Contreras v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago

2023 IL App (1st) 220734

No. 1-22-0734

Order filed November 3, 2023

FIFTH DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ALFREDO CONTRERAS, ) On Petition for Review from a Final

) Administrative Decision of the

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Board of Education of the City of

) Chicago

v. )

) Board Resolution No. 22-0427-RS6

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF )

CHICAGO, PEDRO MARTINEZ, Chief )

Executive Officer, and ILLINOIS STATE )

BOARD OF EDUCATION )

)

Defendants-Appellees. )

PRESIDING JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice Mikva and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We reverse the Board’s decision to terminate a tenured teacher where that decision

was based on factual finding against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Board clearly

erred in concluding that the teacher’s conduct was per se irremediable.

¶2 Plaintiff Alfredo Contreras appeals the Board of Education of the City of Chicago’s

administrative decision dismissing him from his position as a teacher. The issues presented are (1)

whether the Board’s findings of fact were against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (2)

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whether the Board’s conclusion that Contreras’s conduct was per se irremediable was clearly

erroneous. We reverse.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Alfredo Contreras is a tenured teacher at John F. Kennedy High School in Chicago. On

April 30, 2019, the Chief Executive Officer of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago

approved charges and specifications seeking Contreras’s dismissal. The charges listed violations

of sexual harassment, negligence and Title IX non-discrimination policies, as well as violations of

the Illinois School Code.

¶5 The Board charged Contreras with misconduct relating to three students, S.C., N.S., and

L.D. Concerning S.C., the Board alleged that in 1998 Contreras took then-student S.C. to a movie

theater where he kissed and fondled her breast. As to N.S., the Board’s specification alleged

Contreras made inappropriate and flirtatious comments. Finally, the Board’s specification alleged

that Contreras had likewise made inappropriate and flirtatious comments to multiple students,

including L.D. and B.T.

¶6 A hearing was held over two days in February and March 2020 before a mutually agreed

upon hearing officer. The Board presented the testimony of George Szkapiak, principal of Kennedy

High School, Camie Pratt, Chief Title IX Officer for Chicago Public Schools, and student L.D.

Contreras testified in his own defense. The Board listed and subpoenaed two other witnesses, N.S.

and S.C., but neither testified. After post-hearing briefing, the hearing officer concluded that the

Board had failed to prove that it had cause to dismiss Contreras because there was insufficient

evidence to prove he engaged in all of the conduct as alleged. The hearing officer further found

that while Contreras conceded to some of the conduct, that behavior was remediable and could

have been corrected through retraining.

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¶7 The Board then issued its report, accepting the hearing officers finding that Contreras’s

comments were inappropriate teacher-student interaction, but rejecting the rest of the hearing

officer’s findings and concluding that it had sufficiently proven cause to terminate Contreras. The

Board further concluded that Contreras’s conduct was irremediable per se and terminated his

employment.

¶8 ANALYSIS

¶9 Contreras argues that the Board’s findings of fact were against the manifest weight of the

evidence, and even if they were not, the Board’s findings do not support the decision to terminate

Contreras’s employment. The Board argues in response that its factual findings are supported by

the evidence, and because Contreras’s conduct was per se irremediable, it was justified in

terminating his employment.

¶ 10 A.

¶ 11 A tenured Chicago public school teacher cannot be fired except “for cause.” 105 ILCS

5/34-85(a) (West 2020). A dismissed teacher appeals the Board’s decision directly to the Illinois

Appellate Court, and review is conducted under the Administrative Review Law. Id. § 34-85(a).

Under the Administrative Review Law, the proper standard of review depends on whether the

question presented is one of fact, of law, or a mixed question of fact and law. Beggs v. Board of

Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50. The

Board’s findings of fact are held prima facie true and correct. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2020).

Factual findings are reviewed under a manifest weight of the evidence standard., questions of law

are reviewed de novo, and mixed questions of law and fact under a clearly erroneous standard. City

of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998) Under the manifest

weight standard, we do not disturb the Board’s findings unless the opposite conclusion is clearly

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evident. Id. However, the Board’s determination of cause to dismiss is a mixed question, reviewed

under a clearly erroneous standard. Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 63.

