Opinion

Griffin v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

  • 2023 Ohio 3716
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
Sep 27, 2023
Status
Published
On the bench
Sadler
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 14.0%

The opinion

[Cite as Griffin v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2023-Ohio-3716.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

MARK GRIFFIN Case No. 2022-00339JD

Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler

Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck

v.

ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION

Defendant

{¶1} Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody and control of Defendant, brings this action

for negligence arising from allegations that he was electrically shocked and injured by the

light switch in his cell at the Toledo Correctional Institution (ToCI) on June 26, 2021. (A

separate claim for retaliation based upon Plaintiff’s use of the prison grievance system

was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on September 8, 2022.)

{¶2} On July 24, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant

to Civ.R. 56(B). Plaintiff filed responses on August 7 and 9, 2023. The motion is now

before the court for a non-oral hearing pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and L.C.C.R. 4.

{¶3} Civ.R. 56(C) states, in part, as follows:

{¶4} “Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and

written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A

summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or

stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to

but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion

for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or

stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” See also Gilbert v. Summit Cty.,

Case No. 2022-00339JD -2- ENTRY

104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, 821 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 6, citing Temple v. Wean United,

Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

{¶5} “The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing

the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Starner v. Onda, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 22AP-599, 2023-Ohio-1955, ¶ 20, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280,

293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). “The moving party does not discharge this initial burden

under Civ.R. 56 by simply making conclusory allegations.” Id. “Rather, the moving party

must affirmatively demonstrate by affidavit or other evidence allowed by Civ.R. 56(C) that

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Id. “Once the moving party discharges its initial burden, summary

judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party does not respond, by affidavit or as

otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists

for trial.” Hinton v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 2022-Ohio-4783, 204 N.E.3d 1174, ¶ 17

(10th Dist.), citing Dresher at 293; Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 674 N.E.2d

1164 (1997); Civ.R. 56(E).

{¶6} As the basis for its motion, Defendant argues that “[b]ecause DRC had no

actual or constructive notice of any hazard or defect that rendered the light in Mr. Griffin’s

cell unreasonably dangerous, DRC did not have a duty to protect him from that alleged

risk. Therefore, DRC cannot be held negligent as a matter of law.” Motion, p. 2.

{¶7} “In a negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached a duty owed to him and that

the breach proximately caused the injury.” Harris v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-81, 2019-Ohio-5137, ¶ 7.

{¶8} “Typically under Ohio law, premises liability is dependent upon the injured

person’s status as an invitee, licensee, or a trespasser. * * * However, with respect to

custodial relationships between the state and its inmates, the state has a duty to exercise

reasonable care to prevent prisoners in its custody from being injured by dangerous

conditions about which the state knows or should know.” Cordell v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab.

& Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-749, 2009-Ohio-1555, ¶ 6.

Case No. 2022-00339JD -3- ENTRY

{¶9} “Although the state is not an insurer of the safety of its prisoners, once the

state becomes aware of a dangerous condition in the prison, it is required to take the

reasonable care necessary to make certain that the prisoner is not injured.” Barnett v.

Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-1186, 2010-Ohio-4737, ¶ 23.

{¶10} To sustain his claim of negligence, it is Plaintiff’s “burden to demonstrate that

[Defendant] had notice of the condition of which he complains.” Id. at ¶ 23, citing Presley

v. Norwood, 36 Ohio St.2d 29, 31, 303 N.E.2d 81 (1973). “Notice may be actual or

constructive, the distinction being the manner in which the notice is obtained rather than

the amount of information obtained.” Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 11AP-606, 2012-Ohio-1017, ¶ 9. “Actual notice exists where the information

was personally communicated to or received by the party.” Jenkins v. Ohio Dept. of

Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-787, 2013-Ohio-5106, ¶ 23. “Constructive

notice is that notice which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as

a substitute for actual notice.” Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 09AP-1052, 2010-Ohio-4736, ¶ 14.

{¶11} Defendant, in support of its motion, submitted affidavits from two of its

employees: Matthew Wagner, who was a Correctional Sergeant at ToCI at all times

relevant to the complaint, and Benjamin Sommers, II, who was the Building Construction

Superintendent at ToCI at all times relevant to the complaint.

