Rev. A.S. Enoxh v. J. Carter

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rev. Augustus Simmons Enoxh, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 243 C.D. 2022

: Submitted: July 21, 2023

J. Carter, T. Pauley, K. Patterson, :

Mr. Geardner, Librarian, B. Hoffman, :

T. Stewart, N. Wilson :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: August 25, 2023

Appellant Rev. Augustus Simmons Enoxh (Appellant)1 appeals from the

Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) on

November 17, 2021, denying him in forma pauperis (IFP) status and dismissing his

pro se “Complaint in Civil Action” (Complaint) as frivolous.2 Appellant filed his

Complaint against: J. Carter; T. Pauley; K. Patterson; Mr. Geardner, Librarian (Mr.

Geardner); B. Hoffman; T. Stewart; and N. Wilson (collectively, Appellees),

individuals employed at various State Correctional Institutions (SCI), namely SCI-

1

Appellant, whose given name appears to be Augustus Simmons, refers to himself as the

“Revered Magi Augustus Simmon[s] Enoxh,” “the holy protector and founder of the Fellowship

of Spiritual Science.” (Complaint in Civil Action (Complaint) ¶ 6.)

2

Appellant’s request for IFP status was docketed on November 1, 2021, and was

accompanied by his Complaint; however, the Complaint was not docketed until July 17, 2023,

when the Prothonotary of this Court requested that the trial court file the Complaint on the docket

to enable appellate review of whether the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint.

Greene, where Appellant was housed when he brought his cause of action,3 and SCI-

Forest and SCI-Coal Township, where Appellant previously had been housed.4

(Complaint ¶¶ 6-7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 25.) In his Complaint, Appellant makes

numerous allegations regarding his inability to receive his Social Security card, his

birth certificate, and his inmate identification. He also claims numerous legal

documents belonging to him were lost and challenges the prison law library policies

at SCI-Greene. (Id. ¶¶ 6-20.) Following our review, we affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

In his Complaint, Appellant alleges that on April 7, 2021, he filed a grievance

against SCI-Greene inmate accounts when his request slip filed on June 12, 2019,

for his Social Security card and birth certificate went unanswered. (Id. ¶ 21.)

Appellant avers he received a response to his grievance that his Social Security card

was at SCI-Greene, but his birth certificate was not. (Id. ¶ 22.) Appellant then filed

a second request slip on June 17, 2018,5 asking for two copies of his Social Security

card, and that they be personally delivered to him or given to his counselor. (Id.) In

a response dated June 20, 2019,6 Appellant was told his Social Security card would

be “safeguarded in [his] property envelope only.” (Id. ¶ 23.) On March 26, 2021,

Appellant states he asked that a copy of his birth certificate, Social Security card,

3

In his brief, Appellant lists his address as SCI-Phoenix in Collegeville, Pennsylvania.

(Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 1-2.)

4

With the exception of Mr. Geardner, whom Appellant identifies as a librarian, the other

Appellees are identified as working in various capacities in the business office of one of the SCIs.

5

This date appears to be in error as Appellant states this request followed his June 12, 2019

request.

6

This date appears to be an error in light of Appellant’s earlier allegation that he filed the

grievance in April 2021.

2

and inmate identification be sent to his mother, and he was told the “[d]ocuments

have not been received yet.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Appellant states he was “stonewalled for

information about his birth certificate for several months,” which prompted him to

file a grievance related to the missing document. (Id. ¶ 25.) According to Appellant,

he was told SCI-Greene contacted SCI-Coal Township to inquire as to the

whereabouts of his Social Security card and birth certificate. He avers he was told

the Social Security card had arrived at SCI-Greene and was placed in the safe there,

but the birth certificate had not yet been received by either SCI-Coal Township or

SCI-Greene; he would be notified of its arrival. (Id.) Appellant claims he has a

“stub” from Albany, New York, which reflects his birth certificate was delivered to

SCI-Greene, which SCI-Greene denies. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Appellant avers Appellees

J. Carter, T. Pauley, and K. Patterson, the only individuals with access to the

institutional safe, are responsible for, among other things, securing the personal

property of inmates held in the safe, which they did not do in this case, and that T.

