Hicks v. LeBlanc

Case: 22-30184 Document: 00516883884 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/05/2023

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

September 5, 2023

No. 22-30184 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

Ellis Ray Hicks,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public Safety and

Corrections, individually and in his official capacity; Terry Lawson,

Department of Corrections employee, individually and in his official capacity;

Tracy DiBenedetto; Sally Gryder; Angela Griffin,

Defendants—Appellants.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:19-CV-108

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:

We are seeing with some frequency claims of “overdetention,” now a

euphemism for prisoners illegally incarcerated beyond the terms of their

sentence. Unfortunately, many of these cases have come to this Court in

recent years. This is yet another from Louisiana.

Ellis Ray Hicks brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana

state law against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

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(“DPSC”) supervisory officials Tracy DiBenedetto, Angela Griffin, and

Sally Gryder in their individual capacities alleging that he was wrongfully

detained for sixty days after the expiration of his prison sentence. The district

court denied qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage for

DiBenedetto and Gryder but found Griffin enjoys qualified immunity.

DiBenedetto and Gryder timely appealed. We conclude in this interlocutory

appeal that the district court properly denied qualified immunity and

AFFIRM.

I.

A.

In July 2016, Hicks was arrested in Louisiana for a parole violation

stemming from a conviction in Arkansas. In January 2017, after serving 163

days of pretrial detention, Hicks pled guilty to the parole violation and was

sentenced to four years of hard labor with credit for time served in Arkansas.

Hicks alleges that he should have been released on February 24, 2018.

In February 2017, Terry Lawson, a DPSC employee, calculated

Hicks’ sentence to end on February 28, 2018. Hicks alleges that several

weeks later, Gryder ordered Lawson to recalculate the sentence. Lawson

then came up with a new date of May 23, 2019, essentially removing the

credit for time served in Arkansas. Although Gryder reviewed the sentence

and calculation, she did not instruct Lawson to include the credit for time

served in Arkansas.

When Hicks questioned the new release date, Brian Flynn, Claiborne

Parish Clerk of Court, told him he would not get credit for time served

“without an official document from the State of Arkansas showing the credits

that you are due.” Subsequently, Lawson privately informed Hicks that he

was not qualified to receive credit for time served.

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With the help of his family and friends, in June 2017 Hicks obtained a

letter from the Arkansas Department of Corrections confirming his time

served in Arkansas, prompting Gryder to order Lawson to recalculate the

sentence. Lawson then came up with yet another new date, which Hicks

alleges still did not include time in pretrial detention in Arkansas. Seeking to

assure his time was properly being included, in July 2017 Hicks moved to

clarify the record in the Louisiana Second Judicial District Court. Several

weeks later, the sentencing judge again ordered that Hicks’ sentence be “four

(4) years of hard labor with credit for all time served, including the time

served in the State of Arkansas.” In September 2017, DiBenedetto reviewed

a filing by Hicks under Louisiana’s Administrative Remedy Procedure

(“ARP”) asking that his 110 days in Arkansas pretrial detention be included

in his time calculation. A short time later, DiBenedetto informed Hicks that

the current calculation was correct and would not be modified.

Two months later, in November 2017, Lawson asked DiBenedetto to

instruct him as to whether he should include the additional time in Hicks’

time calculation. DiBenedetto informed Lawson that whether to include the

110 days of pretrial detention in the calculation depended on whether Hicks

was being held “under the same circumstances” or if Louisiana had a “hold”

on him. Lacking clarity, Lawson recalculated the release date to be July 11,

2018, and two days later sent a follow-up email to DiBenedetto, asking

whether there was “any ruling” on including the 110 days in Hicks’ time

calculation. DiBenedetto did not answer the question, but rather asked

Lawson to determine whether there was a “hold” on Hicks from Louisiana

before including the 110 days of pretrial detention in the recalculation of his

sentence.

In January 2018, Hicks filed another ARP concerning Lawson’s

refusal to consider his time-served credit. Hicks then moved in Louisiana

state court to enforce the sentencing judge’s order, which was granted on

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January 12, 2018. In a February 2018 state habeas hearing, the judge and the

District Attorney confirmed that the sentence included time served in

Arkansas, but also advised that the court could do nothing else to help him

and that he needed to file suit in Baton Rouge against DPSC. During this

time, Lawson told Hicks’ friends and family that “an awful lot of people were

calling him” about Hicks, that “anyone who messes with me gets longer

time,” and that “if someone keeps bothering me about their computations

they can do more time.”

