The opinion
2023 IL 128609
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 128609)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
FRANCISCO LOZANO, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 21, 2023.
CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, Rochford, and
O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 “No right is held more sacred *** by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). To justify
intruding on a person’s constitutionally protected interest to remain free from an
unreasonable search and seizure, a police officer must “point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 21. The question here is whether a
person’s act of running in the rain while holding the front of his pocket provided
police officers with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an
investigatory stop consistent with the fourth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. IV)
and the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6). Under these facts,
we find that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial and appellate courts’ judgments.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Chicago police officers arrested defendant Francisco Lozano on February 20,
2018. The State subsequently charged him with burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a)
(West 2018)) and possession of burglary tools (id. § 19-2(a)). Weeks later, under
section 114-12(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114-
12(a)(1) (West 2018)), defendant moved to suppress certain evidence that police
officers recovered when they arrested him—namely, a car radio, a wallet, and two
screwdrivers.
¶4 In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that, when the officers stopped,
detained, and searched him, they neither possessed a warrant to search him nor saw
him committing any crimes. Additionally, defendant argued that no circumstances
existed that would cause the officers to reasonably suspect that he had committed
or was about to commit any crimes. See id. § 107-14(a) (“A peace officer *** may
stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer
reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to
commit or has committed an offense as defined in Section 102-15 of this Code
***.”). According to defendant, because the stop was unlawful, any evidence that
the officers recovered must be suppressed. Defendant further contended that the
officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, making their
frisk of him unlawful as well.
¶5 On May 21, 2018, the Cook County circuit court conducted a hearing on
defendant’s motion. Chicago police officer Eulalio Rodriguez testified that on
February 20, 2018, at approximately 1:40 p.m., he and his partner were driving
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southbound on Kedzie Avenue in an unmarked car. Rodriguez did not state that he
and his partner were responding to a specific report of crime or a 911 call; rather,
the officers were on patrol. Rodriguez also did not describe the neighborhood as a
high-crime area.
¶6 As Rodriguez was driving, the officers happened upon defendant, who was
“running at a fast rate of speed toward Kedzie.” Rodriguez noted that defendant
appeared to be holding his front pocket. He testified that he did not see defendant
committing any crime or violating any ordinance. He also acknowledged that it was
raining that day and wet outside.
¶7 Rodriguez made a U-turn on Kedzie Avenue so that the officers could stop
defendant. He testified that, after he turned the car and approached defendant,
defendant fled up the stairs of what appeared to be an abandoned building.
Rodriguez pursued defendant. He ordered him to stop and to remove both hands
from his pocket. At that point, Rodriguez saw a “big bulge” in defendant’s pocket.
In response to the officer’s command, defendant removed his left hand from his
pocket.
¶8 Rodriguez confirmed that defendant was already running when he encountered
him; defendant did not start running once he saw the officer. Rodriguez explained
that he tried to stop defendant before he ran up the stairs to “conduct a field
interview [to] ask him why he was running.” The officer also wanted “to see what
was the bulge,” and he later asserted that the bulge could have been a weapon.
According to Rodriguez, defendant was not free to leave at that time.
¶9 Rodriguez testified that, after he handcuffed defendant, he touched his hooded
sweatshirt and felt a rectangular box. He reached inside defendant’s front pocket
and recovered a wallet, two screwdrivers, and a radio. The officers then arrested
him. Rodriguez acknowledged that he did not have a warrant to either search or
arrest defendant.
¶ 10 Officer Jennifer Soto, Rodriguez’s partner on February 20, 2018, had activated
her body camera. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that she would testify that a
video, marked as petitioner’s exhibit 1, accurately reflected the incidents that
happened at 522 North Kedzie Avenue on February 20, 2018, at 1:39 p.m. After
the trial court admitted the video into evidence, defendant published it to the court.
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¶ 11 In relevant part, the video showed that the sky was gray that afternoon and the
windshield wipers on the officers’ vehicle had been activated. The first time that
defendant appeared on the video, he was standing near the bottom of the apartment
building’s stairs and was facing Rodriguez, who was walking toward him.
Rodriguez grabbed defendant’s arm and walked him toward the unmarked police
vehicle as both officers ordered defendant to remove his hands from his pocket.
The video showed that the front pocket of defendant’s sweatshirt appeared to
contain a rectangular object.
