Reginal L. Holston v. Jacob J. Dawson

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11198

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

REGINAL L. HOLSTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JACOB J. DAWSON,

Assistant Warden of Programs,

WARDEN,

ANNE OTWELL,

MARK HARRISS,

RYAN ENGLISH, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11198

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00202-SPC-NPM

____________________

Before LAGOA, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Reginal Holston, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-

peals the district court’s dismissal of his second amended complaint

alleging federal and state claims of First Amendment retaliation,

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, medical negli-

gence, violations of due process, false imprisonment, intentional

infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), conspiracy, and violations

of Florida’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

(“RICO”) statute. Although Holston contends on appeal that he

sufficiently alleged each of the counts against each of the defend-

ants, the facts he alleged amounted to speculation of violations of

federal and state law based on his disagreements with the defend-

ants’ conduct and, thus, he did not plausibly allege that the defend-

ants violated his rights. In addition, Holston did not comply with

Florida pre-suit requirements, so his claim of medical negligence

was barred. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of

his second amended complaint with prejudice.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

Holston initially filed a pro se civil rights complaint in Florida

state court against Ryan English, Colonel Mark Harriss, Nurse

Anne Otwell, Jacob Dawson, and Derek Snider, who removed the

case to the federal district court. Those defendants then moved to

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and a magistrate

judge ordered Holston to either respond to the motion or file an

amended complaint.

Holston filed an amended complaint attached three docu-

ments as exhibits that would later be referenced throughout a sec-

ond amended complaint and, ultimately, in the district court’s or-

der dismissing Holston’s case. Two of the documents were recom-

mendations for Holston to be placed on Close Management

(“CM”) 1 by nonparties named Smith and Cecilia, which stated that

Holston was initially placed in CM due to one incident where Hol-

ston injured an officer’s arm by pulling him into a shower and an-

other incident where Holston swung a closed fist at another officer.

1 CM is “the separation of an inmate apart from the general population, for

reasons of security or the order and effective management of the institution,

when the inmate, through his or her behavior, has demonstrated an inability

to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of

others.” Fla. Admin. Code § 33-601.800(1)(a). There are three levels of CM:

(1) CMI is the most restrictive single cell housing level; (2) CMII is in the mid-

dle; and (3) CMIII is the least restrictive. Id. § 33-601.800(1)(b), (2). The Insti-

tutional Classification Team conducts hearings and makes recommendation,

which the State Classification Office approves, disapproves, or modifies. Id.

§ 33-601.800(3)(h), (i).

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The third exhibit was English’s disciplinary report accusing Hol-

ston of attempted extortion.

The district court dismissed Holston’s amended complaint

without prejudice because Holston had improperly sought to as-

sert unrelated claims against several defendants. This dismissal

prompted Holston to file a second amended complaint against

Dawson, Snider, Nurse Otwell, Colonel Harriss, English, as well as

Warden Lars Severson and Major A. Scarpati (collectively, the “De-

fendants”), which is the operative pleading in this case.

Holston alleged that, in December 2019, he was beaten and

tortured by officers, which Colonel Harriss authorized and Warden

Severson concealed. He was served with a notice of a CM recom-

mendation based on him causing injury to another, and at the In-

stitutional Classification Team (“ICT”) hearing, ICT recom-

mended he be placed in CMI. Holston was then served another

notice but did not appear at the second ICT hearing.

Thereafter, Holston alleged that was transferred to another

facility, at which English made it clear that he knew Colonel Har-

riss from Holston’s previous facility because Colonel Harriss “used

to be [English’s] sergeant,” and that Holston should expect retalia-

tion at the new facility. Holston filed a grievance regarding Eng-

lish’s retaliatory statements and Dawson, who reviewed the griev-

ance, admitted that Holston was not present at the second ICT

hearing but denied the grievance. At a six-month CM review hear-

ing before the ICT, a nonparty named Brock, Major Scarpati, and

Dawson conspired with Colonel Harriss to ratify the false

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allegations regarding Holston’s physical assault of the officers from

nonparty Smith’s CM recommendation. Dawson based his retali-

atory decision to deny the formal grievance on nonparty Cecilia’s

CM recommendation after Holston engaged in free speech.