In April 2018, Hicks’ attorney called Lawson inquiring why Hicks had

not been released. In a recorded phone call, Lawson advised the attorney that

“judges have no say whatsoever to us applying our time comp laws” and

confirmed that Hicks’ sentence excluded time for which he served in

Arkansas. Later that month, Gryder asked Lawson to call the Faulkner

County Sheriff’s Office to determine how much time Hicks spent in pretrial

detention in Arkansas. Lawson then called and informed Griffin that Hicks

“had enough credit to get released.” Gryder then manually recalculated

Hicks’ sentence, inputting dates for all time served in Arkansas. Although

Hicks was eligible for immediate release, Gryder changed his release date

from April 20, 2018 to April 25, 2018. Ending this saga, Hicks was released

from prison on April 25, 2018.

B.

Later that year, alleging that he was unlawfully detained for 60 days

after the expiration of his prison sentence, Hicks filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, bringing claims against DPSC, James LeBlanc, individually and in his

official capacity as the DPSC Secretary, and Lawson, individually and in his

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official capacity as a DPSC employee.1 In August 2019, DPSC, LeBlanc, and

Lawson moved to dismiss, asserting that: (1) monetary damages were barred

by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, (2) Hicks’ claims were barred

under Heck v. Humphrey,2 and (3) LeBlanc and Lawson were entitled to

qualified immunity. The district court: (1) dismissed the claims for monetary

damages against LeBlanc and Lawson in their official capacities under

sovereign immunity, (2) held that the Heck doctrine did not bar Hicks’

claims, and (3) held that LeBlanc and Lawson were not entitled to qualified

immunity.3 This Court reversed the decision denying LeBlanc’s qualified

immunity but affirmed the district court’s rejection of Lawson’s qualified

immunity assertion.4

Following discovery, Hicks filed a Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”), the operative pleading here, asserting claims against Lawson and

LeBlanc, adding DiBenedetto, Gryder, and Griffin as defendants, and

dropping DPSC as a defendant.5 DiBenedetto, Gryder, and Griffin moved to

dismiss, asserting that Heck v. Humphrey bars Hicks’ § 1983 claims and that

they are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity for the individual

_____________________

1

Hicks v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., No. 19-CV-108, 2020 WL 428116, at *2

(M.D. La. Jan. 27, 2020). Hicks asserted Fourteenth Amendment due process and First

Amendment free speech violations, a Monell failure to train/supervise claim, false

imprisonment, negligence, respondeat superior, indemnification, and a violation of Hicks’

rights under the Louisiana Constitution. Id. at *2.

2

512 U.S. 477 (1994).

3

See generally Hicks, 2020 WL 428116.

4

See generally Hicks v. LeBlanc, 832 F. App’x 836 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished)

(per curiam).

5

Hicks sued DiBenedetto, Gryder, and Griffin in their individual capacities,

asserting Fourteenth Amendment due process violations, a Monell failure to

train/supervise claim (against Griffin alone), false imprisonment, negligence, and a

violation of Hicks’ rights under the Louisiana Constitution.

5

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capacity claims. The district court denied qualified immunity as to

DiBenedetto and Gryder and granted it as to Griffin.6 DiBenedetto and

Gryder (“Appellants”) timely appealed.

II.

Under the collateral order doctrine, we may review the denial of a

motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity immediately.7 For purposes

of this appeal, we accept the factual allegations in the SAC as true.8 When, as

here, the district court denies a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity

grounds, “we have jurisdiction only to decide whether the district court erred

in concluding as a matter of law that officials are not entitled to [qualified

immunity] on a given set of facts.”9 “We do not consider the correctness of

the plaintiff’s version of the facts.”10 We review a district court’s denial of a

motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds de novo.11

III.

A.

Appellants insist they are entitled to qualified immunity because they

neither violated Hicks’ constitutional rights nor acted unreasonably in light

of clearly established law. We disagree.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials

_____________________

6

Hicks v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 595 F. Supp. 3d 463, 467 (M.D. La. 2022).

