108OAG108

108 [108 Op. Att’y

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES

BOARDS OF LIQUOR LICENSE COMMISSIONERS – LICENSE FEES

– HOW TO APPLY THE FEE ALLOCATION REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE HARFORD COUNTY LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD

CODIFIED IN § 22-208(A) OF THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES

& CANNABIS ARTICLE

W. Michael Crabbs

General Manager, Liquor Control Board for Harford County

You have asked for our interpretation of § 22-208(a) of the

Alcoholic Beverages and Cannabis Article, which governs the

disposition of fees that the Liquor Control Board for Harford

County (the “Board”) receives “from the issuance of licenses.” The

provision states that, after deducting “a proportionate share of the

expenses to administer and enforce” the alcoholic beverages laws

in Harford County and then withholding certain amounts for a

reserve account, “the Board shall pay the net proceeds of fees

received from the issuance of licenses” to specified local

governments in Harford County. Md. Code Ann., Alc. Bev.

& Cannabis (“AB”) § 22-208(a); see also id. (b) (governing the

reserve account). You have asked whether “fees received from the

issuance of licenses” means only the license fees themselves or

whether they also include application and transfer fees that the

Board collects as part of the licensing process, as well as late fees,

fines collected from licensees for violations of the liquor laws, and

refunds returned to the Board from various sources. As we explain

below, our opinion is that AB § 22-208(a) applies only to the

license fees themselves.

I

Background

The General Assembly has enacted “a comprehensive scheme

for the regulation, control and distribution of alcoholic beverages”

in Maryland. Coalition for Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No.

622, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 333 Md. 359, 371

(1994). “[U]nlike other regulated areas,” however, “there is not a

single agency that administers the alcoholic beverages law, but

rather numerous local boards that are charged with its

enforcement.” Board of Liquor License Comm’rs v. Hollywood

Prods., Inc., 344 Md. 2, 13 (1996). In Harford County, that task

falls to the Board, which “issues all alcoholic beverage licenses in

[the] County, transfers licenses from one person or entity to

another, from one location to another, or one license class to

Gen. 108] 109

another; issues per diem (one day) licenses for non-profit

organizations[;] and renews alcoholic beverage licenses on an

annual basis.” Functions & Regulations, Harford County Liquor

Control Board, http://www.hclcb.org/functions-regulations (last

visited Sept. 12, 2023).

The Board is a creature of statute.1 Title 22 of the Alcoholic

Beverages and Cannabis Article establishes the Board and sets

forth, among other things, the types of licenses it may issue, the

fees for each license, and how the Board is to dispose of “fees

received from the issuance of licenses.” AB § 22-208(a).

Section 22-208—the statute at issue here—provides that the

Board shall, “after deduction of a proportionate share of the

expenses to administer and enforce this title, including the salaries

of the members and employees of the Board”:

pay the net proceeds of fees received from the

issuance of licenses:

(1) outside of Aberdeen, Bel Air, and Havre

de Grace, to the Treasurer to be credited to the

general fund of the county; and

(2) in Aberdeen, Bel Air, and Havre de Grace,

to the treasurers of the respective municipalities

to pay the interest and redeem the principal of

any bonded indebtedness of the municipality.

1

Despite its name, the Board is officially a board of license

commissioners, not a liquor control board. See AB § 22-201

(establishing a board of license commissioners); AB § 22-301 (providing

that “[t]here is no liquor control board . . . in [Harford] [C]ounty”).

“Generally speaking, boards of license commissioners located in each

county license and regulate retail sellers of alcoholic beverages within

that county,” 99 Opinions of the Attorney General 31, 32 (2014),

whereas liquor control boards “regulate[] the sale and distribution of

alcohol through the operation of liquor dispensaries,” id. at 33. Harford

County once had both a liquor control board and a board of license

commissioners; “though charged with separate and distinct duties,” each

“consisted of the same membership.” 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 41 (Revisor’s

Note to AB § 22-301). But the County’s liquor dispensary system—the

domain of the liquor control board—ceased to exist in 1981. See id.; see

also 1979 Md. Laws, ch. 742 (abolishing the county’s liquor dispensary

system, as of September 1, 1981, subject to a voter referendum); Edna

Goldberg, Private Liquor Sales to Resume in Harford After 42-Year

Absence, Balt. Sun, July 20, 1981, at C1 (noting voters’ approval of the

referendum).

