noting general rule among courts of appeals that “participation in a bench trial without objection constitutes waiver of the jury trial right”
How later courts described this case
- noting general rule among courts of appeals that “participation in a bench trial without objection constitutes waiver of the jury trial right”
- indicating that finding “plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right” is a prerequisite to 3 defeating a qualified immunity defense
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-40659
Summary Calendar
THOMAS EDWARD RODRIGUEZ
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
JACKIE W COLEMAN; EDWARD E SIMON; RONNIE D GATEWOOD; HAROLD
W GARROW
Defendants - Appellees
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(6:94-CV-768)
_________________________________________________________________
July 9, 1996
Before KING, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Thomas Edward Rodriguez appeals the district court’s
judgment in favor of the defendants in his civil rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rodriguez’s complaint alleged that four
corrections officers conspired to retaliate against him for a
prior grievance he had filed against one of them. On appeal,
Rodriguez raises three issues: whether the district court erred
in holding a bench trial rather than a jury trial; (2) whether
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
the district court erred in denying Rodriguez’s discovery
requests; and (3) whether the district court erred in concluding
that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. We
address these issues in turn.
Rodriguez asserts that the district court erred in holding a
bench trial because the defendants had moved for a jury trial.
However, after defendants withdrew their demand for a jury trial
and the district court scheduled a bench trial, Rodriguez neither
requested a jury trial or objected during the bench trial to the
absence of a jury. “A party who participates in the
determination of the issues--without objecting and reminding the
court of its jury request--is barred from later raising the issue
on appeal.” In re Wynn, 889 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1989); see
also Cooper v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045, 1049 (3rd Cir. 1991) (noting
general rule among courts of appeals that “participation in a
bench trial without objection constitutes waiver of the jury
trial right”). Because Rodriguez neither requested a jury trial
or objected to the bench trial, we find that he is barred from
raising this issue on appeal.
Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in denying
his request for production of documents. It is well-settled that
discovery matters are entrusted to the sound discretion of the
district court. Richardson v. Henry, 902 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991). Discovery rulings are
reviewed for abuse of this discretion. United States v. Deisch,
20 F.3d 139, 154 (5th Cir. 1994). They will be reversed only
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when they are arbitrary or clearly unreasonable. Mayo v.
Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986). In
this case, the district court denied Rodriguez’s motion for
request of production as being untimely because it was filed
prematurely. The documents that Rodriguez asserts were not
disclosed were his medical records, a diagram of building C-pod,
and the activity sheet for the recreation and shower areas. The
medical records were introduced at trial. Rodriguez’s assertion
that he needed the building diagram and the activity sheet is not
adequately supported in his brief. Nor is it shown that
Rodriguez suffered any prejudice from the lack of disclosure of
these documents. We find that the district court’s denial of
Rodriguez’s request for production of documents was not an abuse
of discretion.
Rodriguez contends that the district court erred in
concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity. Rodriguez’s § 1983 complaint alleged that, by being
deliberately indifferent to his safety, the defendants violated
Rodriguez’s Eighth Amendment right to protection from violence at
the hands of another prisoner. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.
Ct. 1970, 1979-80 (1994). The district court concluded that the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because it
determined that Rodriguez did not prove a constitutional
violation. See Schultea v. Wood, 27 F.3d 1112, 1115 (5th Cir.
1994) (indicating that finding “plaintiff has asserted a
violation of a constitutional right” is a prerequisite to
3
defeating a qualified immunity defense), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir.
1995). The district court reached this determination based on
the testimony adduced at trial and its findings of fact derived
from that testimony. “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Accordingly, “[w]hen a trial judge’s
finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one
of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and
facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic
evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can
virtually never be clear error.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). We conclude that the district
court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the defendants
were entitled to qualified immunity because they were not
deliberately indifferent to Rodriguez’s safety.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
4