Jerry Scott Heidler v. Warden GDCP

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 1 of 112

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13752

____________________

JERRY SCOTT HEIDLER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

WARDEN, GDCP

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 6:11-cv-00109-LGW

____________________

Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 2 of 112

2 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

LUCK, Circuit Judge:

In the early morning of December 4, 1997, Jerry Heidler

broke into the home of Danny and Kim Daniels and shot them and

two of their children to death. Heidler was convicted and sen-

tenced to death for the murders. He now appeals the denial of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. section 2254.

Heidler makes three arguments on appeal. First, Heidler

contends that the Georgia Supreme Court unreasonably applied

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in denying his claim

that his trial counsel were ineffective in investigating and present-

ing evidence of his mental health during the guilt phase of his trial.

Second, he argues that the Georgia Supreme Court unreasonably

applied Strickland in denying his claim that his trial counsel were

ineffective in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence dur-

ing the penalty phase of his trial. And third, Heidler argues that the

district court erred in concluding that he did not sufficiently plead,

and did not exhaust, his claim that his trial counsel were ineffective

because they failed to adequately present information and evidence

in pretrial motions relating to Heidler waiving his constitutional

rights while he was being interrogated by the police. After careful

review of the briefs and the record, and with the benefit of oral

argument, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Murders

Danny and Kim Daniels lived in Santa Claus, Georgia—a

small town in Toombs County—with their seven children, three of

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 3 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 3

whom were foster children. Mrs. Daniels had been in foster care

herself as a child. And over the years, the Danielses opened their

home to many foster children—including Heidler’s sister Joanne.

While his sister was staying there, Heidler would visit the Dan-

ielses’ home. Even after his sister left their care, Heidler continued

to visit their home. But Mr. Daniels asked Heidler to stop visiting

after the twenty-year-old Heidler developed a relationship with the

Danielses’ sixteen-year-old daughter.

Around the time that Mr. Daniels told Heidler to stop visit-

ing the home, Heidler’s girlfriend, Marie Spivey, “got pregnant . . .

with [Heidler and Ms. Spivey’s] second son.” Six months into Ms.

Spivey’s pregnancy, though, the baby boy was stillborn. Days later,

on December 3, 1997, Heidler went to his stillborn son’s funeral.

Distraught, Heidler left the funeral and drove to the Danielses’

home. Heidler explained that his “mind just went blank” and that

he “[j]ust couldn’t take nothing.” All he felt was “rage.”

When he got to the Danielses’ home, Heidler entered the

house through a back window, smoked a cigarette, and took a shot-

gun from Mr. Daniels’s gun cabinet. He then went to the master

bedroom and shot Mr. and Mrs. Daniels as they slept. Mrs. Daniels

probably died instantly, but Mr. Daniels survived the initial shot.

At the time, Mr. Daniels was forty-seven years old. Mrs. Daniels

was thirty-three.

After shooting Mr. and Mrs. Daniels, Heidler left their room

and went to the Danielses’ eight-year-old son’s bedroom. When

he got there, Heidler killed the sleeping boy with a shot to the head

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 4 of 112

4 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

from close range. The Danielses’ sixteen-year-old daughter woke

up from the commotion and ran to her parents’ bedroom, where

Heidler shot her in the back of the head, killing her instantly.

When Heidler noticed that Mr. Daniels was still alive, Mr. Daniels

threw up his hands and arms to protect himself but Heidler shot

him a second time. Then a third time. Then a fourth. Those shots

were fatal.

After killing Mr. and Mrs. Daniels and two of their children,

Heidler left the Danielses’ two youngest children—a four-year-old

boy and a ten-month-old infant—in the house with their dead fam-

ily members. But Heidler took the Danielses’ three young daugh-

ters with him to a secluded place where he sexually assaulted one

of them, who was eight years old. Heidler threw Mr. Daniels’s

shotgun into a river, dropped the girls off on the side of a dirt road,

and returned to his stillborn son’s grave. After that, Heidler went

to his mother’s house to sleep and play video games.

B. Heidler’s Arrest and Confession

Later that morning, police found the Danielses’ three young

daughters in the middle of the road in their pajamas. The girls iden-

tified Heidler as their kidnapper. Police arrested Heidler, informed

1

him of his Miranda rights, and interrogated him for about four

hours.

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 5 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 5

During the interrogation, Heidler said that he remembered

what had happened in the Danielses’ home “as if it were in a

dream.” The interrogating police officers asked Heidler if they

could “come with [him] and walk in this dream with [him]” and

Heidler then told them “what he remembered from his dream.” At

the end of the interrogation, the officers videotaped Heidler’s con-

fession in which he admitted to killing Mr. and Mrs. Daniels and

two of their children, and to “t[aking] the girls” and “molest[ing]”

one of them.