110 [108 Op. Att’y

AB § 22-208(a). The statute also allows some of the money

“distributed to the Board from license fees,” before being

distributed to the appropriate local jurisdictions, to go into a

“special, nonlapsing” Reserve Account, which, in addition to that

money from license fees, consists of fines collected and

recognizances forfeited for violations of the liquor laws, “interest

or other income earned from the investment of any portion of the

Reserve Account,” and “any other money from any other source

accepted for the benefit of the Reserve Account.” AB § 22-208(b).2

The Board collects various fees as part of the licensing

process. Each applicant pays a license fee, which varies by license

type.3 An applicant for an annual license must, in addition to the

license fee, pay a $600 application fee. Harford County Liquor

Control Board, How to Apply for a New or Transfer Annual

Alcoholic Beverage License in Harford County, Maryland 6 (rev.

June 2023). Applicants seeking to transfer a license from another

licensee must pay a $20 license change fee, and applicants who

want a hard copy of the Board’s rules and regulations must pay an

additional $10 fee. Id. Applicants for a per diem license must, in

addition to the license fee, pay a $1 mailing fee and, if applicable,

a $30 outside event fee and a $50 late fee. Harford County Liquor

Control Board, (Class C) Per Diem Alcoholic Beverage License

Application, Non-Profit Organizations 1 (rev. Apr. 2020).4 The

Board also receives income from fines imposed and recognizances

forfeited for violations of the alcoholic beverages laws, see AB

§ 22-2606, and “refunds that are returned to the Board from various

sources,” Memorandum from Amy K. Finneran, Legal Counsel, to

2

The purpose of the Reserve Account “is to ensure that issuance and

renewal of licenses, licensing enforcement, and other services that the

Board provides will continue to be met in the face of unanticipated

financial events or circumstances.” AB § 22-208(b)(3). The Reserve

Account may not exceed $100,000 at any time, id. (b)(10), and, each

year, “the amount payable into the Reserve Account may not be more

than 20% of the aggregate net proceeds received by the Board,” id.

(b)(8).

3

License fees are set by statute and, in Harford County, range in

amount from $15 for a fundraiser wine permit or a Class C per diem

license to sell beer and/or wine, AB §§ 4-1209(e), 22-1309.1(a), to

$10,000 for an annual stadium beer, wine, and liquor license, AB § 22-

1006(g).

4

Many of these fees, including the $600 application fee, do not appear

to be expressly authorized by statute. We have not been asked to

examine whether the Board has implied authority to charge these types

of fees and, thus, we do not address that question here. The $20 transfer

fee is, however, expressly authorized by AB § 22-1705.

Gen. 108] 111

Liquor Control Board for Harford County 1 (May 16, 2023)

(“Finneran Memorandum”).

The Board has interpreted AB § 22-208(a)—which requires

the Board to pay certain local governments “the net proceeds of

fees received from the issuance of licenses”—to apply only to the

balance of license fees themselves. Finneran Memorandum at 1.

The Board does not transmit the balance of any other fees it collects

in the licensing process, nor does it share any portion of the fines,

recognizances, or other income it receives. The Board now seeks

our interpretation of AB § 22-208(a).

II

Analysis

To determine the scope of the phrase “fees received from the

issuance of licenses,” we must interpret AB § 22-208 and try to

divine the General Assembly’s intent. E.g., Lewis v. State, 348 Md.

648, 653 (1998). We do this by, among other things, examining

the text of the statute, searching the legislative history, and

considering how the statute has changed over time. E.g.,

Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. Kemp, 476 Md. 149, 169-70 (2021)

(recognizing that statutory interpretation begins “with an

examination of the text” and may include a review of “the

legislative history . . . to confirm conclusions drawn from the text

or to resolve ambiguities”); Spiegel v. Board of Educ., 480 Md.

631, 643 (2022) (considering “the evolution of the statutes” at

issue).