¶ 12 In all, the Board made ten specific factual findings. Findings 1-4 concern allegations related

to student N.S., findings 5-9 concern allegations related to student L.D. Finding 10 concerns the

irremediability of Contreras’s conduct as a whole. Each will be addressed in turn below.

¶ 13 As a threshold issue, the Board solicited the testimony of Camie Pratt, Chief Title IX

Officer for Chicago Public Schools, as an expert in the field of Title IX policy. In its response to

Contreras’s request for identification of expert witnesses, the Board stated Pratt would testify to

“the nature of the sexual harassment and psychological harm experienced by the alleged victims

in this matter.” At the hearing, Pratt was admitted for and testified to solely Title IX and sexual

harassment policy. The Board cites Pratt’s limited testimony to support several factual findings.

Questions to Pratt were framed as hypotheticals with factual allegations which had not been

proven. To the extent the Board credits Pratt’s testimony to prove any of its factual allegations,

such testimony is disregarded.

¶ 14 Unproven Specification Concerning S.C.

¶ 15 There is no dispute that the principal charge in this case went unproven. The centerpiece

of the Board’s Amended Dismissal Charges was an allegation from 1998 that Contreras took a

student, S.C., to a movie theater where he kissed her and fondled her breasts. 1 S.C. never testified,

and the only evidence in the record is Contreras’ denial that the incident took place.

¶ 16 Despite being under administrative subpoena, S.C. did not appear at the hearing. What is

of interest is how the Board chose to characterize this failure of proof in ancillary proceedings

below. After the hearing officer denied a second continuance to secure S.C.’s testimony, the Board

1

On four prior occasions (in 1998, 1999, 2002 and 2015), the Board investigated this charge, but

Contreras was never more than temporarily removed from the classroom.

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No. 1-22-0734

took the extraordinary step of filing a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County seeking to

compel a continuance of the administrative hearing. The effort proved unsuccessful, but in its

complaint the Board alleged that “S.C. is an essential witness, and Plaintiff has no way of proving

its case without her testimony.” Further, in its emergency motion for a temporary restraining order,

the Board argued “[i]f Plaintiff is not allowed to present the testimony of essential witness S.C., it

will have no chance to meet its burden of proof in the dismissal hearing***[the Board] will almost

certainly receive an adverse decision***, which will require Contreras’s reinstatement.” Thus, it

seems that the Board itself recognized that the case for Contreras’ dismissal depended on testimony

from a witness (S.C.) that we now know never appeared.

¶ 17 Board’s Findings Concerning N.S.

¶ 18 Finding 1: “In or about February 2015, Respondent said to fourteen-year-old female

student N.S., ‘Can we keep this between you and me? You look a lot better holding

the [classroom] door than I do.’”

¶ 19 At the hearing, Contreras conceded that he did tell N.S. “You look a lot better holding the

[classroom] door than I do.” Contreras testified he made this comment before class began when

N.S. asked to pass out papers to students entering the classroom. Contreras denied ever saying

“Can we keep this between you and me?” or any similar phrase. Contreras testified he would often

compliment students as a form of acknowledgement and to make them feel welcome. Contreras

also conceded that he did tell students they were being rude as a form of discipline when they

criticized him or his appearance, but denied failing to acknowledge N.S. in class. Kennedy High

principal George Szkapiak testified to the veracity of an investigative report concerning the

incident. Szkapiak testified that two assistant principals were investigating a grading issue in

Contreras’s class, and during the course of the investigation heard a complaint from N.S. about the

comment made to her by Contreras. The hearing officer allowed Szkapiak to testify to N.S.’s

first-hand statements contained within the report over Contreras’s counsel’s objection that such

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No. 1-22-0734

statements were hearsay or double hearsay. The Board’s counsel assured the hearing officer that

N.S. would testify to her own statement, and the hearing officer allowed Szkapiak’s testimony

“with that caveat.” The Board did not produce N.S. to testify. Szkapiak then testified that

subsequent to the incident, he met with N.S.’s parents pursuant to policy, stating “[w]e came to a

consensus that [N.S.] did not feel comfortable in Mr. Contreras’s class.” N.S. was then transferred

to another math class.

