State v. Hammond

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

10/20/2023 08:07 AM CDT

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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

315 Nebraska Reports

STATE V. HAMMOND

Cite as 315 Neb. 362

State of Nebraska, appellee, v.

Sheena Hammond, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed October 20, 2023. No. S-22-867.

1. Convictions: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of a criminal conviction,

an appellate court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to

the prosecution.

2. Motions to Suppress: Trial: Pretrial Procedure: Appeal and Error.

When a motion to suppress is denied pretrial and again during trial on

renewed objection, an appellate court considers all the evidence, both

from the trial and from the hearings on the motion to suppress.

3. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress:

Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-

press evidence based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment,

an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding

historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for

clear error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment

protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews indepen-

dently of the trial court’s determination. And where the facts are largely

undisputed, the ultimate question is an issue of law.

4. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Appeal and Error. An

appellate court applies a two-part analysis when reviewing whether a

consent to search was voluntary. As to the historical facts or circum-

stances leading up to a consent to search, the appellate court reviews

the trial court’s findings for clear error. However, whether those facts

or circumstances constituted a voluntary consent to search, satisfying

the Fourth Amendment, is a question of law, which the appellate court

reviews independently of the trial court. And where the facts are largely

undisputed, the ultimate question is an issue of law.

5. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Warrantless Searches.

Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I,

§ 7, of the Nebraska Constitution guarantee against unreasonable

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searches and seizures. Searches without a valid warrant are per se

unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically established and well-

delineated exceptions.

6. Warrantless Searches. The warrantless search exceptions Nebraska has

recognized include: (1) searches undertaken with consent, (2) searches

under exigent circumstances, (3) inventory searches, (4) searches of

evidence in plain view, and (5) searches incident to a valid arrest.

7. Warrantless Searches: Proof. It is the State’s burden to show that a

search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.

8. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Duress. Generally, to be

effective under the Fourth Amendment, consent to a search must be a

free and unconstrained choice, and not the product of a will overborne.

9. Warrantless Searches: Duress. Consent must be given voluntarily and

not as a result of duress or coercion, whether express, implied, physical,

or psychological.

10. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. The determination of whether

the facts and circumstances constitute a voluntary consent to a search,

satisfying the Fourth Amendment, is a question of law.

11. Search and Seizure. Whether consent to a search was voluntary is to be

determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving

of consent.

12. Search and Seizure: Police Officers and Sheriffs. Recitation of magic

words is unnecessary to give consent to a search. The key inquiry

focuses on what the typical reasonable person would have understood

by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.

13. Search and Seizure. Consent to search may be implied by action rather

than words.

14. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Warrantless Searches. While there is

no requirement that police must always inform citizens of their right to

refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search,

knowledge of the right to refuse is a factor to be considered in the vol-

untariness analysis.

15. Appeal and Error. When an issue is raised for the first time in an

appellate court, it will be disregarded inasmuch as a lower court cannot

commit error in resolving an issue never presented and submitted to it

for disposition.

16. ____. An alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifi-

cally argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to be considered

by an appellate court.

17. Warrantless Searches: Probable Cause. Probable cause, standing

alone, is not an exception that justifies the search of a person without

a warrant.

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STATE V. HAMMOND

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18. Criminal Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Arrests: Probable

Cause. Under Nebraska law, a person may be arrested without a war-

rant when an officer has probable cause to believe the person either

has committed a felony or has committed a misdemeanor in the offi-

cer’s presence.

19. Search and Seizure: Probable Cause: Appeal and Error. An appel-

late court determines whether probable cause existed under an objective

standard of reasonableness, given the known facts and circumstances,

but appellate courts should avoid an excessively technical dissection of

the factors supporting probable cause.

20. Probable Cause: Words and Phrases. The concept of probable cause,

as the name implies, is based on probabilities. It requires only a prob-

ability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing

of such activity.

21. Probable Cause: Police Officers and Sheriffs. To find probable cause,

officers are not required to rule out all innocent explanations for suspi-

cious facts.

22. ____: ____. Probable cause may be based on commonsense conclusions

about human behavior, and due weight should be given to inferences

by law enforcement officers based on their experience and special-

ized training.

