In Re ALBA Petróleos De El Salvador S.E.M. De C.V.

22-317-cv

In re ALBA Petróleos de El Salvador S.E.M. de C.V.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

August Term 2022

Submitted: March 17, 2023

Decided: September 18, 2023

No. 22-317

IN RE ALBA PETRÓLEOS DE EL SALVADOR S.E.M. DE C.V. *

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Connecticut

Before: PARK and LEE, Circuit Judges, and STEIN, District Judge. †

This case involves a dispute between two law firms, each of

which claims the right to represent a Salvadoran company in its

efforts to stave off a transnational judgment-collection effort.

Specifically, the two firms are vying to defend ALBA Petróleos de El

Salvador S.E.M. de C.V. (“ALBA”) in the U.S. District Court for the

District of Connecticut from the enforcement of a $45 million default

*The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption

accordingly.

†Judge Sidney H. Stein of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

judgment obtained against Colombian narco-terrorist organizations.

Marcos D. Jiménez appeared to represent ALBA. White & Case LLP

moved to substitute itself as ALBA’s counsel. Both purport to

represent ALBA. White & Case argued that the political-question

doctrine, the act-of-state doctrine, and Venezuelan law required the

district court (Meyer, J.) to allow it to represent ALBA. Jiménez

responded that he had the right to represent ALBA under Salvadoran

law. The district court denied White & Case’s motion, holding that

the issue was governed by Salvadoran law, which authorized

Jiménez’s representation. White & Case filed an interlocutory

appeal and, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of mandamus.

We lack appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of

the denial of a third-party motion to substitute counsel. Such an

appeal fails to satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine

because the denial of a motion to substitute counsel is effectively

reviewable after final judgment and does not implicate an important

issue separate from the merits of the underlying action. White &

Case also does not meet the demanding standard required to obtain a

writ of mandamus. We thus DISMISS the appeal and DENY the

petition for a writ of mandamus.

Claire A. DeLelle, Nicole Erb, Susan Grace, White & Case

LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellant.

Marcos D. Jiménez, León Cosgrove Jiménez, LLP, Miami,

FL, for Appellee.

PARK, Circuit Judge:

This case involves a dispute between two law firms, each of

which claims the right to represent a Salvadoran company in its

efforts to stave off a transnational judgment-collection effort.

2

Specifically, the two firms are vying to defend ALBA Petróleos de El

Salvador S.E.M. de C.V. (“ALBA”) in the U.S. District Court for the

District of Connecticut from the enforcement of a $45 million default

judgment obtained against Colombian narco-terrorist organizations.

Marcos D. Jiménez appeared to represent ALBA. 1 White & Case

LLP moved to substitute itself as ALBA’s counsel. Both purport to

represent ALBA. White & Case argued that the political-question

doctrine, the act-of-state doctrine, and Venezuelan law required the

district court (Meyer, J.) to allow it to represent ALBA. Jiménez

responded that he had the right to represent ALBA under Salvadoran

law. The district court denied White & Case’s motion, holding that

Salvadoran law governed and authorized Jiménez’s representation.

White & Case filed this interlocutory appeal and, in the alternative, a

petition for a writ of mandamus.

We lack appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of

the denial of a third-party motion to substitute counsel. Such an

appeal fails to satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine

because the denial of a motion to substitute counsel is effectively

reviewable after final judgment and does not implicate an important

issue separate from the merits of the underlying action. White &

Case also does not meet the demanding standard required to obtain a

writ of mandamus. We thus dismiss the appeal and deny the

petition for a writ of mandamus.

1 Jiménez was a sole practitioner during the trial court proceedings

but joined León Cosgrove Jiménez, LLP during the pendency of this appeal.

3

I. BACKGROUND

A. ALBA

ALBA is a Salvadoran corporation that distributes Venezuelan

oil in El Salvador. ALBA has two shareholders. The majority

shareholder, with sixty percent ownership, is a subsidiary of

Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), the national oil company of

Venezuela. The minority shareholder is a nonprofit organization

owned by a group of Salvadoran municipalities. The minority

shareholder appointed Jaime Alberto Recinos Crespin, a Salvadoran

national, to the ALBA board, and Crespin also serves as ALBA’s legal

representative.

