the medical and investigative evidence is highly concerning for

the child being a victim of child abuse resulting in his death. Because he

died so quickly after presenting for medical care, a full evaluation, including

skeletal survey . . . opthamology examination were not possible before death.

The autopsy did not include a postmortem skeletal survey, eye examination,

detailed histopathology of his brain or examination of his neck. These

evaluations would have been helpful, if not necessary, to accurately

determine the cause of his death.

Dr. Lowen opined that Dr. Harlan’s autopsy was “shockingly unprofessional and

incomplete for a case like this.” She stated that it was very rare for child abuse to take

place in front of witnesses. Moreover, if the child was too young to speak, this presented

additional challenges to discovering abuse. Dr. Lowen said that she had never seen

significant head injuries like the one suffered by the victim that were caused by the child

falling off the bed. She said she had heard the child-fell-off-the-bed story “hundreds and

hundreds of times” and that this story was “an extremely common excuse for . . . severe or

life-ending head injuries.” She asserted that falls from beds typically did not cause an

injury, but if they did, the injury would be “a simple linear skull fracture” that was very

different that the victim’s skull fracture in this case.

Dr. Lowen said a child’s ability to eat without vomiting showed that the child did

not have brain swelling. She added that injuries like those sustained by the victim would

“[a]bsolutely” have had a deleterious effect on a child’s motor skills and the ability to

reach, grab, drink, focus, and pick up objects. She said she would expect symptoms to

manifest immediately if a child remained conscious after receiving the type of injuries

sustained by the victim. In addition, she said the child would not be acting normally, would

be extremely fussy, would not want to eat or drink, and if they did take a few sips, the child

might vomit, and would not be running around or playing with toys.

Dr. Lowen asserted that “any caregiver” around a child with these types of injuries

would know that the child was “not okay” and would “recognize [that] something [wa]s

wrong with this child.” She explained that being “fussy” in a typical toddler way was

different than exhibiting the symptoms of a child with a head injury.

Dr. Lowen opined that the victim’s injuries were not “a typical childhood accidental

injury.” She said that if such injuries were accidental, there would have been a major

- 31 -

accident of which everyone would have been aware. This would include a car crash where

a child was not restrained and hit their head on the door, or flew outside the car and hit

their head on the ground, or fell from a second-floor balcony and slammed the back of the

child’s head on the ground.

Dr. Lowen asserted that it was “not plausible in any way, shape, or form” that the

victim sustained his injuries by falling approximately two feet to a carpeted floor. She

opined that it would be even less plausible for the victim to sustain his injuries if he fell off

the bed and hit his head on the bed rail to a carpeted floor because then that would be a

“two-foot fall and broken it up into two smaller falls,” which meant that “the force with

which [the child] hit the ground has been lessened, has been dampened by the initial

striking of the bed rail or the bed frame.” However, after being shown a photograph of the

bed at issue, Dr. Lowen said that if sufficient force was applied, then the ball on the end of

the bed post could cause the type of injuries sustained by the victim. She said that the

victim’s injuries were “very consistent . . . of an abusive act, given the [victim’s] history.”

She added that after considering other options, a diagnosis of an abusive act was “by far

the most likely” in the victim’s case.

Dr. Lowen was presented with the same hypothetical as Dr. Lewis. Dr. Lowen

opined that the child who received medical treatment immediately had a better chance of

survival. She also asserted that the victim would have hemorrhaged more blood into his

skull three-and-a-half hours after the injury than he would have if he received treatment

thirty minutes to two hours after the injury because the victim had “a hyperacute subdural,”

which meant that the victim was “actively bleeding” when he arrived in the operating room,

a fact that was documented in the “operative report.” She also clarified that it was not just

the bleeding that caused problems because when the brain swells, it can prevent adequate

breathing, which causes “further brain injury.”

Dr. Lowen stated that when a child came into the emergency room with a subdural

hemorrhage or hematoma, it was not always clear that the child was actively bleeding. She

said a CT scan would show a blood clot, but a physician would not know if the child was

actively bleeding until the child went into the operating room. Dr. Lowen said the victim’s

neurosurgeon’s notes showed the victim in this case was “still actively bleeding” in the

operating room. In particular, she said these notes showed that while “some of the

[victim’s] blood had clotted,” there was “still blood coming into that space actively.” Dr.

Lowen opined that the victim’s active bleeding would have had a deleterious effect on the

victim’s health. She also clarified that “[m]edical professionals use the word [‘]non-

accidental trauma[’] to indicate abuse.” She confirmed that all the opinions she had

expressed during her testimony were opinions consistent with her professional education

and work experience and were stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

- 32 -

On cross-examination, Dr. Lowen reiterated that the victim “had clearly abusive

injuries.” She added that if someone were to “take the child and slam his head into that

bedpost, that could cause some, if not all, of his injuries.” She also asserted that the injuries

sustained by this victim were “far, far, far outside of any normal accident or injury” and

that such injuries took “significant unusual force to occur.” She stated that the victim could

have sustained his injuries from being lifted up and down onto the floor or being lifted up

and slammed down on the round portion of the bed post. Dr. Lowen explained that the

victim sustained a “complex skull fracture” with the point of contact being the “right side”

of the head. She asserted that she was not paid to testify in this case and that she

“consider[ed] it part of [her] job.” Dr. Lowen opined that “the brain injury caused the death

of [the victim], which was made worse by the subdural hematoma.” She reiterated that the

victim’s injuries “did not come from the child falling off the bed.” She added that the

medical record showed the victim got hurt from “abuse” but it could not be determined

whether a hard object was with force struck against the child’s head or the child’s head was

struck against a hard object.

When asked if she was here to try to convince the jury this was a non-accidental

event, Dr. Lowen replied:

I’m here under subpoena and I have the opinion that [the victim] was

a victim of child abuse that resulted in his death. And I agree with the

medical examiner [who] called this a homicide. When I said at the very least

Dr. Harlan should have called it undetermined, the most accurate ruling

should have been that this was a homicide.

She acknowledged that she did not know the time of the victim’s injury or whether the

victim’s injury occurred in the bedroom of the mobile home.