¶ 12 Rodriguez directed defendant’s hands to the hood of the car and began to
handcuff him. Defendant appeared to be cooperating with the officers’ commands.
Rodriguez asked defendant where he was going and stated that defendant had
“turned back” when he saw the officers. Defendant replied that he was “going back
in the house.” Rodriguez asked what defendant “had on [him],” to which defendant
replied, “nothing sir.” Rodriguez asked defendant “who live[d]” in the building he
had attempted to enter. Defendant claimed that his friend lived there.
¶ 13 After he finished handcuffing defendant, Rodriguez asked what he was “going
to find,” as he reached into defendant’s pocket and began removing items from his
shirt. Rodriguez took from defendant’s shirt a wallet, followed by screwdrivers and
then a car radio. Rodriguez and defendant engaged in further conversation, but the
video did not capture what was said. Soto asked defendant why his hands were
bleeding, but his response was unclear. Rodriguez continued to sift through
defendant’s pockets while Soto asked him for identification. Defendant claimed
that he did not have any at the time. At the officer’s request, defendant gave her his
name, birthdate, and street address.
¶ 14 The parties rested after the court finished reviewing the video at the hearing.
The trial court first found that Rodriguez was credible. The court found that
defendant had “attract[ed] his attention [by] running with some kind of bulge in his
pants.” The court stated that, after Rodriguez made a U-turn, defendant ran “toward
an abandoned building trying to further get away from the officers.” The court also
asserted that, when defendant refused to show the officers his hands, the officers
“at that point detain[ed] him, thinking he might have a gun.” Accordingly, the trial
court found that the officers had not violated the fourth amendment by stopping or
frisking defendant, and it denied his motion to suppress evidence.
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¶ 15 Defendant’s bench trial was conducted on June 21, 2018. The parties stipulated
to Rodriguez’s testimony from the suppression hearing. Rodriguez also testified at
defendant’s trial. He stated that, when he recovered the radio, wallet, and
screwdrivers from defendant, Rodriguez asked defendant where he had gotten the
items. Defendant told him that he had found the car radio on a street corner several
blocks away and that he found the wallet in a nearby alley. Rodriguez confirmed
that defendant was handcuffed at the time he made the statements and that officers
had not provided him with Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966)).
¶ 16 At a sidebar, defense counsel moved to suppress defendant’s statements. The
trial court denied his motion, asserting that “[i]t’s a pretrial motion” and “we are in
the middle of trial.” The trial court also stated that it was unsure whether Miranda
“attached” at the time defendant made the statements. The court advised defense
counsel to move on. During further examination of Rodriguez, the officer noted
that the wallet was worth roughly $30 and the car radio was worth roughly $250.
¶ 17 Soto testified that, when she looked through the wallet that Rodriguez recovered
from defendant, she found a student identification card from a nearby high school.
She went to the high school and spoke with the student, Jennelly Cherrez.
¶ 18 Cherrez testified that she drove to school around 7:45 a.m. on February 20,
2018. She parked her car near the intersection of Kedzie Avenue and Franklin
Boulevard, less than one block away from her school. Cherrez explained that she
left her wallet inside the middle compartment and that she left her purse in the back
seat of the car.
¶ 19 Shortly after 2 p.m. that day, Officer Soto met with Cherrez at her school. Soto
confirmed that the wallet belonged to her. Cherrez then led officers to the street
where she had parked. She found that the window on the right passenger side of the
car had been broken, the radio was missing, and the compartment where she had
left her wallet was open. Cherrez testified that she did not know defendant and had
not given him permission to enter her car or to possess her wallet and radio that
day.
¶ 20 The trial court observed that, when the officers detained defendant, he
possessed stolen property that had been taken in a burglary that day, along with
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screwdrivers. The court found that those tools were necessary to loosen the radio
and pull it from the car. The trial court also determined that defendant had been
“evasive with the police, giving stories that” were unreasonable. The court ruled
that his possession of the stolen goods, “co-mingling with the burglary,” and
evading the police sufficed to find defendant guilty on both counts.
¶ 21 The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of three years’
imprisonment on the burglary count and two years’ imprisonment for possession of
burglary tools. In August 2018, defendant moved the trial court to reconsider its
finding of guilt or, in the alternative, to set aside the guilty finding and grant him a
new trial. The court denied defendant’s motion. Defendant filed a notice of appeal.