B. The Caballero Litigation

The plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit is Antonio Caballero,

whose father, a former Colombian ambassador to the United Nations,

was kidnapped, tortured, and assassinated by the Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”). See Caballero v. Fuerzas

Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, No. 18-cv-25337, 2020 WL

7481302, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2020). Caballero sued FARC and the

Norte de Valle Cartel in the U.S. District Court for the Southern

District of Florida under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, and

obtained a default judgment of over $45 million. See id. at *7.

Caballero alleges that ALBA is an agency or instrumentality of

FARC due to its connection to PDVSA. He sued ALBA in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking to enforce the

default judgment from the Southern District of Florida against

ALBA’s account at Interactive Brokers, LLC of Greenwich,

4

Connecticut. Initially, no parties appeared to oppose Caballero, so

the district court entered a default judgment. 2

Following the entry of default judgment, ALBA sought to

intervene, represented by Jiménez and his local counsel. White &

Case and its local counsel then moved to substitute themselves for

Jiménez as ALBA’s counsel. The district court held its decision on

the motion to intervene pending its ruling on the motion to substitute

counsel. It ordered the attorneys to brief their authority to act for

ALBA.

Developments in Venezuela provide context for the

disagreement. Beginning in 2019, two groups claimed control of the

Venezuelan government: one affiliated with Nicolás Maduro and the

other with Juan Guaidó. The United States and El Salvador both

recognized the Guaidó government. 3 White & Case alleges that the

Maduro faction “seized and maintained unlawful control of” PDVSA,

after which the Guaidó faction established an “ad hoc administrative

board to manage PDVSA’s affairs.” Appellant’s Br. at 2, 7.

Neither side questioned the factual basis of the other’s

authorization:

2The case was originally assigned to Judge Robert N. Chatigny.

Following the default judgment, the case was reassigned to Judge Jeffrey A.

Meyer.

3 The Guaidó government was apparently dissolved in early 2023.

See, e.g., Kejal Vyas, Venezuela’s U.S.-Backed Opposition Removes Juan Guaidó

as Its Leader, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 30, 2022). The parties have not indicated that

these events have impacted the litigation, and “we ordinarily do not

consider material not included in the record on appeal.” Keepers, Inc. v.

City of Milford, 807 F.3d 24, 29 n.14 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

5

• Jiménez claimed that Crespin, ALBA’s legal

representative, hired him to defend ALBA. No

party disputes that Crespin was ALBA’s legal

representative or that, under Salvadoran law, ALBA’s

legal representative was responsible for retaining

counsel.

• White & Case claimed the Guaidó-backed ad hoc

board of PDVSA, the parent of ALBA’s majority

shareholder, hired it to defend ALBA. It argued that

under Venezuelan law, the ad hoc board had the

authority to retain counsel for ALBA.4

The district court reasoned that “the dispute is ultimately about

whether the law of El Salvador or the law of Venezuela should

control.” Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,

579 F. Supp. 3d 315, 321 (D. Conn. 2022). It held that the law of El

Salvador governs based on the “presumption that the law of a

company’s state of incorporation governs . . . issues involving the

internal affairs of a corporation.” Id. (cleaned up). The district

court rejected White & Case’s argument that “the act of state doctrine

require[d] [it] to defer to the law of Venezuela.” Id. at 325. It thus

concluded that Jiménez was ALBA’s rightful counsel and later

granted ALBA’s motion to intervene.

4Neither the ad hoc board of PDVSA nor any other entity affiliated

with White & Case moved to intervene.

6

White & Case filed this interlocutory appeal and petitioned for

a writ of mandamus, putatively on behalf of ALBA. Jiménez moved

to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 5

II. DISCUSSION

Before considering the merits of an appeal, “we are obliged to

assure ourselves that appellate jurisdiction exists.” Uniformed Fire

Officers Ass’n v. de Blasio, 973 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2020). We lack

jurisdiction over the appeal and deny the petition for a writ of

mandamus.