¶ 20 The hearing officer found that without N.S.’s testimony, the only fact the Board had

managed to prove was that Contreras told N.S. “you look a lot better holding the [classroom] door

than I do,” based on his own admission. The Board had failed to prove Contreras asked to keep

the statement between the two of them, or that he had “played games and/or acted flirtatiously”

with N.S. The Board rejected this finding and found instead that it had proven the charge.

¶ 21 Though the strict rules of evidence are not applicable, due process generally precludes the

admission of hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings. Kimble v. Illinois State Board of

Education, 2014 IL App (1st) 123436, ¶ 79. When there is sufficient competent evidence to support

an administrative decision, however, the admission of hearsay testimony is not prejudicial error.

Id. The conformity to legal rules of evidence is not necessary because the hearing officer is “the

judge of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence offered,” and has “the power to make

rulings, including the power to exclude evidence.” 23 Ill. Adm. Code 51.60(d)(2)-(3) (2012).

¶ 22 The Board’s findings must be based on competent evidence to survive review. Jackson v.

Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 141388, ¶ 27. The hearing officer found

that much of the investigative report upon which Szkapiak’s testimony was based was hearsay, and

the Board was only allowed to present this evidence by assuring the hearing officer that N.S. would

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testify. Because N.S. did not testify, there is no other competent evidence to corroborate her first-

hand accounts of what occurred or how she felt about the incident.

¶ 23 Accordingly, Finding 1 is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Contreras conceded

he told N.S. she looked better holding the door than he did, but because the Board provided no

competent evidence that Contreras said, “Can we keep this between you and me?” or words to

similar effect, that element of the finding is unsupported.

¶ 24 Finding 2: “Respondent’s statement to N.S. was an inappropriate interaction between

a teacher and a student.”

¶ 25 Finding 2 is within the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 26 Finding 3: “Contreras later discriminated against N.S. by telling her that she was

being “rude” to him and by failing to acknowledge her in class.”

¶ 27 While Contreras admitted he might have told N.S. she was being rude, the manifest weight

of the evidence does not support Finding 3, that he failed to acknowledge her or that he

discriminated against her in any way. The only evidence the Board offered to support this

contention was Szkapiak’s testimony as to N.S.’s statements given to an assistant principal, which

amount to double hearsay and are not otherwise corroborated. Further, nothing in Contreras’s or

Szkapiak’s testimony supports a finding of discrimination against N.S.

¶ 28 Finding 4: “Contreras’s statement to N.S. resulted in her transfer out of

Contreras’s class.”

¶ 29 Finding 4 fails because the Board presented insufficient evidence of causation between

Contreras’s comment and N.S.’s transfer out of his class. Szkapiak was only able to testify to the

administrative steps taken after the comment was made. Szkapiak never testified that Contreras’s

comment was the reason the transfer was made. His testimony reveals that N.S. told an assistant

principal about the comment while being questioned pursuant to an investigation into

discrepancies between another student’s and her grades, and when asked about disciplining N.S.,

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Contreras testified to catching her cheating. Szkapiak testified to notifying N.S.’s parents about

the incident, about which he said, “We came to a consensus that [N.S.] did not feel comfortable in

Mr. Contreras’s class.” Afterwards, “we ended up changing her schedule to another math class so

she wouldn’t have to be in the class.” Szkapiak was not asked by either side for the explicit reason

for transfer. The record is silent as to the reason for N.S.’s transfer.

¶ 30 Board’s Findings Concerning L.D.

¶ 31 Finding 5: “During the 2016-17 school year, Contreras asked fifteen-year-old female

student L.D. why she was with her boyfriend and/or told her to “stay away” from

her boyfriend, or words to that effect.”