7

Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

8

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

9

Ramirez v. Escajeda, 921 F.3d 497, 499 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Rich v. Palko, 920

F.3d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 2019)).

10

Id. at 500 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

11

See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th

Cir. 2009).

6

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from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.”12 Qualified immunity shields government officials

performing discretionary functions from civil damages liability “as long as

their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights

they are alleged to have violated.”13 “Qualified immunity includes two

inquiries. The first question is whether the officer violated a constitutional

right. The second question is whether the ‘right at issue was “clearly

established” at the time of the alleged misconduct.’”14 We may decide which

_____________________

12

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).

13

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); see also Morgan v. Swanson, 659

F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The basic steps of our qualified-immunity inquiry are well-

known: a plaintiff seeking to defeat qualified immunity must show: (1) that the official

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’

at the time of the challenged conduct.” (cleaned up)).

14

Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S.

at 232). We note that we have, at times, reformulated the test for qualified immunity by

adding an objective-unreasonableness component. See Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th

Cir. 2011) (“A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff

demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) the

defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the

time of the violation.”). But to be clear, there is no “standalone ‘objective reasonableness’

element to the Supreme Court’s two-pronged test for qualified immunity.” Baker v.

Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 251 n.10 (5th Cir. 2023), as revised (May 19, 2023). In other words,

to establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must: “(1) allege a violation of a right secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Pratt v. Harris

County, Texas, 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (“Qualified immunity shields

. . . state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct.”); Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177,

185–86 (5th Cir. 2022) (noting that to determine whether the defense applies on a given set

of facts, “[f]irst, [this court] ask[s] whether the officer’s alleged conduct has violated a

federal right. Second, [this court] ask[s] whether the right in question was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation, such that the officer was on notice of the

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question of the qualified immunity analysis to address first.15

B.

We begin with the second question, whether the right at issue was

clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.16 “In determining

what constitutes clearly established law, this [C]ourt first looks to Supreme

Court precedent and then to our own.”17 When there is no direct controlling

authority, “this [C]ourt may rely on decisions from other circuits to the

extent that they constitute a robust consensus of cases of persuasive

authority.”18 Ultimately, the touchstone is “fair warning: The law can be

clearly established ‘despite notable factual distinctions between the

precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior

decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated

constitutional rights.’”19 In other words, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry

in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be

clear to a reasonable [official] that his [or her] conduct was unlawful in the

situation he [or she] confronted.”20

_____________________

unlawfulness of his or her conduct”), petition for reh’g en banc denied, 58 F.4th 844, 845 (5th

Cir. 2023).

15

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242 (“[T]he judges of the district courts and the courts of

appeals are in the best position to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best

facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.”).

16

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

17

Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2018).

18

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

19

Kinney, 367 F.3d at 350 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)).

20

Porter, 659 F.3d at 445.

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The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”21 Clear

as day, the government cannot hold an inmate without the legal authority to

do so, for that would “deprive” a person of his “liberty . . . without due

process of law.”22 Applying this foundational concept to carceral sentences

and releases, it is clearly established that inmates have the right to timely

release from prison consistent with the terms of their sentences, a holding we

have long-held and repeatedly reaffirmed.23 Relevant here, the right to timely

release was clearly established well before 2017.24 And, Hicks’ right to timely

release was clearly established under these particular circumstances because

governing law required DPSC to follow the state court’s orders requiring

them to credit the Arkansas time.25

C.

Having established that Hicks’ right to timely release was clearly

established, we turn to the first question of qualified immunity: whether

_____________________

21

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1.

22

Id.

23

See Parker v. LeBlanc, 73 F.4th 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2023) (“We agree that there is

sufficient clearly established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from

prison.”); Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 188 (noting that the Fifth Circuit “has recognized the

clearly established right to timely release from prison”); see also Porter, 659 F.3d at 445

(“Our precedent establishes that a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are timely

released from prison.”); Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Detention of

a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially valid

court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.”).

24

See Douthit, 619 F.2d at 532.