A. The Collateral Order Doctrine

We have appellate jurisdiction over “appeals from all final

decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision

is typically one by which a district court disassociates itself from a

case,” “terminat[ing] an action.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558

U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (cleaned up). In other words, the statute

“disallow[s] appeal from any decision which is tentative, informal or

incomplete.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546

(1949). The final-judgment rule ensures “efficient judicial

administration” and respects “the prerogatives of district court

judges.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106.

5 To be clear, neither White & Case LLP nor Marcos D. Jiménez is

formally a party to this appeal. Instead, both claim to represent ALBA,

their mutual putative client, and have each filed briefs on its behalf. We

refer to Appellant as White & Case and Appellee as Jiménez for ease of

reference and for the sake of clarity. But when the distinction between

counsel and client is important, we refer to Appellant as “White & Case’s

client” and Appellee as “Jiménez’s client.”

7

But final decisions also include “a ‘small class’ of collateral

rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately

deemed ‘final.’” Id. (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545-46). “That

small category includes only decisions that are conclusive, that

resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are

effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the

underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42

(1995). “All three of the requirements for appeal under the collateral

order doctrine must be met.” Fischer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 812

F.3d 268, 274 (2d Cir. 2016).

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed” that the collateral

order doctrine must not “swallow the general rule that a party is

entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment.”

Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)

(internal citation omitted). “This admonition has acquired special

force in recent years with the enactment of legislation designating

rulemaking, ‘not expansion by court decision,’ as the preferred means

for” regulating interlocutory appeals. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 113

(quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 48); accord Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S.

23, 39-40 (2017).

We apply the collateral order doctrine to “the entire category to

which a claim belongs,” ignoring the “particular injustice[s]” alleged

in “the litigation at hand.” Digit. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868

(cleaned up). Cases do not receive “individualized jurisdictional

inquiry.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107.

Here, White & Case appeals from the district court’s denial of

its third-party motion to substitute counsel. The Supreme Court has

categorized similar collateral orders according to the orders’

8

functions, rather than their rationales. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v.

Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 426 (1985) (“orders disqualifying [opposing]

counsel in a civil case”); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 260

(1984) (“pretrial disqualification of defense counsel in a criminal

prosecution”); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 369

(1981) (“order[s] denying a motion to disqualify counsel for the

opposing party in a civil case”).

White & Case argues, however, that the relevant “category” of

order is the “authoriz[ation] [of] representatives of an unrecognized

government to appear in U.S. courts.” Appellant’s Br. at 52. There

are two problems with this argument. First, it refers to the

“particular injustice” White & Case alleges, not “the entire category

to which [its] claim belongs.” Digit. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868.

Indeed, the unusual posture of this case may make White & Case’s

proposed category—i.e., authorizations of representatives of

unrecognized governments—a category of one. Second, it would

require us to put the merits cart before the jurisdictional horse. The

premise of White & Case’s framing—that Jiménez is “a known

representative of the . . . interests of the illegitimate Maduro

regime”—is itself a contested issue. Appellant’s Br. at 2-3. 6

Jiménez concedes that the district court conclusively resolved

the substitution-of-counsel issue. So we must determine whether

district court denials of third parties’ motions to substitute a party’s

counsel (1) are effectively unreviewable after final judgment and (2)

For the same reason, it would be difficult to say that the question

6

whether Jiménez is a “representative[] of an unrecognized government,”

Appellant’s Br. at 52, is “completely separate from the merits of the action,”

Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 105, as the collateral order doctrine requires.

9

present important issues separate from the merits. See Mohawk

Indus., 558 U.S. at 106.

B. Reviewability After Final Judgment

First, denials of third-party motions to substitute counsel are

effectively reviewable after final judgment. For this “class of claims,

taken as a whole,” interlocutory review is not “necessary to ensure

effective review.” Id. at 107-08. This conclusion incorporates “a

judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through

rigorous application of a final judgment requirement,” Digit. Equip.

Corp., 511 U.S. at 878-79, and in particular, “whether delaying review

until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial public

interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order,’” Mohawk Indus.,

558 U.S. at 107 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-53 (2006)).

White & Case’s client may appeal from a final judgment. The

client is not a party, but we “have long allowed appeals by a nonparty

when the nonparty has an interest that is affected by the trial court’s

judgment.” Rothstein v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 837 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir.