¶ 32 Finding 5 is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Contreras testified that he

did make a statement to L.D. regarding her boyfriend out of concern for L.D. Contreras testified

that he had observed L.D’s behavior become more confrontational and aggressive, that he

witnessed a fight nearly break out involving L.D. and another student, and he knew L.D.’s

boyfriend was involved in gangs and frequently in trouble at school. L.D. testified to Contreras

making the same comment.

¶ 33 Finding 6: “Contreras’s statement to L.D. regarding her boyfriend was an

inappropriate interaction between a teacher and a student.”

¶ 34 Likewise, Finding 6 is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. L.D. testified that

Contreras’s comment made her uncomfortable, and the evidence sufficiently supports the

determination that it was an inappropriate interaction between a teacher and student.

¶ 35 Finding 7: “From February 2015 until on or about July 25, 2018, Contreras made

inappropriate and/or flirtatious comments to various other students at Kennedy High

School including seventeen-year-old female student B.T. and eighteen-year-old female

student L.D.”

¶ 36 As to Finding 7, the Board presented no evidence of any additional comment made to either

L.D. or any other student, and Contreras expressly denied making any such comments. The Board’s

finding specifically mentions student B.T., who did not testify at the hearing and about whom no

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evidence was presented. The Board acknowledged that the evidence presented was “less than

clear,” yet supports this finding by quoting its own post-hearing brief, in which it condenses over

four pages of hearing testimony to conclude that Contreras “regularly devoted an inordinate

amount of attention to female students and ignored male students.” Szkapiak testified to a single

in-class observation of Contreras assisting a group of female students. When asked why, Contreras

told Szkapiak that the students were bilingual and required extra assistance. The Board did not

explain what evidence undercuts Contreras’s testimony or why his explanation qualified as

“inordinate” attention. The remainder of the testimony does not establish any other comment

Contreras made to L.D. or B.T., let alone one that was flirtatious or inappropriate.

¶ 37 Moreover, this allegation was not included in the written charges served upon Contreras.

Section 34-85 requires the Board to approve written charges against teachers in order to initiate

proceedings. 105 ILCS 5/34-85. “The Board's failure to notify the teacher in advance that evidence

concerning these two matters would be presented at the hearing precludes the Board from seeking

to base a dismissal on these charges or from considering evidence on them.” Aulwurm v. Board of

Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 67 Ill. 2d 434, 437 (1977).

¶ 38 Finding 8: “Student L.D. perceived Contreras to be staring at the breasts of female

students.”

¶ 39 This allegation was likewise not included in the original or amended charges against

Contreras. The Board argues that the Amended Specification should have put Contreras on notice

that L.D.’s testimony would concern “verbal and non-verbal communication with students.”

Contreras testified, however, that prior to the hearing he had never been made aware of this

allegation. The purpose of approved charges is to put the accused on notice of the accusations

against them, and to provide them an opportunity to meet those allegations. Even so, L.D.’s

testimony on this issue was, in the Board’s words, “less than clear.” When asked about looks that

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made her uncomfortable, L.D. equivocated on whether the looks were directed at her, at other

students, or even at the students’ breasts. Yet the Board credits the “significance of her perception”

in support of this finding. The Board presented no other testimony to corroborate L.D.’s, and

Contreras denied the accusation. Even if the Board were permitted to seek dismissal based on this

finding, it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 40 Finding 9: “Contreras’s inappropriate comments and stares caused student L.D. to

refrain from seeking instructional assistance offered by Contreras during her lunch

period, and to seek help from another instructor instead.”

¶ 41 L.D. testified that she did avoid accepting Contreras’s help during lunch periods, and

instead sought help from Kennedy High’s “math lab,” a tutoring resource taught by a female

instructor. The manifest weight of the evidence supports Finding 9.

¶ 42 In sum, Findings 2, 5, 6, and 9 are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

Findings 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8 are either against the manifest weight of the evidence or wholly

unsupported.

¶ 43 B.

¶ 44 To determine whether conduct was irremediable, we look first to the statute. Section 34-85

was amended in 1995 to define per se irremediable conduct as “cruel, immoral, negligent, or

criminal or *** that in any way causes psychological or physical harm or injury to a student[.]”