25

See Boddye v. La. Dep’t of Corr., 175 So. 3d 437, 441 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2015) (“It

is well settled that the determination of the sentence a defendant is to serve . . . is made by

the trial judge, not the defendant’s custodian.”).

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Appellants violated Hicks’ clearly established constitutional right.26 Hicks’

right to timely release is clearly established, not just as a general proposition

of law, but specifically by the multiple state-court orders declaring that the

Arkansas time was to be credited.

Under section 1983, “supervisory officials are not liable for the actions

of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”27 Thus, a supervisory

official may be held directly liable “only if he affirmatively participates in the

acts that cause the constitutional deprivation.”28 A supervisor may also be

liable for failure to supervise or train if “(1) the supervisor either failed to

supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the

failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3)

the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.”29

Hicks invokes both theories of § 1983 liability. He argues that

DiBenedetto and Gryder should be liable for directly participating in the

violation of his rights, and that Appellants should be liable for their deliberate

indifference to Lawson’s violation of his constitutional rights. We agree.

Hicks plausibly alleges that DiBenedetto and Gryder were direct

participants in violating his right to timely release from prison. According to

the complaint, DiBenedetto reviewed all of Hicks’ ARPs, knew he was not

being credited for the Arkansas time, yet did not take any action to correct

the error. Indeed, she personally informed Hicks that her (incorrect)

calculation was correct and refused to modify it despite Hicks’ pointing out

_____________________

26

Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874 (“The first question is whether the officer violated a

constitutional right.”).

27

Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987)).

28

Porter, 659 F.3d at 446.

29

Id.

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that his Arkansas time was not credited. And when Lawson asked

DiBenedetto whether he should include the Arkansas time credits,

DiBenedetto did not instruct Lawson to include the time—even though by

then the state court had clarified that Hicks’ Arkansas time was to be

credited. Gryder, too, directly participated in Hicks’ overdetention by

manually altering Hicks’ release date to extend the period of imprisonment

despite knowing that Hicks was, at that point, already being held past the

expiration of his sentence.

The alleged facts also lead to a plausible inference that Appellants, as

supervisors, were deliberately indifferent to Lawson’s violation of Hicks’

clearly established right to timely release from prison. Deliberate

indifference, of course, is a “stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that

a [government] actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his

action.”30 “For an official to act with deliberate indifference, the official must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.”31

In Crittindon, we held that a jury could find prison officials deliberately

indifferent to the plaintiffs’ right to timely release when the officials received

calls from the plaintiffs’ mothers about their release dates and discussed it

among themselves but did nothing about it for 17 days.32 Under those facts,

_____________________

30

Porter, 659 F.3d at 446–47.

31

Est. of Davis ex rel. McNully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th

Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

32

37 F.4th at 189.

11

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we held, “[a] reasonable factfinder could find that their conduct sums to

deliberate indifference to Crittindon and Burse’s overdetention.”33

These facts are worse than in Crittindon. According to the complaint,

DiBenedetto and Gryder both knew—for months—that Hicks had on

numerous occasions contested Lawson’s failure to apply the Arkansas credit,

yet neither trained nor supervised Lawson even after it was confirmed that

the Arkansas credit was to be applied to Hicks’ sentence. Indeed, when

Lawson asked DiBenedetto (his supervisor) “whether he should include”

the Arkansas time, DiBenedetto did not instruct Lawson to follow the court’s

clarifying order—indeed it appears she did not give him any training or

supervision on this issue for nearly a month. DiBenedetto also did nothing in

response to one of Hicks’ (several) administrative grievances “specifically

regarding Lawson refusing the consider [the] Arkansas time” even though,

by then, multiple authorities had unequivocally stated that the Arkansas time

was to be included. Worst of all, DiBenedetto knew that “DOC staff have

discovered approximately one case of overdetention per week for the last nine

years,” with “inmates . . . sometimes incorrectly incarcerated for periods of

up to a year.” Yet she did nothing. As for Gryder, she too knew of Lawson’s

lack of training and supervision as he miscalculated—over and over again—

Hicks’ time credits. Importantly, upon learning that Hicks was entitled to

“immediate release,” she “manually changed his release date from April 20,

2018 to April 25, 2018, deliberately holding him for an additional five (5)

days.” On these facts, we draw the plausible inference that DiBenedetto and

Gryder disregarded the “known or obvious consequence” of their failure to

_____________________

33

Id.