Stewart, B. Hoffman, and N. Wilson as business managers ignored their duty to

investigate the missing birth certificate. (Id. ¶¶ 28-30, 32, 46.) Appellant also

alleges Mr. Geardner who, consistent with Department of Corrections (DOC) policy

should personally collect legal mail, “mis[]plac[ed] recklessly” multiple pages of

Appellant’s legal documents by requiring him to place those documents in the

inmate mailbox, despite flaws in the inmate mail system. (Id. ¶¶ 33-35, 48, 54.)

Appellant posits that Appellees were at all times “acting under the color of the

law, to wit, under color of the statutes, ordinance, regulations, policies, customs, and

usages of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania[,]” and engaged in willful

misconduct; thus, Appellees are not immune from liability under Section 8550 of

the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550. (Id. ¶¶ 7-20, 44-45, 48.) Appellant contends

Appellees committed fraud and numerous criminal offenses, tampered with public

documents, and violated his constitutional rights, including due process. (Id. ¶¶ 31,

3

36-65.) Specifically, Appellant argues that Appellees have deprived him of clearly

established and well-settled constitutional rights while committing violations of the

following statutory provisions:

(a.) Freedom from the deprivation of liberty without due

process of law;

(b.) Freedom from illicit deprivation of personal property due

to the commission of this tort;

(c.) 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550 willful misconduct[;]

(d.) 18 Pa.C.S. § 4911 tampering with public records or

information;

(e.) 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4113 misapplication of entrusted property

of government or financial institutions[;]

(f.) [Section 13(a) of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device

and Cosmetic Act, Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as

amended,] 35 P.S. § 780-113(a) failure to keep records[;]

(g.) 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4911 tampering w[ith] public records or

information[;]

(h.) 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4113 misapplication of entrusted

property[;]

(i.) 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4104 tampering with records or

identification.

(Id. ¶ 64 (unnecessary capitalization and periods omitted).) Appellant seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of changing law library policies and the

manner in which personal property is secured, along with compensatory and punitive

damages in an amount of $750,000.00. Appellant also requests that Appellees be

terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 66-70.)

II. TRIAL COURT ORDER

Simultaneously with his Complaint, Appellant filed his petition seeking IFP

status. Prior to service of the Complaint on Appellees, on November 17, 2021, the

trial court issued its Order denying Appellant IFP status and dismissing the

Complaint upon its determination that the Complaint is frivolous. (Trial Court

4

Order, filed 11/17/2021 (Order) at 7.) In doing so, the trial court relied upon Section

6602(e)(2) of the Act known as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42

Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2), which states:

Notwithstanding any filing fee which has been paid, the court shall

dismiss prison conditions litigation at any time, including prior to

service on the defendant, if the court determines . . . [t]he prison

conditions litigation is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted or the defendant is entitled to assert

a valid affirmative defense, including immunity, which, if asserted,

would preclude the relief.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2).

In dismissing the Complaint, the trial court concluded Appellant’s claims

constituted prison conditions litigation that fell within the PLRA because Appellant

“challenges [] Department of Corrections [(DOC)] policies and procedures relating

to inmate personal property and the procedures to secure such personal property,

i[.]e.[,] [S]ocial [S]ecurity cards, in the institutional safe.” (Order at 6.) The trial

court further reasoned:

[I]t is the understanding of the instant [c]ourt that [] [DOC] rules and

regulations regarding personal property are policies implemented by []

[DOC] to ensure, among other things, health and safety concerns within

the institution. Therefore, based on [] [DOC] procedures, the PLRA,

and precedent related to challenges to [] [DOC] policies and procedures

relating to inmate personal property and the procedures to secure such

personal property, i[.]e.[,] [S]ocial [S]ecurity cards, in the institutional

safe, [Appellant]’s Complaint is determined to be frivolous.

(Id. at 7.)

5

Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the trial court, which was stamped filed

December 28, 2021.7 On January 6, 2022, the trial court filed its Opinion Pursuant

to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.)

(1925(a) Op.), wherein it indicated that it had not ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal and that it would be relying upon its

reasoning contained in its Order for this appeal, with no additions to the record.

(1925(a) Op. at 1 (unnumbered).)8

III. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of Appeal

Before we address Appellant’s substantive issues, we first must determine

whether this appeal is properly before us, for when an appeal has been untimely

filed, the defect is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Monroe

Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Miller, 570 A.2d 1386, 1388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).