A. Text of the Statute

“[O]ur analysis begins with the normal, plain meaning of the

language of the statute.” Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356,

376 (2021). As already noted, AB § 22-208(a) requires the Board

to pay certain local governments “the net proceeds of fees received

from the issuance of licenses.” The use of the word “fees” makes

clear that the Board need not turn over any share of the fines,

recognizances, refunds, or other income that does not come from

fees. See, e.g., State v. Glass, 386 Md. 401, 410 (2005)

(recognizing that one interpreting a statute “may neither add to, nor

delete, statutory language that is plain and unambiguous language

in order to reflect an intent not evidenced in that language” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). But that leaves the question of which

fees qualify as those “received from the issuance of licenses.”

112 [108 Op. Att’y

On that question, however, the text of § 22-208(a) is

ambiguous. To “issue” means “to put forth or distribute usually

officially”5 or “to produce or provide something official.”6 “[T]he

issuance of licenses,” then, ordinarily means the process of

officially providing licenses. One might reasonably conclude that

this process entails only the actual exchange of a license for a

license fee, in which case the “fees received from the issuance of

licenses” would mean license fees only. But one might also

reasonably conclude that the process of providing a license

encompasses the entire application procedure. As we understand

it, the Board will not issue a license unless it receives an

application, and it will not review an application—a prerequisite to

issuing a license—unless the applicant pays all attendant fees,

including, for instance, the $600 processing fee for an annual

license. Thus, one might reasonably conclude that all fees that the

Board charges in the license application process are “fees received”

by the Board “from the issuance of licenses.” Because there are

“two or more reasonable alternative interpretations,” the statutory

phrase is ambiguous, Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 (2004),

and we “must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative

intent in other indicia,” Wheeling, 473 Md. at 377 (quoting

Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 276 (2010)).

B. Legislative History

One place we often look for legislative intent is the legislative

history. But, in this case, it offers no insight. The Legislature

enacted AB § 22-208(a) in 2016 as part of the recodification of

former Article 2B into the Alcoholic Beverages Article. See 2016

Md. Laws, ch. 41, § 2, at 1751-53.7 “As with all other code revision

bills, this [was] a non-substantive revision.” Hearing on S.B. 724

Before the Senate Education, Health, and Environmental Affairs

Comm., 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 37:55 (Feb. 26, 2016) (testimony

of Susan Russell, Manager of Code Revision Projects, Dep’t of

Leg. Servs.). “Code revision is a periodic process by which

statutory law is re-organized and restated with the goal of making

it more accessible and understandable,” and it generally does not

“modify the law.” Smith v. Wakefield, LP, 462 Md. 713, 726

(2019). Not surprisingly, then, the legislative history for the code

5

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/issue (last visited Sept. 12, 2023).

6

Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/

english/issue (last visited Sept. 12, 2023).

7

Lawmakers renamed the article “Alcoholic Beverages and

Cannabis” this year. 2023 Md. Laws, ch. 254, 255, § 6.

Gen. 108] 113

revision legislation does not give any indication that lawmakers

discussed the language that became AB § 22-208 or its meaning.

We thus look beyond the legislative history of that legislation to

earlier iterations of the statutory language that now appears in AB

§ 22-208(a). See, e.g., Kimble v. State, 242 Md. App. 73, 81-86

(2019) (interpreting a statute by, among other things, consulting

earlier versions of the statute); see also Murrell v. Mayor & City

Council of Baltimore, 376 Md. 170, 186 (2003) (“The historical

background of a statute often casts light on the meaning or scope

of that statute.”).

C. Historical Evolution of the Statute

Much of the substance of what is now AB § 22-208 dates back

to 1937. See 1937 Md. Laws, ch. 272 (enacting § 421N of Article

13 of the Code of Public Local Laws). At that time, the County

Commissioners of Harford County issued licenses. See id.

(enacting § 421B of Article 13 of the Code of Public Local Laws).

The legislation authorized two kinds of licenses for Harford

County, id. (enacting § 421E of Article 13 of the Code of Public

Local Laws), specified the fee amount for each type of license, id.

(enacting § 421F of Article 13 of the Code of Public Local Laws),

and outlined how the Commissioners were to distribute the money

they received:

The net proceeds of all funds received by the

County Commissioners from the sale of

licenses under the provisions of this Act

issued in Harford County, outside of the

corporate limits of the municipalities of

Aberdeen, Bel Air and Havre de Grace, shall

be paid to the Treasurer of Harford County

and credited to the “Contingent Fund” of said

County Commissioners.