Holston further alleged that, after placing sick call requests,

Holston visited Nurse Otwell, but she did not take his vital signs,

argued with him about grievances he filed, and belittled him. He

alleged that she falsified information in his medical files regarding

his medical complaints as a form of retaliation.

Holston further alleged that he received a second CM re-

view notice that omitted any reference to the attempted extortion,

and at the ICT review, Dawson, Major Scarpati, and nonparty

Brock were on the review panel. They colluded against him, along

with Warden Severson, who denied a grievance Holston submitted

challenging his continuation in CM without a 90-day review. After

a second recommendation for reduction to CMIII with a 90-day re-

view, English, Dawson, and Major Scarpati rejected the 90-day re-

view with a conspiratorially retaliatory animus.

Based on the above allegations, Holston asserted 14 counts

against varying Defendants. These claims included First Amend-

ment retaliation claims in Counts 1 through 4; an Eighth Amend-

ment deliberate indifference claim and state law medical negli-

gence claim in Counts 5 and 11; procedural due process claims

against in Counts 6 and 7; federal and state false imprisonment

claims in Counts 8 and 12; an IIED claim in Count 10; 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983 conspiracy and common-law civil conspiracy claims in

Counts 9 and 13; and a Florida RICO claim in Count 14.

Ultimately, the district court dismissed Holston’s second

amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The

court explained that Holston had already amended his complaint

twice and that any future attempts to amend would be futile. Hol-

ston’s appeal followed, in which he challenges the dismissal of each

of his claims.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Holland v. Carnival

Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1335

(11th Cir. 2012)). Generally, we must accept as true the allegations

in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. Id. However, such direction is inapplicable to legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id.

To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Hunt v. Amico Prop., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213,

1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plau-

sible on its face when it contains facts that allow the court to draw

a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged

misconduct. Id. While we liberally construe pro se pleadings, Tan-

nenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), the

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plaintiff’s allegations must be more than mere labels, conclusions,

or a formulistic recitation of the cause of action, Hunt, 814 F.3d at

1221. Finally, a district court may consider documents outside the

four corners of the complaint when such information is central to

the plaintiff’s claim and the information’s authenticity is undis-

puted. Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 433 F.d3 1337, 1340 (11th

Cir. 2005).

Generally, a pro se plaintiff must receive at least one oppor-

tunity to amend the complaint if he might be able to state a claim

by doing so. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291-

92 (11th Cir. 2018). However, a district court need not grant leave

to amend where a more carefully drafted complaint could not state

a claim. Id. at 1291. Leave to amend would be futile if the amended

complaint would still fail to state a claim. L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v.

Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

In his second amended complaint, Holston alleged four

claims of First Amendment retaliation. In Count 1, he contended

that Nurse Otwell’s alleged false statements in his medical records

were in retaliation for the grievances he filed regarding the condi-

tions of his confinement during which he experienced swelling and

pain in his abdomen and gastrointestinal complications. In

Count 2, he alleged that Dawson and Major Scarpati kept him in

CM based on their improper reliance on prison staff reports that

falsely stated that he assaulted two officers. In Counts 3 and 4,

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Holston alleged that Dawson, Major Scarpati, and Warden Sev-

erson failed to conduct a 90-day review of his CM detention in re-

taliation for filing grievances.

The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliat-

ing against prisoners for exercising the right of free speech. Smith

v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). To prevail on a First

Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must show: “(1) his

speech was constitutionally protected; (2) the inmate suffered ad-

verse action such that the administrator’s allegedly retaliatory con-

duct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engag-

ing in such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between

the retaliatory action and the protected speech.” Id.