Appeal from the District Court for Gage County: Ricky A.

Schreiner, Judge. Affirmed.

Lee Timan, of Nelson, Clark & Timan, P.C., for appellant.

Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Teryn Blessin for

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,

and Papik, JJ., and Pirtle, Chief Judge.

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Sheena Hammond appeals her convictions for possession of

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia following a stipu-

lated bench trial. Hammond’s primary contention is that the

district court erred when it overruled her motion to sup-

press. The court rejected her Fourth Amendment arguments,

concluding that (1) Hammond consented to a search of her

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vehicle, wherein certain illegal items were found, and (2) a

subsequent search of her person occurred incident to a valid

arrest. The critical issue is whether Hammond’s words and

actions manifested consent. Because we conclude that they

did, we affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

1. Police-Citizen Encounter

We begin by describing Hammond’s encounter with police

officers. In doing so, we generally recite the historical facts set

forth in the district court’s order overruling Hammond’s motion

to suppress. We supplement the court’s findings, as necessary,

with the parties’ stipulated facts that the district court received

as evidence at trial.

On September 5, 2021, Ethan Jordan, a police officer with

the Beatrice Police Department, and Brian Najera, an officer

in training, made initial contact with Hammond in response

to a call complaining about a possible intoxicated driver. The

reporting party stated that an individual was inside an automo-

tive parts store in Beatrice, Nebraska, “‘barely able to stand up

straight’” and “‘about to fall over,’” and the reporting party

was concerned about the possibility of her causing an accident

should she drive away.

Upon arriving at the automotive parts store, Jordan “con-

tacted” Hammond as she was standing by her vehicle in the

parking lot, while an employee of the store appeared to be

examining the inside of her vehicle through the open driver’s-

side door. Jordan testified that when he “contacte[d]” her,

Hammond was “very talkative, was making kind of quick

movements and appeared unable to stand still.” Jordan con-

cluded, based on his training in interdiction and “Advanced

Roadside Impairment & Drug Enforcement” training, that

Hammond “might be under the influence of a CNS stimulant.”

During Jordan’s conversation with Hammond about why he

was there and what he was doing, Hammond “denied being

under the influence of drugs or alcohol or driving errati-

cally.” Jordan asked Hammond if she would perform some

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STATE V. HAMMOND

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field sobriety maneuvers, and “video of this encounter [from

Jordan’s body camera] (Exhibit 2) indicate[d] she was fidgety

and talkative but cooperative and pleasant and did not object

to doing the requested maneuvers.” Hammond “was not hand-

cuffed or restrained in any manner during this time.” She was

able to lean into the open door of her vehicle and maintained

possession of her vehicle’s keys until she placed them on the

hood of her vehicle after being asked to do so by Jordan.

During the horizontal gaze nystagmus portion of the field

sobriety maneuvers, Jordan noted that “nystagmus was not

present, but that [Hammond’s] eyes were unable to converge

and she was swaying.” Jordan determined, based on his train-

ing and experience, that Hammond “did not appear to be

under the influence of alcohol, however, she did show signs

consistent of being under the influence of a CNS stimulant

(like methamphetamine).” Jordan asked Hammond when she

last “used” and if she had any illegal items in her vehicle, to

which Hammond responded that she did not. He then asked if

Hammond would mind if “‘we look,’” and she responded, “‘If

you absolutely need to . . . .’” Jordan again asked to “‘take a

look’” in Hammond’s vehicle, to which she responded, “‘If

you really need to go look, more power to you.’”

While the officers prepared to search Hammond’s vehicle,

she asked if they would hand her cigarettes to her, and Jordan

responded, “‘Absolutely.’” She then “stood by the vehicle and

made a call on her cell phone,” during which she asked some-

one to come to the automotive parts store “‘right now.’”

The officers then conducted a thorough search of

Hammond’s vehicle, during which Najera located a “folded

up” receipt “stuffed in the steering wheel cover that contained

a white crystalline substance that he recognized through

training and experience as possible methamphetamine.” The

receipt was from a gas station where Hammond had previ-

ously told the officers that she worked. Relying on Jordan’s

testimony and exhibit 2 (the video recording from Jordan’s

body camera), the court found that “at no time prior to . . .