Generally, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the docket entry of

the order from which the appeal is taken. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); see also Pa.R.A.P.

105(b) (providing “[a]n appellate court . . . may not enlarge the time for filing a

notice of appeal”). Herein, the trial court’s Order was entered on November 17,

2021, but Appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed until December 28, 2021,

making it facially untimely. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).

However, a review of the record reveals that Appellant completed a

handwritten notice of appeal dated December 16, 2021, wherein he indicated that he

7

The appeal was originally taken to the Superior Court, which transferred the appeal to

this Court on February 11, 2022.

8

When a trial court dismisses an inmate’s complaint sua sponte for its failure to state a

cause of action for which relief may be granted, this Court’s scope of review of the trial court’s

order is plenary. Whitaker v. Wetzel, 170 A.3d 568, 572 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

6

had been transferred from SCI-Greene to SCI-Phoenix and had not received notice

of the trial court’s Order until that date. (Original Record No. 13). The Greene

County Prothonotary Docket Entries support this assertion as they indicate that mail

for Appellant had been returned as undeliverable on December 3, 2021, and again

on December 14, 2021. Moreover, at the conclusion of his handwritten notice of

appeal, Appellant states that he served the notice of appeal on the Greene County

Prothonotary on December 16, 2021, the same day that he learned of the Order and

one day before he had to file a timely notice of appeal. Under the prisoner mailbox

rule, a prisoner’s pro se appeal is deemed filed at the time it is given to prison

officials or put in the prison mailbox. Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426

(Pa. 1997); Sweesy v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 955 A.2d 501, 502 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2008). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly has applied the prisoner mailbox

rule to all inmate appeals where an inmate is not represented by counsel. Jones, 700

A.2d at 426; Kittrell v. Watson, 88 A.3d 1091, 1097 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

In light of the foregoing, and upon applying the prisoner mailbox rule, we

conclude that Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal on December 16, 2021.9

Accordingly, we proceed to address the substantive issues Appellant raises in his

9

Normally, Appellant’s statement on the certificate of service, without more, would be

insufficient as proof that the prisoner mailbox rule applies herein. See Sweesy, 955 A.2d at 503

(holding that the court needs “reasonably verifiable evidence” of the date an inmate deposits an

appeal, including, for example, “certificates of mailing, cash slips, affidavits, and prison operating

procedures”). However, the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s late receipt of the trial court’s

Order as described by Appellant, which are supported by the Greene County Prothonotary Docket

Entries, substantiate Appellant’s claim that December 16, 2021, was the first opportunity he had

to file an appeal from the Order as it appears the Order was twice returned as undeliverable. Thus,

the breakdown in the administration of the court would also permit the appeal to be considered.

See Best Courier v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.Off. of Unemployment Comp. Tax Servs., 220 A.3d 696,

701 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

7

brief pertaining to the denial of his request to proceed IFP and dismissal of his

Complaint.

B. Substantive Issues

Appellant first argues the trial court erred in determining his Complaint

constitutes prison conditions litigation and denying what he describes as his

“professional liability tort” claims against Appellees. (Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 2.)

Appellant states that contrary to the trial court’s determination, he did not file the

action seeking items Appellees refused to give him but, rather, he did so to challenge

their “gross negligence” resulting in the loss of his original birth certificate, as well

as pages of documents pertaining to an unrelated litigation. (Id. at 2-3.) Appellant

relies upon this Court’s holding in Williams v. Beard, 67 A.3d 182 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2013), wherein we reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court upon finding

the trial court had erred in basing its finding that the action was frivolous on

balancing the costs of litigation against the cost of the damaged footlocker for which

the defendant requested reimbursement. Id. at 184-85.

Herein, unlike the situation presented in Williams, the trial court did not base

its finding of frivolity upon the monetary value of the items which Appellant seeks.

Rather, the trial court found Appellant’s Complaint “challenges [] [DOC’s] policies

and procedures relating to inmate personal property and the procedures to secure

such personal property, i[.]e.[,] [S]ocial [S]ecurity cards, in the institutional safe.”

(Order at 6.) Following our review, we find this is only partly correct.