The Defendant offered the following proof at trial. Dr. George Nichols II, a medical

doctor with a specialty in pathology and a former chief medical examiner for the

Commonwealth of Kentucky, was accepted as an expert in the field of forensic pathology

and pediatric trauma. After being contacted by defense counsel, Dr. Nichols reviewed the

victim’s medical records, the first and second autopsy reports, and various reports, records,

and filings connected to the case. Dr. Nichols acknowledged that he never saw the victim

in this case and only reviewed records pertaining to the victim. He said that the victim

“sustained a head impact” that resulted in “at least a subdural hematoma.” He stated that

he did not know how many of the victim’s blood vessels in the brain were torn or broken

or how quickly the blood leaked out of the vessels. Dr. Nichols said that the vessels that

were broken were “venous blood rather than arterial blood,” which meant that the blood

- 33 -

came out “at a low volume under low pressure[.]” However, he said that he did not know

“the rate of bleeding” or whether the victim “formed a blood clot to stop the bleeding in

the injured vein.” He also said that even if a blood clot formed, we do not know whether

there was “re-bleeding from the same injured vein due to clot lysis.”

Dr. Nichols stated that the symptoms of a subdural hematoma could include the

child being stunned, unconsciousness after the initial impact, the child crying inconsolably,

the child being unable to eat or drink, the child being listless or thrashing about, the child

developing convulsive movements, the child becoming unresponsive, the child going into

a coma, or death. He also noted that vomiting might occur because there was a disturbance

of the autonomic nervous system.

Dr. Nichols asserted that there was no evidence that Dr. Harlan recognized

identifiable food particles in the victim’s stomach at the time of the first autopsy. He

claimed that the small amount of “murky fluid” in the victim’s gastrointestinal system was

representative of the victim “clearly not eating a full meal.” Dr. Nichols acknowledged

that he did not know when the injury occurred and, therefore, did not know how much time

elapsed between the victim’s injury and his death. Dr. Nichols said he was involved in Dr.

Harlan’s medical license revocation proceedings and that he agreed with the decision to

revoke Dr. Harlan’s medical license in Tennessee.

Dr. Nichols disagreed with Dr. Harlan’s findings that the manner of the victim’s

death was an accident because there was not enough physical proof or investigative proof

to tell how the injury happened. He asserted that the victim could have been injured by

falling off of a six-foot high porch onto a rock surface. He asserted that all of the victim’s

skull fractures met at a “single contact point.”

Dr. Nichols disagreed with Dr. Li’s conclusion that the manner of the victim’s death

was homicide, instead asserting that the appropriate manner of death was “undetermined”

because he did not know how the victim sustained his injury. He claimed that Dr. Li would

have had to have some information from an investigator or some other investigative source

showing that the death and injury was the result of the act of another person in order to list

the manner of death as homicide.

Dr. Nichols said that it “would be almost impossible” for the victim to have received

his injuries from falling onto a bed rail, unless the child fell from a height of six to eight

feet high. He claimed that during the first autopsy Dr. Harlan should have obtained a

neuropathologic consultation on the victim’s brain to determine what happened. Dr.

Nichols reiterated that the victim had no cuts or abrasions except for the single goose egg

behind the victim’s left ear.

- 34 -

Dr. Nichols said that if someone were to look at this child after falling off a bed to

a carpeted floor below, they would “[n]ot necessarily” recognize that the victim was

severely injured. He agreed that he did not know how long it took for the process of the

subdural hematoma to show itself as symptoms in the victim, but he acknowledged that the

symptoms could take hours to present themselves or could happen very quickly.

On cross-examination, Dr. Nichols stated that if a victim, who was standing up, fell

six feet off the porch to rock below, he would expect there to be “[l]inear marks or puncture

wounds” to the victim’s skin from hitting sharp rocks. Dr. Nichols said that there was

“[n]ot a chance” that falling from a twenty-four-inch couch onto a carpeted floor would

have provided the type of injuries that ultimately killed the victim.

Linda Goodwin, the Defendant’s mother, testified that her mobile home off of Gene

Fitzgerald Road had a back porch that was six feet from the ground. She acknowledged

that there were so many large rocks on the ground there that they had bulldozer work done

and that they “still didn’t get rid of all of them.” She said she spent approximately fifteen

minutes with the victim at 6:00 a.m. on January 20, 2001, and the victim was happy, acting

normally, and playing with some toys. When she left the home at around 6:20 to 6:25 a.m.,

her husband Vernon had already left for work and had taken their grandson Cody to his

mother’s home on the way to work.

Linda denied ever seeing the Defendant being mean to the victim and claimed the

Defendant “loved that child.” She stated that Brandy Eddlemon did not adequately

supervise the victim and would often “turn him loose” in a room without watching him.

She described the victim as a “very rambunctious baby” who could move around, even

with his leg in a cast. Linda claimed that after the victim passed away, Brandy Eddlemon

refused to hold him. Finally, at Brandy’s mother’s insistence, Brandy sat down in a chair

and held him for a brief time. Linda noted that Brandy did not cry a lot at the victim’s

funeral. On cross-examination, Linda Goodwin acknowledged that at the time of the

victim’s death, the Defendant and Brandy Eddlemon had only been dating for around four

months.

Amy Harless stated that she first met Brandy Eddlemon when they took classes

together at Columbia State, and then they became “[c]lose friends.” She said that they

visited each other at their homes, their children played together, and she babysat Brandy’s

children approximately three times. She confirmed that around the time of the victim’s

death, she and the Defendant “were very good friends.” Harless said she never saw any

signs that the victim was being abused and never observed the Defendant being mean to

the victim.

- 35 -

Harless claimed Brandy told her several different stories about the victim’s death.

She said Brandy called her from the hospital in Alabama in the early hours of January 21,

2001, and first told her that the victim had fallen before Brandy went to work but the victim

“seemed fine.” Harless said that in August 2001, she told TBI Agent Tenry about Brandy’s

statement. Harless said that in 2015, she told Investigator Goetz about Harless’s August

2001 statement to Agent Jerry Tenry regarding Brandy’s admission that the victim fell

before Brandy went to work.

On cross-examination, Harless did not recall telling Investigator Goetz that she did

not remember giving the aforementioned statement to Agent Tenry. She said that at the

time, she did not know that Agent Tenry worked for the TBI and that she had simply called

the district attorney’s office, who put Agent Tenry in touch with her, and she and Agent

Tenry later spoke over the phone. Harless stated it was approximately seven months after

the victim’s death when she gave her August 2001 statement to Agent Tenry. When asked

if there was a reason she waited seven months, Harless replied that Brandy’s story about

the victim falling before she went to work “changed several times” and she was “conflicted

about it.” She confirmed that she and Brandy had not had a disagreement or argument

between the time when Brandy made this statement to her about the victim and when

Harless reported it to Agent Tenry. Harless acknowledged that she was not present in the

Goodwin household in January 20, 2001, and did not personally know what happened to

the victim.