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Najera finding the receipt in the steering wheel cover did . . .

Hammond ever ask them to stop searching.”

Immediately after Najera discovered “the possible metham-

phetamine,” Jordan took Hammond into custody, placed her

in handcuffs, and conducted a search of her person. Jordan

located “additional items of alleged illegal contraband during

that search,” including a syringe and a “micro baggie” contain-

ing a white crystalline substance. A crime laboratory report

later identified both white crystalline substances seized in the

encounter as methamphetamine.

2. Charges

The State filed an information charging Hammond with pos-

session of methamphetamine and possession of drug parapher-

nalia. Hammond pled not guilty to both charges.

3. Motion to Suppress

Prior to trial, Hammond filed a motion to suppress all of

the evidence obtained during the encounter. In the motion,

Hammond asserted that she did not voluntarily consent to the

initial search of her vehicle and that therefore, her arrest and

the subsequent search of her person were fruit of the poison-

ous tree. She further asserted that the officers did not have

probable cause to arrest her, because “[a]t the time [she] was

detained, law enforcement did not yet have confirmation that

the item found in her vehicle was in fact a controlled sub-

stance.” Hammond claimed that but for the “illegal arrest” and

the resulting search of her person, the officers would not have

discovered additional evidence.

The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress,

during which it received evidence, including an audio record-

ing of the call for service; video recordings from the officers’

body cameras, including exhibit 2, discussed above; and the

testimony of both officers.

Following the hearing, the district court entered an order

overruling Hammond’s motion for failure to allege a Fourth

Amendment violation. In overruling the motion, the court

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STATE V. HAMMOND

Cite as 315 Neb. 362

made specific factual findings we have already summarized.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, it concluded

that (1) the search of Hammond’s vehicle was based upon her

“voluntary consent” and (2) the search of Hammond’s person

occurred incident to a valid arrest.

4. Bench Trial and Convictions

The case proceeded to a bench trial on stipulated facts,

where Hammond preserved her objections raised in the motion

to suppress. The court received as evidence the exhibits pre-

viously presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress

and other exhibits, including photographs of the items seized

during the September 5, 2021, encounter; a crime laboratory

report; and a document setting forth the parties’ stipulated

facts. Neither party presented argument at trial.

Following trial, the court found Hammond guilty of both

crimes charged. It sentenced her to 36 months’ probation for

the possession of methamphetamine conviction and to a $100

fine for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction.

Hammond filed a timely appeal, which we moved to our

docket. 1

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Hammond assigns, restated, that the district court erred in

(1) overruling her motion to suppress the evidence seized in

the September 5, 2021, encounter; (2) overruling her renewed

objections to that evidence at trial; and (3) finding the evidence

was sufficient to support her convictions.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In an appeal of a criminal conviction, an appellate

court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution. 2

[2] When a motion to suppress is denied pretrial and

again during trial on renewed objection, an appellate court

1

See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022).

2

State v. Dailey, 314 Neb. 325, 990 N.W.2d 523 (2023).

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STATE V. HAMMOND

Cite as 315 Neb. 362

considers all the evidence, both from the trial and from the

hearings on the motion to suppress. 3

[3] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to sup-

press evidence based on a claimed violation of the Fourth

Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part standard of

review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews

the trial court’s findings for clear error, but whether those facts

trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question

of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial

court’s determination. And where the facts are largely undis-

puted, the ultimate question is an issue of law. 4

[4] A nearly identical standard of review applies to con-

sensual search cases. Because of the confusion we discuss

below, we set forth the entire correct standard. An appellate

court applies a two-part analysis when reviewing whether a

consent to search was voluntary. As to the historical facts or

circumstances leading up to a consent to search, the appellate

court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear error. However,

whether those facts or circumstances constituted a voluntary

consent to search, satisfying the Fourth Amendment, is a ques-

tion of law, which the appellate court reviews independently of

the trial court. And where the facts are largely undisputed, the

ultimate question is an issue of law. 5

We shifted to this articulation in 2009, 6 and we believe that

it is the better-reasoned approach. As one legal scholar, relying

on a decision of another state’s high court, has observed:

Underlying this position is the notion that “the concept

of ‘voluntariness’ reflects a balance between the need for

effective law enforcement and society’s belief that the

coercive powers of law enforcement must not be unfairly

exercised,” and that declaring “whether certain police

3

State v. Shiffermiller, 302 Neb. 245, 922 N.W.2d 763 (2019).