2016) (cleaned up). “And we have not required that a nonparty prove

that it has an interest affected by the judgment; rather, stating a

plausible affected interest has been sufficient.” Id. (cleaned up).

“A nonparty may not appeal, however, when it is clear that it has no

interest affected by the judgment.” Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors

of Worldcom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2006). 7

7 It bears noting that White & Case did not need to rely on the

collateral order doctrine—“the better practice is for such a nonparty to seek

intervention for purposes of appeal; denials of such motions are, of course,

appealable.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988). White & Case’s

10

The district court’s judgment will affect White & Case’s client.

The client contends that the district court denied it the opportunity to

proceed with its authorized counsel. Moreover, if the client is

correct that it is ALBA, any judgment adverse to ALBA is necessarily

also adverse to the client. These interests are less speculative than

others we have held suffice to permit a nonparty to appeal. See

WorldCom, 467 F.3d at 78-79 (collecting cases). 8

An appeal from final judgment will also adequately protect the

interests of White & Case’s client. After final judgment, we may

“vacat[e] [the] adverse judgment and remand[] for a new trial”—the

standard way to remedy erroneous rulings. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S.

at 109.

The Supreme Court has recognized that such review suffices

for similar categories of district court orders. First, an “order

refusing to disqualify counsel” on the motion of an opposing party is

“reviewable on appeal after final judgment.” Firestone Tire & Rubber

Co., 449 U.S. at 377. Should “the Court of Appeals conclude after the

trial has ended that permitting continuing representation was

prejudicial error, it would . . . vacate the judgment . . . and order a

new trial,” a “plainly adequate” remedy. Id. at 378. So too here.

client has not moved to intervene, and we express no opinion on the merit

of such a motion.

8 For the same reasons, we reject Jiménez’s argument that White &

Case lacks standing to bring this interlocutory appeal. Jiménez argues that

White & Case “has no right to file an appeal to vindicate the interests” of

ALBA, which “does not wish to appeal the Order” and did not retain White

& Case. Appellee’s Br. at 47-48. Those arguments conflate the merits and

standing and simply assume that Jiménez is correct in its assertion that only

he represents ALBA.

11

Second, when a district court actually disqualifies a party’s

counsel in a civil case, “the propriety of the trial court’s

disqualification order can be reviewed as effectively on appeal of a

final judgment as on an interlocutory appeal.” Richardson-Merrell,

472 U.S. at 438. This is so even though such an order could require

a party to litigate to judgment without the counsel to which it is

legally entitled. See id.

Third, the same principle applies to disqualifications of counsel

in criminal cases. See Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 267. The requirement

that a party defend against a prosecution to judgment, and potentially

conviction, with the wrong counsel—a heavier burden than White &

Case’s here—is simply “one of the painful obligations of citizenship.”

Id. 9 In light of these precedents, we see no basis for treating this case

differently. 10

9 We have similarly held that appeal from final judgment suffices in

other types of disputes over the control of litigation. See, e.g., Ashmore v.

CGI Grp., Inc., 860 F.3d 80, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2017) (substitution of bankruptcy

trustee for natural person as plaintiff); Metro Servs. Inc. v. Wiggins, 158 F.3d

162, 165 (2d Cir. 1998) (appointment of lead plaintiff under Private

Securities Litigation Reform Act); Schwartz v. City of New York, 57 F.3d 236,

238 (2d Cir. 1995) (withdrawal of counsel over client’s objection); Welch v.

Smith, 810 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1987) (denial of party’s motion to appoint

counsel to pursue a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim); see also, e.g., Tracy v. Lumpkin,

43 F.4th 473, 475 (5th Cir. 2022) (denial of a pro se motion to substitute

federal habeas counsel); Crain v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 918 F.3d 1294, 1296

(11th Cir. 2019) (same).