12

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train and supervise Lawson.34 The district court did not err in denying

Appellants’ qualified immunity defense.

IV.

A.

Appellants also contend that Hicks’ claims are barred under the Heck

doctrine, as they argue Hicks challenges both the validity and duration of his

confinement.35 Hicks counters that Heck’s bar does not apply to his claims

because he merely challenges his overdetention. Hicks is correct: Heck has

no place here.

As Hemingway once said, there is no need “to write in another way

what has been well written.”36 Such is the case here. In Crittindon, we

addressed allegations that “DPSC officials, in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment, looked away from the administrative failure they knew was

leaving prisoners in jail who had served their sentences.”37 As in Crittindon,

Hicks does not challenge the validity of his sentence, merely the execution of

his release.38 He seeks to vindicate—not undermine—his sentence. As in

_____________________

34

See Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186; Parker, 73 F.4th at 406.

35

512 U.S. 477 (1994).

36

See Ernest Hemingway, Nobel Prize Banquet Speech (Dec. 10, 1954).

37

Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 181.

38

Id. at 190 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has emphasized that it was

“careful in Heck to stress the importance of the term ‘necessarily,’” such as when the

Court “acknowledged that an inmate could bring a challenge to the lawfulness of a search

pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance, even if the search revealed evidence used to convict

the inmate at trial, because success on the merits would not ‘necessarily imply that the

plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.’” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004)

(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7). “To hold otherwise,” the Court continued, “would

have cut off potentially valid damages actions as to which a plaintiff might never obtain

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Crittindon, the Parties agree that Hicks was held in excess of his sentence.39

And as in Crittindon, if Hicks were to succeed based on the period he was

held beyond his original sentence, it would not invalidate the conviction or

its attendant sentence.40 Crittindon controls this case.41 Heck is no bar here.

The other cases upon which Appellants rely, Muhammad v. Close,42

and Colvin v. LeBlanc,43 also miss the mark. In Muhammad, a prisoner had a

confrontation with a prison guard, resulting in the prisoner being handcuffed

and subjected to pretrial detention on charges of “Threatening Behavior.”44

After six days in mandatory detention, the prisoner was acquitted of

threatening behavior but found guilty of the lesser infraction of insolence,

which would not have mandated pretrial detention.45 The prisoner

subsequently filed an action under § 1983, alleging that the guard had charged

him with threatening behavior and subjected him to mandatory pretrial

detention in retaliation for his prior lawsuits and grievance proceedings

against the guard.46 The Supreme Court held that Heck did not bar the § 1983

case because the plaintiff did not challenge his insolence conviction or any

subsequent detention, but only sought damages for the injuries sustained

_____________________

favorable termination–suits that could otherwise have gone forward had the plaintiff not

been convicted.” Id.

39

Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 190.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 190–92, petition for reh’g en banc denied, 58 F.4th 844, 845 (5th Cir. 2023).

42

540 U.S. 749 (2004).

43

2 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2021).

44

540 U.S. at 752.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 753.

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during the six days of prehearing detention.47 Thus, the plaintiff was

challenging only the conduct that subjected him to unnecessary pretrial

detention, and was not deemed to be seeking a judgment at odds with his

conviction.48 The Supreme Court concluded in Muhammad that challenges

to disciplinary proceedings are barred by Heck only if the § 1983 action would

be “seeking a judgment at odds with [the prisoner’s] conviction or with the

State’s calculation of time to be served in accordance with the underlying

sentence.”49 For that reason, Muhammad does not bar Hicks’ claims because

“the incarceration that matters under Heck is the incarceration ordered by

the original judgment of conviction.”50

Colvin similarly fails to support. In Colvin, James Colvin was

sentenced to eighty years in prison after a 1983 jury conviction in Louisiana.51

In 1986, he escaped from the Louisiana State Penitentiary, only to be

recaptured and sentenced to a new federal prison term.52 After being paroled

in 2004, Colvin then robbed a bank, for which he was sentenced to a new

term of imprisonment.53 When released in 2016, DPSC officials returned him

to Louisiana. While in Louisiana’s custody, Colvin filed a § 1983 suit, seeking

monetary damages for the “unconstitutional interruption” of his federal

sentence as well as the “illegal extradition” to Louisiana and an “artificial

_____________________

47

Id. at 754-55.

