Opinion

Camacho v. Superior Court

Court: California Supreme Court
Filed: Aug 31, 2023
Status: Published
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 11.6%

The opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

CIRO CAMACHO,

Petitioner,

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MERCED COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

S273391

Fifth Appellate District

F082798

Merced County Superior Court

146207

August 31, 2023

Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which

Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban,

Jenkins, and Evans concurred.

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

S273391

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act; Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 6600 et seq.) authorizes the involuntary commitment of

certain convicted sex offenders — termed “sexually violent

predators,” or SVPs — who are found to have mental disorders

that make them likely to reoffend after release from prison. This

case concerns delays in holding trial on a petition for SVP

commitment.

Petitioner Ciro Camacho was first determined to be an

SVP at a 2005 trial and was committed to the state hospital for

a two-year term under the version of the statute then in force.

The next year, the statute was amended to provide for indefinite

commitment instead of renewable two-year terms. In 2007,

before Camacho’s two-year term ended, the state filed a

recommitment petition seeking indefinite commitment under

the new version of the statute. Since then, the defense has

repeatedly requested or agreed to continuances of the trial date,

with the result that the trial on the recommitment petition has

yet to occur. Camacho now argues that the extended pretrial

delay violates his constitutional rights.

Although the Courts of Appeal have previously addressed

similar claims, this case marks the first time this court has

considered the constitutional framework for evaluating the

timeliness of SVP trials. We now hold that persons facing SVP

commitment have a due process right to a timely trial. But as

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

is true in other contexts, whether pretrial delay violates that

right depends in the first instance on the reasons for the delay.

(Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 531.) Here, while the

decade-plus delay in holding Camacho’s recommitment trial is

extraordinarily lengthy, the available record shows that

responsibility for the delay lies primarily with the defense,

which either sought or agreed to the continuances that led to the

delay. While many of the continuance requests were made by

Camacho’s counsel when Camacho was not personally present

in court, the ordinary rule is that delays sought by counsel are

attributable to their clients (Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S.

81, 85), and the record reveals no basis to depart from that rule

in this case. Camacho therefore has not established that the

pretrial delay in this case resulted in a violation of his due

process rights.

Although we find no due process violation in the case

before us, we underscore the vital role of trial courts in

safeguarding the timely trial right of alleged SVPs. Involuntary

commitment entails “a massive curtailment of liberty.”

(Humphrey v. Cady (1972) 405 U.S. 504, 509.) In the context of

SVP proceedings, the deprivation of liberty begins when a court

finds probable cause to hold an alleged SVP in state custody

pending trial. In making determinations that will affect when

trial is held, the trial court must take due account of the

individual’s interests in prompt adjudication and take decisive

steps to guard against unjustified delay.

The Legislature first enacted the SVP Act in 1995,

expressing concerns about “a select group of criminal offenders

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

who are extremely dangerous as the result of mental

impairment, and who are likely to continue committing acts of

sexual violence even after they have been punished for such

crimes.” (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138,

1144 (Hubbart).) In its findings and declarations for the SVP

Act, the Legislature described its intent to “identify these

individuals prior to the expiration of their terms of

imprisonment” and, if they are “found to be likely to commit acts

of sexually violent criminal behavior beyond a reasonable

doubt,” to ensure that they “be confined and treated until such

time that it can be determined that they no longer present a

threat to society.” (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1, p. 5921.)

To be committed as an SVP, an individual must meet the

SVP Act’s definition of the term “ ‘[s]exually violent predator’ ”:

“[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense

against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental

disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety

of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually

violent criminal behavior.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd.

(a)(1); see id., subd. (b) [defining “ ‘[s]exually violent offense’ ” to

include certain enumerated crimes “when committed by force,

violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate and unlawful bodily

injury on the victim or another person, or threatening to

retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person”].)1

The statute sets forth extensive administrative and

judicial procedures for determining whether an individual is

properly classified as an SVP. The process typically begins

The SVP Act has been amended several times since it was

first enacted in 1995. Unless otherwise indicated, statutory

references are to the version of the SVP Act currently in force.

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

while the individual is still serving a prison sentence for a

sexually violent offense. At least six months before the

individual’s scheduled release date, the Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation conducts an initial screening of

individuals who have committed a qualifying offense, using a

standardized screening instrument to review the individual’s

“social, criminal, and institutional history.” (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 6601, subd. (b).) If the initial screening indicates that the

person is likely to be an SVP, the individual is referred to the

California Department of State Hospitals (Department) for a

full evaluation. (Id., subds. (a)(1), (2), (b).) The Department

designates two mental health evaluators, who must be

practicing psychiatrists or psychologists and must use the

Department’s standardized assessment protocol. (Id., subds. (c),

(d).) If both mental health evaluators agree the person meets

the statutory definition of an SVP, then the Director of State

Hospitals asks the state to file a petition for commitment. (Id.,

subd. (d).) If the evaluators reach different conclusions, then

two new evaluations are performed by independent mental

health professionals. (Id., subd. (e).) A petition for commitment

may be filed only if the two new evaluators concur that the

person meets the criteria for commitment. (Id., subd. (f).)

Once the Director of State Hospitals has forwarded the

evaluators’ reports to the appropriate district attorney, the

district attorney may file a petition for commitment. (Welf. &

Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (h)(1).) The trial court then reviews

the petition to determine whether it “contains sufficient facts

that, if true, would constitute probable cause” that the person

meets the definition of an SVP. (Id., § 6601.5.) If the court

answers that question in the affirmative, the court then must

hold a probable cause hearing within 10 days, absent good cause

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

for extending the time period. (Id., §§ 6601.5, 6602, subd. (b).)

In the meantime, the person must be detained in a secure

facility. (Id., § 6601.5.) If, after a hearing, the court finds

probable cause to believe the individual is an SVP, the person is

detained at the state hospital pending trial. (Id., § 6602.5, subd.

(a).)

The statute does not specify a fixed deadline by which trial

must occur. It does, however, lay out a number of procedural

protections for the conduct of trial, including the right to a jury

and to the assistance of counsel and relevant experts. (Welf. &

Inst. Code, § 6603, subd. (a).) At trial, the state bears the

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is

an SVP. (Id., § 6604.) Specifically, the state must prove four

conditions are met: “(1) the person has previously been

convicted of at least one qualifying ‘sexually violent offense’

listed in [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 6600,

subdivision (b) [citation]; (2) the person has ‘a diagnosed mental

disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety

of others’ [citation]; (3) the mental disorder makes it likely the

person will engage in future acts of sexually violent criminal

behavior if released from custody [citation]; and (4) those acts

will be predatory in nature.” (Walker v. Superior Court (2021)

12 Cal.5th 177, 190 (Walker).) The state must prove these

conditions exist at the time of trial: A person is subject to SVP

commitment only if the person is found to have a current

diagnosed mental disorder and to pose a current risk to public

safety. (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1162.)

If the individual is found at trial to be an SVP, the court

then issues an order of commitment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604;

id., § 6604.1, subd. (a).) As initially enacted, the SVP Act

provided for renewable two-year commitment terms. (People v.

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1183 (McKee), citing former Welf.

& Inst. Code, § 6604.) In 2006, however, voters passed

Proposition 83 (Gen. Elec., Nov. 7, 2006), which replaced these

renewable two-year terms with an indefinite commitment from

which the individual can be released if it is shown that the

individual no longer qualifies as an SVP. (See McKee, at p. 1184;

see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.1, subd. (a).) Under this

system, a person who is committed as an SVP must be

reexamined annually by a qualified mental health professional

to determine whether commitment is still appropriate. (Welf. &

Inst. Code, § 6604.9, subds. (a), (b), added by Stats. 2013, ch.

182, § 1, p. 2256.) Depending on the results of the evaluation,

the report may recommend unconditional discharge, conditional

release with outpatient supervision and treatment in the

community, or continued commitment at the state hospital. The

person then may file a petition for release and, depending on the

circumstances, may be entitled to a hearing at which the person

has a right to appointed counsel and experts. (Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 6605, subd. (a)(3); id., § 6608, subds. (a), (g).)