105 ILCS 34-85(a).

¶ 45 As to whether Contreras’s conduct was per se irremediable under section 34-85, the

Board’s decision characterized this conclusion as one of law, yet on appeal it argues this is instead

a finding of fact. Our case law has considered it either a question of fact or a mixed question of

law and fact. See Crawley v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st) 181367,

¶ 17 (“Whether a cause for dismissal is irremediable is a question of fact.”); Russell v. Board of

Education of City of Chicago, 379 Ill. App. 3d 38, 47 (2007) (“The question of whether Russell’s

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conduct was irremediable is a mixed question of law and fact.”). The determination that conduct

is irremediable per se excepts the Board from the statutory requirement that a teacher be given a

warning and an opportunity to correct objectionable conduct before charges are approved. 105

ILCS 5/34-85(a). Because this review examines the legal effect of the Board’s factual finding that

Contreras’s conduct was cruel, immoral, negligent, or caused psychological harm, we are

presented with a mixed question of fact and law. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. We therefore

examine the Board’s factual findings under a manifest weight standard, and the application of those

findings to the statutory language under a clearly erroneous standard. An administrative decision

is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire

evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Beggs, 2016

IL 120236, ¶ 50 (quoting AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security,

198 Ill. 2d 380, 393 (2001)).

¶ 46 The Board characterized Contreras’s conduct as “cruel.” “Cruel” is undefined in the statute,

“cruelty” is commonly defined as “the intentional infliction of mental or physical suffering on a

living creature, especially a human.” Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The Board supported

its characterization with hearing testimony where L.D. stated that in hindsight, she considered

Contreras’s comments about her relationship to be “disrespectful.” The Board provided no further

support for its conclusion. In light of the record, the Board’s characterization of Contreras’s

conduct as “cruel” is clearly erroneous. There is a considerable divide between disrespectful

comments and cruel conduct, and even the most deferential review of the Board’s finding results

in our arriving at the opposite conclusion. Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50.

¶ 47 In arguing that Contreras’s conduct was immoral, the Board cites this court’s opinion in

Ahmad v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago defining immoral conduct as “shameless”

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conduct showing “moral indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the

community.” Ahmad, 365 Ill. App. 3d 155, 165 (2006). In Ahmad, the dismissed teacher

impersonated an agent of Chicago Public Schools to procure school supplies at a heavily

discounted cost, with the intent of selling those supplies in her own private business. Id. at 160.

Such conduct clearly fit the definition of immoral, bordering on criminal. Id. at 165.

¶ 48 A survey of our prior cases addressing what constitutes “immoral” conduct demonstrates

the Board’s conclusion as to Contreras is unsupported. See, e.g., Ball v. Board of Education of City

of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 120136 (teacher’s conduct was immoral and negligent where her

failure to supervise special needs students enabled them to engage in sexual activity on school

property and she gave false statements to investigators); Jones v. Board of Education of City of

Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 122437 (teacher engaged in immoral conduct where she fraudulently

enrolled her nonresident children in a Chicago school so they could receive tuition-free

educations); Younge v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 338 Ill. App. 3d 522 (2003) (teacher

engaged in immoral and criminal conduct by going to work under the influence of marijuana); but

see Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141388 (teacher did not engage in immoral conduct when omitted

prior termination on job application and failed to report test cheating). In these prior cases, the bar

for terming conduct “immoral” was considerably higher than the facts presented in the instant case.

¶ 49 Unlike Ahmad, the record here does not contain “an abundance of evidence demonstrating

plaintiff engaged in conduct” that could be considered immoral. Ahmad, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 165.

No facts presented here rise to the level of a teacher’s dereliction of his teaching duty or

misappropriation of tens-of-thousands of dollars of fraudulently obtained school supplies for

personal gain. The conclusion that Contreras’s conduct is “shameless” or demonstrates “moral

indifference” to such an extent it could be considered immoral is clearly erroneous.

