Timothy Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 23a0172p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

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TIMOTHY A. RAIMEY, Administrator of the Estate of

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Matthew Burroughs, No. 22-3285

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Plaintiff-Appellee, │

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v. >

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CITY OF NILES, OHIO, et al., │

Defendants, │

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CHRISTOPHER MANNELLA, Niles City Police │

Department Officer, in his individual capacity, │

Defendant-Appellant. │

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown.

No. 4:20-cv-00005—Sara E. Lioi, District Judge.

Argued: March 17, 2023

Decided and Filed: August 10, 2023

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Mel L. Lute, Jr., BAKER DUBLIKAR, North Canton, Ohio, for Appellant. Kevin

C. Hulick, SPANGENBERG, SHIBLEY & LIBER, LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Mel L. Lute, Jr., Gregory A. Beck, Andrea K. Ziarko, BAKER DUBLIKAR, North

Canton, Ohio, for Appellant. Kevin C. Hulick, Nicholas A. DiCello, SPANGENBERG,

SHIBLEY & LIBER, LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, Jonathan S. Abady, Earl S. Ward, Vivake Prasad,

EMERY CELLI BRINCKERHOFF ABADY WARD & MAZEL LLP, New York, New York,

for Appellee.

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 2

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OPINION

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JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. In January 2019, Officer Christopher Mannella

fatally shot James Burroughs at an apartment complex in Niles, Ohio. On behalf of Burroughs’s

estate, Timothy Raimey brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the

City of Niles and several involved police officers. The Defendants moved for summary

judgment, which Raimey did not oppose except as to his claims against Mannella. The district

court granted summary judgment to the other Defendants but denied Mannella’s assertions of

qualified and state law immunity, allowing Raimey’s claims of excessive force, wrongful death,

assault and battery, and reckless conduct, to proceed against Mannella. Mannella timely

appealed. We deny Raimey’s motion to dismiss the appeal and affirm the denial of qualified

immunity to Mannella.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties in this case dispute the facts surrounding the shooting. To determine the

relevant set of facts in an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity, “we follow the

same path as did the district court” by “drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s

favor—and, ideally . . . . look[ing] no further than the district court’s opinion for the pertinent

facts and inference.” Bunkley v. City of Detroit, 902 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing

DiLuzio v. Vill. of Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we draw the

following facts from the district court opinion.

On January 2, 2019, Matthew Burroughs went to the Niles Municipal Court to pay a

traffic fine. As the court processed Burroughs’s payment, the electronic docketing system

alerted court officials that there was an active warrant for Burroughs’s arrest that related to a

recent domestic violence incident. Officer James Reppy was one of the officers who responded

to that incident.

Court personnel asked Todd Zickefoose, a probation officer, to ensure that Burroughs did

not leave while a bailiff summoned the police, but Burroughs left through the front doors.

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 3

Zickefoose followed Burroughs outside, commanded him to stop and come back into the court

because there was a warrant for his arrest, and told him to put his hands behind his back. When

Zickefoose tried to grab Burroughs’s forearm, he pulled away and ran toward the building’s

parking lot; Zickefoose chased Burroughs and caught up with him as Burroughs was opening the

door to his car. Zickefoose grabbed Burroughs’s arm as he was getting into the car and

attempted to pull him out, but Burroughs started the car, put it in reverse, and as he pulled away,

the open car door hit Zickefoose in his midsection. Zickefoose reported the incident and the

vehicle’s license plate number to the police.

Dispatch notified police Lieutenant Daniel Adkins and Officers Mannella, Reppy, and

Hogan about the altercation, and each officer responded separately to Burroughs’s apartment on

Royal Mall Drive. Hogan arrived first and saw Burroughs turn onto Royal Mall Drive traveling

approximately 30 to 35 miles per hour—“not over” the speed limit. Burroughs was followed

closely by Mannella, who was then on foot, and then was followed by the police cruisers driven

by Reppy and Adkins. Burroughs’s car approached and stopped about three feet from Hogan’s

cruiser, in what Hogan described as a “controlled stop” that did not require Burroughs to slam on

the brakes. Burroughs then put the car in reverse and backed away from Hogan’s cruiser at a

speed that Hogan testified was “not overexcessive.” But as Burroughs reversed his car, Reppy

pulled into the apartment complex behind him, blocking him between Reppy’s SUV and

Hogan’s cruiser. Burroughs stopped again to avoid hitting Reppy’s vehicle. Burroughs then

shifted the car back into drive.