If the annual report concludes the person is no longer an

SVP, the Director of State Hospitals must authorize the

committed person to petition for unconditional discharge. (Welf.

& Inst. Code, § 6604.9, subd. (d).) After making an initial

probable cause determination on the petition, the court holds a

hearing — or, at the individual’s request, a jury trial — at which

the state bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the individual continues to meet the criteria for

commitment as an SVP. (Id., § 6605, subd. (a)(2), (3).)

A person may petition for conditional release whether or

not the annual report recommends that course (Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 6608, subd. (a)), but the recommendation determines

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

how the petition will be handled. If the annual report

recommends conditional release, then the state must show by a

preponderance of the evidence at a release hearing that the

individual is not, in fact, suitable for release. (Id., § 6604.9,

subd. (d); see id., § 6608, subd. (k).) If, on the other hand, the

annual report recommends continued commitment, the court

screens the petition for frivolousness before holding a hearing

(id., § 6608, subd. (a)), and at that hearing the individual bears

the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

conditional release is appropriate. (Id., subd. (k).) After one

year on conditional release, the individual may petition for

unconditional discharge from SVP commitment. (Id., subd. (m).)

In 1993, Ciro Camacho pleaded guilty to one count of

continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of Penal Code

section 288.5 and two counts of lewd acts on a child under 14

years old in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a).

He was sentenced to 14 years in prison.

In August 2002, while Camacho was still serving his

sentence, the state filed a petition to commit him as an SVP.

Two doctors had evaluated Camacho and concluded he met the

statutory criteria for SVP commitment. Camacho waived his

right to a jury trial, and the trial court held a bench trial in

January 2005. The court ordered Camacho committed to the

state hospital for a two-year term under the version of the SVP

Act then in effect.

The following year, Proposition 83 replaced the system of

renewable two-year terms with the current system of indefinite

commitments subject to annual reevaluations. (See McKee,

supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1183–1184.) On December 18, 2006,

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

before Camacho’s two-year term expired, the state filed a

petition to recommit Camacho to an indefinite term. On

February 8, 2007, Camacho waived the probable cause hearing

on the recommitment petition. The trial on that petition has yet

to occur. Camacho now challenges that delay as violating his

due process right to a timely trial.

In the years since 2007, Camacho’s case has appeared on

the trial court docket and been continued more than 200 times

without trial. Although the record of the proceedings is limited,

the parties have stipulated to the relevant procedural history

and the accuracy of the available record. Because Camacho’s

due process claim requires careful review of the relevant facts,

we discuss this history in some detail below.

After waiving the probable cause hearing on the 2006

petition for recommitment, Camacho entered a general time

waiver on March 29, 2007, when he was personally present in

court. He was then transported from the county jail to the state

hospital.

On July 25, 2008, the Public Defender declared a conflict.

The court assigned Attorney William Davis as replacement

defense counsel. Davis would serve as Camacho’s defense

counsel for the next decade, until 2018.

Two updated doctors’ reports became available in August

2008, both concluding that Camacho met the criteria for

commitment. The court held 16 additional hearings in 2008, but

the court did not set a trial date.

In 2009, Camacho’s case appeared on the court docket 16

times. Camacho was present for 10 of these hearings. That

year, two trial dates were set and later continued, with no record

of the reason for these continuances. Camacho appeared in

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

court for another trial setting conference on March 11, 2010. No

trial date was set.

Between March 11, 2010, and July 5, 2018, Camacho’s

case appeared on the trial court docket 102 times. Camacho was

not personally present at any of the hearings held during that

eight-year period.

In 2010, doctors again concluded that Camacho met the

criteria for commitment as an SVP. The court did not set any

additional trial dates in 2010. The minute orders from 2010

generally state “time waived.”

In 2011, the court held 15 hearings. On April 14, 2011,

the court noted that Davis was “still [a]waiting confirmation of

experts” and a general time waiver was in effect. No trial date

was set in 2011. From 2012 to 2015, the court regularly called

Camacho’s case and set hearings, but the record shows no

reason for the repeated continuances.

In 2015, four new doctors’ reports were prepared. One of

these reports concluded — for the first time — that Camacho no

longer met the criteria for commitment. The other three reports,

by contrast, concluded that Camacho continued to meet the SVP

criteria.

Despite this development, 2016 continued in much the

same vein as the preceding five years. The court held eight

hearings that year without setting a trial date.

In 2017, Camacho’s case appeared on the court docket 10

times, again with no trial date set and multiple continuances

granted at Davis’s request. On March 22, 2018, the court called

the case for a regular hearing. According to the reporter’s

transcript (one of the few available in this case), Davis informed

the court Camacho was “at the hospital at Coalinga by his own

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

choice.” The District Attorney and Davis told the court they

were mutually requesting a continuance, with Davis explaining

“[t]here have been some statewide developments in these kinds

of cases that [the prosecutor] and I have looked at.”

The court held an in camera hearing on May 17, 2018.

Davis waived Camacho’s presence for that hearing and the court

continued the case to June 21 to allow counsel to secure

Camacho’s appearance by video conference. Camacho did not

appear on June 21, however, and Davis waived his presence “for

today’s hearing.”

On July 5, 2018, the court held another in camera hearing.

This time, Camacho was present by video. The prosecutor did

not appear. At the hearing, Davis told Camacho that he had

“placed calls” to three “psychologists or psychiatrists . . . well

qualified to assist us in this case.” Camacho responded, “All

right.” Camacho then asked if he should send Davis letters that

staff members at the hospital wanted to write “in [his] behalf.”

Davis said to “[g]o ahead” and asked if Camacho had his

address. Camacho confirmed he did. The court then concluded,

“All right. I’ll find good cause to continue this to the 16th?” And

Davis confirmed, “Yes.”

On September 20, 2018, the court held another hearing.

Camacho was not present. Davis made “an oral motion to

continue the matter” and the prosecutor objected — the first

recorded objection to a continuance in the history of the case.

The court overruled the objection and scheduled a trial setting

conference in October.

The parties met again on October 4, 2018, with Camacho

present by video conference. The parties discussed setting a

trial date. Davis noted that Camacho “need[ed] to have

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

additional evaluations” because the last doctors’ reports were

from 2015. Davis suggested March 5 for a jury trial. The

prosecutor noted he had another trial on that date, but stated

he was “available several weeks before that. And we are looking

forward to moving this case forward to conclusion.” Davis then

suggested April for trial, and the prosecutor stated, “just for the

record, I can do this significantly earlier,” and “I’m not trying to

delay the trial.” Davis said he understood but that because of

his preparation, April was best. The court set a trial date for

April 2 and ordered monthly pretrial hearings.

After the date was set, the prosecutor said that since

Camacho was present, he wanted to “clear up a few things.” The

prosecutor continued, “First off, the [d]efendant does have a

right to a speedy trial in this matter within a reasonable time

period. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . However, my understanding is the

[d]efendant, having these rights in mind, is consenting to this

date in April because he feels it’s in his best interests.” Davis

responded that he had not “had a chance to discuss all of the

things that [he] need[ed] to discuss with [Camacho]” and asked

the court to order that Camacho be permitted to give Davis a

phone call the next week to “go over all the issues necessary.”

The court asked if Camacho had heard everything and

addressed Camacho directly as he summarized that the parties

would reconvene two weeks later, so that “Mr. Davis can talk to

you in more detail about what he’s planning to do regarding your

defense. And at that time you can decide if you want to ask for

a speedy trial or if you’re agreeable to putting it out longer,

which is what has happened so far. [¶] But so far you’re okay

with everything?” Camacho replied, “Yes.”

The court called Camacho’s case again two weeks later, on

October 18, 2018. Davis began the hearing by stating that

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

Camacho “doesn’t want to waive any more time.” Davis referred

to the Court of Appeal’s then-recent decision in People v.

Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36 (Vasquez),

which upheld the trial court’s determination that a 17-year

delay in holding an SVP trial violated due process because the

delay had been caused by a “ ‘ “breakdown in the public defender

system.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 41.) The prosecutor responded he would

not object to “resetting the trial within 60 days of today.”