48

Id.

49

Id. at 754–55 (emphasis added).

50

Id. at 752 n.1.

51

Colvin, 2 F.4th at 496.

52

Id.

53

Id.

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extension” of his state sentence by thirty years.54 The defendants moved to

dismiss the case, arguing that the claims were barred by Heck, because Colvin

challenged the validity and duration of his detention.55 The district court

agreed.56 Colvin appealed, and we affirmed, holding that Colvin’s claims

were barred by Heck.57

However, we did not view the claim as one of unlawful overdetention.

To the contrary, this Court concluded that although the district court

“characterized Colvin’s claim as only involving the miscalculation of his

release date . . . Colvin actually challenges two independent acts: (1) the

‘artificial enhancement’ of his sentence, and (2) his illegal extradition.”58 We

then held that “a § 1983 damages action predicated on the sentence

calculation issue is barred by Heck because success on that claim would

necessarily invalidate the duration of his incarceration.”59 Hicks is not

challenging the number of days he was supposed to serve, but rather that he

was detained longer than the proper sentence imposed.

B.

Appellants’ last contention is that Heck bars any § 1983 claim that is

also cognizable in habeas at the time it accrues. In support of this argument,

Appellants rely on Preiser v. Rodriguez,60 which predates Heck. Appellants are

mistaken.

_____________________

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 497.

57

Id. at 501.

58

Id. at 499.

59

Id. at 499 (emphasis added).

60

411 U.S. 475 (1973).

16

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In Preiser, state prisoners who had lost good-time credits as a result of

disciplinary proceedings brought an action under § 1983 for restoration of the

credits on the ground that the proceedings violated their due process rights.61

The prisoners would have been entitled to immediate release from prison if

their good-time credits had been restored.62 The Court held that the claims

thus fell within the core of habeas corpus and therefore had to be brought

under habeas, explaining that that the Great Writ is the “specific instrument

to obtain release” from unlawful imprisonment when a prisoner challenges

“the fact or duration of his confinement.”63

In a series of cases after Preiser, the Supreme Court articulated the

reach of its pronouncement, sorting state prisoner claims that fell within the

“core of habeas” and were required to be brought as a habeas action and

those which did not. In Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court reiterated that claims

for restoration of good-time credits were in the core of habeas and therefore

outside the scope of § 1983.64 Then the Court revisited Preiser in Heck when

it held that a § 1983 complaint must be dismissed if judgment for the plaintiff

would undermine the validity of his conviction or sentence.65 In Edwards v.

Balisok, the Court next held that a state prisoner’s challenge under § 1983

that “would necessarily imply the invalidity of the disciplinary hearing and

the resulting [deprivation of good-time credits]” fell within habeas’s

exclusive domain.66 And it later clarified Edwards in Muhammad, holding that

_____________________

61

Id. at 476–77.

62

Id. at 500.

63

Id. at 489–500.

64

18 U.S. 539, 554 (1974).

65

411 U.S. at 486–87.

66

520 U.S. 641, 644–48 (1997).

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such challenges to disciplinary proceedings are barred by Heck only if the §

1983 action would be “seeking a judgment at odds with [the prisoner’s]

conviction or with the State’s calculation of time to be served.”67

The upshot of these cases is that challenges to the validity of any

confinement or to particulars affecting its duration fall within the “core” of

habeas corpus and are barred under this line of precedent;68 “[b]y contrast,

constitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of prisoner’s

confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall

outside of that core and may be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first

instance.”69 Preiser and its progeny do not implicate the claims here because

they are specifically beyond the “core” of habeas, as Hicks’ claims challenge

his overdetention, and by its terms do not implicate the fact or duration of his

confinement.70

The implications of Appellants’ arguments expose their weakness.

Applying Heck to any case also cognizable under habeas would obviate many

§ 1983 remedies the Supreme Court continues to recognize, such as those for

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67

540 U.S. at 754–55.

68

Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006); see also Cook v. Tex. Dep’t. of Crim.

