The opinion
Case: 22-51038 Document: 00516855634 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/11/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-51038
Summary Calendar FILED
____________ August 11, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
Austin James, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Deputy Glenn Larcom, individual capacity; Deputy J. Jiles,
Badge Number 110; individual and official capacity,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 1:22-CV-149
______________________________
Before Clement, Graves, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Austin James, a customer of the Travis County Records Division,
alleges that his civil rights were violated when he was denied entry to the
Records Division’s office for refusing to wear a mask, in contravention of a
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-51038 Document: 00516855634 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/11/2023
No. 22-51038
county order. Because James failed to plausibly allege a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we AFFIRM.
I.
On December 21, 2021, Travis County Constable’s Office Deputies
G. Larcom and J. Jiles denied James access to the Travis County Records
Division because James was not wearing a face covering, in violation of the
county’s mask order. The second provision of the order required all
“employees” “entering into or present within” specified Travis County
buildings to wear a face covering. The third provision applied the same face-
covering requirement to “Customers.” And the fifth provision stated that
“Customers who do not wish to wear a face covering when entering into or
visiting a designated County Facility . . . will be required to leave the
premises.” The order did not contain any provision regarding whether
“employees” who did not wish to wear a face covering would also be required
to leave the premises.
James alleges that, during their confrontation, Jiles “pulled his [own]
face covering entirely below his chin” and yet Jiles—unlike James—“was
allowed reentry into the Records Office.” James therefore filed class-of-one
equal-protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for this
alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court
dismissed James’ complaint for failure to plausibly allege a constitutional
violation. James appeals.
II.
We review a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.
Petersen v. Johnson, 57 F.4th 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
2
Case: 22-51038 Document: 00516855634 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/11/2023
No. 22-51038
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “We may affirm a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal on any grounds raised below and supported by the record.”
Petersen, 57 F.4th at 231 (quoting Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th
Cir. 2007)).
III.
To establish an equal protection violation as a “class of one,” James
was required to plausibly allege that (1) he was “intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated” and (2) “there was no rational
basis for the difference in treatment.” Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d
225, 233 (5th Cir. 2012). The district court found that James failed at the first
prong because he had not identified any “other customer who attempted to
enter the Records Office without a face covering who was not asked to
leave,” and Jiles (an employee) was “not an apt comparator” because the
applicable provision in the county’s mask order “applie[d] only to
‘customers,’ not employees.” We agree.
While there is no “rigid, mechanical” test for determining whether
James and Jiles are “similarly situated,” our court has explained that “[i]n a
case like this one, which involves the application of an ordinance or statute,
the plaintiff’s and comparators’ relationships with the ordinance at issue will
generally be a relevant characteristic for purposes of the similarly-situated
analysis.” Lindquist, 669 F.3d at 233–34. Our opinion in Beeler v. Rounsavall
is instructive. 328 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 2003). There, we found that the statute
3
Case: 22-51038 Document: 00516855634 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/11/2023
No. 22-51038
at issue “clearly distinguishe[d] between applications for new permits and
applications to renew existing permits” and therefore the plaintiff—who was
applying for a new permit—and his proposed comparators—who were
applying to renew an existing permit—“were not similarly situated.” Id. at
817. As the district court recognized, the same logic applies here. The Travis
County order clearly distinguished between “employees” and “customers.”
And while it required both employees and customers to wear masks, only
customers who declined to wear masks were “required to leave the premises.”
Thus, Jiles—an employee—and James—a customer—were not similarly
situated. Because James has not identified any customer-comparators, he has
failed to plausibly allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
A plausibly alleged constitutional violation is a required element of
James’ § 1983 and § 1985 claims. E.g., Jackson v. Pierre, 810 F. App’x 276,
280–81 (5th Cir. 2020). Since James did not establish a constitutional
violation, the district court correctly dismissed James’ claims against Jiles
and Larcom in their personal capacities on qualified-immunity grounds, see
Benfield v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2019), and his claims against
Jiles in his official capacity on the merits, see City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475
U.S. 796, 799 (1986). 1
We AFFIRM.
_____________________
1
We therefore need not address the district court’s other bases for dismissal.
4