The net proceeds of the funds derived from the

sale of licenses issued to licensees within the

corporate limits of the municipalities of

Aberdeen, Bel Air and Havre de Grace, after

the deduction of a proportionate part of the

expenses incident to the proper administration

and enforcement of this Act, shall be paid by

said Commissioners to the Treasurers of said

respective towns, to be applied first to the

payment of the interest due on their respective

bonded indebtednesses, and second to the

114 [108 Op. Att’y

redemption of the principal of said bonded

indebtednesses.

Id. (enacting § 421N of Article 13 of the Code of Public Local

Laws) (emphasis added).8

The 1937 statute’s use of the phrase “sale of licenses”

suggests that the General Assembly was concerned only with the

disposition of license fees themselves, not any other fees that might

have been collected as part of the licensing process.9 Although we

cannot tell if there were in fact any other fees collected as part of

the licensing process at the time, the language suggests that, if so,

they would not have been covered. After all, “sale” means “the act

of selling,”10 and “sell,” in turn, means “to exchange (something)

for money”11 or “to give up (property) to another for something of

value (such as money).”12 Indeed, the term “sale price” is

commonly understood to mean “the price that is paid by the buyer

at the time when something is sold.”13 Thus, while the phrase

“issuance of licenses” might be read to include the entire licensing

process from application to receipt of a license, we think the phrase

8

In 1933, the General Assembly had enacted legislation with similar

language about the disposition of “funds derived from the sale of . . .

licenses.” 1933 Md. Laws, ch. 393 (enacting § 421M of Article 13 of

the Code of Public Local Laws). But that law allowed the Mayor and

Council of Havre de Grace to issue licenses in that municipality. Id.

(enacting § 421B of Article 13 of the Code of Public Local Laws). We

find the 1937 law more significant for our purposes because it was the

first to authorize a single entity (at that time the County Commission) to

issue all licenses in the County and to outline the disposition of funds

derived from the sale of licenses in each of the County’s municipalities,

not just Havre de Grace.

9

The legislation enacted in 1933, when the County Commissioners

issued all licenses except those in Havre de Grace, similarly used the

phrase “sale of licenses.” See 1933 Md. Laws, ch. 393 (enacting § 421M

of Article 13 of the Code of Public Local Laws, which specified the

disposition of “funds derived from the sale of . . . licenses” (emphasis

added)).

10

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/sale (last visited Sept. 12, 2023).

11

The Britannica Dictionary, https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/

sell (last visited Sept. 12, 2023).

12

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/sell (last visited Sept. 12, 2023).

13

Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/

english/sale-price (last visited Sept. 12, 2023).

Gen. 108] 115

“sale of licenses” suggests a narrower focus, limited to the actual

exchange of a license for the payment of a license fee.

To be sure, the use of the phrase “funds derived from the sale

of . . . licenses” in these versions of the statute still leaves some

ambiguity. If the Legislature intended to mandate the disposition

of only the license fees themselves, lawmakers could have

eliminated any ambiguity by simply using the phrase “license

fees.” Unfortunately, there is no legislative history that we may

consult to clarify the General Assembly’s intent. See, e.g., Guide

to Maryland Legislative History Research, Thurgood Marshall

State Law Library, https://mdcourts.gov/lawlib/research/research-

guides/guide-to-md-legislative-history-research (last visited Sept.

12, 2023) (noting that bill files containing legislative history for

each House and Senate bill were not routinely kept until 1976).

But later clues from the statute’s evolution confirm our

reading of the statute. In the years following 1937, the General

Assembly made slight changes to the statutory language and where

it appeared. In 1939, the Legislature established a liquor control

board for Harford County and gave it the power to issue alcoholic

beverage licenses. 1939 Md. Laws, ch. 734. Two years later,

lawmakers established that the liquor control board would serve

also as a board of license commissioners, and the General

Assembly amended the public local law regarding the distribution

of funds from the sale of licenses. 1941 Md. Laws, ch. 260

(establishing the board of license commissioners), ch. 500

(amending § 421N of Article 13 of the Code of Public Local Laws).