Officers Hogan and Mannella failed to activate their body cameras before or during the

incident, in violation of the Niles Police Department’s body camera policy. Reppy’s body

camera was on and partially captured the fatal encounter that ensued, recording the sound of all

eight shots fired and images of the position of Mannella and Burroughs’s car for seven out of

eight shots. Mannella approached the car on foot, with his gun drawn, and yelled for Burroughs

to “[s]hut the car off” and “[g]et out of the vehicle.” Mannella then fired three rounds into the

windshield, which penetrated the windshield and hit Burroughs in the chest, killing him. Reppy

fired an additional five shots that penetrated the car but did not hit Burroughs. Mannella turned

his body camera on after the shooting and immediately stated that he feared that he would be run

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 4

over. Mannella’s body camera footage also captures Mannella admonishing Hogan to be careful

of what he said on camera.1 After the shooting, Officers broke the car window to gain entry.

When they tried to remove Burroughs’s body from the driver’s seat without putting the car in

park, the car lurched forward and hit a dumpster before coming to a complete stop.

Mannella disputes a number of these facts. Based on the record evidence and drawing

inferences in Raimey’s favor, however, the district court determined that a reasonable jury could

credit Raimey’s version of events and find that, when Mannella opened fire, Burroughs was

moving slowly or was stationary; Burroughs was complying with Mannella’s commands by

bringing the vehicle to a stop; and Mannella was standing to the side of the car, not in the

vehicle’s path. In making these findings, the district relied on witness testimony, including

Hogan’s statement that Burroughs’s vehicle was “slowing down . . . to a great degree” when

Mannella fired, along with Reppy’s body camera footage showing that when Mannella fired,

Burroughs was travelling very slowly—if at all—and decreasing his speed, as evidenced by his

car’s lit brake lights. The district court also relied on an unrebutted forensic analysis by

Raimey’s expert, Jason Fries, Ph.D., which determined that Burroughs’s car was pointed away

from Mannella and that Mannella was to the side of the vehicle when he fired. 2 An investigation

by the Bureau of Criminal Investigation for the Ohio Attorney General’s office ensued.

On behalf of Burroughs’s estate, Raimey sued the City of Niles, the City’s Police Chief,

and Officers Mannella, Reppy, and Hogan, bringing claims for violation of Burroughs’s Fourth

Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for wrongful death, reckless conduct, and assault

and battery under Ohio law. The Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified

immunity on the §1983 claims and immunity from liability under Ohio law. Raimey opposed

summary judgment only as to Mannella, and the district court granted summary dismissal to the

other Defendants. The district court held that genuine issues of material fact precluded a grant of

1The Court may look to video footage where “[t]here are no allegations or indications that this videotape

was doctored or altered in any way, nor any contention that what it depicts differs from what actually happened.”

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

2The Defendants chose not to depose Raimey’s expert, then raised a late Daubert challenge to the expert’s

methodology in their reply brief, which the district court rejected on the merits. Mannella does not renew the

Daubert challenge on appeal.

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 5

summary judgment to Mannella because “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances in a

light most favorable to [Raimey], . . . a jury could find that Burroughs did not present an

imminent or ongoing danger to the officers or others at the scene.” Mannella timely appealed,

and Raimey moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Mannella raised factual disputes that

deprived this court of appellate jurisdiction.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on qualified immunity grounds.” Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560,

565 (6th Cir. 2013); Hubbell v. City of Xenia, 873 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Ohio 2007) (same as to

governmental immunity under Ohio law). “Qualified immunity shields government officials

performing discretionary functions from civil liability unless their conduct violates clearly

established rights.” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2013). At

summary judgment, a government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the evidence,

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to find that

“(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established.” Id. at

680-81(quoting Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2011)). Summary judgment is

proper only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.