¶ 22 Issuing three separate opinions, the appellate court affirmed defendant’s
convictions and sentences. The lead opinion found that Rodriguez had reasonable
suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of defendant where Rodriguez saw defendant
running on a rainy day in February, alone, with his hands either in or holding the
front pocket of his sweatshirt. 2022 IL App (1st) 182170, ¶ 34. It observed that,
when Rodriguez made a U-turn and drove in defendant’s direction, defendant ran
toward what appeared to be an abandoned apartment building and tried to enter it.
Id. The lead opinion concluded that defendant’s actions qualified as “ ‘strange
behavior,’ ” which supported a finding of reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify
the initial Terry stop. Id.
¶ 23 “At a minimum,” the lead opinion concluded, “Rodriguez could have suspected
that defendant was attempting to break into an abandoned building.” Id.
Acknowledging that the officer did not list that factor in his reasons for stopping
defendant, the lead opinion determined that it was “not limited to the officers’
subjective reasons for conducting a Terry stop.” Id. ¶ 39. The lead opinion also held
that “Rodriguez’s Terry frisk was justified to determine whether defendant was
holding a weapon in his sweatshirt pocket.” Id. ¶ 46. The lead opinion then ruled
that defendant’s motion to suppress statements was untimely and that Miranda did
not apply to this situation. Id. ¶ 57. Finally, the lead opinion held that sufficient
evidence supported defendant’s convictions. Id. ¶¶ 67-68.
¶ 24 The concurring justice considered “the Terry question very close but ultimately
agree[d] that the record support[ed] the validity of the Terry stop.” Id. ¶ 75 (Ellis,
J., specially concurring). The concurring justice found that “the officers violated
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Miranda when they questioned defendant and that it was error to introduce that
testimony” but “would find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
the circumstances.” Id.
¶ 25 The dissenting justice observed that, at the suppression hearing, Rodriguez
testified that he stopped defendant for two reasons: (1) he wanted to know “ ‘why
he was running’ ” and (2) he wanted “ ‘to see what was the bulge.’ ” Id. ¶ 99
(Gordon, P.J., dissenting). He concluded that “a man running in a cold Chicago
rain, with a bulge in his pocket, up a stoop, and toward shelter” did not provide the
police with “a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. ¶ 114. The dissenting
justice further found that the officers violated defendant’s Miranda rights when
they indisputably asked defendant questions about the seized property without first
providing him with Miranda warnings after he was already stopped. Id. ¶ 117.
¶ 26 This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315
(eff. Oct. 1, 2021).
¶ 27 ANALYSIS
¶ 28 At issue is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence because the police officers subjected him to an unlawful search
and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment and article I, section 6, of the
Illinois Constitution.
¶ 29 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this
court affords deference to the trial court’s factual findings and will reject those
findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v.
Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289, ¶ 14. That said, we review the ultimate question of
whether the evidence should be suppressed de novo. People v. Colyar, 2013 IL
111835, ¶ 24; see also People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51 (2001) (“A reviewing
court *** remains free to engage in its own assessment of the facts in relation to
the issues presented and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief
should be granted.”).
¶ 30 “Both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 guarantee the right of individuals to
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be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v. Carter, 2021 IL
125954, ¶ 22. This court has interpreted section 6’s search and seizure provision in
a manner that is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s fourth
amendment jurisprudence. People v. Pittman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 513 (2004).
¶ 31 This case involves an encounter between a private citizen and a police officer
on a public street, and it is governed by Terry. In Terry, a detective with more than
30 years’ experience was patrolling a particular area for shoplifters and
pickpockets. 392 U.S. at 5. The officer saw two men look into a store window, walk
a short distance, turn around, and then walk back toward the corner to again look
into the same store window. Id. at 6. When the men repeated this ritual numerous
times, the officer suspected them of “casing a job, a stick-up,” and “he considered
it his duty as a police officer to investigate further.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. He approached the men, informed them that he was a police officer,
and asked for their names. Id. at 6-7. After the men “ ‘mumbled something’ in
response,” the officer grabbed the petitioner, spun him around, and patted down the
outside of his clothing. Id. at 7. The officer felt a pistol in the petitioner’s overcoat,
and he reached inside the coat to remove it. Id.