The Legislature replaced references to “County Commissioners”

with “the Board” but otherwise retained the substance of the earlier

version, including the phrases “funds received . . . from the sale of

licenses” and “funds derived from the sale of licenses.” Id.

The key change for our purposes, however, was that

lawmakers, as part of the 1941 legislation, added a new paragraph

that referred to the funds received or derived from the “sale” of

licenses as “license fees”:

All expenses incident to the proper

administration and enforcement of this Act,

including one-half the salaries of the members

of said Board, and the proper proportion of the

salaries of any employees of said Board,

whose duties include the handling of said

licenses, including the salaries of officers,

inspectors, etc., shall be deducted proportionately

116 [108 Op. Att’y

from the shares of the license fees payable as

above set forth to the County Commissioners

and the governing bodies of the three

municipalities.

Id. (emphasis added). By authorizing the Board to deduct expenses

“proportionately from the share of the license fees payable as set

forth above,” the Legislature was referring back to “funds received

. . . from the sale of licenses” and “funds derived from the sale of

licenses”—suggesting that these latter phrases were synonymous

with “license fees.” This bolsters our view that the General

Assembly intended to legislate the disposition of license fees only,

not any other fees that might be assessed as part of the licensing

process.

The Legislature’s recodification of alcoholic beverages laws

in 1947 lends further support. That year, lawmakers revised Article

2B of the Maryland Code, recodifying the alcoholic beverages laws

and incorporating relevant public local laws, including the

provision governing the distribution of “funds received” and

“derived from the sale of licenses” in Harford County. 1947 Md.

Laws, ch. 501 (enacting Art. 2B, § 56). Lawmakers imported the

language of that provision nearly verbatim into a section of the

Code devoted to the disposition of license fees. See Md. Ann.

Code, Art. 2B, § 51(m) (1939 & 1947 Supp.). The opening

paragraph of that section set forth the default approach:

Except as otherwise provided in this section,

the Clerk shall forthwith remit all license fees

collected by him, less a fee of One Dollar

($1.00) for the issuance of each license, to the

Board of County Commissioners for the

county, or to the Mayor and City Council of

Baltimore, as the case may be. . . .

Id. (a). This language suggests that the Legislature intended the

statute to govern only the disposition of license fees themselves,

not any other fees that may have been collected in the licensing

process.

In the subsections that followed, lawmakers specified when

the practice in specific local jurisdictions diverged from the default

practice. In Harford County, the Legislature required, as it did

before, that “[t]he net proceeds of all funds received by the Board

from the sale of licenses . . . issued . . . outside of the corporate

limits of the municipalities” “be paid to the Treasurer of Harford

Gen. 108] 117

County.” Id. (m). “The net proceeds of the funds derived from the

sale of licenses within the corporate limits of the municipalities,”

“after the deduction of a proportionate part of the [Board’s]

expenses,” were to be “paid . . . to the Treasurers of” the

municipalities. Id. And “[a]ll expenses incident to the proper

administration and enforcement” of the alcoholic beverages laws

were to “be deducted proportionately from the shares of the license

fees payable as above set forth to the County Commissioners and

the governing bodies of the three municipalities.” Id. Reading this

language in conjunction with the opening paragraph of the section,

which speaks only of “license fees,” reinforces our instinct that, by

referring to “funds received” and “derived from the sale of

licenses,” the General Assembly meant “license fees.”

Adding to our confidence is the heading that the General

Assembly adopted for this statute: “Disposition of License Fees.”

1947 Md. Laws, ch. 501 (enacting Art. 2B, § 56); see also Md.

Ann. Code, Art. 2B, § 51 (1939 & 1947 Supp.). To be sure,

“captions are often the words of the publisher of the Code, not of

the legislature,” in which case they are of no help for “purposes of

statutory construction.” Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319

Md. 597, 607 n.4 (1990); see also Md. Code Ann., Gen. Provis.