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¶ 50 The Board argues Contreras was negligent based on its finding that Contreras’s conduct

was inappropriate. In its report, the Board states the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 10.01 for

Negligence and concludes, “In finding Contreras’s conduct inappropriate, the Board notes that a

reasonably careful teacher would not make the comments to students that Contreras made.”

Conduct does not rise to the level of negligence merely because it is also inappropriate. The

distinction between remediable and irremediable conduct is predicated on inappropriate behavior;

without it there would be nothing to remediate. Conduct must be, to varying degrees, inappropriate

to be considered cause for dismissal. Section 34-85(a) strictly contemplates remediation, as it

requires a warning and a provision of an opportunity to cure the cause for dismissal before formal

charges may be issued. If any behavior that could be considered inappropriate is sufficient to

trigger the per se irremediable exception to the warning requirement, then the exception swallows

the rule. Board of Education of City of Chicago v. Moore, 2021 IL 125785, ¶ 20 (“Each word,

clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not

be rendered superfluous.”).

¶ 51 Finally, the Board argues that Contreras’s conduct caused psychological harm to students.

The Board presented no expert testimony as to the psychological harm suffered by the affected

students, but cited N.S.’s subsequent transfer out of Contreras’s class and L.D.’s testimony where

Contreras’s comments made her uncomfortable as interfering with both students’ ability to learn.

N.S.’s transfer is not itself evidence of her psychological condition, and the characterization of her

feeling “uncomfortable” in Contreras’s class was provided by Szkapiak and is not competent

evidence of the non-testifying witness’s psychological condition. L.D.’s testimony that she felt

uncomfortable in Contreras’s class and sought assistance from a math tutor likewise does not

establish psychological harm to bring it within the definition contemplated by section 34-85. 105

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ILCS 5/34-85. This court has found teachers to have inflicted psychological harm on their students

in cases where they meted out corporal punishment (M.F. Booker v. Board of Education of City of

Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 151151; Brown v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2021 IL App

(1st) 200727-U), where they revealed to students and staff that a student was suicidal (Williams v.

Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 211167-U), and actively discriminated

against homeless children and youth in enrollment policies (Prato v. Vallas, 331 Ill. App. 3d 852

(2002)).

¶ 52 The Board argues that by using the phrase “in any way causes psychological or physical

harm or injury to a student,” the General Assembly intended to eliminate any requirement that the

harm to a student be significant before it qualifies as per se irremediable. Such an interpretation

impermissibly broadens the scope of this exception. The phrase “in any way” indicates the General

Assembly’s intent to encompass the innumerable ways a teacher may cause harm that are not

possible to delineate within a statute; it does not serve to encompass the similarly innumerable

ways students may be impacted by teachers’ conduct. This sentence is intended to set out a category

of teacher misconduct that is extreme to a greater degree than other forms of misconduct

contemplated by the statute. To interpret it as the Board suggests would broaden the scope of this

limited exception to allow any adverse impact on students, regardless of severity, to meet the

definition.

¶ 53 ______________________

¶ 54 A delay may be expected between an incident and the proceedings intended to rectify it,

but there is a substantial disconnect here between the Board’s insistence that Contreras’s conduct

was so severe that no warning was required to dismiss him, and the failure of any administrator,

from principal to Board, to attempt to warn or remediate the issue with Contreras in the interim

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three years. Remediable conduct is misconduct by a teacher that, if called to their attention, can

ordinarily be remedied. Ahmad, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 163. The Board offers no reason why the

conduct at issue could not be remediated by a conversation with Contreras, or the hearing officer’s

recommended refresher anti-harassment training. Rather, the Board’s inaction emphasizes the

arbitrary nature of its decision.

¶ 55 Over half of the Board’s factual findings are unsupported or against the manifest weight of

the evidence, and the findings actually proven (Findings 2, 5, 6, and 9) simply do not support the

conclusion that Contreras’s conduct was per se irremediable. The Board clearly erred in ordering

Contreras’s termination.

¶ 56 CONCLUSION

¶ 57 For all these reasons, the decision of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago is

reversed, and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 58 Reversed and remanded with directions.

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