C. Trial Counsel’s Investigation of Mitigation Evidence

Two experienced criminal defense attorneys were ap-

pointed to represent Heidler at trial. The first, Michael Garrett,

served as lead counsel. Before Heidler’s case, Mr. Garrett had de-

fended about fifty death penalty cases, including approximately

forty that he tried first chair. Mr. Garrett had experience presenting

a mental health defense in “many” capital cases. “Of the nearly fifty

clients that Mr. Garrett ha[d] represented in death penalty cases[,]

only two received the death penalty.”

The second attorney was Kathy Palmer. Ms. Palmer was the

contract public defender in Toombs County. Before Heidler’s case,

Ms. Palmer had tried “several” murder cases and first chaired three

of them. She had also tried a death penalty case involving mental

health issues before taking Heidler’s case and was “very familiar

with the process of a death penalty case” and “everything that

needed to be done in order to prepare for a death penalty case.”

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 6 of 112

6 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Based on their initial meetings with Heidler, Mr. Garrett and

Ms. Palmer were “totally convinced” that Heidler was mentally ill.

Mr. Garrett and Ms. Palmer also determined that “the facts were

overwhelming as to what happened” on the night of the murders.

So Mr. Garrett and Ms. Palmer decided to pursue a “guilty but

2

mentally ill” verdict to avoid a death sentence. Mr. Garrett took

responsibility for “deal[ing] with the mental health issues.” Ms.

Palmer took responsibility for “mitigation,” which involved “inves-

tigating [Heidler’s] background and finding out anything that [she]

could in regards to reasons as to why [Heidler] was mentally ill and

2

At the time of Heidler’s trial, Georgia law provided:

In all cases in which the defense of insanity is interposed, the

jury, or the court if tried by it, shall find whether the defendant

is:

(A) Guilty;

(B) Not guilty;

(C) Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime;

(D) Guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, but the

finding of mentally ill shall be made only in felony cases; or

(E) Guilty but mentally retarded, but the finding of mental re-

tardation shall be made only in felony cases.

Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(b)(1) (1998). A “guilty but mentally ill” verdict

didn’t preclude a death sentence. See id. § 17-7-131(g), (j); Spivey v. Head, 207

F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[B]oth guilty but mentally ill and guilty but

mentally retarded defendants are sentenced the same as those found guilty of

the offense except that those found guilty but mentally retarded are not eligi-

ble for the death penalty.”).

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 7 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 7

what about his past would help to convince a jury that he should

not receive the death penalty.”

Trial counsel hired an investigator to assist in their investigation,

interviewed witnesses, and gathered Heidler’s records

During Mr. Garrett’s and Ms. Palmer’s initial meetings with

Heidler, Heidler “was totally nonresponsive.” In later meetings,

Heidler continued to provide only “minimal” information to Ms.

Palmer. Beyond interviewing Heidler, Ms. Palmer also hired an

investigator, Frank Gillis, to help her “find witnesses down in the

country.” Investigator Gillis sought out Heidler’s “aunts and un-

cles and cousins” and some of Heidler’s friends. Ms. Palmer also

“drove up and down the dirt roads” and “went up and down the

street where [Heidler] lived” going “door to door and around the

community and at the convenience store” to investigate Heidler’s

background. Ms. Palmer also went “to the jails,” to the “Juvenile

Court,” and to the Toombs County Department of Family and

Children Services (“DFACS”) to speak with caseworkers and

gather Heidler’s records. And when Investigator Gillis found “an-

ything helpful,” Ms. Palmer would “follow up [her]self” to inter-

view the witnesses that Investigator Gillis found.

Ms. Palmer interviewed Heidler’s mother, his aunt and un-

cle, and his sister, Lisa Aguilar. Ms. Palmer described Heidler’s

family members as people who “run from you, they don’t come

and pour out information at all.” According to Ms. Palmer, Ms.

Aguilar was the “most sympathetic family member,” while

Heidler’s mother was “an absolute, raving lunatic.” Heidler’s

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 8 of 112

8 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

mother claimed that Heidler “was not guilty,” that “this was a con-

spiracy,” and that Heidler’s brother Steve (who was in prison)

“committed the murders.” She was “not helpful” at all. Ms.

Palmer and Investigator Gillis also interviewed Heidler’s friends,

but they “weren’t sympathetic” or “helpful.”

Ms. Palmer also met with a DFACS attorney and casework-

ers to “put[] together the history of how [Heidler’s] mother had

mistreated him and his stepfather had abused him and how they

had run from DFACS and [Heidler had] been in and out of care.”

Ms. Palmer explained that it was “very hard” to piece together

Heidler’s history because his mother “had jumped county to

county.” Ms. Palmer “spent hours” going through Heidler’s

DFACS records with the DFACS attorney and caseworkers.

