“[T]he writ will not issue to correct a duty that is to any degree debatable.” (quoting United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143 , 1147 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc))
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he writ will not issue to correct a duty that is to any degree debatable.” (quoting United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143 , 1147 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc))
- “[T]he results of test plaintiffs in a bellwether trial are to be used for informational purposes only, not for issue preclusion.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 23-30243 Document: 00516871910 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/24/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
August 24, 2023
No. 23-30243 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
In re Jefferson Parish; Louisiana Regional Landfill
Company; Waste Connections Bayou, Incorporated;
Waste Connections US, Incorporated; Aptim
Corporation,
Petitioners.
______________________________
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
to the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC Nos. 2:18-CV-7889, 2:18-CV-8071,
2:18-CV-8218, 2:18-CV-9312,
2:19-CV-11133, 2:19-CV-14512
______________________________
Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
Jefferson Parish Landfill emitted noxious gases and odors into
surrounding areas, so nearby residents sued. One of those lawsuits is the
Ictech-Bendeck putative class action, which has not yet had a hearing on class
certification. Another is the Addison mass action, which is comprised of over
500 plaintiffs and is against the same defendants as Ictech-Bendeck. The
matters are not consolidated. This mandamus proceeding arose because the
defendants object to the district court’s scheduling of a small group of
Addison plaintiffs for trial before Ictech-Bendeck will finish its class
certification process, which the defendants have repeatedly delayed.
Case: 23-30243 Document: 00516871910 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/24/2023
No. 23-30243
Petitioners ask us to stop the Addison trial and to order the district
court to rule on class certification in Ictech-Bendeck before allowing any
further proceedings in Addison. Petitioners raise the novel theory that under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of a putative class
action bars any possible class members from reaching the merits of their own,
separate suits until class-certification proceedings conclude in the putative
class action. The district court rejected that argument, and Petitioners
sought mandamus.
Mandamus is an extraordinary form of relief saved for the rare case in
which there has been a “usurpation of judicial power” or a “clear abuse of
discretion.” In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494, 500 (5th Cir. 2019)
(alteration and citation omitted). It is not for testing novel legal theories.
And Petitioners’ theory is not merely new; it is also wrong. Rule 23
establishes a mechanism for plaintiffs to pursue their claims as a class. It does
not cause the filing of a putative class action to universally estop all separate
but related actions from proceeding to the merits until the class-certification
process concludes in the putative class action, after years of motions practice.
Because Petitioners have failed to establish their entitlement to a writ of
mandamus, their petition is DENIED.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
From July 2017 to December 2019, the Jefferson Parish Landfill
released noxious emissions on its premises and into nearby neighborhoods.
In regular English: the landfill made the surrounding areas smell bad. The
“odors and gases emitted by the Jefferson Parish Landfill during the relevant
time period were capable of causing headaches, nausea, vomiting, loss of
appetite, sleep disruption, dizziness, fatigue, anxiety and worry, a decrease in
quality of life, and loss of enjoyment or use of property in the general
population.”
2
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No. 23-30243
Several collections of residents near Jefferson Parish Landfill sued the
landfill’s owner (Jefferson Parish) and its operators (four companies). This
mandamus action arises out of the Eastern District of Louisiana’s case
management of two of those lawsuits: the Ictech-Bendeck class action 1 and the
Addison mass action. 2 The Ictech-Bendeck class action plaintiffs seek damages
on a state-law nuisance theory under Louisiana Civil Code articles 667, 668,
and 669. The Addison mass action plaintiffs seek damages from the same
defendants, although they plead claims for both nuisance and negligence, as
codified in Louisiana Civil Code articles, 2315, 2315.1, and 2316. “Ictech-
Bendeck and Addison are not and have never been consolidated actions. They
remain completely distinct actions, aside from the parties’ agreement to try
the issue of general causation in one bench trial.” Ictech-Bendeck is a putative
class action. Addison is not.
Ictech-Bendeck was filed in July 2018 and removed to federal court in
August 2018. Addison was filed in December 2018 and removed in June 2019.
In recounting the ensuing procedural history, the petition—which complains
that five years have elapsed without a ruling on class certification in Ictech-
Bendeck—skips straight from the 2018 filings to a hearing scheduled by the
district court for February 2022. Omitted from that four-year span is the
extensive motions practice engaged in and led by Petitioners in both Ictech-
Bendeck and Addison.
_____________________
1
Ictech-Bendeck v. Waste Connections Bayou, Inc., et al., No. 18-CV-7889,
consolidated with 18-CV-8071, 18-CV-8218, and 18-CV-9312, is a consolidation of several
proposed class actions brought by Elias Jorge “George” Ictech-Bendeck; Savannah
Thompson; Nicole M. Landry-Boudreaux; Larry Bernard, Sr.; and Mona Bernard,
individually, and on behalf of similarly situated individuals.
2
Addison, et al. v. Louisiana Regional Landfill Co., et al., No. 19-CV-11133,
consolidated with 19-CV-14512, is a consolidation of two mass actions containing over 500
individual plaintiffs.