Hicks v. Scott, 958 F.3d 421, 430 (6th Cir. 2020).

B. Jurisdiction

This court has jurisdiction over appeals from “final decisions of the district courts[.]”

28 U.S.C. § 1291. Interlocutory appeals of the denial of qualified immunity at the summary

judgment stage are considered “final decision[s]” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Our jurisdiction, however, is limited to legal

questions because “circuit courts can review a denial of qualified immunity only ‘to the extent

that it turns on an issue of law.’” Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 6

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530). When the record contains “a videotape capturing the events in

question,” we may not adopt a “version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment” that “blatantly contradict[s]” the asserted version of events such that “no

reasonable jury could believe it.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). And “we must

nonetheless ‘view any relevant gaps or uncertainties left by the videos in the light most favorable

to the Plaintiff.’” LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek, 30 F.4th 572, 578 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2017)).

At summary judgment, courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—which, in qualified immunity

cases, “usually means adopting . . . the plaintiff’s version of the facts.” Id. at 378; see Adams v.

Blount Cnty., 946 F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 2020). As we have acknowledged, “in accepting the

district court’s factual determinations and relying on the plaintiff’s record evidence for the

purpose of deciding the interlocutory appeal, we do not ourselves make any findings of fact or

inference for purposes of any subsequent proceedings.” DiLuzio, 796 F.3d at 611. Instead,

whether the plaintiff “is ultimately able to prove the alleged factual bases for his claims is a

matter left for the finder of fact [on remand]—not the appellate court on interlocutory appeal.”

Bunkley, 902 F.3d at 561 (alterations in original) (quoting Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 448

(8th Cir. 2010)).

Although Mannella purports to accept the facts construed by the district court in the light

most favorable to Raimey, he contests multiple critical factual determinations—arguing, for

instance, that he perceived the car to be accelerating and driving at a speed of twenty to twenty-

five miles per hour and in danger of “striking and killing an officer or officers” when he used

deadly force; that he was positioned in the front-center path of Burroughs’s vehicle; and that

Burroughs was not complying with orders to stop. These assertions directly contradict the

district court’s determinations of the facts.

As Mannella appears to concede, his appeal includes factual disputes that this court has

no jurisdiction to decide on interlocutory appeal. Nonetheless, we may decide a challenge “with

any legal aspect to it,” even if the appellant makes improper fact-based arguments. See Bunkley,

902 F.3d at 560 (providing that a court may “excise the prohibited fact-based challenge so as to

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 7

establish jurisdiction.”). Specifically, we may decide the legal question of whether qualified

immunity is warranted based on the facts as found by the district court, taken in the light most

favorable to Raimey. See id.

C. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects governmental officials from suit as long “as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A two-step inquiry

applies, asking whether the facts, “when taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting

the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” Mullins v. Cyranek, 805

F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2015), and whether the right was “clearly established” such “that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right,” Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). A

court should exercise its “sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified

immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at

hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

1. Constitutional Violation

With respect to the first qualified immunity prong, the question is whether “the

plaintiff[’s] version of the events, relied upon by the district court, supports a holding that

defendants violated [the plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.”

Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from

using excessive force while making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other type of seizure. See

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-395 (1989). A use of force must be “objectively

reasonable” to be constitutional. Id. at 397. Objective reasonableness is “judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 958 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490

U.S. at 396). It allows for the fact that “police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments” about the amount of force necessary “in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving.” Mullins, 805 F.3d at 766–67 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97).

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 8

Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer’s use of deadly force is objectively reasonable

only when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

officer or to others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. To

determine whether such probable cause exists, we consider “the facts and circumstances of each

particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Our precedent establishes

that the question of whether a suspect posed an immediate danger is dispositive: where the

suspect poses no immediate threat to the safety of an officer or others, the use of deadly force is

unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. Foster v. Patrick, 806 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir.

2015).