4

State v. Garcia, ante p. 74, 994 N.W.2d 610 (2023).

5

State v. Saitta, 306 Neb. 499, 945 N.W.2d 888 (2020).

6

See State v. Hedgcock, 277 Neb. 805, 765 N.W.2d 469 (2009).

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conduct is or is not unfairly coercive sets the norms that

fix the limits of acceptable police behavior,” norms that

“should have jurisdiction-wide application.” 7

But when we shifted the standard of review, we did so with-

out expressly repudiating old standards set forth in our prior

opinions, 8 which had required reviewing the voluntariness of

consent as a question of fact. Occasionally, these standards

have crept into lower court opinions that relied on our earlier

cases. 9 To eliminate any confusion, we now disapprove those

7

6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth

Amendment § 11.7(c) at 585 (6th ed. 2020) (quoting State v. Thurman,

846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)).

8

See, State v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668, 668 N.W.2d 448 (2003), abrogated on

other grounds, State v. Rogers, 277 Neb. 37, 760 N.W.2d 35 (2009); State

v. Tucker, 262 Neb. 940, 636 N.W.2d 853 (2001); State v. Chitty, 253

Neb. 753, 571 N.W.2d 794 (1998); State v. Aguirre-Rojas, 253 Neb. 477,

571 N.W.2d 70 (1997); State v. Ready, 252 Neb. 816, 565 N.W.2d 728

(1997); State v. Graham, 241 Neb. 995, 492 N.W.2d 845 (1992); State v.

Shurter, 238 Neb. 54, 468 N.W.2d 628 (1991); State v. Prahin, 235 Neb.

409, 455 N.W.2d 554 (1990); State v. Bowen, 232 Neb. 725, 442 N.W.2d

209 (1989); State v. Bonczynski, 227 Neb. 203, 416 N.W.2d 508 (1987);

State v. Peery, 223 Neb. 556, 391 N.W.2d 566 (1986); State v. Ferrell, 218

Neb. 463, 356 N.W.2d 868 (1984); State v. Christianson, 217 Neb. 445,

348 N.W.2d 895 (1984); State v. Garcia, 216 Neb. 769, 345 N.W.2d 826

(1984); State v. Billups, 209 Neb. 737, 311 N.W.2d 512 (1981); State v.

Ohler, 208 Neb. 742, 305 N.W.2d 637 (1981); State v. Morgan, 206 Neb.

818, 295 N.W.2d 285 (1980); State v. French, 203 Neb. 435, 279 N.W.2d

116 (1979); State v. Rathburn, 195 Neb. 485, 239 N.W.2d 253 (1976);

State v. Van Ackeren, 194 Neb. 650, 235 N.W.2d 210 (1975); State v.

Skonberg, 194 Neb. 550, 233 N.W.2d 919 (1975); State v. Holloway, 187

Neb. 1, 187 N.W.2d 85 (1971). See, also, In re Interest of Clinton G., 12

Neb. App. 178, 669 N.W.2d 467 (2003); In re Interest of Frederick C., 8

Neb. App. 343, 594 N.W.2d 294 (1999); State v. Tierney, 7 Neb. App. 469,

584 N.W.2d 461 (1998); State v. Butzke, 7 Neb. App. 360, 584 N.W.2d 449

(1998).

9

See, State v. Howell, 26 Neb. App. 842, 924 N.W.2d 349 (2019); State v.

Zuniga, 25 Neb. App. 706, 911 N.W.2d 869 (2018); State v. Bond, 23 Neb.

App. 916, 877 N.W.2d 254 (2016); State v. Turner, 23 Neb. App. 897, 880

N.W.2d 403 (2016).

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STATE V. HAMMOND

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prior opinions and the lower court opinions relying on them

to the extent that they set forth a different standard of review.