3
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In April 2019, Petitioner moved to dismiss the Ictech-Bendeck class
action and requested a case management order that would delay the
plaintiffs’ moving for class certification until 91 days after the district judge
ruled on the motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the motion in August
2019. Ictech-Bendeck v. Waste Connections Bayou, Inc., No. 18-CV-7889, 2020
WL 2037185, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2020). In September 2019, Petitioners
then “proposed the Court enter a ‘Lone Pine’ case management order that
permitted discovery on both general and specific causation.” Id. at *2. This
proposed order would not have had the court rule on a class certification
order for at least 16 months. That would have been January 2021, at the
earliest.
While conferring on this proposed case management plan, the parties
consented to the district court’s determining the issue of general causation
for both cases before the parties proceeded with either the certification of the
class or the Addison trial. The first case management plan was therefore
entered in November 2019, and it set a trial on general causation for April
2021. This trial date got pushed back by COVID, Hurricane Ida, and seven
joint motions by the parties for extensions.
Because of the requested extensions, the evidentiary hearing on
general causation occurred in February 2022 (which now brings us back to
Petitioners’ version of the procedural history). At this hearing, which
occurred over nine days, “the district court heard live testimony from
thirteen witnesses, heard excerpts of the Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of
corporate representatives for Waste Connections and Jefferson Parish, and
admitted into evidence dozens of exhibits.” The parties submitted post-trial
briefs in April 2022, and in November 2022 “the district court entered its
46-page-long Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which it found
general causation had been satisfied in both cases.” That is, the court found
that Jefferson Parish Landfill had emitted noxious gases, that the landfill had
4
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No. 23-30243
done so during the relevant time period, and that these fumes were capable
of causing the complained-of injuries.
On April 12, 2023, the district court granted in part and denied in part
Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment against some of the Addison
plaintiffs. Then on April 17, and over some objection from Petitioners, the
district court adopted a new case management order drafted by the parties
that scheduled a September 2023 trial for several of the Addison plaintiffs. 3
This was to be a so-called “bellwether” trial, wherein counsel for both sides
select a small group of test plaintiffs to proceed to trial as a way of gathering
information about what the outcome of the mass action as a whole might be.
In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997). 4 Under the
adopted case management order, the parties were to meet and confer after
the close of discovery in the Addison trial (July 2023) to discuss class
certification and any related discovery in Ictech-Bendeck.
Petitioners were dissatisfied with that case management order. They
filed this mandamus action on April 17, the same day that the district court
adopted the management order. Subsequently, on April 26, the district court
adopted yet another case management order (the ninth one in total),
requiring the parties to meet and confer about class certification earlier, in
May 2023, “so the parties might simultaneously proceed with discovery
_____________________
3
Petitioners had filed a motion in January 2023 to adopt an alternative case
management order and filed a motion for “reverse bifurcation” in February 2023. The
district court denied both motions.
4
“The term bellwether is derived from the ancient practice of belling a wether (a
male sheep) selected to lead his flock. The ultimate success of the wether selected to wear
the bell was determined by whether the flock had confidence that the wether would not lead
them astray, and so it is in the mass tort context.” In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016,
1019 (5th Cir. 1997).
5
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No. 23-30243
related to the first Addison trial while also conducting discovery related to
class certification in Ictech-Bendeck.”
On June 8, 2023, this court stayed all proceedings in the Addison case
pending further order. We then expedited the case for oral argument, which
we heard in July. Following oral argument, we clarified that the stay shall not
affect the Ictech-Bendeck proceedings.
II. Mandamus Standard
The All Writs Act provides this court with the power to issue a writ of
mandamus directed to a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. However, this “is
a ‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary
cases.’” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380
(2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947)). To merit
relief, Petitioners must demonstrate “that there has been a ‘usurpation of
judicial power’ or a ‘clear abuse of discretion.’” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
545 F.3d 304, 311 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted).
We use a three-pronged test to analyze that standard. Petitioners
must show: (1) that there is a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ; (2)
that there are “no other adequate means to attain the relief” requested; and
(3) that the appellate court’s exercise of discretion to issue the writ would be
“appropriate under the circumstances.” In re Itron, Inc., 883 F.3d 553, 567
(5th Cir. 2018) (numbering reordered) (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81).
III. Merits of the Petition
Mandamus petitioners must satisfy all three conditions to obtain
issuance of the writ (clear and indisputable right, no other remedies, and
appropriate exercise of discretion). Petitioners in this case cannot satisfy
even one of them. We address each requirement in the sections below.
6
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No. 23-30243
A. Indisputable Right to the Writ
“The ‘right to the issuance of the writ is necessarily clear and
indisputable’ if ‘the district court clearly abused its discretion.’” In re Itron,
883 F.3d at 568 (quoting In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 311). And it is an abuse
of discretion if a district court “makes an error of law or applies an incorrect
legal standard.” Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir.