Camacho reiterated that he wanted “to apply this Vasquez

case.” Davis stated he was “assuming that means he wants

another attorney,” and Camacho confirmed. Davis noted,

“Vasquez does create some interesting issues . . . part of the

problem is that there is a systemic logistical problem . . .

everybody that has one of these petitions pending is held at

Coalinga, which is a hundred miles from anywhere. Literally,

anywhere else in the state.”

Davis stated that “another issue” was that Camacho was

“not sure that he wants to be brought to the county jail.” The

prosecutor again suggested that they set trial within 60 days.

The court said it sounded like it was Camacho’s “desire to have

a speedy trial in the matter” and they could set trial within 60

days and “come back in two weeks for a readiness conference.”

Davis asked Camacho, “Do you want to be here in Merced

County?” Camacho responded, “No. No. [¶] . . . [¶] I want to

stay here in Coalinga. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I mean, how long is the

trial going to be? If it’s gonna be a while, then, yeah, I’ll go to

the county [jail]. But if it’s just gonna be a ready conference,

then send me back.” Davis and Camacho ultimately agreed to

decide about transportation later and keep the April trial date.

The prosecutor then reiterated that since “the defendant is

requesting a speedy trial” he had no objection to “advancing

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

[trial] to December 11th which is within 60 days of today.” The

court set trial for December 11.

On November 6, 2018, the court held a readiness

conference that began with Davis informing the court that

Camacho wanted to “go ahead and make an oral motion . . . to

dismiss for a lack of prosecution.” The court agreed with Davis’s

recommendation to refer the motion to a different law firm,

Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo, in order “to look into

Mr. Camacho’s claims pursuant to the Vasquez case.”

On November 29, 2018, Davis declared a conflict and was

relieved by the court. Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo became

Camacho’s defense counsel for all purposes.

On March 11, 2021, Camacho filed a motion to dismiss the

2006 petition to extend commitment, claiming his right to due

process had been violated “due to the excessive delay in bringing

his matter to trial.” The trial court denied the motion to dismiss,

describing the pretrial delay as “troubling,” but finding that

“most of that [delay] is attributable to Mr. Camacho or his

counsel.” Camacho then filed an original petition for a writ of

mandate in the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied Camacho’s writ petition in an

unpublished opinion, finding that although “ ‘substantial delays

weigh in [Camacho]’s favor’ . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . the record shows

the delay was at Camacho’s request or agreement,” such that his

right to due process was not violated. The court explained that

“[u]p to October 18, 2018, Camacho waived time repeatedly and

requested or acquiesced to the numerous continuances, either in

person or through his attorney.” Although the continuance

requests were made by counsel without Camacho present, the

court cited the “ ‘general rule’ ” that “ ‘ “delays caused by defense

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

counsel are properly attributed to the defendant, even where

counsel is assigned.” ’ ” The court further opined that while the

length of Camacho’s pretrial incarceration “ ‘constitutes some

degree of prejudice,’ ” the delay had not prejudiced Camacho’s

defense, reasoning that “the passage of time improved

Camacho’s prospects: the first medical evaluation opining that

he no longer satisfied [the criteria for commitment] was

prepared” in 2015.

II.

The issue of SVP trial delays is not new. Nearly 20 years

ago, courts began to raise concerns that significant pretrial

delays in SVP cases “can and do occur.” (Litmon v. Superior

Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1170 (Litmon); see Orozco v.

Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 170, 179 (Orozco).) At

the time, the courts’ concern was that delays in holding trials to

recommit SVPs sometimes matched or even exceeded the two-

year commitment period prescribed by the law then in force.

(Ibid.) Since the SVP Act was amended to provide for indefinite

commitment terms, the issue of pretrial delay has not abated.

Extended delays — in some cases upwards of a decade — have

not been uncommon.2

(See, e.g., In re Kerins (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1084 [14-year

delay], review granted June 14, 2023, S279933; People v. Hubbs

(Jan. 19, 2023, D077636) [nonpub. opn.] 2023 WL 311941 [15-

year delay]; People v. Carter (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 739 [14-year

delay]; People v. Lozano (Aug. 10, 2022, C094245) [nonpub. opn.]

2022 WL 3224388 [11-year delay]; People v. Ballardo (Mar. 29,

2022, B290567) [nonpub. opn.] 2022 WL 906421 [13-year delay];

Camacho v. Superior Court of Merced County (Jan. 21, 2022,

F082798) [nonpub. opn.] 2022 WL 189070 [15-year delay];

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

The reasons for delay in a given case vary, but certain

features of the SVP Act help to explain why, in general,

extended pretrial delays may be more likely to occur in SVP

cases than in other cases. As an initial matter, SVP trials,

unlike criminal trials and most types of civil trials, are not

subject to statutory time limits. (See Litmon, supra, 123

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1170–1171; cf. Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. (a)(2)

[setting presumptive 60-day limit for trial in a criminal case];

Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310 [setting presumptive five-year limit

for trial in a civil case].) This is not because the Legislature has

been inattentive to questions of timing in SVP cases: In 1998, it

set a 10-day limit for holding a pretrial probable cause hearing

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601.5, as added by Stats. 1998, ch. 19,

§ 2, p. 145); more recently, it set limits on granting continuances

and required that continuance requests be made in writing and

supported by good cause. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6603, subd. (c),

People v. Eden (Jan. 21, 2022, A162818) [nonpub. opn.] 2022 WL

188679 [5-year delay]; People v. Tran (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 330

[11-year delay]; People v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529 [8-year

delay]; People v. Sims (Feb. 24, 2021, C088029) [nonpub. opn.]

2021 WL 717063 [9-year delay]; People v. Taylor (Jan. 28, 2021,

B303044) [nonpub. opn.] 2021 WL 281796 [9-year delay]; People

v. Allen (Jan. 27, 2021, B288740) [nonpub. opn.] 2021 WL

268353 [15-year delay]; In re Butler (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 614

[13-year delay]; People v. DeCasas (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 785

[13-year delay]; People v. Bradley (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 32 [3-

year delay]; People v. Teluci (Nov. 4, 2020, A155206) [nonpub.

opn.] 2020 WL 6482396 [11-year delay]; People v. Raker (Aug.

20, 2020, B299718) [nonpub. opn.] 2020 WL 4877437 [11-year

delay]; People v. Barrcena (Aug. 3, 2020, B289917) [nonpub.

opn.] 2020 WL 4435548 [11-year delay]; People v. Burns (May

21, 2020, B296809) [nonpub. opn.] 2020 WL 2570173 [13-year

delay]; People v. Strahan (Feb. 5, 2020, B295295) [nonpub. opn.]

2020 WL 563906 [22-year delay].)

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 606, § 1.) But despite various

calls to set firm limits on the scheduling of trial, the Legislature

has thus far declined to do so, instead choosing to give courts

and parties greater flexibility in matters of trial timing. (See,

e.g., Litmon, at p. 1172.)

More fundamentally, SVP trials are unlike criminal trials

in that they are not aimed primarily at establishing an

individual’s liability for past events, but instead at establishing

the individual’s present need for mental health treatment.

Although an SVP proceeding may involve inquiry into certain

facts about an individual’s criminal history (see, e.g., Walker,

supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 185), the central focus of an SVP trial is

whether the individual currently has a mental disorder that

poses a danger to the public and thus requires hospitalization

(Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1162). Once a judge has found

probable cause to believe an individual is an SVP, that

individual is held in a state hospital and begins to receive

mental health treatment — even before trial is ever held. For

this reason, both sides may have a common interest in delaying

trial. From the individual’s perspective, allowing more time for

treatment may ultimately improve the chance of success at trial,

insofar as treatment may help address a mental disorder that a

jury might otherwise find poses a risk to the public. (See, e.g.,

In re Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 635 (Butler).) While

individuals committed as SVPs after trial may later petition for

release, conditions are generally more favorable at the initial

trial, where the state always bears the burden of proving beyond

a reasonable doubt that the individual qualifies as an SVP.

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604; cf. id., §§ 6605, 6608 [describing

procedures for postcommitment release].) For the state’s part,

there are limited incentives to expend the resources necessary

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to push the case toward trial when, following a finding of

probable cause, the individual is already being hospitalized and

receiving treatment.