Ms. Palmer used the information from Heidler’s DFACS rec-

ords to find his former foster parents and people who had inter-

acted with him while he was under DFACS’s care. But “a lot” of

them “didn’t want to talk” to Ms. Palmer because “the murder[s]

[were] so bad.” Heidler’s case “was exceedingly traumatic for the

people of Toombs County and [DFACS] because of children in

their care being involved and the fact that many of them knew

[Heidler].” For example, one of the juvenile probation officers that

Ms. Palmer interviewed was at first “very sympathetic” and “help-

ful” over the phone but then claimed not to “remember anything

about anything” when Ms. Palmer tried to interview him in person.

And when Ms. Palmer visited the Cedarwood Psychoeducation

Program, a school for emotionally and behaviorally “disordered”

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 9 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 9

students that Heidler attended during his middle school years, Ms.

Palmer could find only one teacher, Marilyn Dryden, who would

testify at Heider’s trial.

Trial counsel retained two mental health experts to evaluate

Heidler

Mr. Garrett retained a psychologist, Dr. James Maish, to

evaluate Heidler. Dr. Maish met with Heidler six times, inter-

viewed him “extensively,” and gave him a “battery of tests.” Mr.

Garrett and Ms. Palmer provided Dr. Maish with reports of

Heidler’s behavior in jail and “several binders” of Heidler’s back-

ground records, including records “from mental health centers in

Southeast Georgia,” “DF[A]CS records,” and “reports from juve-

nile settings.”

Based on his evaluation of Heidler and his review of

Heidler’s records, Dr. Maish diagnosed Heidler with “borderline

personality disorder.” Dr. Maish concluded that Heidler “did not

meet the standard for not guilty by reason of insanity for the state

of Georgia” and that Heidler was competent to stand trial because

he “ha[d] a rational as well as reasonable understanding” of his

criminal proceedings. But Dr. Maish thought that Heidler “met the

standard” for a “guilty but mentally ill” verdict because of his bor-

derline personality disorder diagnosis.

Mr. Garrett also retained Dr. Albert Olson, a “neurological

expert,” to evaluate Heidler for “pathological issues,” “brain dam-

age,” or a “head injury” and to do “neurological testing.” Dr.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 10 of 112

10 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Olson’s evaluation “didn’t find anything that [trial counsel]

thought would be helpful” to Heidler’s case.

Trial counsel interviewed the court-appointed mental health ex-

perts

Because Heidler pleaded not guilty and his trial counsel gave

notice of his intent to raise a mental illness defense, Georgia law

required the state trial court to order Heidler to undergo a separate,

independent psychological evaluation. See Ga. Code Ann.

§ 17-7-130.1; Nance v. State, 526 S.E.2d 560, 564 (Ga. 2000). In line

with this requirement, the state trial court appointed three mental

health experts to evaluate Heidler: Drs. Nic D’Alesandro, Gordon

Ifill, and Everette Kuglar.

Mr. Garrett provided Heidler’s background records and “an-

ything that [Ms. Palmer] got” from her background investigation

to Drs. D’Alesandro, Ifill, and Kuglar and interviewed each of them

before trial. Based on his interviews, Mr. Garrett understood that

Drs. D’Alesandro, Ifill, and Kuglar “seemed to agree [with Dr.

Maish] that [Heidler] was mentally ill.” Mr. Garrett thought that

Dr. Maish’s testimony “was going to be the strongest” but was

“confident” that Drs. Ifill and Kuglar would accurately present

Heidler’s mental health at trial.

D. Trial Counsel’s Motion to Suppress Heidler’s Statement to Police

Before trial, trial counsel moved to suppress “all evidence

obtained in the course of any illegal search and seizure” and ex-

plained in their motion that because “discovery and defense inves-

tigation [were] still ongoing and incomplete,” they “file[d] this

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 11 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 11

preliminary motion to suppress in general form so as to preserve

the right to challenge the legality of any search or seizure of evi-

dence that the [s]tate might introduce at trial.”

The state trial court held a Jackson-Denno3 hearing on the ad-

missibility of Heidler’s statement to police. During the hearing, the

state called the two police officers who had interrogated Heidler

after his arrest. Mr. Garrett cross examined the officers about

Heidler’s statement that he “could remember things if he was in

his dream” and how the police officers “g[ot] in his dream with him

and . . . participated as best [they] could.”

The state trial court denied the motion to suppress Heidler’s

statement to police. The state trial court “f[ound] from a prepon-

derance of the evidence that [Heidler] was advised of each of his

Miranda rights, that he understood them, that he voluntarily

waived them, and that he thereafter gave his statement knowingly,

freely[,] and voluntarily without any hope of benefit or fear of in-

jury.”