2011). So this first mandamus-test prong is about the legal merits of a
petitioner’s claim. But because the standard is a clear abuse of discretion, the
merits of the claim must also be clear: “the writ will not issue to correct a
duty that is to any degree debatable.” United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143,
1147 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
1. Clear Abuse of Discretion
Petitioners claim that it is clearly established that Rule 23 requires a
district court to rule on class certification in a putative class action before
reaching the merits in any related—but unconsolidated—cases. And yet,
Petitioners cannot identify even a single case with this holding. Without any
controlling authority in support of it, their theory about Rule 23’s scope is
not clearly established, and their request for the writ fails at this threshold
stage.5
Petitioners spend the bulk of their argument successfully defending
the uncontroversial claim that a purported class action generally cannot itself
_____________________
5
Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). In Pearson, the Supreme Court held
that courts may rule on claims to qualified immunity by determining only that a right is not
clearly established, without also reaching whether there is such a right. Id. at 237. One
virtue identified by the Court of this approach is that “[t]here are cases in which it is plain
that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact
there is such a right.” Id. Here, it is clear that Petitioners’ claimed interpretation of Rule
23 is not well settled, regardless of whether or not it is correct upon closer examination.
7
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No. 23-30243
go to trial if its class-certification hearing is still pending. But the crux of
Petitioners’ mandamus petition relies on the very different proposition that
this “bar on trial before certification fully applies to closely related individual
actions.” To attempt to support this claim, Petitioners string cite to four
cases, none of which has the same procedural posture or factual background
as the instant case. See In re Citizens Bank, N.A., 15 F.4th 607 (3d Cir. 2001);
In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990); Byerson v. Equifax Info.
Servs., LLC, No. 07-CV-00005, 2009 WL 82497, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2009);
In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., No. 18-MD-2836, 2021 WL 9870367,
at *5 (E.D. Va. May 7, 2021)). Petitioners’ citations to those cases fail to
establish their theory beyond debate. 6
The first two cases—In re Citizens Bank and In re Fibreboard Corp.—
do not even involve separate class and non-class actions. It is therefore
difficult to see at first glance how those cases could support the proposition
that Rule 23 reaches beyond class actions and into the management of other,
unconsolidated non-class actions. However, we examine each case in more
detail below.
In re Citizens Bank did not involve two separate cases. Instead, the
named plaintiffs in a putative class action also filed non-class claims in the
same complaint. 15 F.4th at 610. Because of the unitary nature of the lawsuit,
the Third Circuit held that the class representatives should not be able to try
their tightly related non-class claims before certifying their class claims. 7 Id.
_____________________
6
By way of further analogy to the qualified-immunity context, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly stated that a right’s being clearly established may “not require a case directly
on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
7
It is worth mentioning, though, that the Third Circuit did not grant a petition for
writ of mandamus on the relevant merits portion. The posture of the case at the time was
8
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Petitioners say that In re Citizens Banks cannot be distinguished on the
“non-substantive ground that the different claims were ‘brought in one
complaint.’” That is incorrect. The distinction is not just substantive, it is
the entire ball game. Petitioners are trying to show that Rule 23 reaches
beyond a putative class plaintiff’s complaint and into actions brought by other
individuals who have no interest in joining the class plaintiff’s action.
Because In re Citizens Bank does not involve such a posture, it cannot clearly
establish that legal theory.
In re Fibreboard Corp. also did not involve two separate cases. In that
case, the district court consolidated 3,031 asbestos cases for common trial in
one class action. 893 F.2d at 707. This court then granted a writ of
mandamus to vacate parts of the consolidation as improper. Id. at 711–12.
Rather than seeking to stop individual trials from happening independently
of the class action (like Petitioners here seek), the petitioner-defendants in In
re Fibreboard Corp. wanted to disaggregate the class action and have more trials.
Id. at 709 (“Defendants insist that one-to-one adversarial engagement or its
proximate, the traditional trial, is secured by the seventh amendment . . . .”).
Furthermore, we allowed individual representatives to proceed to trial even
though a class was not certified. Id. at 712 (“We find no impediment to the
trial of Phase I should the district court wish to proceed with that trial.”). In
re Fibreboard Corp. therefore does not stand for the proposition that Rule 23
has the universal reach that Petitioners assert it does.
The second pair of cases that Petitioners cite—Byerson v. Equifax
Information Services, LLC, and In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litigation—
_____________________
a motion for stay pending resolution of a mandamus petition. Given this special procedural
circumstance, the court could “grant a stay even if the ultimate likelihood of granting the
mandamus petition is below 50 percent.” In re Citizens Bank, N.A., 15 F.4th 607, 616 (3d
Cir. 2021).
9
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are unpublished district court decisions from outside this circuit. Byerson,
2009 WL 82497; In re Zetia, 2021 WL 9870367. Even putting aside the fact
that this makes them unable to clearly establish our caselaw in the Fifth
Circuit, we discuss them to explain why their distinct factual circumstances
do not control this case.