Just. Transitional Plan. Dep’t., 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The core issue in

determining whether a prisoner must pursue habeas corpus relief rather than a [§ 1983]

action is to determine whether the prisoner challenges the ‘fact or duration’ of his

confinement or merely the rules, customs, and procedures affecting ‘conditions’ of

confinement.” (quoting Spina v. Aaron, 821 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987)).

69

Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643; see also Hill, 547 U.S. at 579; Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544

U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (“Because neither prisoner’s claim would necessarily spell speedier

release, neither lies at ‘the core of habeas corpus.’” (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489)).

70

The Supreme Court has not extended Heck as far as Appellants suggest. No

published precedent from this Court supports it. And here, the legality of the sentence and

of detention was never at issue. Hicks was released from custody not by a writ, but by a

phone call to the Faulkner County Sheriff’s Office–habeas has no purchase in this situation.

Habeas had no role here. Hicks was released without the aid of any writ.

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First Amendment retaliatory arrest,71 malicious prosecution,72 and Fourth

Amendment unlawful pretrial detention,73 among others. Expanding Heck as

Appellants ask is a request that would overturn a wealth of this Court’s

precedent on those subjects.74

In sum, requiring overdetained plaintiffs to rely on state habeas would,

in practice, deprive them of a remedy under the federal Constitution.

Consider the following: Louisiana requires prisoners to avail themselves of

its Administrative Remedy Process, which can take up to 90 days,75 before

asserting the required state habeas claim.76 The habeas process can take

months, all the while the state can defeat a favorable outcome for the

plaintiffs by releasing the prisoners during the pendency of the habeas

proceedings, as doing so would leave the prisoner without a cognizable § 1983

claim. In other words, under Appellants’ conception of Heck, the state can

continue to detain prisoners for months past the expiration of their duly

imposed sentences without consequence under the federal Constitution.

This effectively utilizes the filing of state habeas proceedings as a cover for

Louisiana’s systemic failures. That, quite simply, is not the law. The district

court did not err in concluding that Hicks’ claims were not barred by Heck.

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71

See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1723 (2019); see also Lozman v. City of Riviera

Beach, Fla., 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1955 (2018).

72

See McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2019).

73

See Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357 (2017).

74

See, e.g., Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 277 (5th Cir. 2021) (considering a

§ 1983 suit for unlawful arrests without probable cause following the shootout at Twin

Peaks restaurant in Waco).

75

LA. ADMIN CODE TIT. 22, § 325(J)(1)(c) (2017).

76

“No prisoner suit shall assert a claim under state law until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:1184.

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V.

“There isn’t always an explanation for everything.”77 Indeed, as our

Court remains plagued by claims arising from inexplicable and illegal

overdetention in Louisiana prisons, explanations scarcely arise, let alone

satisfy scrutiny upon our review.78 The problem is endemic in Louisiana,

where the process for calculating release dates is so flawed (to put it kindly)

that roughly one in four inmates released will have been locked up past their

release dates—for a collective total of 3,000-plus years.79

Appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity and these claims are

not barred by the Heck doctrine.

We AFFIRM.80

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77

Ernest Hemingway, A FAREWELL TO ARMS 81 (1929).

78

See Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 183.

79

Mariah Timms, Louisiana Prisons Hold Inmates Past Their Release Dates, Justice

Department Finds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2023); Kanishka Singh, U.S. finds Louisiana

deliberately kept inmates past release date, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2023); Lea Skene & Jacqueline

DeRoberts, State corrections overdetention woes, known since 2012, cost state millions, lawyer

alleges, THE ADVOCATE (Feb. 6, 2020).

80

Although the order appealed from is the denial of qualified immunity to just

DiBenedetto and Gryder, all defendants filed a notice of appeal. Because these other

defendants have not appealed a final judgment or an order appealable under the collateral

doctrine, we DISMISS the appeal of defendants James M. LeBlanc, Terry Lawson, and

Angela Griffin for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We decline to exercise

pendent appellate jurisdiction over their appeal because the issues they raise are not

inextricably intertwined with the denial of qualified immunity. See Gros v. City of Grand

Prairie, 209 F.3d 431, 436–37 (5th Cir. 2000).

20