V. ANALYSIS

1. Motion to Suppress

In her first assignment of error, Hammond claims that the

district court erred when it overruled her motion to suppress

the evidence obtained during the September 5, 2021, encoun-

ter. She primarily challenges two aspects of this encounter: the

initial search of her vehicle and the subsequent search of her

person, following her arrest. It is undisputed that the officers

conducted both searches without a warrant. The State main-

tains that the searches were reasonable, asserting that certain

warrantless search exceptions applied.

Before addressing the parties’ specific arguments, we begin

by setting forth general legal principles. Then, we review the

district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Finally, we dis-

cuss the application of certain warrantless search exceptions to

these facts.

(a) General Legal Principles

[5,6] Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution guarantee

against unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches with-

out a valid warrant are per se unreasonable, subject only

to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-

tions. 10 The warrantless search exceptions Nebraska has rec-

ognized include: (1) searches undertaken with consent, (2)

searches under exigent circumstances, (3) inventory searches,

(4) searches of evidence in plain view, and (5) searches inci-

dent to a valid arrest. 11

[7] It is the State’s burden to show that a search falls within

an exception to the warrant requirement. 12 Here, the State

10

State v. Miller, 312 Neb. 17, 978 N.W.2d 19 (2022).

11

Id.

12

Id.

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relies on two exceptions to justify the reasonableness of the

searches, arguing that (1) the consent exception permitted the

initial search of Hammond’s vehicle and (2) the search incident

to a valid arrest exception justified the subsequent search of

Hammond’s person. We will discuss these exceptions in more

detail below.

(b) Historical Facts

At this point, our standard of review would require that we

review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. 13

However, Hammond conceded at oral argument that she does

not challenge the court’s findings of historical fact, and we

agree that they are supported by the record and not clearly

erroneous. Therefore, we turn to the ultimate question: whether

these facts established compliance with Fourth Amendment

protections as a matter of law.

(c) Resolving Alleged Fourth

Amendment Violations

Based on the historical facts, the district court reached a

conclusion of law that there was no Fourth Amendment vio-

lation for two reasons. It concluded that (1) the search of

Hammond’s vehicle was undertaken with consent and (2) the

search of her person occurred incident to a valid arrest. We

address the application of these exceptions to the facts and

reach an independent conclusion. 14

(i) Consent Exception

[8-11] We first address the State’s consent argument.

Generally, to be effective under the Fourth Amendment, con-

sent to a search must be a free and unconstrained choice, and

not the product of a will overborne. 15 Consent must be given

voluntarily and not as a result of duress or coercion, whether

13

See State v. Garcia, supra note 4.

14

See id.

15

State v. Saitta, supra note 5.

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express, implied, physical, or psychological. 16 The determina-

tion of whether the facts and circumstances constitute a volun-

tary consent to a search, satisfying the Fourth Amendment, is

a question of law. 17 Whether consent to a search was voluntary

is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances sur-

rounding the giving of consent. 18

On appeal, Hammond contends that her purported consent

was invalid for two primary reasons. She argues that there

was “implied coercion” and that her statement in response to

Jordan’s request to look in her vehicle was “ambiguous.” 19 We

are not persuaded.

Hammond’s sole authority on this issue is our prior deci-

sion in State v. Tucker. 20 In that case, she points out, we said

that “[m]ere submission to authority is insufficient to establish

consent to a search.” 21 However, she points to nothing in the

record to show mere submission in this case.

Here, Jordan asked whether Hammond would mind if “‘we

look’” in her vehicle, and she responded, “‘If you absolutely

need to . . . .’” He then asked a second time to “‘take a look,’”

to which Hammond responded, “‘If you really need to go look,

more power to you.’” The record shows that while the officers

prepared to search her vehicle, Hammond asked if they would

retrieve her cigarettes from the vehicle, and Jordan responded,

“‘Absolutely.’” Hammond then “stood by the vehicle and

made a call on her cell phone.”

These facts show that Jordan did not use coercion when

he asked to look in the vehicle. We agree with the State that

the video of the encounter did not show any threatening ges-

tures or a threatening tone of voice. Rather, the conversation

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Brief for appellant at 7.

20

State v. Tucker, supra note 8.

21

Brief for appellant at 7.