Mike Bottoms, who was the district attorney for the 22nd Judicial District for thirty-

two years before retiring, testified that he was the district attorney when the January 20,

2001 incident involving the victim took place. He stated that he ordered an autopsy of the

victim done in Nashville because of the victim’s suspicious death. General Bottoms said

that he did not specifically request that Dr. Charles Harlan conduct the victim’s autopsy,

only that the autopsy be done in Nashville.

General Bottoms asserted that if he had known that Dr. Harlan was incompetent, he

would not have allowed him to do the victim’s autopsy. He said that at the time of the

victim’s autopsy, there were no rumors that Dr. Harlan was incompetent. General Bottoms

stated that he decided not to pursue the case against the Defendant after he learned that the

Defendant was not around the victim at the time the victim broke his leg, that the Defendant

had no prior criminal record, that there were children in the Defendant’s family who were

never hurt, and that the Defendant’s father was present the entire time that the Defendant

was caring for the victim on January 20, 2001. A short time later, Bob Gafford told him

his son had been married to Brandy Eddlemon and that the victim was their child. Gafford

asked him to have the TBI investigate the victim’s death because Gafford did not want his

other grandchild, the victim’s older brother, to be in a dangerous situation. Later, Agent

Tenry was assigned to investigate the case. Agent Tenry eventually told General Bottoms

- 36 -

about what Harless had said about Brandy’s statement that the victim had fallen before

Brandy left for work. General Bottoms told Agent Tenry to pursue it, but Agent Tenry did

not contact him again about this case. General Bottoms stated that the Department of

Health later wanted a second autopsy on the victim because the department had fired Dr.

Harlan.

On cross-examination, General Bottoms said that he did not agree to a second

autopsy of the victim because he knew that Dr. Levy would disagree with Dr. Harlan about

everything and because Brandy Eddlemon was “insistent” that no disinterment of the

victim’s body occur. He said that he believed that Agent Tenry closed the case on his own

because General Bottoms never closed the case.

General Bottoms asserted that he would not have made the decision to call the

victim’s death an accident unless he really looked at what the investigation showed. He

explained that he “just couldn’t get comfortable with charging [the Defendant]” with the

victim’s death because he “didn’t have any evidence.” While he did not dispute the fact

that the victim’s case was closed within a day-and-a-half after determining the victim’s

death was an accident, General Bottoms acknowledged that ordinary investigations into

child abuse often went on “for months[.]”

Sergeant James Bryant with the Maury County Sheriff’s Department testified that

an emergency room staff member at Maury Regional Hospital, perhaps the emergency

room doctor, informed him that he had been told that the child had fallen off a bed and hit

his head on the metal bed railing. He acknowledged that he did not include this information

in his report. Sergeant Bryant confirmed that even though he was told this information

about the victim falling off a bed, he did not know if this information was true. He also

said that he did not do investigations and that if an investigation was necessary, then he

would turn the case over to detectives. He stated that he never saw the victim or any family

members that night at the hospital.

The Defendant did not to testify on his own behalf at trial.

In rebuttal, the State offered the following proof. Dr. Lauridson testified that

learning the story of how an injury occurred was the “key” as to whether this was an

“accident or homicide.” He asserted that one needed “to look at the story very carefully”

and that a “short fall” did not legitimately explain the victim’s injuries. He also asserted

that the story of the victim falling onto rocks was not legitimate because if the victim had

fallen on a rock hard enough to cause this kind of fracture,” then the victim would “have

lacerations and tearing of the scalp[,]” which did not occur in this case. He also opined

that the story about the victim hitting the rocks “was just too vague for me to buy that . . .

given the autopsy findings.”

- 37 -

While Dr. Lauridson agreed with Dr. Nichols that the source of the subdural

hematoma was the “tearing of the bridging vessels” in the brain, Dr. Lauridson asserted

that “to get those bridging veins ruptured requires a very significant force to the head” such

that the “inner part of the brain is damaged,” which is “where the serious part of this injury

occurred.” He also noted that although Dr. Nichols implied that the cerebral edema did not

happen until neurosurgery in Huntsville, the CT scan done at Maury Regional Hospital

showed that there was edema of the victim’s brain at that point.

Dr. Lauridson stated that Dr. Harlan’s autopsy report said that the victim’s

gastrointestinal track contained a “tan mush containing ground beef, mushrooms, and

bread.” Dr. Lauridson confirmed that some foods are digested faster than others. He noted

that “mushrooms, for some reason, don’t digest as fast as other foods” and confirmed that

there had been times when he was able to identify particular kinds of food. Dr. Lauridson

said that he did not have any reason to disagree with Dr. Harlan’s findings inside the

victim’s gastrointestinal track because he felt that the objective parts of Dr. Harlan’s report

were credible, even though many doctors had disagreed with Dr. Harlan’s opinion that the

manner of the victim’s death was accidental.

When asked about Dr. Nichol’s disagreement with Dr. Li that the victim’s manner

of death was homicide, Dr. Lauridson stated the following:

As I said before, we have the injury. I can tell you for certainty that

this is a big impact, enough to break the skull, enough to . . . tear the brain.

Okay. That’s clear.

So then you have to give me a scenario, a history as to how this

happened. That’s the key. How did this happen. And the first scenario was

a short fall, a fall off a bed or hitting a bed rail or something like that.

The answer is no. That makes it a homicide.

Well, then, if you come up with more stories, you’re going to have to

have a pretty significant story to make this kind of impact or accident.

So I disagree with Dr. Nichols. I think this is homicide.

Dr. Lauridson also stated that in the order revoking Dr. Harlan’s medical license,

the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners stated that the victim’s death in this case

occurred as a result of “non-accidental trauma.”

- 38 -

Brandy Eddlemon also provided rebuttal testimony for the State. Eddlemon stated

that Amy Harless was a friend of the Defendant’s before Harless was her friend. She stated

that her friendship with Harless did not continue through her marriage to the Defendant.

When asked if she talked to Harless the day of or the day after the victim passed away,

Eddlemon stated, “Not to my recollection, no.” Eddlemon denied telling Harless that

anything happened with the victim the morning of January 20, 2001, that would have

caused the victim’s injuries. When asked if she told Harless that the victim was already

injured when Eddlemon left for work, Eddlemon replied, “Absolutely not.” She confirmed

that nothing happened by her or in her presence that could have caused the injury to the

victim’s head. She also denied taking the victim to the back porch on January 20, 2001.

Eddlemon stated that she was originally uncooperative with Investigator Goetz’s

investigation in 2015 because the victim had been gone for fourteen years and she had been

repeatedly told that the victim’s death was an accident. She also said she initially did not

want the victim’s body to be exhumed because she did not want to bury the victim a second

time. However, after Investigator Goetz’s investigation progressed, she agreed to have the

victim exhumed for the second autopsy.

Lastly, Investigator Goetz provided rebuttal testimony for the State. Investigator

Goetz said that Amy Harless originally provided her statement to Agent Tenry on August

1, 2001, which was conspicuously about five days after the second hearing on exhuming

the victim’s body but before the final order was issued. He stated that he met with Harless

on February 27, 2015. When he asked Harless about “the written statement concerning

what Brandy had told her,” Harless said she “did not recall” making that statement. After

he provided the written statement for her to read, Harless acknowledged that she had made

the written statement. Investigator Goetz said that he began to question the veracity of

Harless’s statement after the medical experts opined that the victim’s injury could not have

occurred before he ate. He confirmed that when he spoke to Harless on February 27, 2015,

which was fairly early in his investigation, he felt Brandy Eddlemon was still a suspect in

this case.

On rebuttal cross-examination, Investigator Goetz said that because the medical

experts stated that the victim would not eat, play, or drink following an impact like this, he

concluded that the victim was not injured before he ate.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury acquitted the Defendant in count one of felony

murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse but convicted him in

count two of felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect,

and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.

- 39 -

The Defendant then timely filed a motion for new trial, as well as an amended

motion for new trial, alleging in part the same issues that he raises on appeal. Following a

hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. The Defendant then filed a timely

notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The Defendant argues that the evidence is

insufficient to sustain his conviction for felony murder committed in the perpetration of

aggravated child neglect. He claims there is no proof that he knowingly neglected the

victim after his initial injury. He also asserts that there is no evidence that any neglect

adversely affected the victim’s health or welfare or caused serious bodily injury apart from

the initial injury sustained by the victim. In response, the State contends that the evidence

is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. We agree with the State.

“Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and raises a

presumption of guilt, the criminal defendant bears the burden on appeal of showing that

the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.” State v. Hanson, 279

S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992)).

“Appellate courts evaluating the sufficiency of the convicting evidence must determine

‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Wagner, 382 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). When this court

evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest

legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that

evidence. State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Majors, 318

S.W.3d 850, 857 (Tenn. 2010)).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 691

(Tenn. 2005); State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998). The standard of review for

sufficiency of the evidence “‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or

circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting

Hanson, 279 S.W.3d at 275). The jury as the trier of fact must evaluate the credibility of

the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses’ testimony, and reconcile all

conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing

Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)). Moreover, the jury

determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and the inferences to be

drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with

guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury. Dorantes, 331

- 40 -

S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006)). When considering

the sufficiency of the evidence, this court “neither re-weighs the evidence nor substitutes

its inferences for those drawn by the jury.” Wagner, 382 S.W.3d at 297 (citing State v.

Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)).

Felony murder is “[a] killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt

to perpetrate . . . aggravated child neglect . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (Supp.

2000). No culpable mental state is required for a conviction for felony murder except the

intent to commit the underlying felony, which in this case is aggravated child neglect. Id.

§ 39-13-202(b) (Supp. 2000). A person commits the offense of aggravated child neglect

who “commits . . . child neglect, as defined in § 39-15-401(b) . . . and . . . [t]he act of . . .

neglect . . . results in serious bodily injury to the child[.]” Id. § 39-15-402(a)(1) (Supp.

2000). “Serious bodily injury” is defined as bodily injury involving: “(A) A substantial

risk of death; (B) Protracted unconsciousness; (C) Extreme physical pain; (D) Protracted

or obvious disfigurement; or (E) Protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of

a bodily member, organ or mental faculty[.]” Id. § 39-11-106(34) (Supp. 2000).

A person commits child neglect who “knowingly . . . neglects a child under eighteen

(18) years of age, so as to adversely affect the child’s health and welfare.” Id. § 39-15-

401(b). “[B]efore a conviction for child neglect may be sustained, the State must show

that the defendant’s neglect produced an actual, deleterious effect or harm upon the child’s

health and welfare.” State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.3d 666, 671-72 (Tenn. 2001). “[T]he mere

risk of harm is insufficient to support a conviction.” Id. at 667.

First, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that

he knowingly neglected the victim. He notes the General Assembly’s definition of

“knowing”:

“Knowing” refers to a person who acts knowingly with respect to the conduct

or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the

nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts

knowingly with respect to a result of the person’s conduct when the person

is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(b). The Defendant then references State v. Ducker, 27

S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 2000), to support his claim that the proof was insufficient to establish

that he knowingly neglected the victim. In Ducker, the Tennessee Supreme Court

considered whether the “knowing” mens rea in the pre-2005 version of the child abuse and

neglect statute applied to the conduct of the defendant or to the result of that conduct. Id.

at 896. It held “the statute requires that the act of treating a child in an abusive manner or

neglecting the child must be knowing conduct.” Id. at 897. The court recognized that once

- 41 -

the “knowing” mens rea is established, then “the next inquiry under the plain language of

the statute is simply whether the child sustained an injury or, in the case of child neglect,

whether the child suffered an adverse effect to the child’s health or welfare.” Id. The court

then concluded that the aggravated child abuse and neglect statute was a nature-of-conduct

offense, rather than a result-of-conduct offense, because “the mens rea of ‘knowing’ refers

only to the conduct elements of treatment or neglect of a child” under the statute. Id. at

897. In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the

Ducker court noted that “the defendant knowingly parked her car, rolled up the windows,

securely fastened the children in the car, locked the car and left them inside the parked car

from approximately 3:45 a.m. to between 12 and 1 p.m. on June 6[,]” and “[t]he children

died of hyperthermia.” Id. Consequently, the court held the evidence was sufficient to

sustain the conviction for aggravated child abuse because the proof supported a finding

that “the defendant knowingly and other than by accidental means neglected the children”

and that “the neglect adversely affected the children’s health and welfare.” Id.

Here, the Defendant argues there was no proof that he knew the victim was injured

until he attempted to wake the victim up for his medication at 6:00 p.m. He asserts that

when he arrived home from Lowe’s, the victim was asleep. Shortly after that, he moved

the victim out of his playpen and into the bed to take a nap with him. When the Defendant

woke up, he realized that the victim had vomited and/or was sweating. The Defendant said

he got up and went to the bathroom, and then Vernon Goodwin heard a “thump” from

inside the bedroom. An instant later, Vernon and Cody saw the victim on the floor and

assumed the victim had fallen off the bed, although the victim was not crying and did not

appear hurt. Thereafter, the Defendant put the victim back to bed, where he stayed until

the Defendant tried to wake him up for his medication around 6:00 p.m. The Defendant

claimed this was the first time he became aware that something was wrong with the victim

and immediately called his father and grandmother to help him. The Defendant then

asserted that he called 9-1-1 and rushed the victim to the Maury Regional Hospital within

roughly an hour of first becoming aware that the victim was ill.

To bolster these claims, the Defendant references the testimony from Dr. Pickett,

Dr. Lowen, and Dr. Lewis that there were no noticeable lacerations, wounds, cuts, or

punctures on the victim, that someone looking at the victim would likely not know that he

was injured, and that the victim’s symptoms could have been misunderstood as typical

characteristics of a toddler. In light of this medical testimony, the Defendant asserts that it

was more than reasonable for him, who did not have children of his own and was not

accustomed to caring for children, to not realize that the victim needed medical attention.

The Defendant also argues that because the victim was sick and taking antibiotics, he could

have reasonably believed the victim’s symptoms of being irritable, sleepy, and vomiting

were related to his illness. Lastly, the Defendant asserts that he did not knowingly inflict

the victim’s injuries, as shown by the jury’s acquittal of him in Count 1, is further evidence

- 42 -

that he was unaware that the victim was injured. The Defendant argues that because all of

these factors indicate that he “did not know that [the victim] was suffering from a head

injury” or that the victim “required medical treatment,” he did not knowingly engage in

child neglect, and the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for felony murder

committed in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect.

While the proof was overwhelmingly circumstantial in nature, a rational jury could

have found that the Defendant knew the victim had sustained a serious head injury around

3:00 p.m. when Vernon Goodwin heard the loud “thump” from inside the bedroom. The

medical proof overwhelmingly established that the seriousness of the victim’s head injury

would have been immediately apparent to anyone observing the child. Specifically, Dr.

Pickett testified that the severity of the victim’s injury, which included an extensive skull

fracture and a subdural hematoma, would have “immediately” affected the victim and

would have prevented the victim from eating, from drinking from a sippy cup, or from

playing following this injury, in contrast to what Vernon and the Defendant claimed. In

addition, Dr. Lewis testified that a child who received an injury like the victim’s would

have immediately exhibited physical symptoms and “would not have appeared normal to

even a layperson after sustaining an injury of this severity.” Dr. Lewis added that the child

would usually lose consciousness, or their eyes would roll around in their head, or the child

would be vomiting, or the child would be sleepy and they could not be awakened”; she also

asserted that an injury of this severity would affect a child’s motor skills, including the

ability to reach and pick things up, to eat, and to drink. Dr. Lowen also testified that injuries

like those sustained by the victim would “[a]bsolutely” have had a deleterious effect on a

child’s motor skills and the ability to reach, grab, drink, focus, and pick up objects, and she

asserted that “any caregiver” around a child with these types of injuries would know that

the child was “not okay” and would “recognize [that] something [wa]s wrong with this

child.” Dr. Lowen clarified that being “fussy” in a typical toddler way was different than

exhibiting the symptoms of a child with a head injury. Dr. Lowen also opined that the

victim’s injuries were not “a typical childhood accidental injury” and that if such injuries

were accidental, there would have been a major accident about which everyone would have

been aware, including a car crash where a child was not restrained or a child’s fall from a

second-floor balcony and where the back of the child’s head slammed on the floor. The

record is devoid of any proof indicating that another incident or accident caused the

victim’s severe head injury, and because the medical experts testified that the victim’s

severe injuries would have been immediately apparent to anyone, the proof established that

the Defendant was the only person with the victim at the time he could have been injured.

The jury then could have reasonably inferred that the Defendant, upon realizing the victim

had sustained a severe head injury at 3:00 p.m., deliberately delayed seeking medical

treatment for the victim for approximately four hours. Accordingly, we conclude that the

State presented sufficient evidence that the Defendant knowingly neglected the victim by

- 43 -

failing to obtain prompt medical treatment after the victim sustained a serious head injury

around 3:00 p.m. on January 20, 2001.

Second, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding

that the alleged neglect adversely affected the victim’s health and welfare or resulted in

serious bodily injury apart from the initial injury. He asserts the State must prove that the

alleged act of neglect resulted in serious bodily injury in addition to and apart from the

serious bodily injury caused by the initial act of abuse. See Mateyko, 53 S.W.3d at 671-

72 (stating that “a mere risk of harm in the neglect context is . . . insufficient” and that

“before a conviction for child neglect may be sustained, the State must show that the

defendant’s neglect produced an actual, deleterious effect or harm upon the child’s health

and welfare”); State v. Brock, No. E2009-00785-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 900053, at *6

(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2011) (concluding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain

the defendant’s two convictions for aggravated child neglect because the record was

“devoid of any evidence that the victim suffered further harm or injury subsequent to the

initial abuse”); State v. Barlow, No. W2008-01128-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1687772, at

*11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2010) (concluding that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain a conviction for aggravated child neglect because the proof failed to show that

Barlow’s delay in seeking medical care for the victim caused additional brain damage when

the medical experts testified generally to the risk of continued swelling of the brain but the

proof failed to establish an actual, deleterious effect on the victim caused by the delay);

State v. Dewitt, No. M2015-00816-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 6638857, at *11 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Nov. 10, 2016) (reversing and vacating the conviction for aggravated child neglect

after concluding that there was no proof “concerning what effect, if any, the [d]efendant’s

failure to inform the victim’s parents or seek prompt medical care had on the victim’s

injuries” and “no proof that the victim suffered any injury after the initial trauma or that

her condition worsened due to the passage of time”).

The Defendant also contends that this court has consistently found insufficient

evidence to uphold a charge of aggravated child neglect where the record did not establish

that the delay in seeking medical treatment adversely affected the victim’s health or

resulted in serious bodily injury apart from the initial injury. See State v. Raymundo, No.

M2009-00726-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4540207, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2010)

(reversing and vacating the conviction for aggravated child neglect because the State failed

to show that the defendant’s delay in obtaining medical attention for the victim had an

‘actual, deleterious effect’ on the victim’s health and where no proof indicated that the

victim “collapsed” from other causes besides the act of abuse that caused the victim’s

internal injuries); State v. Wiggins, No. W2006-01516-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 3254716,

at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2007) (concluding the evidence was insufficient to sustain

the conviction for aggravated child neglect because the proof established that it was the

defendant’s “act of abuse which produced the serious bodily injury to the victim” not the

- 44 -

defendant’s “act of neglect, or failure to seek medical treatment, which resulted in serious

bodily injury”); State v. Dykes, No. E2001-01722-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1974147, at *6-

7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2002) (reversing and vacating the defendant’s conviction for

aggravated child abuse through neglect after concluding that there was “no proof in the

record that the defendant knew [the victim] was injured and delayed seeking treatment for

those injuries such that serious bodily injury resulted”).

The Defendant notes that when Dr. Pickett was asked whether he could have saved

the victim if he had operated on him sooner, Dr. Pickett replied, “I don’t have a crystal ball

and I can’t—I can’t, you know, say with certainty whether or not that would have made a

difference.” He asserts that while Dr. Pickett asserted that the victim’s chances of survival

may have been higher if he had been seen sooner, Dr. Pickett also acknowledged that he

could not guarantee that there would have been a different outcome. The Defendant also

asserts that although Dr. Lewis testified generally that the sooner someone receives medical

treatment, the better, Dr. Lewis failed to specifically testify whether earlier treatment would

have made a difference in this case. The Defendant asserts that while the medical experts

spoke “generally to the mere risk of continued bleeding in the brain and that time is of the

essence[,]” the medical testimony “f[ell] short of establishing that the outcome would have

differed had medical treatment been sought sooner.” Consequently, the Defendant argues

that the State failed to show that the delay caused an “actual, deleterious effect,” which

resulted in additional bodily injury to the victim.

Despite the aforementioned claims, we conclude that a rational jury could have

found that the Defendant’s delay in seeking medical treatment after the victim’s initial head

injury caused the victim’s separate injury of brain damage, which ultimately caused the

victim’s death. Dr. Pickett testified that if the victim had been seen within an hour of his

injury and had been operated on quickly, it “certainly would have approved his outcome

and his chances of survival.” Dr. Pickett also stated that “any time that exceeds four hours

with a large acute subdural hematoma in human beings, the chances of survival [were]

almost nil” and that the victim was treated “well beyond that four[-]hour mark.” Dr. Lewis

testified that a child who did not receive treatment for three-and-a-half hours would

“[d]efinitely” have bled more into a skull than the child who was treated thirty minutes or

even two hours after receiving the injury. Dr. Lowen also stated that the victim would have

hemorrhaged more blood into his skull three-and-a-half hours after the injury than he would

have if he received treatment thirty minutes to two hours after the injury because the victim

had “a hyperacute subdural,” which meant that the victim was “actively bleeding” when

he arrived in the operating room, a fact that was documented in the “operative report.” Dr.

Lowen also concluded that the victim’s active bleeding would have had a deleterious effect

on the victim’s health. Dr. Lowen added that it was not just the bleeding that caused

problems because when the brain swells, the swelling itself can prevent adequate breathing,

which causes “further brain injury.” Based on this proof, a rational jury could have

- 45 -

determined that the Defendant’s neglect—namely his more than four-hour delay in taking

the victim to the Maury County Regional Hospital—caused a completely separate injury,

namely the victim’s brain injury as his brain swelled within the confines of his skull. The

evidence shows that the Defendant’s neglect in obtaining prompt medical treatment caused

the victim’s severe brain injury and death, which constitutes “an actual, deleterious effect

or harm to the child’s health and welfare[.]” See Mateyko, 53 S.W.3d at 667. Therefore,

we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for felony

murder committed in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect.

II. Denial of Motion to Suppress. The Defendant contends that the trial court

erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police during an illegal and

coercive interrogation. He asserts that because he never voluntarily provided his statement

to Investigator Roe at the hospital, his initial statement should be suppressed. He also

contends that his later statements to law enforcement should be suppressed as “fruit of the

poisonous tree” because the officers relied on information improperly obtained by

Investigator Roe in conducting their interviews of the Defendant. In response, the State

asserts that the trial court properly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. We

conclude that because the record fully supports the trial court’s denial of the suppression

motion, the Defendant is not entitled to relief.

When this court reviews suppression issues, the prevailing party in the trial court

“‘is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression

hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that

evidence.’” State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Odom,

928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). “‘Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight

and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted

to the trial judge as the trier of fact.’” Id. (quoting Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23). A trial

court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld, unless the evidence

preponderates against them. Id. (citing Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23). However, this court

reviews the trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo with no presumption of

correctness. Id. (citing State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)). When evaluating

the correctness of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this court may consider the

entire record, including not only the proof offered at the suppression hearing but also the

evidence presented at trial. State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn. 2012); State v.

Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Tenn. 2012).

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V; see U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, the Tennessee Constitution provides “that in all criminal

prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.”

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Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. Both the Fifth Amendment and article I, section 9 provide the

criminally accused the right against compelled self-incrimination. State v. Callahan, 979

S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tenn. 1998).

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the United States Supreme Court

created procedural safeguards to protect against compulsory self-incrimination. Miranda

compels law enforcement to warn an individual prior to a custodial interrogation:

that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against

him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and

that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any

questioning if he so desires.

Id. at 479. The opportunity to exercise the aforementioned rights must be afforded to the

individual throughout the interrogation. Id. After these warnings are given and an

opportunity to exercise these rights is afforded, the person being questioned may

“voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” waive these rights and make a statement. Id. at

444, 479; Echols, 382 S.W.3d at 280; State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 529 (Tenn. 1997).

Because “coerced confessions are inherently unreliable,” only voluntary

confessions are admissible. State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 567 (Tenn. 2013). In order

for a statement to be voluntary, it “‘must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence,

nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any

improper influence.’” State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tenn. 1980) (quoting Bram v.