(“GP”) § 1-208 (providing generally that “the caption or catchline

of a section . . . that is printed in bold . . . is intended as a mere

catchword to indicate the contents of the section” and “may not be

considered as a title of the section”). But on the “rare occasions”

that “captions are written by the General Assembly,” Maryland’s

appellate courts have sometimes “look[ed] to the captions to assist

[their] search for the legislature’s intent.” Bartenfelder v. Bartenfelder,

248 Md. App. 213, 239 (2020); see also Westfield Ins. Co. v.

Gilliam, 477 Md. 346, 373 n.29 (2022) (acknowledging that, in an

earlier decision, the Maryland Supreme Court relied on a caption

to interpret a statute because the “heading was created by the

Legislature itself and was not, as is often the case, simply a caption

added by a legal publisher”); Morris, 319 Md. at 607 n.4 (providing

that, while courts “do not ordinarily refer to [captions] for purposes

of statutory construction,” “[i]t is otherwise . . . when the General

Assembly has itself included the caption in the enacted bill”);

Smelser v. Criterion Ins. Co., 293 Md. 384, 386 n.2, 390 (1982)

(stating that an earlier version of GP § 1-208, providing generally

that section captions “are intended as mere catchwords,” was “not

applicable” where “the captions [were] found in the original

enactment of” the statute that the Court was interpreting (quoting

Md. Ann. Code, Art. 1, § 18 (1981 Repl. Vol.))); State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm’r, 283 Md. 663, 675 & n.4

(1978) (considering, in the interpretation of a statute, a section

118 [108 Op. Att’y

heading that was “not merely a caption inserted by the codifier”

but, rather, in the act passed by the General Assembly).14

14

We acknowledge that the Maryland Supreme Court has also said in

a footnote that captions “are not evidence of legislative intent,” “[e]ven

if the General Assembly . . . adopted those headings.” Select Portfolio

Servicing, Inc. v. Saddlebrook W. Util. Co., 455 Md. 313, 336 n.28

(2017) (citing GP § 1-208); accord Rohrer v. Humane Soc’y of

Washington County, 454 Md. 1, 24 n.15 (2017) (citing GP § 1-208 for

the proposition that “captions and catchlines are not regarded as evidence

of legislative intent”). But we think it appropriate to consider the section

heading here, for several reasons. First, notwithstanding the language in

Select Portfolio and Rohrer, and notwithstanding GP § 1-208 and its

predecessors, the Court has, on several occasions, considered a section

heading when interpreting a statute. See Morris, 319 Md. at 607 n.4;

Smelser, 293 Md. at 386 n.2, 390; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 283

Md. at 675 & n.4. Indeed, in a case decided more recently than Select

Portfolio and Rohrer, the Court has reaffirmed the idea that a caption

enacted by the Legislature may be relevant to the interpretation of a

statute. See Westfield Ins. Co., 477 Md. at 373 n.29 (explaining, without

disavowing, the Court’s earlier reliance on a caption to interpret a

statute). Second, the Court has more recently indicated that it is typically

captions that are “added by a legal publishing company” after enactment

that have no relevance to “the meaning of a statutory provision.” SVF

Riva Annapolis LLC v. Gilroy, 459 Md. 632, 646 (2018) (“When

divining the meaning of a statutory provision, we do not allow such

unsanctioned additions to impact our analysis.” (emphasis added)); see

also Johnson v. State, 467 Md. 362, 373 n.2 (2020) (asserting that

“captions and catchlines are not evidence of legislative intent”

“[b]ecause of [the] fact” that “[c]aptions and catchlines are generally not

part of the legislation passed by the General Assembly” but, rather, “are

added by legal publishers after a bill becomes law” (emphasis added)).

Third, in Select Portfolio, where the Court said that even headings

adopted by the General Assembly are not evidence of legislative intent,

the statute at issue did not actually have captions enacted by the

Legislature but, instead, “headings added by legal publishers,” 455 Md.

at 336 n.28—meaning that the Court’s statement was not necessary to

resolve the case and, as such, “not controlling,” see, e.g., Plank v.

Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 594-96 (2020). Finally, in Rohrer, the legislation

at issue contained uncodified language expressly providing that

“catchlines, captions, and Revisor’s Notes contained in” the legislation

were “not law and [could] not be considered to have been enacted as a

part of” the legislation. 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26, § 14; see also Rohrer,

454 Md. at 24 n.15 (citing that session law); see also Williams v.

Peninsula Reg’l Med. Cent., 440 Md. 573, 584 (2014) (“[i]gnoring . . .

section captions” when the underlying act contained language expressly

stating that catchlines were not part of the law). Although the 2016 bill

revising the Alcoholic Beverages Article included similar language, see

2016 Md. Laws, ch. 41, § 7, the 1947 session law at issue here contained

no such limitation, see 1947 Md. Laws, ch. 501.

