Inzunza v. Naranjo

Filed 8/21/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JOSE R. INZUNZA et al., B318956

Defendants and Appellants, (Los Angeles County

v. Super. Ct. No.

BC678942)

MARIA NARANJO et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Mel Red Recana, Judge. Reversed in part and

remanded with directions.

Locke Lord, Susan A. Kidwell; Clark Hill and Pamela A.

Palmer for Defendant and Appellant CR GTS, Inc.

Clark Hill, Dean Olson, Pamela Palmer; Greines, Martin,

Stein & Richland, Robert A. Olson and Laura G. Lim for

Defendant and Appellant Jose R. Inzunza.

California Truck Injury Law and Katherine Harvey-Lee for

Plaintiffs and Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

Jose I.V. Naranjo died after his pick-up truck collided with

a tractor-trailer driven by Jose R. Inzunza (Inzunza) for CR GTS,

Inc. (CRGTS), an interstate motor carrier. Jose’s surviving spouse

(Maria ), their four adult children (Griselda, Araceli, Jose Jr., and

Oscar), and Jose’s two adult stepchildren (Carla and Luis)

(collectively, plaintiffs) 1 brought this wrongful death action

against defendants and appellants Inzunza and CRGTS

(collectively, defendants).

The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. CRGTS

appeals from the judgment, contending: (1) the trial court

prejudicially erred by precluding it from contesting liability and

comparative fault and, instead, imputing Inzunza’s deemed

admissions to CRGTS to establish its liability; and (2) the

verdicts in favor of the stepchildren must be vacated because no

substantial evidence supports a finding that they were financially

dependent on the decedent at the time of his death – an essential

element of standing to bring a wrongful death claim under Code

of Civil Procedure section 377.60, subdivision (b)(1). 2 Inzunza

separately appeals from the judgment, contending: (1) the jury’s

award of noneconomic damages to Maria was excessive as a

matter of law (CRGTS joins this argument); and (2) in addition to

the lack of evidence to support the stepchildren’s standing, the

trial court also improperly instructed the jury regarding the

necessary elements for stepchild standing in a wrongful death

action.

For the reasons discussed below, we agree with CRGTS’s

first contention and conclude the trial court prejudicially erred by

1 Because the decedent and some of the plaintiffs share a

surname, we use their first names when referring to them

individually to avoid confusion.

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the

Code of Civil Procedure.

2

precluding CRGTS from presenting evidence contesting liability

and of comparative fault. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment

against CRGTS and remand the action for a new trial against

CRGTS. The judgment against Inzunza is set aside pending the

outcome of the new trial. We address defendants’ additional

contentions only to the extent they regard issues likely to arise on

retrial.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3

In December 2015, Jose was involved in a fatal car accident

involving a tractor trailer driven by Inzunza and owned by

CRGTS. According to eyewitnesses, a portion of the tractor trailer

was partially blocking the left lane of a divided highway when

Jose’s vehicle collided with it.

Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against Inzunza and

CRGTS, alleging a single cause of action for negligence. 4 They

alleged defendants were negligent and proximately caused Jose’s

fatal injuries. They further alleged Inzunza was driving the

tractor trailer while working for CRGTS in the course and scope

of his employment.

Plaintiffs later propounded requests for admission on

Inzunza. The requests sought the following admissions, among

others: Inzunza was negligent, Inzunza’s negligence caused the

accident, no negligence on the part of the decedent caused or

contributed to the fatal injuries he sustained, and Inzunza’s

negligence proximately caused the fatal injuries to decedent.

Despite receiving multiple extensions of time to respond, Inzunza

failed to serve any responses to the requests. Thus, plaintiffs filed

3 Except for background facts included for context, we limit

our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the issues we are

deciding.

4 Plaintiffs also sued Kershaw Fruit & Cold Storage, Inc.,

and later added Carlos Gonzalez as a defendant. Neither party

remained in the case at the time of trial.

3

a motion for an order that the truth of each matter specified in

the requests for admission propounded on Inzunza be deemed

admitted under section 2033.280, subdivision (b). 5 In opposition

to the motion, Inzunza’s counsel explained they lost contact with

Inzunza despite multiple attempts to reach him, including by

hiring two private investigators. The court found that “[w]hile

[Inzunza’s] counsel demonstrates that they made reasonable

efforts to locate and contact [Inzunza], [Inzunza’s] counsel does

not show [Inzunza] is not attempting to evade the lawsuit or

discovery demand.” On that basis, the court granted plaintiffs’

motion, and “deem[ed] admitted the truth of the matters set forth

in Requests for Admission, Set One, to defendant Jose R.

Inzunza.”

Plaintiffs also propounded requests for admission on

CRGTS. Several of the requests were the same as those

propounded on Inzunza, including: admit that Inzunza caused or

contributed to the accident, admit Inzunza was negligent, admit

the negligence of Inzunza was the cause of the fatal injuries to

Jose, and admit no negligence on the part of Jose caused or

contributed to the fatal injuries he sustained. CRGTS provided

verified responses denying these requests. 6

5 Section 2033.280, subdivision (b) states, in relevant part: If

a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve

a timely response, the “requesting party may move for an order

that . . . the truth of any matters specified in the requests be

deemed admitted . . . .”

6 CRGTS originally provided unverified responses to the

requests for admission, and plaintiffs obtained an order from the

court deeming the requests admitted based on the “incomplete,”

“evasive,” and unverified responses. It is undisputed, however,

that the parties entered into a stipulation under which the order

deeming the requests admitted was withdrawn, and CRGTS

ultimately served verified responses to the requests for

admission.

4

Before trial, plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to preclude

defendants “from offering evidence, expert opinion, exhibits,

writings, testimony, reference or argument contrary to the

Requests for Admissions propounded to [Inzunza] which were

deemed admitted by court order . . . .” Plaintiffs argued the

admissions by Inzunza conclusively established that Inzunza

caused the accident and Jose bore no comparative fault. Thus,

according to plaintiffs, “the court must exclude any opinion

testimony by . . . experts, or indeed any other evidence or

argument that conflicts or casts doubt on the admitted liability of

[Inzunza].” CRGTS filed its own motion in limine for “an order

permitting evidence regarding liability . . . as to . . . CRGTS . . . .”

After hearing argument, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion

and denied CRGTS’s motion on the ground it was moot. The trial

court explained that CRGTS could present evidence that Inzunza

was acting beyond the scope of his employment, and therefore,

CRGTS is not vicariously liable. The court ruled CRGTS could

not, however, present evidence of comparative fault.

Just before the start of trial, the court heard argument on

how to implement its decision to grant plaintiffs’ motion in limine

to preclude evidence contrary to Inzunza’s deemed admissions.

CRGTS’s counsel explained: “[W]e had three eyewitnesses . . .

who had been deposed . . . . We were prepared to provide their

testimony that it appeared that the decedent was not paying

attention; he never put his brakes on, they saw the vehicle but

somehow the decedent didn’t see or react to the vehicle.” In

response, plaintiffs’ counsel argued Inzunza’s deemed admissions

“precluded any evidence coming in that would contradict those

deemed admissions,” and that meant that “not CRGTS, not

[p]laintiffs, not anybody [sic] can bring in evidence contrary [to]

or contesting deemed admissions.” The trial court agreed with

plaintiffs.

At trial, plaintiffs read Inzunza’s deemed admissions to the

jury. Plaintiffs also called two of Jose’s grandchildren, his two

5

stepchildren, his four children, his surviving spouse, and a

damages expert to testify. Unable to contest that Inzunza was

entirely at fault for the accident, defendants called only a

damages expert to testify about the value of Jose’s household

services.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. The jury

determined Inzunza was negligent and his negligence was a

substantial factor in causing harm to Jose and plaintiffs. The jury

also determined Inzunza was the agent of CRGTS and was acting

within the scope of his agency when he harmed Jose and

plaintiffs. The jury awarded a total of $7,619,000 to plaintiffs,

including Jose’s two adult stepchildren. The court entered

judgment on the verdict, holding CRGTS and Inzunza jointly and

severally liable.

Defendants moved for a new trial and for partial judgment

notwithstanding the verdict. The court denied both motions.

CRGTS and Inzunza each appealed from the final judgment.

DISCUSSION

1. Inzunza’s Deemed Admissions Do Not Preclude

CRGTS From Introducing Evidence Contrary to

Those Admissions

A. Governing Principles and Standard of Review

When a party to whom requests for admission are directed

fails to serve a timely response, “[t]he requesting party may move

for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth

of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted . . . .”

(§ 2033.280, subd. (b).) The court “shall make this order,” unless

it finds the party to whom requests for admission have been

directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed

response that substantially complies with the discovery statutes.

(§ 2033.280, subd. (c).) “[A] deemed admitted order establishes, by

judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the

requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein.”

6

(Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979.) Any matter

deemed to have been admitted “is conclusively established

against the party making the admission” but “is binding only on

th[e] party” that made the admission. (§ 2033.410, subds. (a) &

(b).)

“‘Generally, a trial court’s ruling on an in limine motion is

reviewed for abuse of discretion.’” (Appel v. Superior Court (2013)

214 Cal.App.4th 329, 336.) Here, however, the trial court’s order

was predicated on its interpretation of section 2033.410. We

therefore exercise de novo review. (Ibid [“‘Statutory construction

is a question of law we decide de novo’”].)

B. Analysis

Plaintiffs acknowledge, as they must, that deemed

admissions are conclusively established only against the party

making the admission. (§ 2033.410, subds. (a) & (b).) Plaintiffs

nevertheless contend the trial court correctly ruled CRGTS was

also precluded from introducing evidence on the issues of liability

and comparative fault because that evidence would directly

contradict Inzunza’s deemed admissions, and CRGTS’s liability is

merely derivative of Inzunza’s based on the doctrine of vicarious

liability. CRGTS counters that precluding it from introducing

evidence contrary to Inzunza’s deemed admissions effectively

makes Inzunza’s admissions binding on CRGTS. CRGTS explains

that because it is vicariously liable for Inzunza’s tortious conduct,

prohibiting it from introducing evidence of liability and

comparative fault imputes Inzunza’s failure to respond to

requests for admission to CRGTS in violation of section 2033.410,

subdivisions (a) and (b). For the reasons discussed below, we

agree with CRGTS.

We begin with the plain language of the statute. (Estate of

Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 911 [“If the terms of the statute

are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant what they

said, and the plain meaning of the language governs”].) As noted

above, section 2033.410 provides, in relevant part, that any

7

matter deemed admitted “is conclusively established against the

party making the admission” and is “binding only on that party.”

(§ 2033.410, subds. (a) and (b), italics added.) It is undisputed

that Inzunza failed to respond to plaintiffs’ requests for

admission propounded on him, and the trial court correctly

deemed the matters in the requests admitted by Inzunza. It is

also undisputed, however, that CRGTS timely responded to

plaintiffs’ requests for admission, and denied some of the same

requests as those deemed admitted by Inzunza (i.e., that Inzunza

negligently caused the accident and that Jose was not

comparatively at fault). The basis of plaintiffs’ action against

CRGTS is vicarious liability arising from the acts of Inzunza.

Vicarious liability of an employer is wholly derivative of the

employee’s fault. If the employee is not at fault, the employer is

not vicariously liable. (See Lathrop v. HealthCare Partners

Medical Group (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426 [“[v]icarious

liability of an employer is not based on fault and is wholly

derivative”].) Thus, by precluding CRGTS from introducing

evidence contesting liability, the trial court saddled it with

Inzunza’s deemed admissions—making his admissions of fault

binding not only on Inzunza, but also CRGTS, in violation of

section 2033.410.

Despite the clear language of the statute, plaintiffs argue

“[u]nanimous authorities preclude any party from introducing

evidence to contest deemed admissions being held against the

party who made them.” (Italics added.) There are two problems

with this argument. First, plaintiffs appear to rely on Murillo v.

Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 730 (Murillo) and People

v. $2,709 United States Currency (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1278

($2709 United States Currency) for the proposition that section

2033.410 prevents all parties from introducing evidence contrary

to deemed admissions. The courts in those cases stated the

“general rule [that] an admission is conclusive in the action as to

the party making it” and “no contradictory evidence may be

8

introduced.” (Murillo, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 736; $2709

United States Currency, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286.)

Neither case, however, involved multiple defendants. Thus, the

courts in Murillo and $2709 United States Currency had no

occasion to address the issue here, i.e., whether a defendant may

introduce evidence contrary to a codefendant’s deemed

admissions to demonstrate the party’s (as opposed to

codefendant’s) non-liability. (See Rosen v. State Farm General

Ins. Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1076 [“‘It is a well-established

rule that an opinion is only authority for those issues actually

considered or decided’”].)

Second, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, Inzunza’s deemed

admissions were, in practical effect, used against a party that

denied the very same requests. As discussed above, CRGTS is

vicariously liable for its agent’s negligence if the agent was acting

within the scope of his agency. (See Presbyterian Camp &

Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493,

502.) But Izunza was not acting as CRGTS’s agent when he failed

to timely deny the requests for admissions addressed to him.

Thus, while it is fair to hold CRGTS liable for Inzunza’s actual

actions and inactions during the course and scope of his

employment as its agent, it is unfair to hold CRGTS liable for

deemed admissions of fault resulting from Inzunza’s failure to

timely respond to the requests for admissions.

We likewise reject plaintiffs’ argument that the jury

instructions preclude any party from introducing evidence

contrary to the deemed admissions of one defendant. The

instruction given to the jury on requests for admission, California

Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 210, provides: “Before trial,

each party has the right to ask another party to admit in writing

that certain matters are true. If the other party admits those

matters, you must accept them as true. No further evidence is

required to prove them.” But nothing in the jury instruction

9

states the jury must accept those matters as true as against a

party who denied the same requests. 7

The parties have not directed us to, and we have not

located, a case directly addressing the issue presented, i.e.,

whether the deemed admissions of an agent preclude the

principal from introducing evidence of liability and comparative

fault. In an analogous context involving defaulting defendants,

however, courts have held that admissions implied from the

default of one defendant are not binding on a codefendant who

answered, and expressly denied, the allegations in the complaint.

For example, in Taylor v. Socony Mobil Oil Co. (1966) 242

Cal.App.2d 832, 833 (Taylor), the plaintiff sued Socony Mobil and

its employee for malicious prosecution. The employee failed to

answer the complaint and his default was entered, but Socony

Mobil answered, “denying all material allegations of the

complaint.” (Ibid.) The action went to trial against Socony Mobil

and at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, the trial court granted

Socony Mobil’s motion for nonsuit. (Ibid.) On appeal, the plaintiff

did “not seriously argue that he presented testimony constituting

a prima facie showing of lack of probable cause or of malice” but

argued “proof of these issues is supplied by the pleadings”

because the employee admitted the allegations in the pleadings

by failing to answer the complaint. (Id. at pp. 833-834.) The

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, explaining: “The validity

of plaintiff’s argument rests upon his major premise that an

admission implied from the default of one defendant is binding

7 We note that, in brackets, CACI No. 210 states: “However,

these matters must be considered true only as they apply to the

party who admitted they were true.” And, in the directions for

use of the instruction, it states: “The bracketed phrase should be

given if there are multiple parties.” It appears on the record

before us that neither party requested this sentence be included

in the instruction. On retrial, in accordance with the directions

for use of the instruction, the bracketed sentence should be

included.

10

upon an answering codefendant who has denied the relevant

allegations of the complaint. His position is untenable.” (Id. at p.

834.) Rather, “the correct rule . . . [is] ‘ . . . that admissions

implied from the default of one defendant ordinarily are not

binding upon a codefendant who, by answering, expressly denies

and places in issue the truth of the allegations thus admitted by

the absent party.’” (Ibid.)

Similarly, in Western Heritage Insurance Co. v. Superior

Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1199-1200 (Western

Heritage), the court held an intervening insurer was permitted to

litigate the issue of liability notwithstanding its insured’s default.

The court explained: “A party’s default does not bind

nondefaulting codefendants, even when the basis for the action

against the codefendants is vicarious liability arising from the

acts of the defaulting defendant.” (Id. at p. 1211.)

Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish these cases is unavailing.

First, plaintiffs claim Taylor and Western Heritage involved

“default[ing] parties with wildly different procedural postures

and fact patterns.” They point to the fact that in Taylor, the

defaulting employee never answered the complaint or appeared

in the case, and in Western Heritage, the employee’s answer had

been stricken at the plaintiff’s request. We fail to understand the

significance of these distinctions. Whether the defendant fails to

answer the complaint, or to respond to requests for admission,

facts are established by his or her failure to respond. Thus, the

principles expressed in Taylor and Western Heritage should

equally apply here (or perhaps with even greater force in the

deemed admissions context) because the controlling statute

explicitly states admissions by one party are “binding only on

that party[.]” (§ 2033.410, subd. (b).)

Next, plaintiffs contend CRGTS “misapplies another

holding in Taylor.” We disagree. In Taylor, as an additional

reason in support of its holding, the court explained that, “under

the rules of evidence[,]” declarations of an agent are admissible

11

only when made during the course of his agency and at the time

the event occurred. (Taylor, supra, 242 Cal.App.2d at p. 834.) The

admissions in Taylor, the court explained, were made not only

after the event occurred, but also after his employment had

terminated. (Ibid.) Thus, the employee’s admissions implied from

his default could not bind his employer. (Ibid.) So too, here.

Inzunza’s admissions were deemed to have been made long after

the accident in 2015. This additional point in Taylor, therefore,

lends further support to CRGTS’s argument that the principles in

Taylor should apply here.