Understanding why parties may have incentives to delay

SVP trials in general does not, of course, tell us the reasons for

delay in any particular case. Nor does the Legislature’s choice

to avoid imposing statutory time limits justify prolonged delay

or tell us whether the delay is consistent with an individual’s

constitutional rights. In recent years, the Courts of Appeal have

confronted a number of cases calling for consideration of these

questions. (See, e.g., In re Kerins, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 1084

[14-year pretrial delay and extended absence from court did not

violate due process], review granted; People v. Tran, supra, 62

Cal.App.5th 330 [11-year delay between petition for

commitment and SVP retrial did not violate due process]; People

v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 (Landau) [seven-year

delay did not violate due process].) In three cases, courts found

that extended delays violated the due process rights of alleged

SVPs.

In the first of these cases, Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th

36, the Court of Appeal reviewed the record of the 17-year delay

in that case and affirmed the superior court’s finding that delays

sought by defense counsel could not be attributed to Vasquez

himself, but instead resulted from an institutional breakdown

related to budget cuts and understaffing in the public defender’s

office that handled his case. (Id. at pp. 54, 66, citing Vermont v.

Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 94 (Brillon).) Concluding the delay

violated Vasquez’s due process right to a timely SVP trial, the

court dismissed the petition for commitment.

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Two years later, the appellate court in People v. DeCasas,

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 785 (DeCasas) confronted a 13-year delay

caused by “the same reduction of the SVP unit staff” at the same

public defender’s office as in Vasquez. (DeCasas, at p. 809.)

Following the logic of Vasquez, the court found a due process

violation and dismissed the petition for commitment. (Id. at

p. 813.)

Finally, the court in Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 614

dismissed a petition for commitment after finding a due process

violation based on pretrial delay. Though there were “several

factors ... suggesting that the public defender’s

mismanagement of this case went beyond any particular

attorney’s performance,” the court found that even if those

circumstances did not constitute systemic breakdown in the

public defender’s office, it would be “fundamentally unfair to

hold Butler personally and solely accountable for delays caused

by his counsel” where the record showed that counsel refused to

convey Butler’s explicit demands for trial, failed to demand a

probable cause hearing or consult with a defense expert, and did

not ever “come close to being ready for trial.” (Id. at p. 658.)

In response to Vasquez and cases that followed, the

Legislature amended the SVP Act to prescribe more demanding

requirements for seeking and granting trial continuances. The

statute now requires that motions for trial continuances be in

writing, supported by good cause, and resolved in a timely

manner. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6603, subd. (c), as amended by

Stats. 2019, ch. 606, § 1.) While these amendments provide

procedural safeguards against unwarranted delays, they do not

address whether or when an SVP commitment trial may become

untimely as a result of previously granted continuances.

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III.

We turn, then, to the question before us, which concerns

the constitutional principles governing the timeliness of SVP

trials. The due process clauses of both the federal and state

Constitutions forbid the state from depriving individuals of their

liberty without due process of law. (U.S. Const., Amend. XIV,

§ 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)3 Civil commitment under

the SVP Act undoubtedly involves “a significant deprivation of

liberty.” (People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 209; see Kansas

v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 356–357.) “The fundamental

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” (Mathews v.

Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 333 (Mathews).) Thus, as every

Court of Appeal to address the issue has agreed, individuals

facing commitment under the SVP Act have a due process right

to a timely trial. (See, e.g., Orozco, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 179–180; People v. Litmon (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 383, 395–

399 (Litmon II); Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 27;

Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.)

Although the appellate courts have agreed on this

threshold point, they have expressed uncertainty about the

appropriate framework for evaluating claims of excessive

pretrial delay under the due process clause. (See, e.g., Litmon

Although Camacho brings a claim under both the federal

and state Constitutions, he focuses exclusively on federal

authorities. While we reaffirm that we have the “power and

authority to construe the state Constitution independently”

(Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1152, fn. 19), Camacho has

offered no arguments specific to the California Constitution.

Our analysis, like the parties’, therefore centers on the federal

Constitution.

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II, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 [noting the United States

Supreme Court has not addressed the issue].) In the absence of

more specific guidance, the Courts of Appeal have uniformly

borrowed the Barker framework used to adjudicate claims of

speedy trial violations in criminal cases. (Barker v. Wingo,

supra, 407 U.S. 514 (Barker); People v. Williams (2013) 58

Cal.4th 197 (Williams).) But several courts, including the Court

of Appeal in this case, have also applied the Mathews general

balancing test used to evaluate the adequacy of governmental

process under the federal due process clause. (Mathews, supra,

424 U.S. 319.) We now clarify that this general balancing under

Mathews is unnecessary; it suffices to consider the factors laid

out in Barker in deciding whether an alleged SVP has been

deprived of the constitutional right to a timely trial.

In Barker, the United States Supreme Court considered

the scope of the right to a speedy criminal trial secured by the

Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The speedy trial

right, the court observed, is a “slippery” one, “generically

different from any of the other rights enshrined in the

Constitution for the protection of the accused.” (Barker, supra,

407 U.S. at pp. 522, 519.) For one thing, the accused may not

actually want a speedy trial and may perceive a tactical

advantage in delay; in particular, the accused may believe that

the passage of time will hurt the prosecution’s ability to prove

guilt more than it hurts the accused’s ability to defend. (Id. at

pp. 519–521.) In this respect, the interests of the accused may

not align with broader societal interests in the prompt

resolution of criminal charges. (Id. at p. 519; see id. at pp. 519–

521.) And “perhaps most importantly,” the court explained, “the

right to speedy trial is a more vague concept than other

procedural rights.” (Id. at p. 521.) “We cannot definitely say

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how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be

swift but deliberate. As a consequence, there is no fixed point

in the criminal process when the State can put the defendant to

the choice of either exercising or waiving the right to a speedy

trial. . . . [A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a

functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the

case.” (Id. at pp. 521–522, fn. omitted.)

In keeping with these observations about the slippery

nature of the speedy trial right, the Barker court declined to

adopt any bright-line rules for determining when the right has

been violated. The court instead identified four factors for

courts to examine: the length of the pretrial delay, the reason

for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and

prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. (Barker, supra,

407 U.S. at p. 530.) The defendant carries the “burden of

demonstrating a speedy trial violation under Barker’s

multifactor test.” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 233.)

Because none of these factors is dispositive, “courts must still

engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process” to

determine whether trial has been unconstitutionally delayed.

(Barker, at p. 533.)

Although Barker concerned the constitutional right to a

speedy trial in a criminal case, courts have employed Barker’s

flexible, four-factor inquiry to evaluate claims of

unconstitutional delay in other contexts. (See, e.g., United

States v. $8,850 (1983) 461 U.S. 555, 564 [applying Barker test

to evaluate pretrial delay in civil forfeiture case]; DeLancy v.

Caldwell (10th Cir. 1984) 741 F.2d 1246, 1247–1248 (per

curiam) [applying Barker factors to review delay in furnishing

trial transcript to be used by incarcerated criminal defendant on

appeal]; see also U.S. v. Sanders (6th Cir. 2006) 452 F.3d 572,

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577 [holding that Barker applies to due process claims based on

postsentencing delays, and citing similar cases from other

circuits]; cf. Betterman v. Montana (2016) 578 U.S. 437, 448, fn.

12 (Betterman) [reserving the question of how the due process

clause applies to claims based on postsentencing delays, but

noting that “[r]elevant considerations may include the length of

and reasons for delay, the defendant’s diligence in requesting

expeditious sentencing, and prejudice”].)

The Barker factors are likewise appropriate for use in

evaluating due process claims based on delays in holding SVP

trials. The timing of SVP trials is not in all respects comparable

to the timing of criminal trials, but many of the same general

principles translate. Once a court has found probable cause to

support an SVP commitment petition, an individual is

committed to a state hospital for treatment while awaiting trial.

But as is true in criminal cases, an individual’s interests in a

timely trial do not run in just one direction; one individual facing

SVP commitment may wish for a prompt trial, while another

may perceive a tactical advantage in delay. (See Barker, supra,

407 U.S. at pp. 519–521.) And, more fundamentally, as is true

in criminal cases, it is impossible to define with any precision a

fixed point at which trial must occur — “how long is too long in

a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate.”

(Id. at p. 521.) The Barker test outlines a broadly relevant set

of functional, case-dependent factors to consider in analyzing

questions of trial timing. To the extent the SVP context differs

from the criminal context in which Barker was decided, the

flexibility of the test allows courts to account for those

differences.

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Indeed, every Court of Appeal to address the issue to date

has done so by employing the Barker factors.4 But in an

abundance of caution, some have also employed the Mathews

test to evaluate claims of SVP trial delay.

The issue in Mathews was whether due process required

an evidentiary hearing before the termination of Social Security

disability payments. (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 323.) The

United States Supreme Court set out a three-factor framework

to decide the question: (1) “the private interest that will be

affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the

function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would

entail.” (Id. at p. 335.) With its focus on evaluating the value of

additional procedural safeguards for the sake of reducing error,

this test is more clearly suited to questions about the adequacy

So have other state high courts. (See Matter of Ellison

(2016) 305 Kan. 519, 531–532, 535 [adopting Barker test to

evaluate delay of 1,705 days between probable cause hearing

and trial under Kansas’s SVP Act]; Morel v. Wilkins (Fla. 2012)

84 So.3d 226, 246 [applying Barker to evaluate 10-year pretrial

delay under Florida’s SVP Act]; cf. In re Commitment of Beyer

(2006) 287 Wis.2d 1, 25–31 [implicitly adopting Barker in

evaluating due process violation for 22-month delay between

filing of annual examination and probable cause hearing]; Com.

v. Blake (2009) 454 Mass. 267, 279–280 (conc. opn. of Ireland, J.)

[discussing relevance of Barker to evaluation of 13-month delay

between bench trial for adjudication of sexual dangerousness

and issuance of decision].)

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of procedures used in government decisionmaking than to

questions about the timing of those decisions.

To be sure, the United States Supreme Court has invoked

Mathews in evaluating certain timing-related claims. In FDIC

v. Mallen (1988) 486 U.S. 230, 231–232, 242, for instance, the

high court employed a modified version of the Mathews test in

considering, and rejecting, a claim that a statute allowing the

government to suspend indicted bank officials facially violated

due process because the statute did not guarantee that

suspended officials would receive sufficiently prompt decisions

on their appeals. (See Litmon II, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 396–397 [discussing Mallen].)

But the trial timing question here bears far greater

resemblance to the trial timing question in Barker than to the

question in Mallen about the adequacy of postsuspension review

procedures. And it serves no meaningful purpose to analyze

pretrial delays under both Mathews and Barker, as some Courts

of Appeal have done. None of these courts has ever found that

the Mathews inquiry yields a different result from Barker. This

is unsurprising, since the questions the courts have asked under

Mathews — adapting the three-part test for the context of a

challenge to trial timing — are all matters already addressed,

with somewhat greater specificity, by the Barker factors. We

thus clarify that courts need not apply Mathews in this context;

it suffices to apply the Barker factors in considering whether

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pretrial delay in an SVP case has resulted in a denial of due

process.5

It is a separate question whether Barker dictates the

remedy when a violation is found. In the criminal context,

Barker instructs that the sole remedy for a Sixth Amendment

speedy trial violation is dismissal of the prosecution — an

“unsatisfactorily severe remedy,” but, in the high court’s view,

the “only possible” one. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522;

accord, Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 233.) The Courts of

Appeal have generally assumed the same must be true in

evaluating claims of due process violations in the SVP context.

(Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 82–83 [holding that

dismissal is the only possible remedy for a timely trial violation

and affirming the trial court’s order of dismissal]; DeCasas,

supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 813 [same]; see also Butler, supra,

55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 637, 664 [affirming order of dismissal

without discussing the question of appropriate remedies].)

Other courts have, however, suggested that there may be

other possible remedies for unreasonable delays in this context.

(U.S. v. Timms (4th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3d 436, 455, fn. 19 [“[E]ven

if Timms’ case constituted a due process violation, the proper

remedy would not be release, but to conduct the hearing and

adjudicate whether he is a ‘sexually dangerous person’ under

the statute.”]; see Orozco, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 179

[finding no due process violation, but noting that when trial had

not occurred within a reasonable time after the probable cause

hearing, the remedy was to order that trial be held “forthwith”];

cf. Betterman, supra, 578 U.S. at pp. 445, 444 [discussing

remedy for unconstitutional postconviction delay in sentencing

and noting that “a dismissal remedy ordinarily would not be in

order” and would provide “an unjustified windfall” to the

defendant].) The parties before us have not addressed the

question of possible alternative remedies in this case and we

have no occasion to decide it.

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IV.

With this background in mind, we turn to Camacho’s due

process claim. The Court of Appeal in this case reviewed the

trial court’s denial of relief for abuse of discretion. Under that

standard, “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for

substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de

novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only

if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court

(2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.) Neither party

here contends we should employ a different standard of review.

Ultimately, however, the standard of review is not dispositive,

because Camacho fails to establish a due process violation under

any possible standard.

We begin with the first Barker factor, the length of the

pretrial delay. This factor operates as a threshold hurdle;

“[u]ntil there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial,

there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go

into the balance.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530.) “If the

accused makes this showing, the court must then consider . . .

the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare

minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.”

(Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 652 (Doggett).)

Here, Camacho awaits trial on a petition for

recommitment that was filed in 2006. Although this delay is not

entirely out of line with delays seen in other SVP cases, it is an

exceedingly lengthy delay all the same. The Attorney General

contends that our inquiry should focus more narrowly on the

eight-year period from 2010 to 2018, when Camacho did not

personally appear in court. The Attorney General notes that

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Camacho “makes no real effort to establish that he was denied

his speedy trial right between 2006 and 2010,” when Camacho

frequently appeared personally in court and had entered a

general time waiver. The Attorney General concedes, however,

that an eight-year delay is “significant” in its own right, and so

“the length of the delay weighs in Camacho’s favor.” We agree;

the first Barker factor unquestionably supports Camacho’s

claim of a constitutional timely trial violation.

We next turn to the second Barker factor, the reasons for

the delay. This is the “flag all litigants seek to capture” (United

States v. Loud Hawk (1986) 474 U.S. 302, 315) because the

permissibility of pretrial delay depends to a great extent on who

bears responsibility for it and why.

In analyzing the second factor, courts examine “whether the

government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e]

delay.” (Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 651; Barker, supra, 407

U.S. at p. 530.) Courts also examine why the delay occurred, for

“different weights should be assigned to different reasons.”

(Barker, at p. 531.) If the government deliberately delays trial

to hamper the defense, for instance, that effort at manipulation

“should be weighted heavily against the government.” (Ibid.) “A

more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts

should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be

considered since the ultimate responsibility for such

circumstances must rest with the government rather than with

the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing

witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” (Ibid.) By

contrast, “if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his

waiver [of his right to a speedy trial] may be given effect under

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standard waiver doctrine.” (Id. at p. 529; accord, Brillon, supra,

556 U.S. at p. 90.)

Our analysis of the reasons for delay in this case is

hampered to some extent by the limited record before us. We

emphasize that trial courts have a responsibility to maintain an

adequate record for review. The parties have, however,

stipulated to an undisputed record that forms a sufficient basis

for our opinion today. In the majority of the hearings at which

delays were sought and granted, the record does not identify the

party that requested the continuance. But in every instance

where the available record identifies the party moving for a

continuance, the record shows that it was defense counsel —

either alone, or jointly with the People. The record also does not

show a single instance of the defense objecting to a continuance.

In other words, as far as the record shows, virtually all the

delays in this case were either sought by the defense or agreed

to by the defense, and no continuances were requested solely by

the People. Camacho does not contend otherwise. Against that

backdrop, we assess the conduct of the defense, the prosecution,

and the trial court in turn.

It is undisputed that Camacho — either personally or

through counsel — either sought or agreed to most of the delay

in this case. The central point of dispute between the parties is

whether we should distinguish between those delays Camacho

personally agreed to and those to which his counsel assented on

his behalf, particularly during the eight-year period when

Camacho did not personally appear in court.

In general, delays sought by the defendant’s counsel weigh

against the defendant’s claim of a speedy trial violation.

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(Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 90–91.) This rule flows from the

ordinary principle that an “ ‘attorney is the [defendant’s] agent

when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation,’ ”

such that the client must assume the consequences of the

attorney’s delay. (Ibid., quoting Coleman v. Thompson (1991)

501 U.S. 722, 753 (Coleman).)

Applying this principle in Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. 81, the

United States Supreme Court reversed a state court’s decision

that pretrial delay should be charged against the state when the

blame for the delay lay with court-appointed counsel for an

indigent criminal defendant. (Id. at p. 92.) The high court

explained that “assigned counsel generally are not state actors

for purposes of a speedy-trial claim. . . . [¶] . . . Their ‘inability

or unwillingness . . . to move the case forward,’ [citation], may

not be attributed to the State simply because they are assigned

counsel.” (Id. at pp. 92–93, fn. omitted.) The court noted that

the analysis might be different if, as Brillon had argued, the

delay was shown to result from “a systemic ‘breakdown in the

public defender system.’ ” (Id. at p. 94.) But, the court observed,

the Vermont Supreme Court had “made no determination, and

nothing in the record suggest[ed], that institutional problems

caused any part of the delay in Brillon’s case.” (Ibid.)

In Camacho’s case, the Court of Appeal concluded that

“the record contains substantial evidence that the delay was ‘the

result of defense counsel’s agreement or . . . explicit request.’ ”

The court cited Brillon’s holding that delays caused by defense

counsel are ordinarily charged to the defendant. The court

acknowledged the high court’s suggestion that delay caused by

appointed counsel could be charged to the state if there was a

systemic breakdown in the public defender system, citing

Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 36 and DeCasas, supra, 54

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Cal.App.5th 785. But the court noted that in Camacho’s case

“the record does not support such a finding.”

Camacho argues the Court of Appeal mistakenly

construed Brillon to mean that delay caused by defense counsel

may be charged against the state only when there is a systemic

breakdown of the public defender system and under no other

circumstances. It is unclear whether the appellate court so held

or was simply responding to what it understood as Camacho’s

argument that there had been an “institutional breakdown.” In

any event, like Camacho, we do not read Brillon as standing for

any such broad proposition; Brillon addressed a hypothetical

systemic breakdown of the public defender system because that

was the argument presented in the case. The Attorney General,

for his part, acknowledges that a constitutional problem might

arise if Camacho had shown “that, during the eight years at

issue, his absence from the courtroom had been unknowing or

involuntary, or if Camacho had demonstrated that his attorney

had waived time against Camacho’s wishes.” In those

circumstances, “the People would likely agree that Camacho

suffered a due process violation.” (Cf. Butler, supra, 55

Cal.App.5th at p. 658 [finding due process violation where

alleged SVP explicitly demanded trial and defense counsel failed

to convey those demands to the court or make progress towards

trial].) We, too, agree that Brillon does not prevent a court from

taking such matters into account.

Still, Camacho provides no sufficient reason for us to

depart from the ordinary rule that delays sought by counsel are

attributed to their client. (Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 90.)

Camacho does not allege that his eight-year absence from court

was involuntary. Nor does he allege that his attorney waived

time against his express wishes. His argument is, instead, that

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delays sought by defense counsel during a period when he did

not personally appear in court should not count against him,

solely by virtue of his absence. We reject this broad argument.

(See People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 799 [finding the

defendant’s absence from 17 pretrial proceedings did not violate

constitutional right to be present and noting that most of the

proceedings “concerned routine legal and procedural matters”].)

There is no reason why, standing alone, absence from

court would relieve an individual of responsibility for delays

sought by counsel who was acting as the individual’s agent.

(Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 753.) Of course, an individual’s

extended absence from court may raise concerns about whether

the individual’s wishes about timing have been adequately

considered; when an individual is absent from court, it becomes

more difficult to evaluate whether the individual has been

adequately informed about and agrees with counsel’s proposed

approach to trial timing. Here, however, the record contains no

indication that Camacho was inadequately informed of — much

less disagreed with — counsel’s approach to trial timing during

his eight-year absence from court.

Although Davis at one point referenced Camacho’s remote

location as an obstacle to trial preparation, there is nothing in

the record to indicate Davis and Camacho faced substantial

obstacles in communicating in general. 6 The continuances and

The transcript of the hearing from October 18, 2018

reflects one relevant exchange between Camacho and Davis.

Davis stated, “The Vasquez case has raised some issues that are

certainly parallel to Mr. Camacho’s situation.” The prosecutor

responded that he would not object to “resetting the trial within

60 days of today.” Davis reminded the judge that Camacho did

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time waivers during the period when Camacho was absent from

court were consistent with continuances and waivers that had

been entered before 2010, when Camacho did regularly appear

in court. And Camacho’s first reappearance in court after eight

years was uneventful. On that date, Camacho did not assert his

timely trial rights, complain about his absence from court, or

otherwise express dissatisfaction with the progress of his case.

He also confirmed that he had Davis’s mailing address, which,

if nothing else, suggests he had an available method of

communicating with Davis about any concerns he may have

had.

In sum, we agree with Camacho that an extended absence

from court could raise concerns about an SVP’s opportunity to

complain about attorney-sought delay, but we conclude that

absence alone does not provide a sufficient basis to depart from

the ordinary rule that delays sought by attorneys are properly

attributed to the clients they represent. On the available record,

Camacho bears most of the responsibility for the delay he now

challenges.

not have any updated evaluations, and Camacho added, “[a]nd

this is why I wanted to not waive any more time because they

have never come to see me at any time after nine years. [¶] . . .

[¶] I’ve been waiting and waiting for, you know, for somebody

to come and talk to me about anything. [¶] And I was looking

at this Vasquez case, and it kind of like — it does apply to

myself. [¶] Seventeen years of not having a representative to

get me ready for trial.”

We note, however, that Camacho does not assert here that

he was unable to speak with Davis or an expert for nine years,

or that he was unrepresented for 17 years. Both claims are,

moreover, unsupported by the record the parties stipulated to

here.

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While the People were not primarily responsible for the

delay in the case, the record also shows the People made little

effort to move the case toward trial. The Attorney General

acknowledges as much, explaining that “[a]t least until the

September 2018 decision in Vasquez, the People were amenable

in many cases — including Camacho’s — to the defendant’s

desire to delay trial for the purpose of progressing in treatment.

If, before the case went to trial, the individual progressed in

treatment to the point where he was no longer a danger to public

safety, the People could simply dismiss the case.”

Although this policy of acquiescence is perhaps

understandable, it also carries important risks and drawbacks.

For one thing, it invites reliance on the assumption that when

the defense repeatedly requests continuances, it is because the

alleged SVP has decided to indefinitely delay trial for the

purpose of progressing in treatment. Though this may be true

of some alleged SVPs, it may not be true of other individuals,

and individual preferences may change over time. (See, e.g.,

Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 635, 636 [noting alleged

SVP “made sincere and repeated demands for a speedy trial . . .

throughout his 12-year period of detention awaiting trial” and

his “public defenders essentially ignored and disregarded his

demands for a timely trial” by never communicating those

demands in court].) For another, permitting the alleged SVP to

indefinitely delay trial discounts the broader societal interest in

timely, definitive decisions about whether individuals satisfy

the criteria for involuntary commitment — where commitment

necessarily comes at taxpayer expense and carries personal

costs for families and communities from whom the individual

will remain indefinitely separated.

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

Because alleged SVPs have no duty to bring themselves to

trial, the government has a responsibility to ensure the case is

moving forward in a manner that is consistent with due process.

When faced with unwarranted delays or repeated continuances,

“diligent prosecution of an SVP petition may necessitate

objecting to the delays, insisting upon trial deadlines, and

making the trial court aware of the length of time since the filing

of the SVP petition or other pertinent details from the record.”

(Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 655.)