A prisoner’s complaints to prison administrators about the

conditions of his confinement are protected speech. Id. Under the

second element, we employ an objective test which allows for

“weeding out” those claims for which complained of injuries are

trivial or are no more than a “de minimis inconvenience in the exer-

cise of First Amendment rights.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247,

1253 (11th Cir. 2005). Finally, to establish causation the plaintiff

must show that the defendant was subjectively motivated to disci-

pline him because of complaints about his conditions of confine-

ment. Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278.

Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice

Holston’s Counts 1 through 4. As to Count 1 against Nurse Otwell,

Holston failed to sufficiently allege that he suffered an adverse ac-

tion. The note Nurse Otwell wrote did not cause others to deny

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Holston medical care, as evidenced by Holston’s own allegations.

Moreover, the note directly related to the ailments Holston com-

plained of at that time. Thus, Holston failed to establish a causal

connection between his alleged injuries and Nurse Otwell’s ac-

tions. Smith, 532 F.3d at 1276.

To Count 2 against Dawson and Major Scarpati, Holston’s

claim again failed to establish causation between his alleged injuries

and the defendants’ actions. Specifically, Holston’s allegations re-

garding the impact that the reports of other officers had on his

placement in CMI is entirely speculative and insufficient to support

a First Amendment retaliation claim. Hunt, 814 F.3d at 1221.

Finally, to Counts 3 and 4 against Dawson, Major Scarpati,

and Warden Severson, Holston’s claims do not establish that he

suffered an adverse action or causation. First, the ICT’s decisions

were in Holston’s favor because his CM restrictions were reduced.

Second, as to causation, Holston’s allegations do not support a find-

ing that the defendants’ decision to offer him a 180-day as opposed

to 90-day review was motivated by his previous grievances. Any

attempt to amend these claims would be futile, and we affirm the

district court’s dismissal of these claims with prejudice.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Need Claims

In Count 5, Holston alleged that Nurse Otwell violated the

Eighth Amendment by refusing to treat an unspecified “serious

medical condition” and wrote a note in his records instructing

other medical personnel to deny him future treatments.

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The Eighth Amendment prohibits a prison official from act-

ing with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To prevail on an

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must

satisfy an objective and subjective inquiry. Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t

of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). Under the objective

inquiry, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he had an “objectively

serious medical need” that had either been diagnosed by a doctor

as requiring treatment or was so obvious that a lay person would

readily see the necessity for a doctor’s attention. Id. Under either

scenario, the medical need must be one that, if it were to be left

unattended, would pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. Un-

der the subjective prong, the plaintiff must show that the prison

officials acted with a deliberate indifference to his medical needs,

which requires the plaintiff to show that the officials “had a subjec-

tive knowledge of a risk of serious harm,” they ignored that risk,

and in ignoring the risk, acted with more than gross negligence. Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harper v. Lawrence

Cnty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010)).

“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diag-

nosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim

of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle,

429 U.S. at 106. Instead, medical treatment only violates the Eighth

Amendment “when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or ex-

cessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamen-

tal fairness.” Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266

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(11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harris

v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991)).

Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice

Count 5. Holston’s second amended complaint failed to allege

what his “objectively serious medical condition” was at the time he

saw Nurse Otwell. Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1270. To the extent Count 5

is based on Nurse Otwell’s alleged decision not to treat him which

caused his stomach to swell, none of his allegations suggest the

swelling was an objectively serious medical need. Finally, Holston

failed to show that Nurse Otwell was deliberately indifferent to his

swelling—his initial sick call request never mentioned gastrointes-

tinal swelling, and when Holston did seek treatment for the condi-

tion, other medical professionals treated him. Because Holston

cannot cure these pleading deficiencies, the district court properly

dismissed this claim with prejudice.

C. Medical Negligence Claims

Holston also alleged that Nurse Otwell negligently failed to

properly assess him and refer him to a physician. The district court

interpreted his complaint as raising a state-law medical negligence

claim and dismissed it for failure to satisfy Florida’s pre-suit require-

ments.