In sum, we conclude an agent’s deemed admissions do not

bind the principal codefendant, even when the basis for the action

against the principal codefendant is vicarious liability arising

from the acts of the agent. 8 To hold otherwise would directly

contradict the plain language of section 2033.410. The trial court

therefore erred by precluding CRGTS from introducing evidence

of non-liability and comparative fault. This error clearly was

prejudicial. We therefore reverse the judgment against CRGTS

and remand for a new trial. The judgment against Inzunza must

be set aside pending the outcome of that trial. (See Adams Mfg. &

Engineering Co. v. Coast Centerless Grinding Co. (1960) 184

Cal.App.2d 649, 655 [“[W]here there are two or more defendants

and the liability of one is dependent upon that of the other, the

8 We note other jurisdictions have reached the same

conclusion. (See, e.g., Riberglass, Inc. v. Techni-Glass Industries,

Inc. (11th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 565, 566-567 [Even where the

liability of a guarantor depends on the liability of a co-party,

deemed admissions of the latter that it is indebted to the creditor

do not justify the entry of judgment against the guarantor who

has responded sufficiently to requests for admissions]; see also

Alipour v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (N.D. Ga. 1990) 131 F.R.D.

213, 215-216, fn. 3 [even in cases involving defendants whose

rights or liabilities are derivative of the party who failed to

respond to material admissions, the deemed admissions of one

defendant are not binding on the codefendant].)

12

default of one of them does not preclude his having the benefit of

his codefendants establishing, after a contested hearing, the

nonexistence of the controlling fact; in such case the defaulting

defendant is entitled to have judgment in his favor along with the

successful contesting defendant”]; see also Western Heritage,

supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210, fn. 18 [“[I]f the action is still

pending against a party which may be jointly liable with the

defaulting insured, it is improper to enter judgment against the

defaulting defendant while the action remains pending against

the other defendant”].)

2. Additional Contentions of Error at Trial

In light of our conclusion that the case must be remanded

for a new trial, we need not address defendants’ other contentions

(i.e., no substantial evidence that the stepchildren were

financially dependent on the decedent at the time of his death,

and the noneconomic damages awarded to Maria were excessive

as a matter of law). To assist the parties and the trial court,

however, we address Inzunza’s instructional error contention

because it is likely to arise on retrial.

Inzunza contends the trial court’s instruction on stepchild

standing contained the wrong standard. Under section 377.60,

subdivision (b)(1), stepchildren of the decedent may bring a

wrongful death action “if they were dependent on the decedent[.]”

For purposes of this subdivision, dependence refers to financial

support at the time of decedent’s death, or at most, two years

before the decedent’s death. (See, e.g., Chavez v. Carpenter (2001)

91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1445, 1447-1148.)

The trial court gave the following instruction, proposed by

plaintiffs: “Under California law, a stepchild is permitted to bring

a claim for wrongful death if they are dependent, to some extent,

upon the decedent for the necessaries of life. No strict formula

can be applied to determine this. If a stepchild received financial

support from their parent which helped them in obtaining the

13

things which one cannot and should not do without, then that

stepchild is dependent upon their parent and is qualified to bring

a wrongful death claim. Such things may include, but are not

limited to, shelter, clothing, food, utilities, car payments, medical

treatment, and other customary living expenses.” Inzunza asserts

the instruction “erroneously implied that dependence could occur

at any point in the stepchild’s life” rather than “present

dependence.” (Original italics.) He argues defendants’ proposed

instruction included the necessary temporal restriction. Their

proposed instruction provided, in part: “[I]n order for you to

award damages to either [Carla or Luis], you must find that

either stepchild was dependent on the decedent. Dependence is

defined as financial support, ‘actually dependent, to some extent,

upon the decedent for necessaires of life . . . which aids them in

obtaining the things, such as shelter, clothing, food and medical

treatment which one cannot and should not do without.’”

We are unpersuaded. Indeed, we find defendants’ proposed

instruction is not any clearer on the temporal issue than the

instruction given. We therefore conclude the trial court did not

err by giving plaintiffs’ proposed instruction, which correctly used

present tense in the introductory sentence: “[A] stepchild is

permitted to bring a claim for wrongful death if they are

dependent, to some extent, upon the decedent for the necessaries

of life.” (Italics added.)

14

DISPOSITION

The judgment against CRGTS is reversed and the matter is

remanded for a new trial against CRGTS. The judgment against

Inzunza is set aside pending the outcome of that trial. In the

event plaintiffs decide not to retry the action, the trial court is

instructed to enter a new judgment against Inzunza only.

Assuming that happens, this opinion does not prejudice Inzunza’s

right to appeal from the new judgment, and renew his arguments

raised in this appeal that we have not decided (i.e., the

noneconomic damages awarded to Maria were excessive as a

matter of law and the stepchildren lacked standing to bring a

wrongful death claim) on the ground those arguments may be

moot depending on whether plaintiffs retry the case. CRGTS is

awarded its costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

CURREY, P. J.

We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.

15