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between Jordan and Hammond was casual and cordial

throughout the encounter. Moreover, Jordan gave Hammond

the opportunity to refuse consent, but she allowed the search

to proceed without hesitation or protest. On these facts, we

conclude that Hammond’s will was not overborne and that she

did not merely acquiesce to coercion. We therefore reject her

implied coercion argument.

[12,13] We now turn to Hammond’s argument that her

response was ambiguous. This argument seems to overlook our

statement in Tucker that recitation of magic words is unneces-

sary to give consent to a search. The key inquiry focuses on

what the typical reasonable person would have understood

by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. 22 And,

as the State correctly points out, our subsequent cases have

stated that consent to search may be implied by action rather

than words. 23

Based upon the district court’s findings of fact and our

review of the record, we reach an independent legal conclu-

sion that the search of Hammond’s vehicle was undertaken

with consent. As noted above, the officers’ body cameras

recorded the encounter, and the district court received the

recordings as evidence. The body camera video shows that,

22

State v. Tucker, supra note 8.

23

State v. Saitta, supra note 5, 306 Neb. at 514, 945 N.W.2d at 901 (holding

that search of defendant’s glove was undertaken with consent when

police officer “‘simply asked’” for glove, and defendant “‘gave’” it to

him); State v. Modlin, 291 Neb. 660, 867 N.W.2d 609 (2015) (noting that

defendant allowed phlebotomist to draw his blood without doing anything

to manifest refusal). See, also, State v. Tucker, supra note 8 (noting that

after request to search his home, defendant responded by stepping back

and gesturing with his arms raised and his hands outward and upward);

State v. Juhl, 234 Neb. 33, 42, 449 N.W.2d 202, 209 (1989) (holding that

defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was not

violated when, in response to question from police officer as to what he

had in his jacket’s pocket, defendant raised his right arm and responded,

“‘[C]heck’”), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Messersmith, 238

Neb. 924, 473 N.W.2d 83 (1991).

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in addition to her statement, Hammond made a hand gesture

toward her vehicle. She then stood nearby and had a conver-

sation on her cell phone, without doing anything to manifest

her refusal, as the officers conducted a thorough search of

her vehicle. Consent may be implied from such actions. We

therefore reject her ambiguity argument and conclude that the

search of her vehicle was undertaken with consent.

For completeness, we briefly address two other matters. Part

of Hammond’s consent argument seems to suggest that Jordan

had a duty to expressly inform her of her right to refuse con-

sent. We disagree.

[14] While there is no requirement that police must always

inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permis-

sion to conduct a warrantless consent search, knowledge of

the right to refuse is a factor to be considered in the volun-

tariness analysis. 24 Here, to the extent that Hammond perhaps

relies upon this principle, she fails to point to anything in our

record to show that she did not have knowledge of the right to

refuse consent.

Additionally, Hammond asserted, for the first time at oral

argument, that her interaction with Jordan leading up to the

search of her vehicle constituted a “second-tier” encounter.

Based on the principles underlying such an argument, she

seemed to suggest that the encounter constituted a seizure

under the Fourth Amendment. 25 There are at least two prob-

lems with this argument.

[15,16] Generally, when an issue is raised for the first time

in an appellate court, it will be disregarded inasmuch as a

24

State v. Degarmo, 305 Neb. 680, 942 N.W.2d 217 (2020) (citing United

States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242

(2002)).

25

See State v. Drake, 311 Neb. 219, 229, 971 N.W.2d 759, 770 (2022) (“‘[t]he

second tier, the investigatory stop . . . is limited to brief, nonintrusive

detention during a frisk for weapons or preliminary questioning’” and “‘is

considered a seizure sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment safeguards’”).

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lower court cannot commit error in resolving an issue never

presented and submitted to it for disposition. 26 Further, an

alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifi-

cally argued in the brief of the party asserting the error to be

considered by an appellate court. 27 Because Hammond did not

raise this argument in her motion to suppress or her appellate

brief, we do not address it.

(ii) Search Incident to

Valid Arrest Exception

We next address the State’s search incident to a valid arrest

argument. The State contends that this exception applied to

the search of Hammond’s person, because, it asserts, probable

cause existed to arrest her for possession of a controlled sub-

stance. We agree.

[17-19] Probable cause, standing alone, is not an excep-

tion that justifies the search of a person without a warrant. 28

However, under Nebraska law, a person may be arrested with-

out a warrant when an officer has probable cause to believe

the person either has committed a felony or has committed a

misdemeanor in the officer’s presence. 29 An appellate court

determines whether probable cause existed under an objec-

tive standard of reasonableness, given the known facts and

circumstances, but appellate courts should avoid an exces-

sively technical dissection of the factors supporting prob-

able cause. 30

On appeal, Hammond maintains that the officers did not

have probable cause to arrest her for the crime of possessing

a controlled substance, after discovering the white crystalline

26

State v. Johnson, 314 Neb. 20, 988 N.W.2d 159 (2023).

27

State v. Fernandez, 313 Neb. 745, 986 N.W.2d 53 (2023).

28

State v. Saitta, supra note 5.

29

State v. Perry, 292 Neb. 708, 874 N.W.2d 36 (2016).

30

State v. Seckinger, 301 Neb. 963, 920 N.W.2d 842 (2018).

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STATE V. HAMMOND

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substance in her vehicle, and that the subsequent search of her

person was unlawful. She asserts that Jordan did not testify

as to any specifics that led him to believe this white crystal-

line substance was a controlled substance and that “Jordan did

not conduct a field test for this substance until he returned to

the police station, after he had already arrested [Hammond],

searched her person, and taken her to jail.” 31

[20-22] But the concept of probable cause, as the name

implies, is based on probabilities. It requires only a probability

or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual show-

ing of such activity. 32 In other words, to find probable cause,

officers are not required to rule out all innocent explanations

for suspicious facts. 33 Probable cause may be based on com-

monsense conclusions about human behavior, and due weight

should be given to inferences by law enforcement officers

based on their experience and specialized training. 34

Here, the known facts and circumstances show that it was

reasonable for the officers to believe that probable cause

existed to arrest Hammond. Two historical facts are par-

ticularly relevant. First, based on his specialized training and

experience, Jordan determined from the field sobriety maneu-

vers that Hammond “did not appear to be under the influence

of alcohol, however, she did show signs consistent of being

under the influence of a CNS stimulant (like methamphet-

amine).” Second, during the search of Hammond’s vehicle,

Najera located a “folded up” receipt “stuffed in the steer-

ing wheel cover that contained a white crystalline substance

that he recognized through training and experience as pos-

sible methamphetamine.” As noted above, these facts are not

in dispute.

31

Brief for appellant at 9.

32

State v. Seckinger, supra note 30.

33

Id.

34

State v. McGovern, 311 Neb. 705, 974 N.W.2d 595 (2022), cert. denied

___ U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 404, 214 L. Ed. 2d 201.

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Based on the totality of the circumstances, these facts estab-

lish probable cause to believe that Hammond had committed

a felony—specifically, possession of methamphetamine—in

the officers’ presence. We therefore conclude that probable

cause existed to arrest her and that the subsequent search of

her person occurred incident to a valid arrest. This argument

lacks merit.

2. Remaining Assignments of Error

Hammond derivatively assigns that the district court erred

in overruling her renewed objections to the evidence presented

at trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support her

convictions. She appears to concede that these assignments are

premised on her motion to suppress assignment.

Because Hammond’s premise fails, so do these claims. We

have already determined that the court did not err in overruling

the motion to suppress. It follows that it did not err in over-

ruling Hammond’s renewed objections, which were premised

on her arguments in the motion to suppress. And because the

court did not err in admitting the evidence, we cannot say

that the evidence—which included methamphetamine and drug

paraphernalia—was insufficient to support her convictions for

possession of those items.

VI. CONCLUSION

Because the search of Hammond’s vehicle was undertaken

with consent, and because the subsequent search of her person

occurred incident to a valid arrest, we conclude that the dis-

trict court did not err when it overruled Hammond’s motion to

suppress the evidence obtained as a result of those searches.

For that reason, Hammond’s remaining arguments, which are

premised on her motion to suppress, also fail. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment below.

Affirmed.

Freudenberg, J., not participating.