Appellant’s allegations against the named prison officials regarding the

handling of his personal documents and his requests for reforms in the prison law

library and its mailing procedures assert claims that constitute “prison conditions

litigation.” Section 6601 of the PLRA defines prison conditions litigation as:

8

[a] civil proceeding arising in whole or in part under Federal or State

law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of

actions by a government party on the life of an individual confined in

prison. The term includes an appeal. The term does not include

criminal proceedings or habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact

or duration of confinement in prison.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6601. Because it concerns prison conditions litigation, the Complaint

is subject to Section 6602(e)(2) of the PLRA, which allows a trial court to dismiss

prison conditions litigation where the complaint “fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted[,] or [that] the defendant is entitled to assert a valid affirmative

defense, including immunity, which, if asserted, would preclude the relief.” 42

Pa.C.S. § 6602(e)(2); Bailey v. Miller, 943 A.2d 1007, 1009 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

“Accordingly, the defense of sovereign immunity can provide a basis for dismissal

of a prison conditions lawsuit.” McCool v. Dep’t of Corr., 984 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2009).

This Court previously explained the applicability of sovereign immunity as

follows:

Sovereign immunity acts as a bar to suits against Commonwealth

parties, including its officials and employees acting within the scope of

their duties. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. Establishing a limited list of exceptions

to immunity, the General Assembly adopted what is commonly referred

to as the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8501-8502, 8521-

8527. Section 8522 of the Sovereign Immunity Act waives “immunity

as a bar to an action against Commonwealth parties, for damages

arising out of a negligent act where the damages would be recoverable

under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the

injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of

sovereign immunity,” for specifically enumerated categories of acts.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8522. A “Commonwealth party” is defined in Section

8501 as “[a] Commonwealth agency and any employee thereof, but

only with respect to an act within the scope of his office or

employment.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. Thus, when an employee of a

Commonwealth agency, such as a DOC employee, is acting within the

scope of his or her duties, the employee is shielded by the doctrine of

9

sovereign immunity from liability for tort claims arising from negligent

acts that do not fall within the statutory exceptions listed in Section

8522(b) of the Sovereign Immunity Act. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310; 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 8522(a)-(b). Sovereign immunity is not waived for intentional acts

committed by a Commonwealth employee acting within the scope of

his or her employment. La Frankie v. Miklich, . . . 618 A.2d 1145, 1149

([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992).

Paluch v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 175 A.3d 433, 437-38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). One of the

enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity is for “damages caused by . . . [t]he

care, custody or control of personal property in the possession or control of

Commonwealth parties, including . . . property of persons held by a Commonwealth

agency.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(3).

“Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading jurisdiction; consequently, a pleading must

not only apprise the opposing party of the asserted claim, [but] it must also formulate

the issues by summarizing those facts essential to support the claim.” Richardson v.

Wetzel, 74 A.3d 353, 356-57 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Appellant casts his Complaint, on the one hand, as sounding in negligence.

For instance, Appellant alleges J. Carter, T. Pauley, and K. Patterson owed a duty to

safeguard his personal documents, which was breached when they were lost.

(Complaint ¶¶ 28-30.) However, Appellant also asserts that T. Stewart, B. Hoffman,

and N. Wilson “intentional[ly] ignored the fact that his personal property was

missing and[/]or destroyed.” (Complaint ¶ 32.) He also claims Mr. Geardner

engaged in “willful misconduct.” For example, he describes Mr. Geardner’s willful

misconduct in requiring legal materials to be passed through the inmate mailing

system which he “knowingly” knew to be “flawed.” (Id. ¶ 48.) This Court has held

that for purposes of the Tort Claims Act, willful misconduct is viewed as

synonymous with an intentional tort. Delate v. Kolle, 667 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1995). As stated above, generally, intentional tort claims are barred by

10

sovereign immunity.10 Paluch, 175 A.3d at 438. Notwithstanding, where, as here,

an inmate pleads both negligence and intentional tort claims, we have held that

because a “plaintiff is the master of his claim” and can plead causes of action in the

alternative, it was error for a trial court to dismiss an inmate’s complaint in its

entirety as frivolous. Nifas v. Williams (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 319 C.D. 2019, filed July

