Opinion

Deborah L. Hale v. W. Va. Dept. of Transportation, Div. of Highways, etc.

Court
West Virginia Supreme Court
Filed
Jun 28, 2013
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Administrative Agency-Other
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 27.7%

The opinion

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Deborah L. Hale, Respondent Below,

Petitioner FILED

June 28, 2013

vs) No. 12-0776 (Kanawha County 11-AA-95) RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA

West Virginia Department of Transportation,

Division of Highways, Petitioner Below,

and Kristen Cook, Intervenor Below,

Respondents

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Deborah L. Hale, by counsel John W. Feuchtenberger, appeals the Circuit

Court of Kanawha County’s February 17, 2012 order reversing the decision of the West Virginia

Public Employees Grievance Board (“Grievance Board”) granting petitioner relief on her

grievance. Respondent West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways

(“DOT”), by counsel Krista D. Black, has filed a response and also asserted a cross-assignment

of error in regard to this order. Petitioner has also filed a reply. Kristen Cook has made no

appearance in this matter.

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these

reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

In 2009, Respondent DOT posted a new position in District Ten for an Administrative

Services Manager 1. Interviewees were chosen by a committee consisting of Jeff Black, the

director of the human resources division, and Gene Godfrey, a mid-level manager in the central

DOT headquarters. Both petitioner and Respondent Cook were among the chosen interview

candidates, and Cook was eventually selected for the position. In April of 2010, petitioner filed a

Level I grievance because she was not selected for the position, and a conference was held on

April 16, 2010. By decision issued on May 5, 2010, the grievance was denied. Petitioner

appealed the decision to Level II, where mediation was unsuccessful. On July 13, 2010,

petitioner appealed the decision to Level III. Following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) granted petitioner’s grievance. Respondent DOT was ordered to place petitioner in the

grieved position with increased compensation and all additional pay and benefits, with back pay,

and appropriate statutory interest and benefits beginning April 1, 2010. Thereafter, Respondent

DOT filed an appeal in the circuit court. By order entered on February 17, 2012, the circuit court

reversed the Grievance Board’s decision. It is from this order that petitioner appeals, alleging

three assignments of error.

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This Court has previously held that “‘[a] final order of the hearing examiner for the West

Virginia Educational Employees Grievance Board . . . should not be reversed unless clearly

wrong.’ Syllabus Point 1, Randolph County Board of Education v. Scalia, 182 W.Va. 289, 387

S.E.2d 524 (1989).” Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Alderman v. Pocahontas Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 223 W.Va.

431, 675 S.E.2d 907 (2009) (internal citations omitted). Upon our review, the Court concludes

that the circuit court did not improperly review the Grievance Board’s decision nor did it err in

reversing that decision. While petitioner argues that the circuit court applied an incorrect

standard of review in reaching its decision to reverse, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to

no relief in regard to this assignment of error. A review of the order in question shows that the

circuit court found “that the decision of the ALJ for the [Grievance Board] was clearly wrong in

view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.” As such, it is clear

that the circuit court applied a “clearly wrong” standard as required by Scalia and Alderman.

In reaching its determination as to the ALJ’s decision being clearly wrong, the circuit

court also found that the ALJ substituted her judgment for that of the interviewers in identifying

a significant flaw in the selection process. The circuit court applied an arbitrary and capricious

standard in reviewing the ALJ’s finding as to a significant flaw in the selection process. We have

previously held that “[t]he ‘clearly wrong’ and the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standards of review

are deferential ones which presume an agency’s actions are valid as long as the decision is

supported by substantial evidence or by a rational basis.” Syllabus Point 3, In re Queen, 196

W.Va. 442, 473 S.E.2d 483 (1996).” Syl., Adkins v. W.Va. Dep’t of Educ., 210 W.Va. 105, 556

S.E.2d 72 (2001).

The circuit court noted that the ALJ’s decision indicated flaws with the selection process,

such as inaccurate ratings for each interviewee, and also the fact that Mr. Black suffered a cough

that caused him to excuse himself, which deprived petitioner of a valid interview. However, the

circuit court found that the testimony established that “the interviewers had logical reasons for

the ratings that were given to [petitioner] and [Respondent Cook].” These logical reasons

included consideration of each applicant’s credentials, their experience, and what was discerned

during the interview process. The circuit court noted that, after completing the interviews, “the

interviewers determined that [Cook] possessed the college-level education and persona that

would make her a good fit for the position.” Further, the circuit court noted that “although Mr.

Black excused himself with a cough, he was present and answered all of the questions on

[petitioner’s] standard application evaluation form.” While petitioner argues that the circuit

court’s finding in this regard constitutes error because these issues cannot be seen as anything

other than “a significant flaw in the selection process,” the Court agrees with the circuit court’s

reasoning on this issue. Respondent DOT’s actions were valid because their decision was

supported by substantial evidence, as addressed above, and by a rational basis regarding their

reasons for selecting Respondent Cook. As such, the Court finds no error in the circuit court’s

finding that the ALJ erred in substituting her judgment for that of the interviewers in identifying

an alleged flaw in the selection process.

In regard to petitioner’s remaining assignment of error, the Court finds no merit in

petitioner’s argument that the circuit court incorrectly found that petitioner had to establish that

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she was the most qualified candidate out of all applicants. According to petitioner, all she was

required to establish was that she was more qualified than Respondent Cook. Based on the

foregoing, including the Court’s affirmation of the circuit court’s findings as to Respondent

Cook’s qualifications, we find that petitioner could not even establish that she was more

qualified than Respondent Cook. As such, petitioner has failed to establish error on the part of

the circuit court.

Finally, the Court declines to grant respondent relief in regard to its cross-assignment of

error. On appeal, Respondent DOT argues that the Grievance Board violated its right to cross-

examine witnesses when it admitted and gave dispositive weight to an unauthenticated statement

by a declarant who was not shown to be unavailable, whose statement directly contradicted that

of three witnesses, and who had not been disclosed on petitioner’s witness list. Respondent

requests that should the Court reverse the circuit court’s judgment as to petitioner’s assignments

of error, it also reverse the Grievance Board’s decision and enter judgment for respondent based

upon this alleged due process violation, or, in the alternative, that it remand the matter to the

Grievance Board for proceedings wherein the statement is not admitted. However, in light of the

foregoing, the Court finds this cross-assignment of error to be moot.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court and its

February 17, 2012 order reversing the Grievance Board’s decision is affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: June 28, 2013

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Brent D. Benjamin

Justice Menis E. Ketchum

Justice Allen H. Loughry II

DISSENTING:

Justice Robin Jean Davis

DISQUALIFIED:

Justice Margaret L. Workman

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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