10 White & Case claims only case-specific prejudice, arguing that the

district court caused “irreversible harm” to “the legitimacy and primacy of

Venezuelan acts of state, the Ad Hoc Board’s authority under those

sovereign acts,” and “the Executive Branch’s recognition of the Interim

12

Lastly, we note that White & Case has other ways to protect its

interests beyond an appeal from final judgment. It can attempt to

appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which allows a district court to

certify that its order turns on a substantial question of law and that

interlocutory review is efficient. See id. 11 It can also petition for a

writ of mandamus, as it did here. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706

F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 2013); cf. United States v. Prevezon Holdings Ltd.,

839 F.3d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (granting mandamus in a

disqualification dispute). “While these discretionary review

mechanisms do not provide relief in every case, they serve as useful

safety valves for promptly correcting serious errors,” mitigating the

risk of “severe hardship” and thus the need for early appeal.

Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 111-12 (cleaned up); accord Firestone Tire &

Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 378 n.13.

We hold that denials of third-party motions to substitute

counsel are effectively reviewable from final judgment.

C. Importance and Separation from the Merits

Second, denials of third-party motions to substitute counsel do

not implicate “an important issue completely separate from the merits

of the action.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).

Government.” Appellant’s Br. at 56. These do not relate to “the class of

claims, taken as a whole.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107.

11 Indeed, White & Case filed a belated § 1292(b) motion after filing

this appeal. The district court denied the motion “without prejudice to

prompt reconsideration in the event that the Second Circuit may request

the issuance of an indicative ruling or in the event that the Second Circuit

rules that it does not have appellate jurisdiction over the already-filed

appeal.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 202. White & Case does not request that we seek

an indicative ruling before disposing of this appeal.

13

An issue is not separate from the merits if its resolution requires the

courts of appeals “to review the nature and content of [the merits]

proceedings.” Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 439. The parties

agree that disputes about which counsel should rightfully represent a

client do not turn on the merits.

But this requirement also “insists upon important questions

separate from the merits,” ensuring that “[t]he justification for

immediate appeal [is] . . . sufficiently strong to overcome the usual

benefits of deferring.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107. 12 In other

words, an “important” issue is one “weightier than the societal

interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final judgment

principles.” Digit. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 879. Moreover, early

appeals are unlikely “to bring important error-correcting benefits”

unless they turn on “purely legal matters” within the “comparative

expertise” of appellate courts. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316

(1995); see also Banque Nordeurope S.A. v. Banker, 970 F.2d 1129, 1131

(2d Cir. 1992) (contrasting “important question[s] of law whose

12 White & Case suggests that Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd.,

718 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2013), abrogated the collateral order doctrine’s

importance requirement. This is incorrect. Liberty Synergistics merely

clarified that we “simply cop[y] the Supreme Court’s formulation and [do]

not attempt[] to craft some additional element that the Supreme Court has

not yet recognized.” Id. at 149 n.10. And the Supreme Court

unambiguously requires the appealed issue to be important. See Mohawk

Indus., 558 U.S. at 107; Will, 546 U.S. at 351-53; Digit. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S.

at 878-79. We thus continue to assess importance when applying the

collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Bescond, 24 F.4th 759,

767-68 (2d Cir. 2021). Liberty Synergistics itself did so. See 718 F.3d at 148-

49.

14

resolution will guide courts in other cases” with “merely the

application of well-settled principles of law to particular facts”).

Substitution-of-counsel disputes do not present “neat abstract

issues of law” that “need only be answered once.” Liberty

Synergistics, 718 F.3d at 148. The right to represent a client is likely

to turn on case-specific, idiosyncratic facts, such as the client’s internal

procedures for selection of counsel, the course of the litigation, and

the history of communications between the parties. Cf. Firestone Tire

& Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 377 (noting that the “decision whether to

disqualify an attorney ordinarily turns on the peculiar factual

situation of the case then at hand”). It may also involve the

application of idiosyncratic law, as in this case, in which the parties

appeal to the laws of El Salvador and Venezuela in addition to those

of the United States. The interest in early resolution of these fact-

intensive questions does not outweigh “the usual benefits of

deferring” review, Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107, nor would it “guide

courts in other cases” given the “particular facts,” Kensington Int’l Ltd.

v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).