25, 2019), slip op. at 7.11 Thus, to the extent the Complaint alleges negligence

against J. Carter, T. Pauley, and K. Patterson with regard to their duty to secure

documents pertaining to an inmate’s identity, (Complaint ¶¶ 28-30), the trial court

erred in dismissing those claims as frivolous.12

Appellant also avers Appellees “committed intentional fraud.” (Complaint ¶

31.) As stated above, intentional acts are barred by sovereign immunity. Paluch,

175 A.3d at 438. Furthermore, under Pennsylvania’s pleading rules, averments of

fraud must be stated with particularity, although Appellant’s Complaint presents

only vague generalizations in this regard. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure

1019(b), Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(b). Accordingly, to the extent Appellant attempts to

assert claims against Appellees for fraud, we conclude the trial court did not err in

dismissing those claims as frivolous.

10

Pursuant to Section 8550 of the Judicial Code, sovereign immunity is waived where the

injury is caused by willful misconduct of an employee. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550. However, Section

8550 applies only to local agency employees. See id. (“In any action against a local agency or

employee thereof . . . .”) DOC employees, such as Appellees, are Commonwealth agency

employees. Williams v. Shawley (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1250 C.D. 2018, filed June 27, 2019), slip op.

at 16.

11

While not binding, this Court’s unreported opinions may be cited for their persuasive

authority pursuant to Rule 126(b)(1)-(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,

Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2), and Section 414(a) of our Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §

69.414(a).

12

It appears from Appellant’s own allegations that his Social Security card was received

at SCI Greene and kept in the prison safe; therefore, he has not stated a claim for the loss of this

document. (Complaint ¶25.)

11

The Complaint further alleges Appellees violated numerous criminal statutes

and seeks for Appellees to be criminally charged as a result thereof. (Complaint ¶¶

36-41.) In Pennsylvania, there is a procedure by which private criminal complaints

can be lodged. See Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 506, Pa.R.Crim.P. 506.

This involves the affiant submitting the complaint first to the attorney for the

Commonwealth for approval and, if the complaint is not approved, the affiant may

petition the court of common pleas for review of that decision. Pa.R.Crim.P. 506

(A). Appellant did not follow this procedure. Instead, Appellant filed a civil action

alleging Appellees violated various criminal statutes and seeking to have them

criminally charged. These allegations are outside the trial court’s jurisdiction in a

civil action, and, thus, dismissal of those claims was not in error.

Appellant also claims Mr. Geardner, who was required to safeguard his

documents, was “recklessly” responsible for losing “dozens” of his legal documents

by requiring him to deliver them through the prison mail system with “no care of its

return or delivery.” (Complaint ¶¶ 33-35, 48, 53, 62-63.) Specifically, Appellant

refers to 27 pages of legal documents consisting of “[d]ecl[a]rations, [l]egal

evidence, and procedural documents.” (Id. ¶ 34.) However, while these allegations

pertain to intentional action on the part of Mr. Geardner, Appellant also sets forth

allegations sounding in negligence that as the “head librarian,” Mr. Geardner

through “a very flawed system” “process[ed] sensitive legal mail with no care of its

return or delivery.” (Id. ¶ 48.) Initially, we observe that this Court appears to have

viewed personal legal documents and mail under the umbrella of personal property.

See White v. Walter (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1341 C.D. 2019, filed Feb. 9, 2021), slip op.

at 9-10 (finding inmate’s allegations in his complaint that prison officials negligently

mishandled his “personal property (mail)” failed where they had not been pled with

specificity); Samuels v. Walsh (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 318 C.D. 2014, filed Nov. 17,

2014), slip op. at 2-4, 9-10 (finding that where an inmate’s “personal property and

12

legal documents” were left unattended and were subsequently lost, and the items

were in the “care, custody and control” of prison employees, inmate was “not

prohibited from pursuing a negligence action against [prison employees] for the loss

of his property” as “[a] factfinder could conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable

that in a prison, an inmate’s personal property would be misplaced or stolen if not

secured”). Thus, following our review of the Complaint, we find that Appellant pled

in his Complaint that Mr. Geardner had a duty to “secure and protect” his property

(legal documents) once those materials were deposited in the inmate mailbox. See

Samuels, slip op at 9-10. Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding this claim to

be wholly frivolous and dismissing it at this stage of the proceedings.