In Byerson v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, an individual action
sat on the docket for years because the lawyers wanted to see what happened
in a distinct but related class action. Byerson, 2009 WL 82497, at *2. The
district court dismissed the individual action, not because a related class
needed to be certified, but because of failure to prosecute. Id. And in fact,
the court seemed to endorse the kind of suit occurring in this case, where
individuals decide to forgo the benefit of being a part of a class action so that
they can risk litigating on their own. Id. (“Plaintiffs must either be a part of
the class, or litigate on their own without the benefit of collateral estoppel.
They have done neither.”).
In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litigation is the closest to helping
Petitioners. But it is still not on point. In that case, several related class
actions and an individual action had nearly identical summary-judgment
motions pending at the same time. In re Zetia, 2021 WL 9870367, at *6. The
district court delayed ruling on the individual action’s motion for summary
judgment until one of the other classes finished its certification process. Id.
However, the reasoning was rooted in the pendency of nearly identical
dispositive motions. The district court acknowledged the individual action’s
argument that “[t]he rule against one-way intervention is not implicated
whenever an absent class member might learn something about the strength
or weakness of the class case based on a related case.” Id. (alteration in
original). But the court held that “this is not an instance where the absent
class members might learn ‘something.’ Rather it is an instance where absent
class members would learn the court’s exact ruling on identical dispositive
10
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motions.” Id. That is not the circumstance here. The class and non-class
actions are not waiting on identical rulings at the same time.
* * *
The most that Petitioners’ four authorities can show is an arguable
case for extending the rule against pre-certification trials within class actions
to also apply to related actions. Petitioners have not shown that preventing
such trials in related cases is a judicial duty established beyond debate. This
lack of clarity in the caselaw would persist even if all the above cases were
binding on this court. But the point is made even stronger by the fact that
Petitioners’ only cases involving separate class and non-class actions are
district court decisions from outside this circuit. Those cases are not
authoritative in this court, so they could not have clearly established the legal
argument that Petitioners now make before us.
2. Any Abuse of Discretion
As just explained, we could deny Petitioners’ request for the writ on
the threshold ground that they have not shown a clear abuse of discretion.
But we need not stop there. Petitioners have also failed to show any abuse of
discretion. Their argument for extending Rule 23 to reach all lawsuits that
might relate to a putative class action is mistaken. It is premised on the
existence of two harms, neither of which apply here: (a) one-way
intervention, and (b) collateral estoppel.
a. One-Way Intervention
The primary harm that Petitioners point to is what the Supreme Court
has called “one-way intervention.” Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
538, 547 (1974)). That harm is, by definition, not applicable to a case in this
posture. To see why, it is important to specify what exactly “one-way
11
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intervention” is and when it can occur. The Supreme Court provided a
useful history of the topic in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.
Before Rule 23 was substantially amended in 1966, it “contained no
mechanism for determining at any point in advance of final judgment which
of those potential members of the class claimed in the complaint were actual
members and would be bound by the judgment.” Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 545–
46. Taken to its maximal limit, this feature allowed a potential class member
to sit on the sidelines during the pendency of the suit and then decide to join
the class only after the plaintiffs in the suit were victorious. If the class
plaintiffs lost, however, then the spectators would not opt in to being bound
by the unfavorable judgment. They would simply bring their own individual
suits instead. Id. at 547. When Rule 23 was amended in 1966, however, it
“closed the ‘one-way intervention’ loophole . . . and made clear that class
action judgments were binding on all class members.” Robert H. Klonoff,
Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell 29 (6th ed. 2021);
see also 7AA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1789 (3d ed. 2023).
The unique part of one-way intervention is its “heads I win, tails you
lose” nature. Sideline plaintiffs can swoop in to benefit from a class
representative’s hard-won victory without having to share in that
representative’s possible defeat. The Third Circuit raised this concern in In
re Citizens Bank when considering whether to allow the class representatives
in a class action to try their own related, non-class claims before certifying
their class claims. 15 F.4th at 616–17. Raising the one-way intervention
concern in that context makes sense, because when the plaintiffs of the class
and non-class claims are the same, there is still a possibility of intervention
from the sidelines. A spectator plaintiff can observe the class
representatives’ success in their individual action and then use that
information when determining whether or not to opt out of the class
12
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representatives’ later-certified class claims. In doing so, the spectator’s
intervention allows him or her to benefit from the judgment when the class
representative wins in the class portion of the lawsuit.
The ability to become bound by the judgment is what makes the
procedural differences between In re Citizens Bank and this case crucial.
Petitioners’ citation to In re Citizens Bank does not merely fail to clearly
establish their theory. It reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of what
one-way intervention is. In one-way intervention, a sideline spectator must
be able to hitch his or her proverbial wagon onto the case that is going well.
Merely “learn[ing] something about the strength or weakness of the class
case based on a related case” is not one-way intervention because there is no
possibility of intervention into the binding nature of the judgment. In re Zetia,
2021 WL 9870367, at *6.
That difference is not merely semantic: it is what allows sideline
plaintiffs to accept benefits without also accepting losses. When the only
thing at stake from watching the individual action is gaining more information
about the likelihood of success on the merits in the class action, then the
sideline plaintiffs take the losses as much as they take the gains. If the
individual plaintiffs win, then the potential class members might learn more
about the strength of their case, and their settlement position could
strengthen. But importantly, if the individual plaintiffs lose, then the
potential class members observing the proceedings—as well as the
defendant—learn more about the weaknesses of the claim, so the class’s
settlement position likely weakens.
The gamified nature of one-way intervention can be clarified by
analogizing to other competitive contexts. Take baseball, for example. One-
way intervention would be a problem if a free-agent baseball player could sit
on the sidelines during the middle of the playoffs while watching the Astros
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and Rangers play a game, then decide which team to sign onto only after that
team has won. The free agent player (sideline plaintiff) gets to benefit from
the very win (judgment) that he got to watch without having to put any skin
in the game. That is not what is occurring here. No plaintiffs can jump onto
either the Addison or Ictech-Bendeck suits after their judgments have issued.
To continue the analogy: Addison and Ictech-Bendeck are separate
teams. But they share something in common: they both have left-handed
pitchers. Ictech-Bendeck can learn something by watching Addison’s left-
handed pitcher play against Petitioners, just as baseball teams can scout other
games. But Ictech-Bendeck isn’t the only “team” gathering information.
Petitioners are learning too. If Petitioners lose against Addison, they may
switch up their game strategy when playing Ictech-Bendeck to ward off any
weaknesses that they have against left-handed pitchers. And if Petitioners
win against Addison, then they will know what tactics to keep using when they
play Ictech-Bendeck. Addison cannot lose and then join Ictech-Bendeck’s team
to get a rematch. They already took their shot and are knocked out of the
tournament (i.e., they are claim precluded from suing twice). Thus, the pros
and cons of the additional information flow to all parties equally.
Petitioners do not explain why, if the Addison plaintiffs lose, putative
class members would be “more likely to opt-out and bring individual serial
actions in search of a more favorable (but presumptively inaccurate result).”
If putative class members saw that the merits of their case were bad, why
would they be more inclined to go through the time and expense of filing their
own suits? In the case of one-way intervention, putative class members must
opt out of the class-action loss so that their claims do not become precluded,
which would cause them to lose the ability to bring suit at all.
Here, a putative class member has no risk of having his or her rights
extinguished by a related, non-class lawsuit where the plaintiffs lose. The
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putative class member still has to decide whether to vindicate his or her cause
of action as part of a class or as an individual. Watching another plaintiff lose
would not seem to suggest that a future lawsuit would be any more or less
successful whether brought as part of a class action or as an individual action.8
Because the posture of the instant case categorically removes the risk
of one-way intervention, the district court did not abuse its wide case-
management discretion in authorizing the preliminary Addison trial to
commence before the Ictech-Bendeck class certification process concludes.
b. Issue Preclusion
The second (and related) harm that Petitioners identify is issue
preclusion. Petitioners assert that any judgment entered against them in the
Addison trial might be used against them in the class action through offensive
non-mutual collateral estoppel. 9 This is mistaken. Louisiana law—which is
what a federal court sitting in diversity would apply in conducting its issue-
preclusion analysis—does not recognize non-mutual collateral estoppel.
The preclusive effect of judgments issued by federal courts is
determined by federal common law. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
_____________________
8
And in fact, Petitioners may even get the incentives exactly backwards. One
reason that people choose not to opt out of class actions is that if they bring their own suits,
they take on more risk. A plaintiff on his or her own must front the lawsuit’s cost but will
only possibly obtain relief. If he or she instead rides along in a class action, then his or her
downside risk is mitigated by not having to front the cost. If that person was, instead,
certain of the merits of his or her claim, then it would be less risky for such a person to bring
his or her own suit and swing for a higher recovery than what he or she might receive as a
mere class member.
9 “Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose
the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully
in an action with another party.” Bradberry v. Jefferson County, 732 F.3d 540, 548–49 (5th
Cir. 2013) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
326 n.4 (1979)).
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Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (Scalia, J.); see also Reimer v. Smith, 663 F.2d
1316, 1325 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) (“When a federal court sitting in diversity is
considering the collateral estoppel effect of a prior federal judgment, this
circuit applies federal common law.”). And “[a]s a matter of federal
common law, federal courts sitting in diversity apply the preclusion law of
the forum state unless it is incompatible with federal interests.” Anderson v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 953 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2020). In this case, that
means Louisiana issue preclusion law will control. See Dotson v. Atl. Specialty
Ins. Co., 24 F.4th 999, 1002 (5th Cir. 2022).
This offshoot of Erie’s legacy matters because Petitioner’s collateral-
estoppel fears are based on the common law of preclusion used by federal
courts exercising federal-question jurisdiction. 10 In that species of federal
common law, there is no requirement of strict mutuality for issue preclusion
to apply. If a defendant loses an issue in a suit where the issue was actually
litigated and necessary to the decision, then a different plaintiff can sue the
defendant, identify the defendant’s prior loss, and then preclude the
defendant from relitigating the issue. See Bradberry v. Jefferson County, 732
F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir. 2013). This is because the Supreme Court has
determined that “the preferable approach . . . is not to preclude the use of
offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to
_____________________
10
The legal authority that Petitioners cite for this proposition on page 8 of the
Petition is dicta from the district court’s order denying Petitioners’ motion to bifurcate.
That would, of course, not bind this court in a future appeal. The only Fifth Circuit
precedent that Petitioner cites in support of the argument that Parklane’s test would
apply—rather than Louisiana law—is Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334
(5th Cir. 1982). That case predates and is in conflict with Semtek International Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), as is seemingly recognized by recent Fifth
Circuit cases’ adoption of the Semtek rule instead of the Parklane test. E.g., Anderson v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 953 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2020).
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determine when it should be applied.” Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331
(emphasizing fairness to the defendant).
The same is not true in Louisiana. Until 1991, Louisiana did not
recognize any form of collateral estoppel at all. Welch v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 359 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. 1978) (“Collateral estoppel is a doctrine of
issue preclusion alien to Louisiana law.”). The state then codified a narrow
form of collateral estoppel that requires strict mutuality of identities between
the parties in the first and second actions:
A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is
conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with
respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its
determination was essential to that judgment.
La. Rev. Stat. 13:4231(3) (1991) (emphasis added).
As the emphasized portion of the quoted code suggests, Louisiana law
requires that “the parties must be identical.” Cook v. Marshall, --- F. Supp.
3d ---, 2022 WL 17555514, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 2022). “Absent an identity
of the parties in the first and subsequent actions, the exception of res
judicata will not be maintained.” Alpine Meadows, L.C. v. Winkler, 154 So. 3d
747, 757 (La. Ct. App. 2014). While this does not mean that the parties must
be physically identical, they must at least be in privity with each other. Under
Louisiana law, “a privy is defined as ‘one who, after the commencement of
an action, has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the
judgment through or under one of the parties, as by inheritance, succession,
purchase or assignment.’” Id. at 757–58 (quoting Five N. Co. v. Stewart, 850
So. 2d 51, 61 (La. Ct. App. 2003)). “It is not sufficient to merely show that
the party and the nonparty have common or parallel interests in the factual
and legal issues presented in the respective actions.” Slaughter v. Atkins, 305
F. Supp. 3d 697, 709 (M.D. La. 2018).
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The other requirements for collateral estoppel are the same as those
used in federal-question cases: “(1) the issue to be precluded must be
identical to that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue must have been
actually litigated; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior action
must have been necessary to the resulting judgment.” Sevin v. Parish of
Jefferson, 632 F. Supp. 2d 586, 594–95 (E.D. La. 2008) (renumbered)
(quoting In re Keaty, 397 F.3d 264, 270–71 (5th Cir. 2005)).
In this case, the Addison trial would be in the Eastern District of
Louisiana. The class action is also in the Eastern District of Louisiana, and
the asserted basis of jurisdiction for both cases is diversity. If a member of
the class action suit attempted to wield issue preclusion based on anything
that occurred in the Addison trial, then Louisiana law would apply. Mutuality
between the plaintiffs in the first and second actions would not be satisfied
because the second-suit plaintiffs would not have acquired an interest in the
subject matter from one of the first-suit plaintiffs “by inheritance,
succession, purchase or assignment.” Alpine Meadows, 154 So. 3d at 758.
Thus, there would be no collateral estoppel.
And even putting Louisiana law aside, issue preclusion would not be
allowed under federal law. Parklane Hosiery’s fairness-focused test for non-
mutual collateral estoppel announces that:
The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could
easily have joined in the earlier action or where, either for the
reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the application of
offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge
should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331. And we have previously taken particular note of
the fact that the results of test plaintiffs in a bellwether trial are to be used for
informational purposes only, not for issue preclusion. See In re Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1997) (denying mandamus with
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regard to blocking the bellwether plaintiffs’ test trial, but granting mandamus
“insofar as it relates to utilization of the results obtained from the trial of the
thirty (30) selected cases for any purpose affecting issues or claims of, or
defenses to, the remaining untried cases”). Our circuit’s caselaw would not
allow plaintiffs to use any results in the preliminary Addison trial to preclude
the defendants from litigating any issues in subsequent cases.
Finally, even if Louisiana or federal law could possibly allow issue
preclusion to be used in this case, the Ictech-Bendeck plaintiffs told this court
during oral argument that they will not seek to use collateral estoppel
offensively. Oral Arg. Transcript at 23:55–24:02. Any such attempt for them
to do so in contravention of that representation would be judicially estopped.
* * *
The alleged harms of one-way intervention and collateral estoppel are
not presented by the procedural posture of this dispute. Petitioners’ theory
about Rule 23 is therefore not just lacking clear establishment in the caselaw;
it is also wrong on the merits. Petitioners fail to satisfy clear entitlement to a
writ of mandamus, which is a necessary requirement for our issuing the writ.
However, we proceed and briefly analyze the remaining two prongs as well.
B. Lack of Other Remedies
Prong two of the mandamus analysis—that there must be no other
adequate means to obtain the relief desired—is “a condition designed to
ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals
process.” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 311 (5th Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367,
380–81 (2004)). If the issue presented in the mandamus petition is
“effectively reviewable after trial,” then the writ should not issue. In re
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones, J., specially
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concurring). This makes prong two similar to an irreparable-injury analysis.
See In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 319 (holding this prong to be satisfied when
“the harm . . . will already have been done by the time the case is tried and
appealed, and the prejudice suffered cannot be put back in the bottle”).
Petitioners are correct that they are unable to appeal the district
court’s case management order because “that order is not a final decision
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” In re Citizens Bank, 15 F.4th at 621. But they have
not explained why they could not seek effective relief on appeal if the Addison
plaintiffs were to win in their trial. Petitioners say that “a reversal on final
appeal cannot restore witness memories or lost evidence from the passage of
time.” But that is not a risk created by the district court’s case management
order in this dispute. That is inherent to all appeals.
If the harm allegedly caused here is that a judgment for the Addison
plaintiffs allows for one-way intervention into their victory, then a denial of
such joinder or a review of the judgment as to those who attempted to join
the case would provide relief. And if the harm is that a future ruling in the
class action on collateral estoppel grounds would erroneously allow offensive
use of issue preclusion from the Addison trial, then any judgment flowing
from such a ruling could be appealed. 11 Mandamus is not a mechanism for
addressing hypothetical erroneous rulings in future cases.
The Supreme Court has warned that appellate courts reviewing
mandamus petitions “must be careful lest they suffer themselves to be misled
by labels such as ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘want of power’ into interlocutory
review of nonappealable orders on the mere ground that they may be
_____________________
11
And, to reiterate, the existence of this harm turns on the merits of Petitioners’
one-way intervention and collateral estoppel arguments. If a case in this posture is
categorically exempt from those harms, as we have explained, then an appeal in this case
would be no different than in any other dispute.
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erroneous.” Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n.6 (1967). For this
reason, we have specified that when a writ of mandamus issues as a form of
review over a non-appealable order, the risk of prejudice should be specific
to that order. For example, in In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., we granted
mandamus over an erroneous venue transfer order because the harm asserted
by the petitioners was the trial’s being carried out in the wrong location. 545
F.3d at 319. A risk of delay, however, is not caused by an order scheduling a
trial. Delay is a byproduct of all appeals. And if anything, the district court’s
setting of a trial in Addison helps avoid delay, unlike Petitioners’ request to
indefinitely postpone reaching the merits in either Addison or Ictech-Bendeck.
As discussed in the prior section on Petitioners’ asserted right to the
writ, it is not clear that either of the harms that Petitioners fear suffering is
likely (or even possible). However, if either the alleged one-way intervention
problem or an erroneous collateral estoppel ruling were to occur, Petitioners
have access to effective review on appeal.
C. Appropriate Exercise of Discretion
The third prong is “whether [the court], in the exercise of [its]
discretion, [is] ‘satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.’” 12 In re Itron, Inc., 883 F.3d 553, 567 (5th Cir. 2018)
_____________________
12
This inquiry may sound equitable, but mandamus is a remedy at law. Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584 (1943) (“The common law writs, like equitable remedies,
may be granted or withheld in the sound discretion of the Court . . . .”); see also James E.
Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72 Stan. L. Rev.
1269, 1304 n.205 (2020) (“This equitable-style inquiry into adequate alternative remedies
has led the Supreme Court to mislabel mandamus as an equitable remedy in the present
day.” (citing Great-W Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 215 (2002)).
However, the prerogative writs have fallen “into desuetude” and no longer qualify
“as adequate alternative remedies” in equitable analyses. Owen W. Gallogly, Equity’s
Constitutional Source, 132 Yale L.J. 1213, 1316 (2023) (“At the Founding, public-law
plaintiffs typically did have adequate avenues for redress outside of Chancery, namely the
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(alteration in original) (numbering reordered) (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at
380–81). We have said that our “traditional reluctance to meddle in the
formulation of a district court’s trial plan is tempered by the demands placed
upon judicial resources and the extraordinary expense to litigants that
typically accompanies mass tort litigation.” In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1018.
But this case is not like In re Chevron, and Petitioners’ own delays deflate
their arguments that the district court has abused its discretion by extending
the class certification timeline in Ictech-Bendeck.
The facts of this case are substantially different from those in In re
Chevron. And they do not give rise to the same reasons for discretionarily
providing extraordinary relief. As Judge Jones highlighted in her In re
Chevron special concurrence, the mass action in that case had 3,000
individual cases. “The number of cases in which there are 3,000 plaintiffs is,
even in these days of frenzied tort litigation, extremely rare.” In re Chevron,
109 F.3d at 1022 (Jones, J., specially concurring). The mass action in this
case, by contrast, has just over 500 plaintiffs—one sixth of the number in In
re Chevron. And the number of plaintiffs actually approved for the
preliminary Addison trial was a mere fraction of that. In Addison, each side
was to select its own, preferred three plaintiffs and one family group. The
district court in In re Chevron selected thirty cases to proceed as
representatives of the whole. In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1019. In re Chevron
was also “an ‘immature’ mass tort action, in which the defendant’s liability
ha[d] not even been tested, much yet firmly established.” 109 F.3d at 1022
_____________________
prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.”); see also Thomas Tapping,
The Law and Practice of the High Prerogative Writ of Mandamus, as It Obtains Both in England,
and in Ireland 22 (London, William Benning & Co. 1848) (“Where a legal right exists, it is
no answer to an application for a mandamus, to shew that there is also a remedy in equity;
for when the Court refuses to grant the writ, because there is another specific remedy, it
means a specific remedy at law.”).
22
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(Jones, J., specially concurring). Here, specific liability is still up in the air,
but the extensive trial on general causation in both the class and mass actions
makes this case much more “mature” in terms of factual development.
Here, the facts are not “so unique as to warrant mandamus,” as that
“remedy is only to be used sparingly and with the utmost care.” Id. at 1021.
And Petitioners’ own delays make them less-compelling recipients for
exceptional judicial treatment. Petitioners participated in and led much of
the pre-trial motions practice, which pushed back any opportunity for the
district court to rule on class certification. And Petitioners’ litigation strategy
led to the trial on general causation, which also delayed class certification.
Petitioners complain of a “five-year delay” between the filing of these cases
and now. But the district court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of
law from the general-causation trial in November 2022, just five months
before this petition was filed.
If Petitioners were actually interested in expediting the Ictech-Bendeck
action, then they would want this court to order the district court to have a
class-certification hearing as soon as possible. But at oral argument we asked
Petitioners’ counsel about their preferred timeline for concluding the class-
certification proceedings, and they seemed interested only in further delay.
When we asked if they wanted us to order the district court to hold a class
certification hearing within 60, 90, or 120 days, counsel responded that “it’s
not a calendar issue, it’s no trials on the merits before that class certification
decision is made.” Oral Argument Transcript at 39:35–39:43. We inquired
further about Petitioners’ seeming lack of interest in proceeding with haste
on class certification, so long as they could remain in pre-trial limbo in both
Ictech-Bendeck and Addison, and counsel suggested that “no more than six
months from today [July 12, 2023]” would be practicable. Oral Argument
Transcript at 39:357–40:00. Yet Petitioners did not request that we issue
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relief to expedite the class-certification hearing’s occurring by any particular
date.
Such a timeline—after there has been multiple years’ worth of
discovery—is not the kind of emergency intervention that mandamus is
saved for. Petitioners were at least acquiescent in, and very likely the drivers
of, the delays in certification. But that is not to say that we approve of
litigation tactics that drag out class action proceedings. The fact that
plaintiffs choose to join as a putative class rather than sue individually should
not unreasonably extend the timeline for resolving the matter, even if
statistically it might do so. Some defendants would like for there to be a
requirement that “significant (or even complete) merits discovery must
occur before class certification,” but “delaying certification until late in the
case is contrary to the sequencing set forth in Rule 23.” Robert H. Klonoff,
The Decline of Class Actions, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 729, 756 (2013). With this
in mind, we are confident that the able district court will proceed
expeditiously with the certification hearing.
This court is not eager to allow the use of the mandamus process for
parties to escape from the litigation positions that they have put themselves
in. As the district court wrote in its invited brief to us, “While Petitioners
imply the district court has wrongfully delayed the class certification hearing
to such an extent that a writ of mandamus is the only appropriate relief, the
delay in determining class certification has been the result of the parties’
actions, not the district court’s.” 13
_____________________
13
Or, as the Ictech-Bendeck plaintiffs put it in their brief opposing the petition for
writ of mandamus, “Petitioners now complain about the position in which they find
themselves. However, Petitioners need only look in the mirror to find the cause of their
current woes.”
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No. 23-30243
* * *
Petitioners cannot satisfy any of the three required prongs of our test
for mandamus relief. First, Petitioners’ novel legal theory—that Rule 23
applies to related actions when a class action exists—fails to demonstrate that
Petitioners have a clear right to relief. And the harms that Petitioners
allege—one-way intervention and collateral estoppel—do not apply to a case
in this posture. Second, Petitioners have failed to show why those harms, if
they exist, could not be corrected on appeal. Third, Petitioners have not
demonstrated that this case is so unique that we, in our discretion, should
issue this extraordinary relief. The petition is DENIED.
25