In this case, the Court of Appeal observed that “[n]othing

in the record suggests that the prosecution engaged in

deliberate delay tactics or acted in bad faith.” We agree with

the court’s conclusion in this regard, and Camacho does not

dispute that reading of the record. He argues, however, that the

Court of Appeal erred in implicitly requiring a showing of bad

faith to prevail on a timely trial claim. To the extent that the

Court of Appeal’s opinion may be construed as applying such a

rule, we agree with Camacho that bad faith on the part of the

prosecution is not necessary to establish a constitutional

violation. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in

Doggett, “Between diligent prosecution and bad-faith delay,

official negligence in bringing an accused to trial occupies the

middle ground. While not compelling relief in every case where

bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither

is negligence automatically tolerable.” (Doggett, supra, 505 U.S.

at pp. 656–657.)

Ultimately, though the People should have exhibited

greater diligence in ensuring Camacho was timely brought to

trial, the record shows that the People do not bear most of the

responsibility for the delays; as discussed above, the

responsibility falls primarily with the defense.

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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

We now assess the trial court’s responsibility for the delay.

In the criminal context, this court has recognized that the trial

court “ ‘has an affirmative constitutional obligation to bring the

defendant to trial in a timely manner. [Citation.] And to that

end, it is entirely appropriate for the court to set deadlines and

to hold the parties strictly to those deadlines unless a

continuance is justified by a concrete showing of good cause for

the delay. [Citation.] The trial judge is the captain of the ship;

and it goes without saying that the ship will go in circles if the

crew is running around the deck with no firm marching

orders.’ ” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 251, quoting State

v. Couture (2010) 357 Mont. 398, 427.)

Camacho’s case did indeed go in circles, and the trial court

appears to bear some responsibility. From the limited available

record, it appears the trial court allowed long periods of time to

elapse without setting a trial date at all; if the trial court made

efforts to move the case along, they are not apparent.

The Attorney General argues that the trial court’s conduct

is “more properly characterized as acceding in Camacho’s desire

to delay trial rather than as negligence.” But what we have said

of the People is equally true of the trial court: There are risks

and drawbacks to a policy of readily acceding to an alleged SVP’s

perceived wishes to delay trial. Because trial courts ultimately

control when trial will be held, they bear particular

responsibility for preserving an alleged SVP’s constitutional

right to a timely trial.

Trial courts have a number of tools available to fulfill their

responsibility to advance a case to trial in a timely manner.

Courts should make affirmative inquiries about the procedural

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

posture of a case and the status of counsel’s trial preparation;

ask alleged SVPs about their wishes for the timing of trial (or, if

the alleged SVP is not present, ask counsel whether there is

ongoing communication with the alleged SVP about their wishes

regarding trial timing); set a date for trial within a reasonable

time from the probable cause hearing; and carefully examine the

propriety of continuing that date once it has been set. As in the

criminal context, it is “ ‘entirely appropriate for the court to set

deadlines and to hold the parties strictly to those deadlines.’ ”

(Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 251.)

Indeed, the recent amendments to the SVP Act now

require the court to proceed with a trial date, once set, unless a

continuance is justified by good cause. (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 6603, subd. (c).) To show good cause, the parties must provide

written materials that detail “specific facts showing that a

continuance is necessary.” (Ibid.) What constitutes good cause

will vary from case to case, but a party’s showing of good cause

should generally demonstrate due diligence in preparing for

trial. Any continuance shall last “only for the period of time

shown to be necessary” by the specific factual circumstances

justifying the continuance. (Id., subd. (c)(7).) Even when an

alleged SVP has entered a time waiver, courts should remind

the parties that a trial cannot be delayed indefinitely and must

still be held within a reasonable timeframe.

Trial courts also bear the critical duty of creating an

adequate record to enable review of any claims that trial has

been unconstitutionally delayed. The limitations in the record

of this case make our review challenging; such record

deficiencies are to be avoided in future cases, and should be

helped through careful adherence to the requirements of written

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

justification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6603,

subdivision (c).7

Limited though the record may be in this case, however,

both parties have stipulated to a joint version of events and the

available record supplies a sufficient basis for our decision

today. On this record, while the court certainly could have done

more to urge the case to trial and enforce deadlines, the

responsibility for the delay rests primarily with the defense.

The second Barker factor thus weighs against finding a violation

of his constitutional right to a timely trial.

Analysis of the third Barker factor, the petitioner’s

assertion of his right to a timely trial, does not hinge on “ ‘the

number of times the accused acquiesced or objected; rather, the

focus is on the surrounding circumstances, such as the

timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of the objections, the

reasons for the acquiescence, whether the accused was

represented by counsel, the accused’s pretrial conduct (as that

conduct bears on the speedy trial right), and so forth. [Citation.]

The totality of the accused’s responses to the delay is indicative

of whether he or she actually wanted a speedy trial.’ ”

(Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 238, quoting State v. Couture,

supra, 357 Mont. at p. 417.) Viewing the complete picture

matters because “[t]he more serious the deprivation [of the right

We additionally note that, as is typically true, a more

complete record of proceedings may be developed by way of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this case, Camacho has

had the opportunity to present evidence that Davis acted

against his wishes in requesting trial continuances and entering

time waivers on his behalf. He has not, however, presented any

such evidence.

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

to a speedy trial], the more likely a defendant is to complain.”

(Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 531.)

It bears some emphasis that assertion of the right is only

one factor in the analysis, and not a dispositive one; in Barker,

the court explicitly rejected the argument that a defendant must

expressly demand a speedy trial or else be deemed to have

waived the right. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 528.) Instead,

the court instructed that “the defendant’s assertion of or failure

to assert his right to a speedy trial” is just one factor to balance

against the others and must be evaluated in a holistic manner.

(Ibid.) This flexibility allows courts “to attach a different weight

to a situation in which the defendant knowingly fails to object

from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay

without adequately informing his client, or from a situation in

which no counsel is appointed.” (Id. at p. 529.) The high court

emphasized, however, that “failure to assert the right will make

it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy

trial.” (Id. at p. 532.)

According to the available record, Camacho first

demanded trial in October 2018. Camacho did not demand trial

at any point over the previous decade, including in July 2018,

when he made his first court appearance in eight years. There

is no evidence that he previously asked Davis to go to trial and

was ignored; nor does he allege an inability to communicate with

Davis during his eight-year absence from court. Camacho was

free to offer evidence that defense counsel acted against his

wishes in delaying trial when he filed his motion to dismiss, but

he did not do so. In sum, there is no evidence that Camacho

sought to go to trial before October 2018 and was prevented from

exercising his right to do so. On this record, we are not

persuaded that Camacho desired trial before October 2018 and

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

we conclude this Barker factor weighs against his claim of a due

process violation.

The final Barker factor is the prejudice to the defendant

caused by the delay in bringing the case to trial. “Prejudice, of

course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of

defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to

protect.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532.) In the criminal

context, the court has identified “three such interests: (i) to

prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize

anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the

possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (Ibid.) In the SVP

context, we consider the same interests, but acknowledge

differences in how the interests arise.

We begin with the “most serious” interest: the “possibility

that the defense will be impaired.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at

p. 532.) The Barker court identified this as the most important

interest covered by the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right,

since impairment to an individual’s ability to present a defense

“skews the fairness of the entire system.” (Barker, at p. 532.)

Of course, not every case raises such concerns; indeed, a

criminal defendant may affirmatively deploy delay as a “defense

tactic.” (Id. at p. 521.) “[U]nlike the right to counsel or the right

to be free from compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the

right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused’s

ability to defend himself.” (Ibid.) But in many criminal cases,

a period of lengthy pretrial delay may impose real detriment to

an individual’s ability to mount a defense; defense witnesses

may die, disappear, or lose their memory of the relevant events.

(Id. at p. 532.) Because “time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

and testimony ‘can rarely be shown’ . . . we generally have to

recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the

reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for

that matter, identify.” (Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 655,

quoting Barker, at p. 532.) Accordingly, in the criminal context,

“ ‘[a]ffirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential

to every speedy trial claim’ . . . ‘[w]hile such presumptive

prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim . . . it is

part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases

with the length of delay.’ ” (People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th

871, 892, quoting Doggett, at pp. 655–656.)