To the extent Appellant seeks injunctive relief due to DOC mailing policies,

it is axiomatic that Appellees’ decisions addressing internal prison operations are

largely outside this Court’s original or appellate jurisdiction. Bronson v. Cent. Off.

Rev. Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa. 1998); Winton v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 263

A.3d 1240, 1243 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has

reasoned that, “internal prison operations are more properly left to the legislative and

executive branches, and . . . prison officials must be allowed to exercise their

judgment in the execution of policies necessary to preserve order and maintain

security free from judicial interference.” Bronson, 721 A.2d at 358.

Finally, Appellant avers that J. Carter has committed numerous criminal

offenses against him

pursuant to the statutory provisions found at 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4113[]

misapplication of entrusted property of government or financial

institutions; § 4911[] Tampering with public records or information; §

8550[] Willful misconduct; § 7507[] Breach of privacy; § [sic] Invasion

of privacy; Failure to keep records, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a); Tampering

w[ith] public records or information [§] 4911; Misapplication of

entrusted property, [§] 4113 and Tampering with records or

identification [§] 4104(a)M1.

13

(Complaint ¶ 36.) Appellant further alleges that P. Pauley, K. Patterson, T. Stewart,

B. Hoffman, and N. Wilson each “has committed a criminal offense(s) against

[Appellant named] in paragraph 36[] [i]ncluding and not limited to criminal

conspiracy to commit all the above[-]named offenses.” (Complaint ¶¶ 37-38, 40-

41a.)13 In addition, Appellant alleges Mr. Geardner has committed “the following

offense(s) 18 Pa.C.S. § 8550 willful misconduct; misapplication of entrusted

property, [§] 4113; Failure to keep records, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a).” (Complaint ¶

39.)

Other than his bald allegations punctuated with statutory citations, Appellant

has failed to plead material facts to support a viable claim that Appellees committed

any of the enumerated criminal offenses or violated any of his constitutional rights.

In fact, Appellant does not even mention, let alone apply to the named Appellees or

their specific actions, any of the elements of the enumerated offenses. Tedesco v.

Link (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 709 C.D. 2020, filed May 16, 2023), slip op. at 7-8.

Moreover, “[a] complaint claiming civil conspiracy must allege material facts which

will either directly or inferentially establish elements of conspiracy.” Brown v.

Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166, 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Appellant does not allege specific

facts indicating a plan or an agreement among Appellees to act unlawfully, but

merely makes general allegations that they did so. “Because he has not pled

sufficient facts to plead a conspiracy as well as the necessary predicate illegal act

necessary for there to be a civil conspiracy, the trial court properly dismissed this

count.” Id.

13

There are two paragraphs numbered 41 in the Complaint. We refer to the second as 41a.

14

IV. CONCLUSION

This Court may affirm a trial court’s dismissal of claims on grounds different

from those upon which the trial court relied. McCool, 984 A.2d at 570-72; Guy M.

Cooper, Inc. v. E. Penn Sch. Dist., 903 A.2d 608, 618 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Even

though we find the Complaint is not barred in its entirety, we do find the trial court

properly dismissed Appellant’s intentional tort claims, fraud claims, prison reform

claims, and his claims pertaining to violations of his constitutional rights and

criminal offenses against Appellees. However, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse

the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s negligence claims against J. Carter, T.

Pauley, and K. Patterson for their alleged failure to secure his identifying documents.

We also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s negligence claim against

Mr. Geardner in connection with his alleged loss of Appellant’s legal documents.

We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

Opinion.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

15

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rev. Augustus Simmons Enoxh, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 243 C.D. 2022

:

J. Carter, T. Pauley, K. Patterson, :

Mr. Geardner, Librarian, B. Hoffman, :

T. Stewart, N. Wilson :

ORDER

NOW, August 25, 2023, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene

County date November 17, 2021, is AFFIRMED IN PART with regard to the

court’s dismissal of Appellant’s intentional tort claims, fraud claims, prison reform

claims, and his claims pertaining to violations of his constitutional rights and

criminal offenses against Appellees and REVERSED IN PART with regard to

Appellant’s negligence claims against J. Carter, T. Pauley, and K. Patterson relating

to their alleged failure to secure his birth certificate and inmate identification card,

and against Mr. Geardner relating to the alleged loss of Appellant’s legal documents.

The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge