Eric K. Brooks v. D Miller

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10590

____________________

ERIC K. BROOKS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

D MILLER,

Officer,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States district court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00524-MW-MAF

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

____________________

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:

Everyone’s heard the saying that “the camera doesn’t lie.”

That notion lies at the heart of Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).

Usually, on a motion for summary judgment, we view the evi-

dence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—mean-

ing we accept the nonmoving party’s version of events if the parties

disagree about what happened. But in Scott, a video told “quite a

different story” than the plaintiff there. And the Supreme Court

held that “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the

facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judg-

ment.” Id. at 380. In other words, Scott stands for the com-

monsense proposition that when a video proves that the plaintiff

can’t be telling the truth, we don’t accept the facts as he alleges

them, even for purposes of deciding a summary-judgment motion.

But Scott’s rule has its limits. Most obviously, it applies only

when the video actually proves that the plaintiff’s version of the

facts cannot be true. When the action happens off camera and the

audio doesn’t clearly contradict the plaintiff’s story, Scott’s rule be-

comes irrelevant. Under those circumstances, we default to the

usual rule: we accept the nonmoving party’s version of the facts in

determining whether to enter summary judgment.

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 3

This appeal from an order granting summary judgment re-

quires us to apply both the default rule and Scott’s rule in evaluat-

ing the evidence supporting Plaintiff-Appellant Eric K. Brooks’s

various claims. Brooks alleges that Defendant-Appellee Officer Da-

mon Miller falsely arrested him, used excessive force in doing that,

and then was deliberately indifferent to Brooks’s alleged medical

needs.

The dash-cam recording from Brooks’s interaction with Of-

ficer Miller proves definitively that Miller did not falsely arrest

Brooks. And though the dash-cam recording does not resolve

Brooks’s deliberate-indifference claim, Brooks hasn’t shown that

any violation Officer Miller may have committed was clearly estab-

lished. So Officer Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on that

claim as well. As for Brooks’s excessive-force claim, the recording

did not capture Officer Miller’s physical arrest of Brooks, so we

must rely on the default summary-judgment rule and assume the

truth of Brooks’s attestations that Miller used excessive force in ar-

resting him. And when we do that, we must conclude that

Brooks’s excessive-force claim survives summary judgment.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s entry of sum-

mary judgment in part and reverse in part. And we remand this

matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

As we’ve mentioned, the record contains different versions

of the facts. To keep track of them, we set them out separately

below.

1. Brooks’s Version

Brooks filed a verified complaint, so we treat his allegations

as his testimony. Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir.

2019).

According to Brooks, on November 12, 2016, he was stand-

ing around with other people, when Officer Miller arrived on the

scene. Officer Miller stepped out of his car and “demand[ed] to talk

to whomever it was that drove the black Kia” located nearby.

When Brooks started to walk away, Officer Miller stopped

him and asked for Brooks’s identification. But Brooks said he had

“nothing to talk to [Officer Miller] about and he did not know who

was driving” the Kia.

Officer Miller responded by grabbing Brooks by the shirt and

“slam[ming] him into [Miller’s] patrol vehicle.” Then Officer Mil-

ler “handcuffed [Brooks] so tight that sharp pain shot through

[Brooks’s] arms” and Brooks lost “all circu[]lation in his [w]ris[t]

and arms.”

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 5

With Brooks handcuffed, Officer Miller searched him and

found drugs in Brooks’s right pocket. So Officer Miller arrested

Brooks.

Brooks complained to Officer Miller that “the handcuffs

were to[o] tight and that he could not feel his hands.” He also asked

Officer Miller for medical attention “because he thought his

[wrists] were broke[n] or damaged.” Instead of taking Brooks for

medical care, though, Officer Miller drove him to the Leon County

Jail.

When Brooks arrived at the Jail, he again complained of

pain. But the nurse at the Jail prescribed only Tylenol and ibu-

profen.

Brooks filed grievances about these events.

In his complaint, Brooks did not allege that his wrists were,

in fact, broken or damaged. Nor did he assert that he suffered any

ongoing, extended, or permanent damage from the handcuffs.

2. Officer Miller’s Version

Officer Miller filed a probable-cause affidavit in support of

his arrest of Brooks. In it, (as relevant here) he said that he saw

Brooks driving a black Kia, which Brooks parked at the scene of the

incident. After Brooks pulled in, he got out of the car and walked

towards others who were gathered in the area.

Officer Miller then parked in the area, left his patrol car, and

asked Brooks for his driver’s license. Brooks answered that he

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

didn’t have a valid license. So Officer Miller arrested him for oper-

ating a motor vehicle without a valid license.

In connection with the arrest, Officer Miller searched

Brooks. In Brooks’s left front jacket pocket, Officer Miller found

crack cocaine. Immediately, Brooks said he didn’t know that the

crack was in his pocket.

Officer Miller took Brooks to the Leon County Jail “without

incident,” and Brooks was also charged with possession of cocaine.

3. The Video

As it turns out, Brooks and Officer Miller weren’t the only

witnesses to Brooks’s arrest and transport to the Jail. Officer Mil-

ler’s patrol vehicle was equipped with a dash cam that recorded at

least part of the events.

The video shows another officer’s patrol vehicle following a

black Kia as the Kia turns into a dead-end street and parks. The

Kia’s door opens, and a man wearing a black and grey hoodie exits

the car through the driver’s door. The parties agree that that man

is Brooks, though Brooks disputes he was driving the Kia. No one

else leaves the car or appears to remain in it.

Brooks then walks out of view of the camera, and Officer

Miller gets out of his patrol car and follows in the same direction.

While both men remain outside the camera’s view, Officer Miller

begins to make casual conversation with what sounds like a group

of people. He asks one of these individuals (who the parties agree

is Brooks) whether he has a driver’s license with him. Brooks

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 7

audibly responds that he does not. So Officer Miller asks whether

Brooks has a driver’s license at all. Although we can’t distinctly

hear Brooks’s response, Officer Miller asks Brooks a couple times,

“Why you ain’t got a driver’s license?” Again, to the extent that

Brooks answers, we can’t really hear what he says.

Officer Miller then instructs Brooks to put his hands behind

his back and tells Brooks, “Just relax.” We hear a very brief bit of

what sounds like friction on Officer Miller’s body microphone, and

Officer Miller places Brooks under arrest for driving without a

driver’s license.

Officer Miller notices crack and a pipe on the ground and

asks Brooks whether he dropped them. Brooks denies knowing

anything about them.

Then Officer Miller and Brooks, walking side by side with a

few inches between them, reenter the dash cam’s view. Although

Brooks is handcuffed behind his back when he reenters the dash

cam’s view, he does not appear to be uncomfortable or hurt in any

way, and at this point, Officer Miller is not touching him. Officer

Miller directs Brooks to stand in front of Miller’s car and asks

Brooks whether he has anything in his pockets that Miller should

know about. Brooks responds that there’s nothing that will hurt

Officer Miller, and Miller calmly reaches into each of Brooks’s

pockets. In Brooks’s left front hoodie pocket, Officer Miller finds

crack cocaine. Brooks takes a look and says, “It damn sure is!” But

he insists that he “didn’t even know that was in there.”

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

At this point, Officer Miller tells Brooks he’s under arrest for

driving without a driver’s license and for possession of cocaine.

When Officer Miller reads Brooks his rights, Brooks indicates that

he understands. Throughout the entirety of the encounter that un-

folds before the dash cam, both men calmly interact with each

other.

Officer Miller, another officer, and Brooks then walk in front

of the patrol car and out of the dash cam’s view once again. Shortly

after that, we hear what sounds like a car door opening and Officer

Miller and Brooks talking. About a minute later, the video screen

goes black but we still hear audio. Officer Miller says he’s going to

take the handcuffs off so Brooks can take his jacket off, and he in-

structs Brooks to “please [not] try anything.” The two talk some

more, and Officer Miller directs Brooks to put his hands “straight

up in the air” and “pull it off,” presumably referring to Brooks’s

hoodie. Of course, these are things Brooks could not have done if

he remained handcuffed at that time.

Then Officer Miller tells Brooks he is going to put the cuffs

back on and says, “You’ve been straight-forward with us so far.”

He explains, “When you sit in the car—a little trick—put your

hands facing that door over there, so that way your hands don’t go

numb. And try not to change it at all ‘cause if you change it, that’s

gonna change up the way it’s gonna feel.” With that, Officer Miller

directs Brooks to “have a seat,” and we hear what sounds like a car

door closing.

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Next, we hear Officer Miller speaking with others outside

the car and on the scene.

After this, Officer Miller returns to his patrol car and asks

Brooks whether he dropped the pipe the officers found. Brooks

denies having done so. Officer Miller goes back and speaks to oth-

ers again. Then Brooks yells, “Hey, Sir!” And Officer Miller seem-

ingly returns to Brooks. Once Officer Miller responds, Brooks

pleads with him not to take him to jail. Officer Miller explains that

he has no leeway because the crack offense is a felony.

After this occurs, and about sixteen minutes after the picture

on the dash-cam video goes black, the video feed comes into view

for about fifteen seconds, before blacking out again. At this time,

Officer Miller’s car is still parked at the scene. Soon after that, we

hear Officer Miller on his police radio. Then Officer Miller speaks

to Brooks again, explaining further that, under the governing pro-

cess, he can’t let Brooks go without taking him to the jail. At this

point, we begin to hear what sound like driving-related noises (cars

going by, possible wind sounds, and the metronome-like beating of

what sounds like a car signal).

After a period of silence, Officer Miller and Brooks discuss

Brooks’s biographical information. Officer Miller then comments

on traffic.

Officer Miller asks Brooks whether they’ve met before, and

Miller and Brooks discuss that Miller has previously arrested

Brooks for hitting Brooks’s mother and possessing drugs.

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

As the drive continues, Officer Miller asks Brooks whether

there’s too much wind for him. It sounds like Brooks says no.

Other than the wind and some additional announcements from Of-

ficer Miller’s police radio, the recording is quiet for a few minutes.

And for a fraction of a second here and there (and about two sec-

onds at one point), the video picture returns in whole or in part.

Several more minutes pass, and Officer Miller again asks

Brooks about the crack cocaine in his pocket. Although we hear

Brooks’s voice, we can’t discern what he says. During this period,

it sounds as though the car has stopped.

A few minutes later, Officer Miller asks Brooks to confirm

some of his biographical information, and Brooks does. Soon after

that, we hear the sounds of a car door opening and closing. Officer

Miller instructs Brooks to step out and walk to a door, and the

video picture returns long enough for us to catch a glimpse of what

appears to be the Leon County Jail. The picture blacks out again,

and a few seconds later, the recording ends.

About twenty-five minutes go by between the earliest point

when Officer Miller could have been driving and the time that Mil-

ler directs Brooks to get out of the police cruiser.

At no point in the recording do we hear Brooks make sounds

of pain or distress. Nor do we hear him ever complain about pain

or physical distress or even hear him mention his handcuffs. In fact,

all interactions that we can hear throughout the 51-minute record-

ing sound calm and low-key.

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B. Procedural Background

As we’ve mentioned, Brooks was charged with possession

of cocaine and driving without a valid driver’s license. But the

Leon County State Attorney’s Office eventually dismissed those

charges in exchange for Brooks’s guilty plea in an unrelated case.

Almost two years later, Brooks, proceeding pro se, sued Of-

ficer Miller under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brooks asserted claims for false

arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; excessive force, in

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and deliber-

ate indifference to medical needs, in violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments.

In a nutshell, Brooks alleged in his false-arrest claim that

without probable cause, Officer Miller arrested him for driving

without a license and for possession of drugs, and that Miller un-

lawfully searched Brooks in the process. He made a tagalong claim

that Officer Miller’s search of Brooks’s pockets at the time of

Brooks’s arrest also violated Brooks’s Fourth Amendment rights.

As for his excessive-force claim, Brooks contended that Officer Mil-

ler “slammed [Brooks] against his patrol vehicle [in arresting him]

and hand cuff[ed] [Brooks] so tight that both hands, [wrist] and

arms resulted in los[s] of circu[]lation and excruciating pain when

there were no need for any violence.” And finally, in his deliberate-

indifference claim, which he referred to as a denial-of-medical-care

claim, Brooks alleged that he “made several request[s] that he was

hurt and needed medical attention because he could not feel his

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

hand[] and [wrists] due to the evil intent of squeezing the handcuffs

as tight as [Officer Miller] could.” But, Brooks continued, Officer

Miller “refuse[d] to allow [Brooks] to see any medical person[nel]

and waited some time before taking [Brooks] to jail where he again

[sought] medical attention.”

Six months after Brooks filed his complaint, Officer Miller

moved for summary judgment. He argued that he was entitled to

qualified immunity because he did not violate any of Brooks’s con-

stitutional rights, and even assuming he did, any rights were not

clearly established. In further support of his position, Officer Miller

asserted that the dash-cam video completely contradicted Brooks’s

claims and showed that his allegations were false.

Soon after filing his motion for summary judgment, Officer

Miller moved to stay discovery pending a ruling on his motion for

summary judgment. Noting that qualified immunity is a defense

not only from liability but also a “limited ‘entitlement not to stand

trial or face the other burdens of litigation,’” (quoting Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), the magistrate judge granted the

motion.

Brooks objected to the entry of the stay of discovery.

Among other things, Brooks sought his medical records, if any,

from Leon County Jail’s medical records. Brooks contended that

these records would “bolster [Brooks’s] description of the type and

extent of his injuries” from being handcuffed by Officer Miller.

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The magistrate judge denied Brooks’s discovery requests

without prejudice until after the court resolved Officer Miller’s mo-

tion for summary judgment. That said, the magistrate judge did

allow Brooks to file a response to the order, explaining why any

specific discovery he sought was necessary for him to adequately

respond to Officer Miller’s motion for summary judgment.

Brooks filed a motion for review of the magistrate judge’s

order staying discovery. Upon review, the district judge overruled

Brooks’s objections and affirmed the magistrate judge’s order.

Brooks then responded to Officer Miller’s motion for sum-

mary judgment. He argued first that the video recording left gen-

uine issues of material fact in dispute. In particular, Brooks alleged

that Officer Miller had used excessive force against him outside the

camera’s view but that the audio portion of the recording picked

up the interaction. Brooks also contended that the video portion

of the recording cut out before Officer Miller tightened Brooks’s

handcuffs, so Officer Miller could not rely on it to prove that he

hadn’t tightened Brooks’s handcuffs. As for Brooks’s alleged pleas

to loosen the handcuffs because they were hurting him, Brooks said

the audio part of the recording did not pick those up because they

were drowned out by Officer Miller’s patrol-car radio. Finally,

Brooks asserted that “clear evidence of tampering” with the dash-

cam video existed. In support of this proposition, Brooks relied

solely on things he observed while watching the recording itself,

like the portions where the video went black.

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14 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

(“R&R”), recommending that the court grant Officer Miller’s mo-

tion for summary judgment. See Brooks v. Miller, No. 4:19-CV-

00524, 2020 WL 8258414, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2020). First, the

magistrate judge concluded that the video refuted Brooks’s ac-

count of the events that transpired because (1) the dash-cam video

showed two police cars in pursuit of a black Kia for several blocks,

and Brooks was the man who exited the Kia from the driver’s side;

(2) the recording gave no indication that Officer Miller employed

any force in arresting Brooks; (3) Officer Miller and Brooks walked

towards the patrol car calmly, and Brooks had no apparent injury;

and (4) Officer Miller gave Brooks instructions on how to wear the

handcuffs comfortably, and Brooks never complained of pain or in-

jury.

Then the magistrate judge determined that Brooks’s false-

arrest, excessive-force, and deliberate-indifference claims each

failed. Id. at *5–*8. Starting with Brooks’s false-arrest claim, the

magistrate judge found that Officer Miller had probable cause to

arrest Brooks for driving without a license when he saw Brooks

driving and leaving the Kia and Brooks admitted he did not have a

driver’s license. As for Brooks’s excessive-force claim, the magis-

trate judge viewed the dash-cam video as “refut[ing] [Brooks’s]

claims” that Officer Miller “slam[med]” Brooks into the car when

he was arresting Brooks. But even if Officer Miller did “shove”

Brooks, the magistrate judge reasoned, that action did not rise to

the level of a constitutional violation because the alleged force was

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 15

de minimis. On the deliberate-indifference claim, the magistrate

judge said that Officer Miller used no force, and Brooks suffered no

injury. And even if he did use force, the magistrate judge con-

cluded in the alternative, Brooks failed to put Officer Miller on no-

tice of a risk of serious harm because Brooks made no complaints

of “injury, pain, or discomfort” that would have alerted Officer Mil-

ler that Brooks required medical attention. Id. at *8. Because Of-

ficer Miller violated none of Brooks’s rights, the magistrate judge

reasoned, Miller was entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

The district judge adopted the report. Brooks v. Miller, No.

4:19CV524, 2021 WL 230059, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2021). He

then noted that Brooks’s sworn complaint was testimony, so if Of-

ficer Miller’s statements were the only other evidence in the rec-

ord, material facts would be in dispute and the case would survive

summary judgment. But on this record, the district judge ex-

plained, the court had the benefit of the dash-cam video. And in

the district court’s view, that recording discredited Brooks’s allega-

tions. So the district court granted Officer Miller’s motion for sum-

mary judgment and dismissed Brooks’s case for failure to state a

claim. Id. at *2.

Brooks now appeals the district court’s order adopting the

magistrate judge’s R&R. He also appeals the stay of discovery.

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16 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable factual

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—here, Brooks. Chap-

man v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Summary judgment is appropriate when “no genuine issues [of]

material fact” exist and the law entitles the movant to judgment on

the record. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Universe of Applicable Facts

Because the facts are everything in this appeal, we begin

with them. But before we can determine the operable facts, we

must discuss Scott. When opposing parties disagree about the rel-

evant facts, Scott is the Supreme Court case that tells us how to

identify the applicable facts for purposes of ruling on a summary-

judgment motion.

In Scott, to end a high-speed chase, the defendant officer hit

the plaintiff’s car from behind, causing the plaintiff to lose control

of his car and crash. Scott, 550 U.S. at 375. The plaintiff sued, al-

leging that the officer had violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amend-

ment right to be free from the use of excessive force. Id. at 376. In

support of his claim, the plaintiff said that, throughout the chase,

he had remained in control of his car, slowed for turns and inter-

sections, and used his turn signals. Id. at 379. He also claimed he

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hadn’t run anyone off the road and wasn’t a threat to pedestrians

or other motorists. Id. But when the Court viewed a recording of

the incident, it concluded that “[t]he videotape t[old] quite a differ-

ent story.” Id. In fact, the Court said, the plaintiff’s “version of

events [was] so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable

jury could have believed him.” Id. at 380. For that reason, the

Court held that the district court should not have relied on the “vis-

ible fiction” that was plaintiff’s version of events in ruling on the

officer’s summary-judgment motion. Id. at 380–81.

As the Court explained (and as we’ve mentioned), “[w]hen

opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe

it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of

ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 380. Our review

of Scott teaches us that two important requirements must be met

before we can disregard the non-moving party’s version of events:

(1) the recording (or other evidence) must “so utterly discredit[]”

the party’s story “that no reasonable jury could have believed” that

party, id.; see also Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th

Cir. 2013); Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007)

(refusing to extend Scott to police photographs that failed to depict

“all of the defendant’s conduct and all of the necessary context”);

and (2) there must be no evidence that the recording has been “doc-

tored or altered,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. So if a valid recording

completely and clearly contradicts a party’s testimony, that testi-

mony is not credible, and the court should disregard it. See

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Morton, 707 F.3d at 1284. But if the recording renders a party’s

story merely unlikely yet does not necessarily contradict it, the de-

fault rule kicks in: we must accept the party’s version for purposes

of considering the motion for summary judgment.

Applying Scott’s rule here, we conclude that the material

facts for purposes of summary judgment are as follows1:

Officer Miller followed the Kia until it stopped on a dead-

end road. When the Kia parked, Brooks got out of the driver’s seat.

No one else appeared to be in the car.

Soon after Brooks left the Kia, Officer Miller walked over to

a group of people where Brooks was standing and asked Brooks

whether he had a license. Brooks said he did not. So Officer Miller

arrested Brooks for driving without a license. We must use this

universe of facts because the video recording “so utterly

1 Brooks asserts that the video recording was tampered with. We need not

address that because his allegations of tampering apply to only the parts of the

recording dealing with Brooks’s excessive-force and deliberate-indifference

claims, and we reverse the entry of summary judgment on the excessive-force

claim and don’t rely on the recording to affirm the entry of summary judg-

ment on the deliberate-indifference claim. As for Brooks’s false-arrest claim,

Brooks agrees that the recording accurately represents the events from the

time that it began through at least when Officer Miller arrested Brooks for

driving without a license. Indeed, Brooks himself relies on that part of the

recording in advocating for reversal of summary judgment on the false-arrest

claim. And that is what we rely upon as well in our analysis of that claim.

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discredit[s]” Brooks’s version of this part of the story that “no rea-

sonable jury could . . . believe[] him,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

As for the arrest itself, that occurred outside the camera’s

view. So we can’t see Officer Miller “grab[bing] [Brooks] by the

shirt and slam[ming] him into the patrol vehicle,” as Brooks al-

leged. But during the arrest, we can hear what sounds like friction

on Officer Miller’s microphone. We can’t say that sound is Officer

Miller slamming Brooks against the patrol car, but we also can’t

rule out the possibility because the friction obscures the audio. To

be sure, when we see Brooks walking with Officer Miller to Miller’s

patrol car soon after we hear the friction, Brooks does not appear

at all hurt. But it’s not necessarily the case that we would have

been able to see any injuries slamming Brooks against the car to

arrest him might have caused. The long and short of these circum-

stances is that the recording doesn’t preclude the possibility that a

reasonable juror could conclude that Officer Miller “grab[bed]

[Brooks] by the shirt and slam[med] him into the patrol vehicle”

when Officer Miller arrested Brooks. So we accept that version of

the story for purposes of reviewing the summary-judgment order.

Next, we consider the facts as they relate to Brooks’s claims

that Officer Miller overtightened Brooks’s handcuffs and ignored

his pleas for assistance. Again, nearly all Brooks’s time in handcuffs

occurred outside the camera’s view (not to mention, the video pic-

ture was also black for most of that time). Add to that the fact that

we can’t clearly distinguish Brooks’s statements while sitting in the

police cruiser. And again, we must conclude that we can’t rule out

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20 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

the possibility that a reasonable juror could find that Brooks com-

plained about the tightness of the handcuffs and Officer Miller did

not respond. Even if, given the rest of the recording, we might not

reach that conclusion, the bottom line is that the recording does

not “so utterly discredit” Brooks’s version of this part of the story

that “no reasonable jury could . . . believe[] him.” Id. So for pur-

poses of reviewing the summary-judgment order, we accept

Brooks’s claims that Officer Miller overtightened the handcuffs and

did not respond to Brooks’s complaints while they rode to the Leon

County Jail, and that his hands and wrists were numb and hurt.

Now that we’ve identified the relevant facts, we turn to the

legal analysis.

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity shields government employees from

suit in their individual capacities for discretionary actions they per-

form while going about their duties. The thought behind the doc-

trine is the “balanc[ing of] two important public interests: ‘the need

to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irre-

sponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distrac-

tion, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Da-

vis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Under the balance that qual-

ified immunity strikes, “all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law” enjoy its protection. Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 21

To determine whether qualified immunity applies, we en-

gage in a burden-shifting analysis. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d

1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). At the first step, the public-employee

defendant must show that he was acting within the scope of his

discretionary authority when he committed the challenged acts.

Once the defendant does that, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who

must show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Id. To do

that, the plaintiff must establish two things: (1) the defendant vio-

lated a constitutional right, and (2) that constitutional right was

“clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s actions. Powell

v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920 (11th Cir. 2022).

A plaintiff can show that a violation is “clearly established”

in any of three ways: (1) by relying on a “materially similar decision

of the Supreme Court, of this Court, or of the supreme court of the

state in which the case arose;” (2) by invoking “‘a broader, clearly

established principle [that] control[s] the novel facts’ of the case;”

or (3) by persuading us that the officer’s acts “so obviously violate[]

th[e] [C]onstitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Id. (citation

omitted) (fourth alteration in original; other alterations added). If

a plaintiff proceeds under the first or second method, he must point

to a court decision. Id. The second and third methods require “ob-

vious clarity.” Id. That is, the principle must be so apparent that,

even without a case with similar facts to light the way, any compe-

tent officer would know that his conduct crossed the line. See id.

In sum, the “clearly established” part of the qualified-immunity in-

quiry asks whether the law when the officer engaged in the

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22 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

challenged conduct gave him “‘fair warning’ that his conduct was

unlawful.” Id. at 921 (citation omitted).

Courts have “discretion to decide which of the two prongs

of [the] qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). And since a plaintiff must show both

prongs to overcome qualified immunity, if the prong the court con-

siders first is not satisfied, the court need not consider the other

prong because the officer is entitled to qualified immunity, regard-

less. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

Here, the parties agree that Officer Miller acted within his

discretionary authority during the alleged conduct Brooks chal-

lenges. For that reason, we turn to the questions of whether the

alleged conduct violated Brooks’s rights and whether, at the time

of the alleged violations, the law was clearly established.

1. Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest Brooks and

properly searched Brooks’s pockets incident to Brooks’s arrest.

We begin by addressing Brooks’s claim that Officer Miller

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by falsely arresting him.

Brooks asserts that Officer Miller lacked probable cause to arrest

him for two reasons: (1) because Brooks never conceded to driving

the black Kia, and (2) because even if Brooks drove the Kia, “driving

without a valid license is a non-criminal traffic infraction for which

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 23

one cannot be arrested.” 2 Appellant’s Br. at 13. Both reasons lack

merit.

To be sure, a warrantless arrest without the existence of

probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and forms a basis

for a § 1983 claim. See Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th

Cir. 1996); see also Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1382

(11th Cir. 1998). To succeed on a false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must

establish (1) a lack of probable cause and (2) an arrest. See Rich-

mond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180 (11th Cir. 2022). Probable cause

exists when “a reasonable officer could conclude . . . that there [is]

a substantial chance of criminal activity.” Washington v. Howard,

2 Brooks also argues that when Officer Miller approached Brooks and asked

whether he had a license, that was pretextual because Miller was allegedly

there investigating possible drug crimes. But Brooks, who was not detained,

voluntarily answered Officer Miller’s question about whether Brooks had a

license. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–201 (2002) (“Law en-

forcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of un-

reasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other

public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen . . .

Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular

individual, they may . . . ask for identification . . . provided they do not induce

cooperation by coercive means.”). See also United States v. Caraballo, 595

F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Law enforcement officers do not violate the

Fourth Amendment simply by approaching an individual on the street or in

some other public place and asking a question or asking for identification.”).

Because Brooks said he did not have a license and the video shows Brooks

driving, Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest Brooks for driving without

a license, regardless of what Officer Miller was investigating before Brooks’s

arrest. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).

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24 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). And proba-

ble cause is an “absolute bar” to a § 1983 false-arrest claim. Rankin

v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998).

The problem for Brooks is that the record undoubtedly re-

flects that Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest Brooks for

driving without a license.

First, as we’ve noted, the video recording clearly shows

Brooks exited the driver’s door of the Kia immediately after the car

was parked. And Brooks was the only one to leave the car. Because

Brooks’s claim that he was not driving the Kia is “blatantly contra-

dicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,”

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, the district court correctly dismissed his at-

testations to that effect and concluded that Brooks was driving the

Kia.

Second, probable cause supports the arrest. Besides the fact

that Brooks was driving the Kia, the recording shows that after

Brooks left the car, Officer Miller walked over to a group where

Brooks was standing. And we hear a microphoned Officer Miller,

who, at that point, was not in view of the camera, ask Brooks

whether he has a driver’s license with him. Brooks admitted that

he did not. Officer Miller then repeatedly asked Brooks why he

didn’t have a driver’s license. And when Brooks didn’t answer, Of-

ficer Miller arrested Brooks for driving without a license.

Florida Statutes § 322.03(1) makes it a misdemeanor for any

person to operate a car without a driver’s license. So given that

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 25

Officer Miller saw Brooks driving the Kia without a license and that

Brooks admitted he had no license, Officer Miller had probable

cause to arrest Brooks for violating that law. Indeed, “[i]f an officer

has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed

even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, with-

out violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwa-

ter v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).

And because Officer Miller’s arrest of Brooks was lawful, the

search Officer Miller conducted of Brooks’s pockets incident to that

arrest was also lawful. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232

(2011).

2. Brooks’s excessive-force claim that Officer Miller slammed

him into the car and overtightened his handcuffs survives sum-

mary judgment.

Next, Brooks argues that Officer Miller used excessive force

in violation of the Fourth Amendment when Miller allegedly

“slam[med]” Brooks into the car at the time of the arrest and “over-

tightened Brooks’s handcuffs, causing “excruciating pain” and

numbness, and refused to adjust the cuffs. As we’ve explained,

these events do not appear in the video of the recording. And based

on the audio portion, we can’t rule out the possibility that Officer

Miller “slam[med]” Brooks into the patrol car when he arrested

him. Nor can we say with certainty that Brooks did not complain

to Officer Miller that his handcuffs were too tight and were causing

him pain and numbness. Given these facts that we must accept for

purposes of considering Officer Miller’s summary-judgment

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26 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

motion, we conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate

on Brooks’s excessive-force claim.

“[T]he right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it

the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof

to effect it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). But the

Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from the use of

excessive force during an arrest. 3 Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262,

1266–67 (11th Cir. 2014). Under the Fourth Amendment, we eval-

uate whether force is excessive by applying an objective reasona-

bleness standard. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96. That is, we ask

“whether the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable in light of

the facts confronting the officer.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d

1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002). This inquiry requires us to balance the

“nature and quality” of the acts on the individual against the gov-

ernment’s justification for using force. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. In

making this assessment, we employ “the perspective of a reasona-

ble officer on the scene, rather than . . . 20/20 . . . hindsight.”

3 Brooks asserted in the district court that Officer Miller’s alleged use of exces-

sive force violated Brooks’s Eighth Amendment rights. But Brooks was not in

prison at the time of the events here. And we evaluate a “free citizen’s claim

that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an

arrest” under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness standard.”

Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. We apply Eighth Amendment case law when an

incarcerated person alleges excessive force. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34,

35–38 (2010).

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 27

Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243,

1248 (11th Cir. 2004).

Our cases identify some non-exclusive factors that help us

assess whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable:

(1) how severe the underlying crime was; (2) the type of threat, if

any, a suspect presented to the safety of the officers or others; and

(3) “whether [the suspect] actively resist[ed] arrest or attempt[ed]

to evade arrest by flight.” Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217,

1229 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). We’ve

recognized that “[n]onviolent misdemeanors are crimes of minor

severity for which less force is generally appropriate.” United

States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1295 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

When we apply these factors to the facts we’ve identified for

summary-judgment purposes, we conclude that Brooks’s exces-

sive-force claims survive. First, Officer Miller arrested Brooks for

the misdemeanor crime of driving without a license. We can’t say

that this crime “rise[s] to the level of criminal conduct that should

have required the use of force.” Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d

1298, 1322 (11th Cir. 2017). Second, no evidence so much as sug-

gests that Brooks posed any threat to Officer Miller or anyone else.

In fact, Officer Miller’s probable-cause affidavit expressly notes that

the “arrest was without incident.” And third, Brooks neither re-

sisted arrest nor tried to flee.

Under these circumstances, it was objectively unreasonable

to “slam[]” Brooks into the car while arresting him. Similarly, it

was objectively unreasonable for Officer Miller to unnecessarily

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28 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

overtighten Brooks’s handcuffs as part of this same arrest and re-

fuse to make any adjustments when Brooks complained of numb-

ness and “excruciating pain.” So if these events occurred, they vi-

olated Brooks’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Brooks’s right to be free from the use of this type of exces-

sive force was also clearly established when Officer Miller arrested

him on November 12, 2016. In Lee v. Ferraro, a plaintiff alleged

that the defendant officer slammed her head onto the car when he

arrested her for improperly honking her horn. 284 F.3d at 1191.

Under her version of the facts, the plaintiff posed no risk to anyone

and she did not attempt to resist or flee. Id. at 1198. We said that,

in those circumstances, it was “abundantly clear . . . that [the of-

ficer] used force that was plainly excessive, wholly unnecessary,

and, indeed, grossly disproportionate . . . .” Id.

We think Lee provides clear guidance to officers that they

use excessive force if they slam a person into a car during an arrest

for a relatively minor offense when the suspect does not endanger

anyone else, does not resist, and does not attempt to escape. And

if an officer cannot slam a person into a car under these circum-

stances, the officer certainly cannot engage in additional unneces-

sary force, such as gratuitously overtightening handcuffs and refus-

ing to adjust them in response to complaints of “excruciating pain”

followed by numbness. For these reasons we conclude that, under

the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Brooks as the non-

moving party, Officer Miller is not entitled to qualified immunity

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 29

on the excessive-force claim that he “slam[med]” Brooks into the

car and unnecessarily overtightened Brooks’s handcuffs.

Because we hold that Officer Miller is not entitled to quali-

fied immunity on Brooks’s excessive-force claim at the summary-

judgment stage, we direct the district court to remove the stay on

discovery as it pertains to this claim and to reconsider Brooks’s re-

quest for his medical records from the Leon County Jail.

3. The district court properly granted summary judgment on

Brooks’s deliberate-indifference claim.

That leaves Brooks’s other handcuff-related claim: that Of-

ficer Miller was deliberately indifferent to Brooks’s alleged serious

medical needs arising from his being handcuffed too tightly. But

unlike with the excessive-force claim, we conclude that the district

court properly found that Officer Miller was entitled to qualified

immunity on this claim.

We begin with the facts. As we’ve mentioned, at no point

during any of the audio portion of the recording can we hear

Brooks complain about pain or numbness from the handcuffs. But

during the car ride, the recording includes some portions of garbled

audio that preclude us from ruling out the possibility that Brooks

complained at some point about pain and numbness from the cuffs.

Besides that, Brooks alleges that Officer Miller turned up the radio

to cover up Brooks’s complaints of injury. And we do hear the ra-

dio in portions of the recording.

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30 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

So while we can’t hear Brooks complain about the cuffs, the

audio does not “blatantly contradict[]” Brooks’s version of events.

Because the audio offers only some support for Officer Miller’s ver-

sion of the incident, we must accept Brooks’s allegations for pur-

poses of ruling on the summary-judgment motion. As a result, we

assume that Brooks complained to Officer Miller during the car

ride that the handcuffs were too tight and they were making his

wrists and hands numb.

As for the substance of Brooks’s deliberate-indifference

claim, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-

quires government officials to provide medical care to those

who’ve been injured during arrest. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.

Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). To prevail on a § 1983 claim alleg-

ing a violation of that right, a plaintiff “must satisfy both an objec-

tive and a subjective inquiry.” Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265,

1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

First, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of an objec-

tively serious medical need. Id. A “serious medical need” is “one

that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or

one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize

the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Kuhne v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

745 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2014). Or a serious medical need can

exist if a delay in treating the need exacerbates the condition. Mann

v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009). But in ei-

ther scenario, the need “must be one that, if left unattended, pos[es]

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 31

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,

1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Second, as to the subjective inquiry, the plaintiff must prove

that the officers were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

need. Id. More specifically, the plaintiff must present evidence that

would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that (1) the officer knew

facts that should have allowed him to draw the inference that a

substantial risk of serious harm existed; (2) the officer actually drew

that inference; (3) the officer nonetheless disregarded the risk of se-

rious harm; and (4) the officer’s conduct amounted to more than

negligence of a specified degree. 4

The district court concluded that Officer Miller was entitled

to qualified immunity on this claim. As we’ve explained, to over-

come qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the officer “vi-

olated a statutory or constitutional right” that “was clearly estab-

lished” at the time of his challenged conduct. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at

735.

4 As of the time we issue this opinion, arguably, some uncertainty exists in our

precedent as to whether the standard is “more than mere negligence” or

“more than gross negligence.” Compare, e.g., Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537

(11th Cir. 1995), and Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir.

2010). Luckily for us, we need not wade further into this sticky wicket here

because, as our analysis of Brooks’s claim shows, it makes no difference

whether the standard is “mere” or “gross.”

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32 Opinion of the Court 21-10590

On Brooks’s deliberate-indifference claim, we start with the

“clearly established” prong because it resolves the question of qual-

ified immunity. In determining whether Officer Miller violated a

clearly established constitutional right, we must focus on the spe-

cific facts and context of this case. See Perez v. Suszczynski, 809

F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016). So we ask whether, when Officer

Miller transported Brooks to the Jail on November 12, 2016, it was

clearly established that an officer acted with deliberate indifference

to a transported person’s complaints that his handcuffs were caus-

ing numbness and injury, if he drove about twenty-five minutes to

a jail where the transported person could receive medical attention,

instead of stopping on the road or driving to a nearby hospital for

medical assistance. We conclude that, even if these facts state a

constitutional violation, any such violation was not clearly estab-

lished when Officer Miller transported Brooks.

To support the opposite conclusion, Brooks relies on case

law that establishes the general proposition that if an officer “actu-

ally know[s] about a condition that poses a substantial risk of seri-

ous harm and yet do[es] nothing to address it, [he] violate[s] the

Constitution.” Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 34 (quoting Patel v. Lanier

Cnty., 969 F.3d 1173, 1190 (11th Cir. 2020)). And to be sure, Patel

states the general rule. But that case does not get to the heart of

the allegations here.

Even assuming without deciding that Brooks had a serious

medical need, the general principle Brooks relies on does not pro-

vide clear notice to a reasonable officer in Officer Miller’s position.

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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 33

It does nothing to clarify whether driving about twenty-five

minutes for medical attention in response to an arrestee’s state-

ment that handcuffs are too tight, instead of stopping roadside to

provide medical attention or finding a hospital and obtaining care

in a local emergency room, would violate a detainee’s rights. And

we do not see how Patel’s general principle would have provided

Officer Miller with “‘fair warning’ that his conduct was unlawful.”

Powell, 25 F.4th at 921. Because Brooks failed to point to any prec-

edent or a generally established rule that would give Officer Miller

fair warning that his specific conduct was unconstitutional, Officer

Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on Brooks’s claim for delib-

erate indifference to a serious medical need.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s grant of Officer Miller’s mo-

tion for summary judgment on Brooks’s false-arrest and deliberate-

indifference claims, and we reverse the district court’s summary-

judgment ruling on Brooks’s excessive-force claim. So we remand

the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN

PART.

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1 JORDAN, J. Concurring 21-10590

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

When it comes to matters of technology and science, the

courts frequently lag behind society. See John G. Roberts, 2014

Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, United States Supreme

Court, at 3, (Dec. 31, 2014) (“[T]he courts will often choose to be

late to the harvest of American ingenuity.”); Lillian R. BeVier, The

Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: A

Surprising Sequel to the Break Up of AT&T, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1049,

1061–62 (1999) (“For many reasons, the pace of legal change can

never keep up with the pace of technological evolution.”). And

that reality is probably more true today than in years past given the

current pace of technological innovation.

In a world of artificial intelligence, video and picture editing

software, and video and image generators—to only name a few—

we must “tread carefully . . . to ensure that we do not ‘embarrass

the future’” when assessing video footage like the dash-cam record-

ing in this case. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206,

2220 (2018) (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322

U.S. 292, 300 (1944)). To “keep pace with the inexorable march of

technological progress,” United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,

285 (6th Cir. 2010), we must be confident that a video or photo-

graph is truly what it purports to be before accepting it as gospel.

Some of today’s smart phones, like the Google Pixel—with its

“Magic Eraser” feature—can edit or erase persons and objects from

photographs with a couple of clicks and replace them with AI-

generated imagery that fills the gap. Similar technology, I am sure,

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2 JORDAN, J. Concurring 21-10590

will likely soon be available for the editing of videos. Indeed, there

are reports that the next version of “Magic Eraser” will allow users

of Google Pixel phones to remove audio (like background noise)

from videos. See Brad Linder, Audio Magic Eraser Feature May

Debut With the Google Pixel 8 (Liliputing - August 12, 2023).

Mr. Brooks asserts that the dash-cam recording was tam-

pered with. That may or may not be true. But, as the court’s opin-

ion explains, we need not decide the matter. The tampering alle-

gations apply only to the parts of the recording relating to Mr.

Brooks’ excessive-force and deliberate-indifference claims, and “we

reverse the entry of summary judgment on the excessive-force

claim and don’t rely on the recording to affirm the entry of sum-

mary judgment on the deliberate-indifference claim.” Maj. Op. at

18 n.1.

With these thoughts, I join Judge Rosenbaum’s opinion for

the court in full.