There is little reason, however, to apply a presumption of

trial prejudice in the SVP context. As previously noted, trial on

a petition for commitment under the SVP Act aims to establish

whether a person meets the definition of an SVP at the time of

trial. This inquiry is categorically different from that of a

criminal trial, where the issue is whether the defendant’s past

conduct constitutes guilt of a particular offense. In the SVP

context, then, time ordinarily will not erase critical evidence for

the defense, since the jury relies on recent expert evaluations to

evaluate whether the individual qualifies as an SVP at the time

of trial. In Camacho’s case, for example, though his defense may

suffer if the author of the favorable 2015 report recommending

release became unavailable to testify, that evidence is unlikely

to be dispositive. Camacho will still need updated evaluations

by mental health experts before he can proceed to trial. Mental

status may fluctuate over time, and the jury will focus on the

most recent evidence to determine whether the alleged SVP

meets the commitment criteria at the time of trial. Severe

prejudice to the alleged SVP’s defense is less likely to result

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

purely as a function of the passage of time; as a result, no

presumption of prejudice applies in this context.8

In addition to prejudice at trial, the Barker court identified

“oppressive pretrial incarceration” and the “anxiety and concern

of the accused” as two other threats the speedy trial right was

designed to ward against. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532.)

The court observed that “time spent in jail awaiting trial has a

detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a

job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails

offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs.” (Ibid.)

Being held in anticipation of an SVP trial, like pretrial

detention in a jail, unquestionably entails a severe and

oppressive restriction on liberty that may give rise to feelings of

anxiety and concern. (Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418,

425–426 [noting it is “indisputable that involuntary

commitment to a mental hospital . . . can engender adverse

social consequences to the individual”].) But pretrial SVP

custody does differ from pretrial criminal detention in certain

pertinent respects. After the trial court holds a probable cause

hearing, alleged SVPs are confined at a state hospital, not jail,

and begin receiving mental health treatment while they await

trial. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600.05, subd. (a); id., §§ 6602, subd.

(a), 6604.) Pretrial treatment of the underlying mental disorder

We disapprove the following cases to the extent they apply

a presumption of prejudice when evaluating a claimed violation

of the due process right to a timely SVP trial: People v. Tran,

supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 354; In re Butler, supra, 55

Cal.App.5th at p. 662; People v. Bradley, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th

at p. 41; People v. DeCasas, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 808;

People v. Superior Court (Vasquez), supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at

p. 74.

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

that caused the state to seek commitment in the first place may

ultimately facilitate the individual’s release before trial. This

observation does not, of course, minimize the oppressive nature

of involuntary detention awaiting an SVP trial. But it does to

some extent distinguish pretrial incarceration at a state

hospital from pretrial detention at a jail, which has few

rehabilitative resources.

Determining how heavily to weigh the prejudice resulting

from pretrial custody therefore requires a sensitive inquiry into

the circumstances of the case. For individuals who have never

received a favorable expert evaluation, delay in holding trial will

generally entail less prejudice than for individuals who have a

more substantial basis for arguing they do not satisfy the

criteria for SVP commitment. Where an individual makes such

a showing, the amount of prejudice may increase as the length

of the delay increases. For example, in the case of an individual

who has expert reports recommending release, a four-year delay

in going to trial will generally be significantly more prejudicial

than a one-year delay.

Applying these general principles to Camacho’s case, the

delay here had no appreciable impact on Camacho’s ability to

present his defense. In 2015, one out of four expert reports

concluded — for the first time ever — that Camacho no longer

met the criteria for commitment, and two of the other reports

seemed to suggest he might qualify for conditional release in the

future. The length of delay since that point — approximately

seven years — is significant, and Camacho has been

involuntarily committed throughout that period. We therefore

find some amount of prejudice in Camacho’s case, but no

indication that the delay has undermined the fairness of the

proceedings. Any prejudice is, moreover, extenuated by the fact

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

that Camacho has not shown he in fact wanted a timely trial.

(See Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 534 [“More important than

the absence of serious prejudice, is the fact that Barker did not

want a speedy trial”].)

Balancing the Barker factors, we conclude that Camacho

fails to demonstrate a violation of his due process right to a

timely trial. Only one factor — the length of the delay —

strongly supports Camacho’s claim of a due process violation.

Though the trial court and the state seemingly neglected their

responsibility to bring the case to trial in a timely manner, we

agree with the Court of Appeal that the defense, rather than the

state, bears more responsibility for the delay. Camacho did not

demonstrate a desire to go to trial before 2018, nor did he suffer

significant prejudice to his case as a result of the delay. We find

no violation of Camacho’s due process right to a timely trial.

Camacho raises an alternative due process argument:

that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to

“enact any procedural safeguards to ensure that [he] consented

to the repeated delays in his case” during the eight-year period

when he did not personally appear. In Camacho’s view, if, at

any given hearing, an alleged SVP is not “present in court with

the opportunity to be heard,” due process mandates that “an

appropriate written waiver” of personal appearance must be

filed.

We decline to hold that due process requires the

defendant’s personal presence at every hearing, regardless of

the substance of the hearing. As a general rule, a criminal

defendant has no due process right to be present at hearings

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

unless “his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to

the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.”

(Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105–106; id. at

pp. 107–108 [“[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due

process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be

thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.”].) There is no

reason to believe a different rule should apply in the SVP

context. To require personal presence at every hearing would,

moreover, entail transportation and other logistical costs not

justified by any substantial benefit. If an individual objects to

delays and wishes to assert the right to a speedy or timely trial,

he or she may communicate as much through counsel or

communicate directly with the court; and courts may consider

any difficulties in that communication when determining

whether an individual’s timely trial right has been violated.

(See Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 529.)

As discussed above, Camacho fails to show that his

prolonged absence from court was involuntary. Camacho does

not attempt to demonstrate that his presence at any of the

hearings held in his absence would have had a “reasonable,

substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges

against him.” (People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 861.) Nor

does Camacho allege, much less demonstrate, that his counsel

acted against his wishes in seeking trial continuances during

periods when Camacho was not personally present.

Accordingly, we find no due process violation.

VI.

Although Camacho fails to establish a violation of his due

process rights, the Attorney General concedes that the People

and the trial court both could have done more to move the case

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

along. We agree. It bears emphasis that an individual faced

with potential SVP commitment has a due process right to trial

at a reasonable time, and the People and trial court both bear

responsibility for ensuring that right is respected. The trial

court, in particular, has responsibility to exercise its power over

trial timing in a manner that takes account of the individual’s

interests and that adequately guards against unjustified delays.

We have already described what this responsibility

entails, including careful compliance with new statutory

procedures designed to safeguard against unjustified

continuances of previously set trial dates. (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 6603, subd. (c).) In view of the vital importance of ensuring

adequate procedures are in place to protect the interests of the

defendant, the state, and the public, we further call on the

Judicial Council to examine the issue. As the policy and

rulemaking body of the courts, the Judicial Council is in the best

position to study the issue of pretrial delays in SVP cases with

the input of interested persons and consider what, if any,

additional safeguards would facilitate timely adjudication of

petitions for commitment under the SVP Act.

Here, however, although the trial court and the People

should have taken more affirmative steps to bring Camacho to

trial, Camacho fails to demonstrate a violation of his due process

right to a timely trial on the petition for recommitment under

CAMACHO v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

the SVP Act. Because the Court of Appeal reached the same

conclusion, we affirm its judgment.

KRUGER, J.

We Concur:

GUERRERO, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Camacho v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published)

Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 1/21/22 – 5th Dist.

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S273391

Date Filed: August 31, 2023

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Merced

Judge: Ronald W. Hansen

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo and Douglas C. Foster for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant

Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric

L. Christoffersen, Julie A. Hokans, Rachelle A. Newcomb and Sally

Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Douglas C. Foster

Fitzgerald, Alvarez & Ciummo

3185 M Street, Suite 200

Merced, CA 95348

(209) 691-7280

Sally Espinoza

Deputy Attorney General

1300 I Street

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 210-6282

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.