Florida courts will read a plaintiff’s negligence claim as a

claim alleging medical negligence when the claim arises out of the

failure to render medical services. See Indian River Mem’l Hosp. v.

Browne, 44 So. 3d 237, 238-39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (granting

petitioner’s writ of certiorari and holding that the plaintiff’s

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complaint for negligence was really a claim for medical negligence

because the claim arose out of the rendering of or failure to render

medical care); see also Fla. Stat. § 766.106(1)(a) (defining a claim for

medical negligence as “a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or

the failure to render, medical care or services.”).

To sufficiently allege a medical negligence claim, the plain-

tiff must allege the following: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff

a standard of care; (2) the defendant breached that standard; and

(3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s damages. Holly-

wood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Alfred, 82 So. 3d 122, 125 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.

App. 2012) (applying medical malpractice elements to a medical

negligence claim). In a medical negligence action, the burden is on

the plaintiff to establish the physician-defendant’s actions breached

prevailing professional standards of care. Dockswell v. Bethesda

Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d 1201, 1206-07 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Fla.

Stat. § 766.102(1)).

Importantly, Florida law imposes conditions precedent for

any lawsuit “arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render,

medical care or services,” such as notifying the defendant of the

intent to initiate litigation and a pre-suit investigation. Fla. Stat.

§ 766.106(1)(a), (2)(a). Before a claimant can bring a medical negli-

gence claim under Florida law, the claimant must comply with

these pre-suit requirements. Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr., Inc. v.

Pusha, 254 So. 3d 1076, 1081 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2018).

As an initial matter, the district court properly construed

Holston’s negligence claim as a claim for medical negligence

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because the claim arose out of Nurse Otwell’s rendering of, or al-

leged failure to render, medical care. Indian River Mem’l Hosp., 44

So. 3d at 238-39. Thus, Holston had to comply with Florida’s pre-

suit requirements to properly bring this claim. In his second

amended complaint, Holston merely stated that all conditions

precedent had been satisfied which is a legal conclusion not entitled

to a presumption of truth. Holland, 50 F.4th at 1093. He otherwise

made no representation in his second amended complaint that he

satisfied Florida’s pre-suit requirements for medical negligence

claims.

Even if Holston had satisfied Florida’s pre-suit requirements,

he still failed to allege a causal connection between his gastrointes-

tinal issues and any action on Nurse Otwell’s part. Moreover, he

did not show that Nurse Otwell proximately caused his gastroin-

testinal problems, nor can Nurse Otwell’s note in Holston’s medi-

cal records be read as a directive to future health care providers to

not provide Holston future treatment. Thus, he has failed to satisfy

the third element of a medical negligence claim. The district court

properly dismissed this claim with prejudice as well.

D. Procedural Due Process Claims

In Counts 6 and 7, Holston brought procedural due process

claims against Dawson and Colonel Harriss. To Count 6 against

Dawson, Holston alleged that Dawson improperly denied the

grievance Holston filed related to his CM detention, a decision

which, at least in part, was based on evidence Holston disputed. In

Count 7 against Colonel Harriss, he alleged that Harriss violated

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his due process rights by rehearing Holston’s grievance without

Holston present.

To assert a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a deprivation of a constitution-

ally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and

(3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345

F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d

175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994)). Incarcerated individuals have “no con-

stitutionally-protected liberty interest in access to” a prisoner inter-

nal grievance procedure. Bingham v. Thomas, 645 F.3d 1171, 1177

(11th Cir. 2011).

However, a prisoner has a protected liberty interest that

would entitle him to procedural due process protections in two cir-

cumstances. Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir.

2016). First, he is entitled to “procedural due process when an in-

creased restraint ‘exceeds his sentence in such an unexpected man-

ner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its

own force.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Second, he is entitled to “procedural due pro-

cess when a change in his conditions of confinement ‘imposes atyp-

ical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordi-

nary incidents of prison life.’” Id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484)).

Thus, incarcerated individuals have a due process right to a hearing

prior to being punished for violating prison rules if “the punish-

ment is demonstrably harsher than the ordinary conditions of

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prison life. This is because these inmates are already subject to pun-

ishment on account of their convictions and sentences.” Id.

However, the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell recog-

nized that a state statute could create a liberty interest, separate

from the Due Process Clause, where a statutory provision provided

for a shortened prison sentence based on good time credits which

were revocable if the prisoner was found guilty of serious miscon-

duct. 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). Florida law provides inmates with

the possibility to receive ten days of gain time for each month of

the sentence as a means of encouraging satisfactory behavior and

gain-time may be forfeited when the person violates the rules of

the Department of Corrections. Fla. Stat. § 944.275(4)(a), (5).

When a constitutionally-protected liberty interest exists for

a disciplinary hearing in a prison, the prison must give the pris-

oner: “(1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) a written state-

ment of the reasons for the disciplinary action taken; and (3) the

opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence ‘when permit-

ting him to do so [would] not be unduly hazardous to institutional

safety or correctional goals.’” Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1350 (quoting

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66).

Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice

Counts 6 and 7. As an initial matter, Holston has not established

that his placement in CM impacted his ability to receive gain-time,

and it has not been established that the hearings before the ICT

implicate procedural due process protections, meaning Counts 6

and 7 were properly dismissed for that reason. Nevertheless, as to

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16 Opinion of the Court 22-11198

Count 6 against Dawson, to the extent Holston’s claim involves the

CM hearing, to which he was procedurally entitled under Wolff, his

claim fails because he does not allege that the CM hearing itself was

procedurally inadequate. Additionally, to the extent Holston con-

tests Dawson’s denial of his grievance, the denial was not so atypi-

cal or harsh as to entitle Holston to heightened due process protec-

tions. Bingham, 645 F.3d at 1177.

As to Count 7 against Colonel Harriss, Holston’s claim was

based on an ICT hearing where the ICT met to correct a typo-

graphical error, not to worsen Holston’s conditions of confine-

ment. Thus, Holston failed to allege a protected liberty interest

based on either increased restraint or a change in confinement con-

ditions at stake at the hearing where the ICT met to merely correct

a typographical error. Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1347. Because any at-

tempt to amend these claims would also be futile, the district court

properly dismissed this claim with prejudice.

E. False Imprisonment Claims

Next, Holston alleged two counts of false imprisonment

against Colonel Harriss, Dawson, English, Warden Severson, and

Major Scarpati, based on his placement in CM.

A claim of false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “re-

quires a showing of common law false imprisonment and a due

process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Campbell v.

Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009). A valid conviction de-

prives a criminal defendant “of his liberty to the extent that the

State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison

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system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise

violate the Constitution.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224

(1976).

Under Florida law, a “plaintiff must establish four elements

to prevail on a false imprisonment claim: (1) the unlawful deten-

tion and deprivation of liberty of a person; (2) against that person’s

will; (3) without legal authority or color of authority; and (4) which

is unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.” City

of Boca Raton v. Basso, 242 So. 3d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

2018) (quotation marks omitted). A lawful detention cannot be

considered false imprisonment. Johnson v. Barnes & Noble

Booksellers, Inc., 437 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2006).

Here, Holston is clearly confined within the Florida prison

system due to a valid criminal conviction, the prison officials have

authority to place Holston within CM, and Holston has established

no separate violation related to his CM detention. Thus, the dis-

trict court properly dismissed with prejudice Counts 8 and 12.

F. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims

In Count 10, Holston alleged that Colonel Harriss, Dawson,

English, Major Scarpati, Nurse Otwell, and Warden Severson in-

flicted intentional emotional distress by denying him medical care

and recommending that he be housed in CM. The district court

dismissed this claim because Holston’s claims failed to allege

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18 Opinion of the Court 22-11198

outrageous conduct under Florida law, and it alternatively con-

cluded that his claim was barred pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 2

Under Florida law, to state a claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress, the plaintiff must allege: “(1) deliberate or

reckless infliction of mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct;

(3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress

was severe.” Thomas v. Hosp. Bd. Of Dirs., 41 So. 3d 246, 256 (Fla.