Our court has a line of precedent addressing the use of deadly force against suspects

fleeing in cars. When an officer uses deadly force in that situation, we ask whether the officer

had “reason to believe that the car present[ed] an imminent danger” to the lives of “officers and

members of the public in the area.” Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 775 (6th Cir. 2005). Deadly

force is justified against “‘a driver who objectively appears ready to drive into an officer or

bystander with his car,’ but generally not ‘once the car moves away, leaving the officer and

bystanders in a position of safety,’ unless ‘the officer’s prior interactions with the driver suggest

that the driver will continue to endanger others with his car.’” Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541,

548 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cass v. City of Dayton, 770 F.3d 368, 375 (6th Cir. 2014)).

For instance, in Kirby, officers “essentially sandwiched” the defendant’s vehicle between

their police cars and a ditch so that he could not easily flee. 530 F.3d at 477-78. The police

claimed: that the defendant’s car began to back up toward an officer on the shoulder of the road

next to a ditch, endangering his life and prompting him to fire his weapon at the driver; and that

the car then lurched forward toward a second officer, who shot at Kirby because he feared he

would be crushed between two vehicles. Id. at 478. Eyewitness testimony and accident

reconstruction evidence, however, established that: Kirby’s car had moved slowly; that it could

not have hit any of the officers; who were shielded by their own vehicles or standing to the side;

and that it was not moving when the officers fired. Id. at 482. We affirmed the district court’s

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 9

denial of qualified immunity because a jury could conclude that a reasonable police officer

would not have believed Kirby posed a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.

Id. at 482.

Similarly, in Cupp, the defendant officer claimed that he shot a suspect who gained

control of a police cruiser and accelerated toward the nearby officer and a bystander—but the

plaintiff produced evidence that the officer had in fact fired the fatal shot after the suspect’s car

had already passed him, under circumstances “of no threat to [the officer] or others.” 430 F.3d at

770. Even though the officer made a “split-second judgment” based on rapidly developing

events, the court held that a reasonable jury could conclude the car was merely pointed in the

officer and bystander’s general direction and a reasonable officer would not have perceived

danger to anyone at the scene. Id. at 774-75 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). Likewise, we

held in Sigley v. City of Parma Heights that it was constitutionally unreasonable for police to

shoot the driver of a fleeing vehicle—even though the driver might have hit an officer while

backing up—because the driver later avoided collisions with police cars, and because it was not

clear that he had intended to injure any officers or bystanders. 437 F.3d 527, 536-37 (6th Cir.

2006).

As in Kirby and Cupp, the facts taken in the light most favorable to Raimey show that no

person at the scene was in danger when Mannella used deadly force. At the time Mannella fired,

Burroughs was driving very slowly and braking to comply with Mannella’s orders to stop, while

Mannella himself was either not in the path of the vehicle or could easily have stepped away

from the slowly braking car. The officers also never saw Burroughs drive in a reckless or

dangerous manner leading up to the shooting—instead, their testimony establishes that he drove

under the speed limit, did not risk hitting or attempt to hit any cars, officers, or pedestrians,

avoided hitting police vehicles by making a controlled stop, and was not facing Mannella head

on but rather was to the side of Mannella when Mannella fired. Based on the facts found by the

district court, a reasonable officer in Mannella’s position would not have had reason to believe

that Burroughs posed an imminent danger. Cupp, 430 F.3d at 774.

Mannella’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, he argues that Burroughs’s

prior confrontation with Zickefoose showed he was willing to injure an officer that got in the

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 10

way of his escape. But the use of deadly force at issue here occurred at a different location, and

after that possible danger had subsided, when Burroughs was trying to comply with Mannella’s

commands. See Kirby, 530 F.3d at 479. Between Burroughs’s confrontation with Zickefoose

and the situation at the time of Mannella’s use of force, the facts viewed in Plaintiff’s favor as

found by the district court show that Burroughs drove under the speed limit, avoided hitting any

cars or pedestrians, initially brought his vehicle to a controlled stop to avoid hitting a police

vehicle, and was in the process of complying with Mannella’s orders to stop his car. Therefore,

although the situation “developed rapidly,” this “is not a case where a dangerous situation

evolved quickly to a safe one before the police officer had a chance to realize the change.”

Cupp, 430 F.3d at 774-75.