United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)).

Whether a confession is involuntary is a question of fact. State v. Willis, 496

S.W.3d 653, 695 (Tenn. 2016) (citing State v. Sanders, 452 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tenn. 2014)).

The State has the burden of establishing the voluntariness of a confession by a

preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Sanders, 452 S.W.3d at 305). “The test of

voluntariness for confessions under article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution is broader

and more protective of individual rights than the test of voluntariness under the Fifth

Amendment.” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996); accord State v. Freeland,

451 S.W.3d 791, 815 (Tenn. 2014).

“The due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda.” State v. Davidson,

509 S.W.3d 156, 189 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-

35 (2000); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978)). “[T]he essential inquiry

under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the

confession a product of coercion.” Id. (citing Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815). The

voluntariness test requires this court to assess the psychological impact on the accused and

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to evaluate the legal significance of the accused’s reaction. Id. (citing Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). When determining whether a confession was

made voluntarily, this court must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the

“characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. (citing Dickerson,

530 U.S. at 434). These circumstances include:

“[T]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the

extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged

nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before

he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of

his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing

him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused

was injured[,] intoxicated[,] or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the

statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep[,] or medical

attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the

suspect was threatened with abuse.”

Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (quoting State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tenn.

1996)).

At the suppression hearing, Investigator Roe testified that she told an officer at the

Huntsville Hospital to immediately isolate the Defendant and Brandy Eddlemon from each

other and from the rest of their family as soon as they arrived. When Investigator Roe

arrived at the hospital, the Defendant was alone in an isolated waiting room with an officer

present. During the interview process with the Defendant, Investigator Roe talked to Dr.

Pickett, who stated he believed this was a homicide case. She acknowledged that the

Defendant was detained and not free to leave. Investigator Roe asserted that she read the

Defendant his Miranda rights before questioning him. While acknowledging that she did

not have the Defendant sign a waiver form, she repeatedly insisted that she provided the

Defendant with his Miranda warnings before questioning him and that she provided these

warnings both at the hospital and the police station. Investigator Roe clarified that she

provided the Defendant with his Miranda warnings before the Defendant decided to speak

with her. Investigator Roe admitted that although she kept notes during her questioning of

the Defendant at the hospital, she did not make a notation about reading the Defendant his

Miranda warnings. She acknowledged that the Defendant appeared to be visibly upset and

that the Defendant was “shaky” and “started to cry at different times.” She also

acknowledged that she wore a gun on her person during the interview with the Defendant.

The trial court specifically accredited Investigator Roe’s testimony, stating, “We had

Miranda with that detention.”

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The Defendant contends that Investigator Roe never read him his Miranda rights,

but that even if this court accredits Investigator Roe’s testimony on this point, the evidence

showed that Investigator Roe coerced his statement because the Defendant’s interrogation

took place late at night after a traumatic event; the investigator placed him into custody as

soon as he entered the hospital, before Investigator Roe even arrived on the scene or learned

any significant facts about the case; he was isolated from his family during the

interrogation; and Investigator Roe noted that the Defendant was upset, “shaky,” and

crying.

Although the Defendant claims that Investigator Roe never provided him with

Miranda warnings, he fails to identify any proof that would preponderate against the trial

court’s decision to accredit Investigator Roe’s testimony that she verbally provided the

Miranda warnings to the Defendant before questioning him. In addition, there is nothing

in this record to suggest that the Defendant did not understand his Miranda rights or that

Investigator Roe coerced his statement, rendering his confession involuntary.

In applying the Climer factors, we note that at the time of Investigator Roe’s

interview, the Defendant was twenty-nine years old. Almost immediately after receiving

his Miranda warnings, the Defendant provided his statement. Investigator Roe stated that

she only questioned the Defendant for approximately fifteen minutes at the hospital. While

the record shows the Defendant was detained prior to his interview with Investigator Roe,

there is no proof regarding the length of time the Defendant was detained. In addition,

although the evidence shows that the Defendant was shaky and cried during the interview,

there is nothing in the record indicating that the Defendant did not want to speak with

Investigator Roe at the time he provided his statement. Furthermore, there is no proof that

the Defendant was injured, intoxicated, under the influence of drugs, deprived of food,

physically abused, or threatened with abuse at the time he provided his statements. Finally,

there is no evidence that Investigator Roe extracted the Defendant’s statement by any sort

of threats or violence, by any direct or implied promises, or through any improper

influence. Because the evidence demonstrates that the Defendant provided a voluntary

statement to Investigator Roe that was not coerced, the trial court properly denied the

motion to suppress as to this statement.

The Defendant, following his interview with Investigator Roe at the hospital, was

handcuffed and transferred to the police station. Investigator Roe said she could not recall

how long the Defendant was in handcuffs. She admitted that she never believed that

Brandy Eddlemon was a suspect and focused only on the Defendant as the perpetrator.

Later, at the police department, Lieutenant Brady and Detective Fogle provided the

Defendant with his Miranda rights before interviewing him because the Defendant was

already in custody. Before interviewing the Defendant, they spoke to Investigator Roe,

who gave them the information she obtained during her interview with the Defendant.

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In February 2015, Investigator Goetz interviewed the Defendant. This interview

occurred at the Defendant’s parents’ home, and Investigator Goetz did not read the

Defendant his Miranda warnings. On March 12, 2015, Investigator Goetz again

interviewed the Defendant at his parent’s home and again did not provide the Defendant

with his Miranda warnings prior to conducting the interview. Years later, on June 18, 2019,

he interviewed the Defendant at the district attorney’s office, and because Investigator

Goetz treated the Defendant as a suspect during this last interview, he provided the

Defendant with his Miranda rights prior to questioning him.

The Defendant asserts that any statements he made during subsequent interviews

with Lieutenant Brady and Detective Fogle, and later Investigator Goetz, should be

suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree” because the officers in the later interviews relied

on information improperly obtained by Investigator Roe. Pursuant to the “fruit of the

poisonous tree” doctrine, evidence obtained through an unlawful search or seizure is

excluded from use by the State. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85

(1963); Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 674. This exclusionary rule “was designed to protect

Fourth Amendment guarantees by deterring lawless searches, seizures, and arrests.”

Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 674.