{¶12} Wagner avers, in part, that when an inmate is assigned to a new cell, staff

inspect the cell for safety and security issues, and staff also make “[q]uality rounds of

inmate living areas * * * on a routine basis for the purpose of assessing the functioning of

the specific units within the institution including any maintenance issue affecting the

area/location. Rounds include visual inspection of cells, examining operational issues,

and speaking with the inmates and inquiring about issues/concerns they may have.”

Wagner Affidavit, ¶ 5, 7. Unit staff are responsible for notifying the maintenance

department through a work order or other written record of any damage to cells or

potential hazard or defect so that such issues can be fixed or corrected. Id. at ¶ 6, 8-9.

“Inmates may also submit kites, internal complaints, and grievances to report and directly

pursue any concerns regarding inmate health and safety.” Id. at ¶ 10. From February 3,

2021, through the time of the incident on June 26, 2021, Plaintiff was the only inmate

Case No. 2022-00339JD -4- ENTRY

assigned to the cell in question, which was a single-occupancy cell in a restrictive housing

unit. Id. at ¶ 14, 17. Plaintiff “never reported or raised any concerns regarding the light

or conditions of his cell until after this incident”, nor had any other inmates previously

raised such concerns about the cell. Id. at ¶ 18-19. “Inspections and rounds of the unit

did not reveal or note any defect in Mr. Griffin’s cell or living areas in the months prior this

incident.” Id. at ¶ 20. Wagner states that prior to Plaintiff reporting the incident he “had

no knowledge of any defect with the light or potential electrical hazard in” the cell, nor

prior “knowledge of any inmate or DRC staff being shocked or otherwise injured by the

light in [the cell].” Id. at ¶ 21-22.

{¶13} In his affidavit, Sommers describes, in part, how cells are routinely inspected

for maintenance issues and how potential safety hazards, defects, or other issues are to

be documented in writing. Sommers Affidavit, ¶ 4-6. Sommers “reviewed all maintenance

records from 2021 and there were no work orders or documentation of any deficiency

and/or potential hazard” for the cell in question prior to the incident. Id. at ¶ 9. Sommers

avers that he “also reviewed [his] older communication and never received any kite,

informal complaint, or grievance from Mr. Griffin regarding any issues/concerns with the

light or conditions of [the cell] before this incident.” Id. at ¶ 11.

{¶14} Plaintiff’s responses are nearly devoid of any argument or legal authority but

he asserts that “[t]here is a genuine issue and material fact as to cause of plaintiff’s

electrocution, and shock, and (ODRC employees) listed it as; electrical failure, and

electrical malfunction,.” (Emphasis sic.) As evidence, Plaintiff submitted five documents

that he explains were received in discovery and which, in his view, are “related to actual

cause of electrical burn and shock.”

{¶15} Upon review, the affidavits of Wagner and Sommers demonstrate that

Defendant did not have notice of any hazard associated with the light switch in Plaintiff’s

cell before the incident. The documents that Plaintiff submitted in response include an

incident report, an inmate accident report, a work order request, a maintenance record,

and a Rules Infraction Board document, all of which were created after the incident. Even

when viewing the evidence most strongly in Plaintiff’s favor, the documents that he

submitted fail to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant had

notice of the alleged hazard. While it appears from at least one of these documents and

Case No. 2022-00339JD -5- ENTRY

others attached to the complaint that there was a dispute at some point about whether

the incident was caused by Plaintiff tampering with the light switch as opposed to some

other electrical failure for which he had no fault, the basis for Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment does not involve that issue and instead rests on the question of

whether Defendant had notice—actual or constructive—of the alleged hazard. On that

question, reasonable minds can only conclude that Defendant lacked notice and therefore

cannot be liable on Plaintiff’s claim of negligence. See Barnett, 2010-Ohio-4737, at ¶ 24

(in negligence claim, inmate failed to establish that prison had notice of a problem with

electric device that shocked him); Hill v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 12AP-265, 2012-Ohio-5304, ¶ (in negligence claim, prison visitor failed to establish

that prison had notice an electrical box cover had been removed).

{¶16} Based upon the foregoing, the court concludes that there are no genuine

issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As

a result, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and judgment is

hereby rendered in favor of Defendant. All previously scheduled events are VACATED.

Court costs are assessed against Plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice

of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

LISA L. SADLER

Judge

Filed September 27, 2023

Sent to S.C. Reporter 10/12/23

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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