¶ 32 In denying the petitioner’s motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that,
based on his experience, the officer “ ‘had reasonable cause to believe *** that the
defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some interrogation
should be made of their action.’ ” Id. at 8. The court also determined that “the
officer had the right to pat down the outer clothing of these men, who he had
reasonable cause to believe might be armed.” Id. The trial court further ruled that
“a ‘frisk’ of the outer clothing for weapons” “was essential to the proper
performance of the officer’s investigatory duties.” Id.
¶ 33 The question before the United States Supreme Court was “whether it is always
unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search
for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.” Id. at 15. The Court
observed that the fourth amendment “provides that the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 8. To
determine whether the search and seizure was unreasonable, the Court assessed
(1) whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and (2) whether it was
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reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in
the first place. Id. at 19-20.
¶ 34 The Court explained that, to justify a search and seizure, “the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 21.
The Court also concluded that
“[w]hen an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to
the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the
officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person
is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 24.
¶ 35 Thus, a temporary detention and pat down for weapons will be upheld “as
constitutionally permissible if two conditions are met.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555
U.S. 323, 326 (2009). First, to conduct a lawful investigatory stop, the police officer
must reasonably suspect that the person apprehended is committing or has
committed a criminal offense. Id. “When considering whether an officer was
justified in making an investigatory stop, ‘the facts should not be viewed with
analytical hindsight, but instead should be considered from the perspective of a
reasonable officer at the time that the situation confronted him.’ ” People v. Scott,
148 Ill. 2d 479, 503 (1992) (quoting People v. Long, 99 Ill. 2d 219, 229 (1983)).
“Second, to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably
suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.” Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326-
27.
¶ 36 In this case, defendant was seized when Rodriguez confronted him and ordered
him to come down from the apartment building’s stairs. See People v. Thomas, 198
Ill. 2d 103, 111 (2001) (“A person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth
amendment *** when, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.”); see
also Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (“[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”). Accordingly, we
must assess whether the facts available to Rodriguez when he encountered
defendant on the stairs provided the officer with “a reasonable suspicion based upon
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specific and articulable facts that the person has committed, or is about to commit,
a crime.” People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 518 (1999); see United States v.
Street, 917 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 2019) (“To determine whether a Terry stop was
reasonable, we ‘must consider the totality of circumstances known to the officer at
the time of the stop.’ ” (quoting United States v. Quinn, 83 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir.
1996))).
¶ 37 At the time of the seizure in this case, the facts available to the officer were that
it was raining, defendant had been running and was holding the front of his
sweatshirt as he ran, defendant attempted to run up the stairs of an apartment
building upon encountering the officer, and there was a large bulge in the front of
his sweatshirt. As Rodriguez explained at the suppression hearing, he tried to stop
defendant before he ran up the stairs to “ask him why he was running” and because
he wanted “to see what was the bulge.” Although “ ‘reasonable suspicion’ ***
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the
Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for
making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). “The officer must
be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch
of criminal activity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id. at 123-24.
¶ 38 Among the factors that may support an officer’s claim that he had reasonable
suspicion to stop and frisk a person are whether “the stop occurred in a ‘high crime
area’ ” (id. at 124), whether the incident occurred late at night or in the early hours
of the morning (Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972)), whether the
person engaged in “unprovoked flight” from police officers (Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
125), and whether the person’s behavior was consistent with the officer’s
knowledge of criminal activity (Terry, 392 U.S. at 6 (“after observing their
elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window ***, [the
officer] suspected the two men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up’ ”)).
¶ 39 None of these factors weigh in favor of finding that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. Based on Rodriguez’s testimony, the officers
were not responding to a particular report of crime in the area when they happened
upon defendant. Neither Rodriguez nor Soto stated that the neighborhood was a
high-crime area, and the stop occurred in the middle of the afternoon. Although
defendant attempted to run up the apartment building’s stairs when he saw
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Rodriguez, the officer testified that defendant had been running from the first
moment they saw him. Thus, his continued running cannot be seen as “unprovoked
flight” from the officers. Further, Rodriguez did not testify that defendant’s conduct
conformed with his knowledge of criminal activity. He simply wanted to know why
defendant was running and what item caused a bulge in defendant’s pocket.
¶ 40 The facts available to Rodriguez at the time of the seizure demonstrate that he
lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed or was about to commit
a crime. Accordingly, we hold that the Terry stop in this case was unlawful. See
State v. Weyand, 399 P.3d 530, 535-36 (Wash. 2017) (en banc) (holding that a
police officer’s belief that the defendant “was acting suspiciously by walking
quickly to his car and looking up and down the street” after leaving a “ ‘known’
drug house” did not provide the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary
to justify an investigatory stop); People v. Croft, 346 Ill. App. 3d 669, 675-76
(2004) (an officer’s belief that it “ ‘just seemed strange’ ” for the defendant to walk
his bicycle down a street at 11:15 p.m. in a neighborhood where acts of vandalism
had occurred days before was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that a
crime had been or was about to be committed); see also People v. Shipp, 2015 IL
App (2d) 130587, ¶ 46 (“That defendant placed his hands in his pockets was,
standing alone, insufficient, especially when it was January and defendant had no
gloves.”).
¶ 41 Before this court, the State asserts that the officers “could have reasonably
concluded that defendant was either carrying and concealing contraband or trying
to break into an abandoned building, or both.” Thus, they contend that the officers
had the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary for a valid investigatory
stop under Terry. Although the State attempts to piece together facts to justify an
investigatory stop, the question for this court is whether it was objectively
reasonable for the officers to suspect that criminal activity was afoot when
defendant was running alone in the rain with his hands in his pocket at 1:39 p.m. in
a neighborhood that, so far as we know from the record, was not a particularly high-
crime area. See People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 18 (observing that “a
reasonable suspicion determination *** considers the totality of the circumstances
of each case”). We conclude that it was not objectively reasonable for the officers
to make an investigatory stop under these circumstances.
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¶ 42 We further hold that the officer’s frisk of defendant was unlawful when
Rodriguez lacked any reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and
dangerous. See Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d at 109 (noting that the validity of an
investigatory stop “is a separate question from whether a search for weapons is
valid”). A search in this context “must be limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. As we have observed, “[a] weapons frisk is valid only when
the officer has reason to believe that a particular individual is armed and
dangerous.” People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 266 (1997).
¶ 43 Here, defendant was handcuffed when Rodriguez searched him, and he had not
been resisting the officers even before he was handcuffed. Rodriguez asserted that
he conducted a protective pat down of defendant’s sweatshirt and felt “a rectangular
square box, which [was] a radio.” Nonetheless, he reached into defendant’s pocket
and retrieved a wallet, two screwdrivers, and the radio. Nothing in either
Rodriguez’s testimony or his conduct on the video suggests that he or Soto believed
that defendant was presently dangerous. See id. at 263 (“The sole justification for
the search allowed by the Terry exception is the protection of the police officer and
others in the vicinity, not to gather evidence.”).
¶ 44 When the police violate a defendant’s constitutional rights by, for instance,
conducting an unconstitutional search or seizure, the constitutional violation is
termed a “ ‘poisonous tree.’ ” People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 351 (1992). Any
evidence that the State obtains by exploiting the constitutional violation is subject
to suppression as the “ ‘fruit’ ” of that poisonous tree. Id.; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 15
(“[C]ourts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct
*** which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary
justification which the Constitution requires. When such conduct is identified, it
must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence
in criminal trials.”). “[T]he exclusionary rule encompasses both the primary
evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure and *** evidence
later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, the so-called fruit of the
poisonous tree.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232,
237 (2016).
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¶ 45 Yet, “evidence which comes to light through a chain of causation that began
with an illegal seizure is not per se inadmissible.” People v. Henderson, 2013 IL
114040 ¶ 34. Instead, “a court must consider whether the chain of causation
proceeding from the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been
interrupted by some intervening circumstance so as to remove the taint imposed
upon that evidence by the original illegality.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id. ¶ 33.
¶ 46 In this case, Rodriguez improperly searched and seized defendant within a
matter of moments, and no intervening circumstance removed the taint from the
original illegality. Thus, the evidence that officers obtained from Rodriguez’s
unlawful search and seizure of defendant was subject to suppression as fruit of the
poisonous tree. The trial court erred in ruling otherwise.
¶ 47 Without the evidence that was improperly obtained, the State cannot prove the
charges for burglary and possession of burglary tools. Therefore, we reverse
defendant’s convictions outright. See, e.g., People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525,
¶ 100 (“Because the State cannot prove the aggravated DUI charge without that
evidence, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment reversing that conviction
outright.”).
¶ 48 CONCLUSION
¶ 49 For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence, and we reverse defendant’s convictions outright.
¶ 50 Judgments reversed.
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