Specifically, the Defendant argues that Lieutenant Brady, Detective Fogle, and

Investigator Goetz used information and statements illegally obtained by Investigator Roe

in her initial interview with the Defendant. He asserts that although his later statements

were not confessions, they were “elicited using the information obtained by Investigator

Roe in contravention of the Defendant’s constitutional protections.” He also claims the

State used his later statements against him at trial “by trying to demonstrate through State

experts that [the Defendant]’s timeline of events was impossible, and to attack [the

Defendant]’s credibility.” Consequently, he asserts that his later statements should be

suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” We have already determined that the

Defendant’s statement to Investigator Roe was voluntary and not coerced. Accordingly,

we conclude that the Defendant’s later statements to the other officers should not be

suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Because the record fully supports the trial

court’s denial of the suppression motion, the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Aggravated Child Neglect Statute. The Defendant also argues that the

aggravated child neglect statute violates due process because it is vague and fails to give

proper notice of prohibited conduct. Specifically, he claims that Code section 39-15-

402(a), the aggravated child neglect and abuse statute, fails to adequately define “neglect,”

which precludes an individual from determining what proof is required to sustain a

conviction. He also claims Code section 39-15-402(a) fails to define the phrase “so as to

adversely affect the child’s health and welfare” and fails to explain whether this phrase

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requires proof of some actual detriment or harm before criminal liability may be imposed.

In response, the State asserts that this court has repeatedly held that the statute is

constitutional. We conclude that because this statute is not unconstitutionally vague, the

Defendant is not entitled to relief.

This court reviews issues of constitutional interpretation de novo with no

presumption of correctness. State v. Merriman, 410 S.W.3d 779, 791 (Tenn. 2013); State

v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263

S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn. 2008)). “In construing legislative enactments, we presume that

every word in a statute has meaning and purpose; each word should be given full effect if

the obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing.” Lawrence

Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Lawrence Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 244 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Tenn. 2007)

(citing In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005)). “When the statutory language is

clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use,

without a forced interpretation that would limit or expand the statute’s application.”

Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). On the other hand, if

the statute is ambiguous, we must look to the “broader statutory scheme, the history of the

legislation, or other sources to discern its meaning.” State v. Casper, 297 S.W.3d 676, 683

(Tenn. 2009). When interpreting statutes, this court must begin with the presumption that

legislative acts are constitutional. State v. Pickett, 211 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tenn. 2007).

“‘[W]e must indulge every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of

constitutionality.’” Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting

Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., 937 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn. 1996)).

“‘It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its

prohibitions are not clearly defined.’” Pickett, 211 S.W.3d at 704 (quoting Grayned v. City

of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Tennessee

Constitution, a criminal statute cannot be enforced when it prohibits conduct “‘in terms so

vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and

differ as to its application[.]’” Id. (quoting Leech v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 582 S.W.2d

738, 746 (Tenn. 1979)). The fair warning requirement in the due process clause prohibits

the states from holding individuals criminally responsible for conduct which they could

not reasonably understand to be proscribed. Id. “If a statute is to avoid unconstitutional

vagueness, it must ‘define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary

people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter,

866 S.W.2d 520, 532 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358

(1983)).

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However, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the fair warning requirement

“does not demand absolute precision in the drafting of criminal statutes.” State v. Burkhart,

58 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tenn. 2001). “The constitutional test for vagueness is whether a

statute’s ‘prohibitions are not clearly defined and are susceptible to different interpretations

as to what conduct is actually proscribed.’” Pickett, 211 S.W.3d at 704 (quoting State v.

Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 447-48 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). Accordingly, a statute is not

unconstitutionally vague if “by orderly process of litigation [it] can be rendered sufficiently

definite and certain for purposes of judicial decision.” Burkhart, 58 S.W.3d at 697.

The aggravated child neglect statute states that “[a] person commits the offense of .

. . aggravated child neglect . . . who commits . . . child neglect, as defined in § 39-15-401(b)

. . . and . . . [t]he act of . . . neglect . . . results in serious bodily injury to the child[.]” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-15-402(a). A person commits child neglect who “knowingly . . . neglects

a child under eighteen (18) years of age, so as to adversely affect the child’s health and

welfare.” Id. § 39-15-401(b).

This court has repeatedly held that “[t]he ‘common understanding’ of ‘neglect’ is

‘to ignore or disregard’ or ‘to fail to care for or attend to sufficiently or properly.’” State

v. Smith, No. 1153, 1990 WL 134934, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 20,

1990) (quoting Webster’s New World Dictionary 907 (3d coll. ed. 1988)); see State v.

Burton, No. E2015-00879-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 3351316, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June

9, 2016). Moreover, this court has concluded “[t]he neglect of ‘a child so as to adversely

affect its health and welfare’ presents a plain and certain meaning” and “[t]he warning of

the prohibited conduct is . . . sufficiently clear.” Smith, 1990 WL 134934, at *3; see

Burton, 2016 WL 3351316, at *4.

In Mateyko, 53 S.W.3d at 669, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s

appeal on the issue of whether the pre-2005 version of Tennessee Code Annotated section

39-15-401(a) required proof of an actual, deleterious effect upon the child’s health and

welfare. While the State argued that the phrase “adversely affect” did not require a harm

to actually occur and only required that a defendant put the child’s health and welfare at

risk of suffering some harm, the defendant countered that the child neglect statute required

proof of some actual harm and that a mere risk of harm to the child was insufficient. Id. at

670. The court held that because the parties legitimately disputed the ordinary meaning of

the language in the statute, the court needed to look beyond the language and examine the

entire statutory scheme for guidance. Id. Ultimately, the Mateyko court held that “a mere

risk of harm in the neglect context is . . . insufficient” and that “before a conviction for

child neglect may be sustained, the State must show that the defendant’s neglect produced

an actual, deleterious effect or harm upon the child’s health and welfare.” Id. at 671-72.

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In light of the plain meaning of the term “neglect” used in the statute and this court’s

guidance in Mateyko regarding the interpretation of the phrase “so as to adversely affect

the child’s health and welfare,” we conclude that the aggravated child neglect statute is

sufficiently clear to put an ordinary person of common intelligence on notice that it is a

crime to knowingly fail to care for a child where such an omission results in an adverse

effect the child’s health and welfare and where the act of neglect results in serious bodily

injury to the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402(a); Burton, 2016 WL 3351316, at

*4; Smith, 1990 WL 134934, at *3. Because the aggravated child neglect statute is not

unconstitutionally vague, the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

IV. Proof that Medical Examiner Lost Medical License. The Defendant

additionally argues th

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