Mannella’s other arguments also rely on factual disputes over which we have no

jurisdiction. For instance, Mannella attempts to distinguish this case from Cupp, arguing that the

suspect’s flight in that case did not immediately threaten the officer or any other bystander. But

the facts found by the district court yield the same conclusion: that Mannella, positioned to the

side of the car, was not immediately threatened by Burroughs, who was braking and traveling at

a very slow speed. This case is also unlike Burghardt v. Ryan, in which the court found an

officer’s use of deadly force did not violate a clearly established right where the suspect’s car

crashed into a parked cruiser immediately before the officers opened fire. No. 21-3906, 2022

WL 1773420, at *1 (6th Cir. June 1, 2022). Here, Burroughs affirmatively avoided crashing into

any other cars and was in the process of complying with Mannella’s commands.

In the factual setting in which deadly force was used, a reasonable officer in Mannella’s

position would not have had reason to believe that Burroughs posed a threat of imminent harm.

We therefore affirm the district court’s decision that Mannella’s use of deadly force was

unreasonable and violated Burroughs’s Fourth Amendment rights.

2. Clearly Established Law

“It is clearly established constitutional law that an officer cannot shoot a non-dangerous

fleeing felon[.]” Cupp, 430 F.3d at 775-76 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 11). The Supreme Court

has long held that, “[w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 11

others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force

to do so.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. Like the plaintiff in Cupp, Burroughs posed no threat of

imminent harm to officers or others, making this an “obvious case where Tennessee v. Garner

clearly establishes the law.” Cupp, 430 F.3d at 776. Kirby and Sigley reinforce this conclusion

and make clear that it is constitutionally unreasonable to use deadly force where an officer is

positioned to the side of a car or is not in danger of being hit, and Cupp gave Mannella fair

warning that a reasonable officer would not perceive imminent harm based merely on the fact

that the decedent looked at the officer with his hands on the wheel of a vehicle. Kirby, 530 F.3d

at 482; Sigley, 437 F.3d at 536-37; Cupp, 430 F.3d at 769.

Moreover, “[g]eneral statements of the law are capable of giving clear and fair warning to

officers even where ‘the very action in question has [not] previously been held

unlawful.’” Cupp, 430 F.3d at 776-7 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640) (second alteration in

Cupp). Garner long ago established that a non-dangerous fleeing suspect has the right not to be

seized with deadly force. Mannella had clear warning of the unconstitutionality of using deadly

force to apprehend Burroughs. We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

D. Ohio Statutory Immunity

In addition to the § 1983 claims, Raimey also brings state law tort claims for wrongful

death, assault and battery, and reckless conduct. Mannella appeals the district court’s

determination that he was not entitled to immunity under the Ohio statute that grants immunity to

municipal employees acting within the scope of their employment. Ohio law grants immunity

from civil suit to employees of political subdivisions unless their acts or omissions are

“manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities” or taken

“with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2744.03(A)(6)(a)-(b). Relevant here, “reckless conduct” is “characterized by the conscious

disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable

under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” Anderson v. City of

Massillon, 983 N.E.2d 266, 273 (Ohio 2012).

No. 22-3285 Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio Page 12

When federal qualified immunity and state-law immunity “rest on the same questions of

material fact, we may review the state-law immunity defense ‘through the lens of federal

qualified immunity analysis.’” Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 878 (6th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Hopper v. Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 759 (6th Cir. 2018)) (police officers’ Ohio law

statutory immunity defense “stands or falls with their federal qualified immunity defense.”). We

have previously held that “if the trier of fact were to find that” a decedent “posed no immediate

threat of harm to anyone else. . . then the officer’s actions in shooting the decedent were reckless

at best” for purposes of Ohio statutory immunity. Stewart v. City of Euclid, 970 F.3d 667, 677

(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sabo v. City of Mentor, 657 F.3d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 2011)). We hold

that the same evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that Mannella’s actions were

unconstitutional supports a finding that Mannella’s actions were at least taken in a reckless

manner. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we DENY Raimey’s motion to dismiss the appeal,

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court, and REMAND the case for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.