The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Alton D. Brown, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 924 C.D. 2019
: Submitted: April 14, 2023
Correct Care Solutions, John E. :
Wetzel, and Tom Wolf :
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM FILED: September 18, 2023
Alton D. Brown (Inmate) appeals pro se the order of the Fayette County
Court of Common Pleas (trial court) granting the Motion to Dismiss filed by Correct
Care Solutions (CCS) pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
(Pa.R.Civ.P.) 233.1.1 We affirm.
1
Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1(a) and (c) states, in pertinent part:
(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff
in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to
dismiss the action on the basis that
(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims which
the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same or related
defendants, and
(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to . . . a court
proceeding.
***
(Footnote continued on next page…)
On October 22, 2018, Inmate filed a 100-page Complaint in the trial
court containing 25 counts and naming over 380 defendants, including CCS, a
contracted healthcare service provider with the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (DOC), and its employees; DOC, and its former Secretary John E.
Wetzel (Secretary); and former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf (Governor)
(collectively, Defendants). See Original Record (O.R.) Docket (Dkt.) Entry 1.
Specifically, the Complaint generally alleged: (1) Defendants deprived Inmate of
his rights, privileges, and immunities under the First Amendment to the United
States (U.S.) Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. I; (2) violation of the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV, with respect to his housing
and treatment in various DOC facilities; (3) violation of the Eighth Amendment
through the use of excessive force and corporal punishment while being housed in
DOC facilities; (4) violation of the Eighth Amendment through the denial of proper
medical care for his prostate cancer, and other physical and mental conditions, while
being housed in DOC facilities; (5) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to
be free of a civil conspiracy among the named government officials; (6) violation of
his rights under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§12101-12213, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794;
(7) violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by providing
medical care and facilities that do not comply with a number of state statutes and
regulations; (8) various torts including negligence, malpractice, and intentional
(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the court
may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se
litigation against the same or related defendants raising the same or
related claims without leave of court.
2
infliction of emotional distress, for acts relating to his housing and care in DOC
facilities; (9) breach of contract regarding the medical care provided by CCS
employees; and (10) violation of his right to access to the courts under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. See generally id. Based on the foregoing, Inmate sought
various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief; monetary damages totaling
$50,000,000.00; court costs; and any other relief the trial court deemed to be
appropriate. See id.
On May 2, 2019, CCS and its named employees filed a Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1 (Motion) and a brief in support thereof. See
O.R. Dkt. Entries 12, 13. On June 14, 2019, the trial court granted the Motion and
dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. See id. at 16. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion filed in support of its order, the trial court explained the reasoning
underlying its dismissal of all claims against CCS and its employees under
Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1. See O.R. Dkt. Entry 19 at 2-4. The trial court also cited the
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§6601-6608,2 as a basis upon
2
Specifically, Section 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA states, in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding
any filing fee which has been paid, the court shall dismiss prison conditions litigation at any time,
including prior to service on the defendant, if the court determines . . . [t]he prison conditions
litigation is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .”
42 Pa. C.S. §6602(e)(2). As this Court has observed: “Section 6602(e)(2) of the [PLRA]
establishes that the court shall dismiss prison conditions litigation at any time if it determines that
the litigation fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(e)(2).”
McCool v. Department of Corrections, 984 A.2d 565, 569 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (emphasis in
original).
In addition, Section 6602(f) of the PLRA states, in relevant part:
If the prisoner has previously filed prison conditions litigation and:
(1) three or more of these prior civil actions have been dismissed
pursuant to subsection (e)(2); or
(Footnote continued on next page…)
3
which it dismissed all of the claims raised against the remaining Defendants. See id.
at 4-5. Inmate then filed the instant timely appeal of the trial court’s order.
On appeal,3 Inmate claims: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction
over the Defendants that were not served with his Complaint; (2) the trial court erred
as a matter of law and fact in dismissing the Complaint under Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1; and
(3) the trial court erred as a matter of law in applying the PLRA’s “three strikes rule”
in Section 6602(f) to dismiss the claims that were raised in the Complaint.4
(2) the prisoner has previously filed prison conditions litigation
against a person named as a defendant in the instant action or a
person serving in the same official capacity as a named defendant
and a court made a finding that the prior action was filed in bad
faith . . .
the court may dismiss the action. The court shall not, however,
dismiss a request for preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary
restraining order which makes a credible allegation that the prisoner
is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.
42 Pa. C.S. §6602(f)(1), (2). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained: “It is undisputed
[Inmate] has previously filed more than three prison conditions litigation actions that have been
dismissed. It is also undisputed the underlying complaint the prothonotary refused to accept
constitutes prison conditions litigation.” Brown v. Levy, 73 A.3d 514, 517 (Pa. 2013) (citations
omitted).
3
“‘The interpretation and application of a [Pa.R.Civ.P.] presents a question of law.
Accordingly, to the extent that we are required to interpret a [Pa.R.Civ.P.], our standard of review
is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.’” Ligonier Township v. Nied, 161 A.3d 1039, 1046
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citation omitted). Likewise, with respect to the trial court’s dismissal of
claims under the PLRA, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo.
Robertson v. Zaken (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1111 C.D. 2019, filed December 22, 2021), slip op. at 4
n.5; see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (“‘[N]on-precedential decision’ refers to . . . an unreported
memorandum opinion of the Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008. Non-precedential
decisions . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.”).
4
As indicated above, as alternate bases, the trial court also dismissed all of the claims in
the Complaint pursuant to both Section 6602(e)(2) and (f) of the PLRA See O.R. Dkt. Entry 19 at
(Footnote continued on next page…)
4
However, after reviewing the record, Inmate’s brief, and the relevant law, we
conclude that the appellate issues have been ably resolved in the thorough and well-
reasoned opinion of the Honorable Linda R. Cordaro, and affirm on the basis of her
opinion in the matter of Brown v. Correct Care Solutions (C.P. Fay., No. 2299 of
2018, G.D., filed September 18, 2019).5
Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.
4-6. Inmate does not raise a claim of trial court error with respect to the dismissal of all of the
claims under either Section 6602(e)(2) or (f)(1). See Brief of the Appellant at 2, 20.
5
In its order, the trial court relied exclusively on Pa.R.Civ.P. 233.1, while its opinion
explicated that Section 6602(e)(2) and (f)(1), 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(e)(2) and (f)(1), provides another
basis upon which its order could be affirmed. Because courts speak in orders, the exclusive
rationale set forth in the trial court’s order ordinarily would control. However, because the trial
court added analysis to its order in the opinion, we are adopting that analysis as well, despite the
fact that the trial court did not amend its order to reflect the total analysis set forth in its opinion.
It is well settled that “‘[w]e may affirm a trial court determination under a different rationale,
where the result is correct and the basis on which we affirm is clear on the record.’” Brown v.
James, 822 A.2d 128, 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citation omitted).
5
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Alton D. Brown, :
:
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 924 C.D. 2019
:
Correct Care Solutions, John E. :
Wetzel, and Tom Wolf :
PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 18th day of September, 2023, the order of the Fayette
County Court of Common Pleas (trial court), dated June 14, 2019, is AFFIRMED
on the reasoning set forth in the trial court’s September 18, 2019 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
Opinion.