2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steadman, 968 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. 2d Dist.

Ct. App. 2007)). Outrageous conduct is behavior that is “so outra-

geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and

utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc.,

948 So. 2d 921, 928 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Allen v.

Walker, 810 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).

Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice

this count. Notwithstanding the district court’s alternative ruling

regarding the applicability of § 1997e(e), the dismissal was proper

because Holston failed to allege any kind of “outrageous conduct.”

Accepting Holston’s allegations as true, none of the Defendants’

2 On appeal, Nurse Otwell continues argue that Count 10 is procedurally

barred under § 1997e(e). However, we will not reach this issue because we

affirm the district court's dismissal on other grounds supported by the record.

See Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1097 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding

that this Court may affirm a district court decision for any reason supported

by the record).

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actions can be interpreted as “extreme” or as going “beyond all pos-

sible bounds of decency” to be considered “atrocious.” Id.

G. Federal & State Conspiracy Claims

In Counts 9 and 13, Holston alleged that Colonel Harriss,

Dawson, English, Major Scarpati, Nurse Otwell, and Warden Sev-

erson conspired against him to violate his Eighth, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

To adequately state a claim for a conspiracy under § 1983,

the “plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendants reached an under-

standing or agreement that they would deny the plaintiff one of his

constitutional rights; and (2) the conspiracy resulted in an actual

denial of one of his constitutional rights.” Weiland v. Palm Beach

Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1327 (11th Cir. 2015).

Under Florida law, there is no freestanding cause of action

for a civil conspiracy. Tejera v. Lincoln Lending Servs., LLC, 271 So.

3d 97, 103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, to state a claim for

a civil conspiracy, the “plaintiff must allege and underlying inde-

pendent tort. The conspiracy is merely the vehicle by which the

underlying tort was committed.” Id. Where the counts regarding

the goals of the conspiracy fail, the conspiracy count must also fail.

Palm Beach Cnty. Health Care Dist. v. Prof’l Med. Educ., Inc., 13 So. 3d

1090, 1096 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Here, the district court

properly dismissed with prejudice these counts because, as ex-

plained above, his underlying constitutional and state law tort

claims already fail.

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-11198

H. Florida RICO Claims

Finally, Holston asserted a Florida RICO claim against Daw-

son, Snider, Major Scarpati, and Warden Severson, accusing them

of seven distinct wrongdoings: (1) not serving him coffee for 372

days; (2) imposing restrictions on other inmates “for any or no rea-

son at all,” depriving them of the use of their property; (3) conceal-

ing inmate violence; (4) falsely reporting that Holston attempted to

extort English; (5) encouraging Smith to falsify Holston’s CM rec-

ommendation; (6) relying on a false CM report in a CM recommen-

dation; and (7) including false information in a CM recommenda-

tion.

To sufficiently allege a Florida RICO claim, which is ana-

lyzed under the same standards as federal RICO claims, the plaintiff

must plead “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern

(4) of racketeering activity.” Omnipol, A.S. v. Multinational Def.

Servs., LLC, 32 F.4th 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). An “enterprise” is any individual or

group of individuals associated in fact. Fla. Stat. § 895.02(5). Com-

mitting a “racketeering activity” means someone is committing, at-

tempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting, coercing,

or intimidating another person into committing the crimes out-

lined in the statute. Fla. Stat. § 895.02(8)(a).

Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice

Count 14 because he failed to allege facts supporting the conclusion

that Dawson, Snider, Major Scarpati, or Warden Severson

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22-11198 Opinion of the Court 21

participated in any behavior that would qualify as racketeering ac-

tivity under Florida law.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM the district

court’s dismissal with prejudice of Holston’s second amended

complaint. 3

3 Holston also moved this Court for leave to file a single copy of his reply brief,

which is GRANTED.