Gen. 108] 119

Here, the General Assembly apparently included the heading

“Disposition of License Fees” in the act itself, see 1947 Md. Laws,

ch. 501, § 1 (enacting Art. 2B, § 56), supporting the view that

lawmakers intended to govern the disbursement of only those

specific fees and not of any others. Of course, this heading does

not, standing alone, establish the meaning of the statute. “[A]

caption to a section of the law, particularly one inserted by the

Legislature during a nonsubstantive code revision, should never be

the determining factor in deciphering legislative intent.” Sanchez

v. Potomac Abatement, Inc., 198 Md. App. 436, 450 (2011)

(emphasis added), aff’d, 424 Md. 701 (2012). But even assuming

that the 1947 enactment was a nonsubstantive code revision, the

1947 enactment was not the first time that the Legislature indicated

that this statutory provision applied only to license fees. In 1933,

when the General Assembly first enacted Article 2B, lawmakers

adopted the caption “License Fees—Computation and Disposition”

for the statutory provision that, in 1947, was amended to include

the language specific to Harford County. 1933 Md. Laws, Spec.

Sess., ch. 2 (enacting Art. 2B, § 14). And, read alongside the text

of the statutory provision itself, we think these headings—even

though they are not controlling on their own—are at least another

indication that the Legislature intended the statute to control the

disposition of license fees only, not of any other types of fees.

Following the 1947 codification, the relevant statutory

language moved to different locations in the Code15 but otherwise

remained essentially unchanged until the 2016 code revision when

the General Assembly adopted the language that now appears in

AB § 22-208. Compare Md. Ann. Code, Art. 2B, § 10-204(n)

(2011 Repl. Vol.), with Md. Ann. Code, Art. 2B, § 51(m) (1939

& 1947 Supp.). Lawmakers made clear that the 2016 legislation

15

The language appeared in § 60 of Article 2B, see Md. Ann. Code,

Art. 2B, § 60 (1951), then in § 63, see Md. Ann. Code, Art. 2B, § 63

(1957), and then in § 10-204, see Md. Ann. Code, Art. 2B, § 10-204

(1994 Repl. Vol.). The opening paragraph of the provision also changed

to permit, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in [the] section,” the clerk in

each local jurisdiction to retain $2 (as opposed to only $1), see Md. Ann.

Code, Art. 2B, § 63(a) (1981 Repl. Vol), and later “a commission of 5

percent,” Md. Ann. Code, Art. 2B, § 63(a) (1987 Repl. Vol.).

Lawmakers then amended the default language to require “the local

collecting agent” to “remit all license fees” to “the board of county

commissioners or county fiscal agent for the county, or to the Mayor and

City Council of Baltimore, as the case may be.” Md. Ann. Code, Art.

2B, § 10-204(a) (1994 Repl. Vol.). That default language now appears

in AB § 4-112. See 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 41, § 2, at 270-71 (Revisor’s

Note to AB § 4-112).

120 [108 Op. Att’y

was to “be construed as a nonsubstantive revision,” not a “change

in the law.” 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 41, § 6. In other words, the

Legislature intended “fees received from the issuance of licenses,”

AB § 22-208(a), to mean the same thing as “funds received” and

“derived from the sale of licenses,” in the earlier version of the

Code, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 2B, § 10-204(n) (2011 Repl. Vol.).

And, for the reasons stated above, we believe that these phrases are

simply another way of saying “license fees.”

III

Conclusion

Having examined the plain language of AB § 22-208,

consulted its legislative history, and traced the evolution of the

statutory language since 1937, we conclude that the phrase “fees

received from the issuance of licenses” refers only to license fees,

not to any other types of fees collected by the Board, nor any other

income the Board receives.

Anthony G. Brown

Attorney General of Maryland

Rachel A. Simmonsen

Assistant Attorney General

Patrick B. Hughes

Chief Counsel, Opinions and Advice