Moreover, a district court’s order denying substitution of

counsel does not implicate sufficiently important “value[s] of a high

order.” Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107 (cleaned up). To be sure,

immediate review of the district court’s order would protect ALBA’s

putative interest in controlling the litigation. It may also protect

White & Case’s interest in representing its client. But we apply the

collateral order doctrine categorically, and as explained above, the

15

Supreme Court has rejected the suggestion that controlling litigation

is sufficiently important to justify the costs of interlocutory appeal. 13

In the civil disqualification context, for example, the Supreme

Court rejected the argument that an interlocutory appeal is needed

“to vindicate the client’s choice of counsel” or “the interest of the

attorneys.” Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 433 (cleaned up).

Although not having counsel of choice imposes “significant hardship

on litigants,” the costs of “piecemeal appeal” are too high. Id. at 434,

440. Early appeals would “delay proceedings on the merits until the

appeal is decided,” even “when counsel appeals an entirely proper

disqualification order.” Id. at 434. Plus, the attorney’s interest

makes interlocutory review less desirable: the “personal and

financial” element would incentivize attempts at obtaining such

review. Id. The same costs and benefits are present here. In the

criminal disqualification context too, the Supreme Court found that

“[t]he costs of . . . expansion [of the collateral order doctrine] are

great, and the potential rewards are small.” Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 269.

And White & Case, unlike a criminal defendant, has no Sixth

Amendment interests at stake. See Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151,

154 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that criminal defendants have a “qualified

13 White & Case argues that the order is important because it

“implicates important questions of State sovereignty and separation of

powers” related to “the political question and act of state doctrines.”

Appellant’s Br. at 54. Even if true, those issues are idiosyncratic to this

appeal, and do not exist in “the class of claims, taken as a whole.” Mohawk

Indus., 558 U.S. at 107. “That a fraction of [adverse] orders . . . harm[s]

individual litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable does not

justify making all such orders immediately appealable.” Id. at 112

(cleaned up).

16

[Sixth Amendment] right to be represented by the counsel of [their]

choice”).

In short, “[w]e routinely require litigants to wait until after final

judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our

adversarial system,” such as civil choice of counsel. Mohawk Indus.,

558 U.S. at 108-09 (citing Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 426; Flanagan,

465 U.S. at 260). The interest in controlling litigation is impeded as

much by decisions disqualifying counsel as by denials of motions to

substitute counsel. It thus follows that denials of motions to

substitute counsel do not implicate “important questions” of a “high

order.” Id. at 107. So we conclude that a denial of a motion to

substitute counsel is not immediately appealable under the collateral

order doctrine. We thus lack appellate jurisdiction and must dismiss

the appeal.

D. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus

We also deny White & Case’s alternative arguments petitioning

for a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is “drastic and extraordinary,”

requiring that there are “no other adequate means to attain the relief,”

the petitioner has a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ, and “the

writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct.

for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004). White & Case cannot meet this

high standard.

First, as explained above, White & Case has “other adequate

means to attain the relief [it] desires,” id. at 380 (cleaned up), namely,

“obtain[ing] relief through the regular appeals process,” United States

17

v. Manzano (In re United States), 945 F.3d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 2019). 14

Second, we are satisfied that the district court’s resolution of the

representation dispute did not amount to “a judicial usurpation of

power, or a clear abuse of discretion.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380

(cleaned up). White & Case conceded the foundations of the district

court’s order—that ALBA is a Salvadoran corporation governed by

Salvadoran law, that legal representatives direct litigation under

Salvadoran law, and that ALBA’s legal representative hired Jiménez.

White & Case’s argument that the internal-affairs doctrine does not

apply in the unique circumstances of this case is not so self-evident as

to warrant granting mandamus.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS the appeal and DENY

the petition for a writ of mandamus. We otherwise DENY all

pending motions as moot.

14 The rare cases in which we have granted mandamus as a

substitute for collateral order appeal typically implicate extraordinary

confidentiality interests such that waiting for final judgment would “let the

cat out of the bag.” In re Roman Cath. Diocese of Albany, N.Y., Inc., 745 F.3d

30, 35 (2d Cir. 2014); see Prevezon Holdings, 839 F.3d at 237-38; SEC v.

Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2010); In re City of New York, 607

F.3d 923, 933-94 (2d Cir. 2010). No such circumstances exist here.

18