E. The Trial

Then came the trial—which was split into a guilt phase and

a sentencing phase. We’ll start with the guilt phase. During the

guilt phase, the state introduced video and photographs of the

3

See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Jackson, “the Supreme Court held

that, when a defendant objects to the introduction of his statement as invol-

untary, due process requires a trial judge to make an independent determina-

tion that the statement is voluntary before permitting it to be heard by the

jury.” Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1988).

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 12 of 112

12 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

murder scene, evidence that Heidler’s fingerprint was on the back

window of the Danielses’ home, evidence that Heidler’s DNA was

on a cigarette butt found at the Danielses’ home, evidence that the

Danielses’ three daughters identified Heidler as their kidnapper,

and evidence that Heidler sexually assaulted one of the them The

state also played Heidler’s videotaped confession and called the

two police officers who had interrogated him to testify about his

statements during the interrogation.

After the state rested, the state trial court ruled—over the

state’s objection—that it would call Drs. D’Alesandro, Ifill, and Ku-

glar as witnesses and would permit Heidler to use the court-ap-

pointed experts to prove his mental health condition. Based on the

state trial court’s ruling, Mr. Garrett decided not to call Dr. Maish

during the guilt phase because he “wanted to let the jury hear the

mental health evidence on the front end with [Drs. D’Alesandro,

Ifill, and Kuglar], and then let them hear it all over again [in the

penalty phase] from someone who [Mr. Garrett] thought would

. . . give the strongest testimony.” Thus, trial counsel rested their

case without calling any witnesses during the guilt phase but pre-

sented mental health evidence through Drs. D’Alesandro’s, Ifill’s,

and Kuglar’s testimony. We’ll walk through that testimony now.

Trial counsel’s guilt phase presentation of mitigation evidence

Dr. D’Alesandro

Dr. D’Alesandro was employed by Georgia as a “coordina-

tor of forensic services” and “forensic psychologist” at the Georgia

Regional Hospital in Savannah. Dr. D’Alesandro testified that he,

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 13 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 13

together with Dr. Ifill, performed “a fairly extensive evaluation” of

Heidler that included two “clinical interview[s]” and “a review of

the voluminous records that were provided . . . by both the [state]

as well as [trial counsel].” The records that Dr. D’Alesandro re-

viewed included records from Satilla Mental Health (a mental

health institution where Heidler had been treated), “mental health

histories,” “school records,” “prior mental health evaluations,” and

“clinical documents.” Those records also included “police re-

ports,” “witness statements,” and “investigating officers’ reports.”

Dr. D’Alesandro also “talked to the jail employees that were . . .

watching [Heidler] during the time of his incarceration.”

Dr. D’Alesandro explained that the state trial court had

posed two questions for him to answer when it appointed him to

evaluate Heidler: “[o]ne, is the defendant competent to stand

trial”; and two, “was [Heidler] affected by some form of mental ill-

ness such that it would make him incompetent or make him not

responsible for his behaviors.” As to Heidler’s competency to stand

trial, Dr. D’Alesandro concluded, based on his evaluation, that

Heidler was not mentally disabled and was competent to stand trial

because Heidler “understood the proceedings” and “was able to

work with his attorney in the preparation of his defense.”

As to whether Heidler was not guilty by reason of insanity,

Dr. D’Alesandro concluded, “based on the information [that he and

Dr. Ifill] had and on the [Georgia] statutes,” that Heidler “was re-

sponsible for his behaviors during that time frame [of the mur-

ders].” Dr. D’Alesandro said that “there had been no indication

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 14 of 112

14 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

that [Heidler] was psychotic” when he killed the Danielses, which

would have meant “that [Heidler] was out of contact with reality

or that he was unaware of what he was doing.” Instead, Dr.

D’Alesandro testified that “what [Heidler] was doing was volitional

and it was fairly goal directed.” For this reason, Dr. D’Alesandro

concluded that Heidler “kn[ew] the difference between right and

wrong, and . . . d[id] not meet the criteria for not guilty by reason

of insanity.”

Dr. D’Alesandro diagnosed Heidler with alcohol and sub-

stance abuse and “a number of personality disorders which have

influenced his behaviors, have affected the way he perceive[d]

things, [and] the way he [thought] about things.” Dr. D’Alesandro

“found severe emotional problems beginning in [Heidler’s] child-

hood” that Heidler “was still suffering from” at the time of his eval-

uation.

Dr. D’Alesandro explained that Heidler “probably would

best be identified as a borderline and/or an antisocial personality

disorder,” which meant that, “through his upbringing, . . . he’[d]

developed behavioral patterns which [were] basically in conflict

with society.” Dr. D’Alesandro testified that a person with border-

line personality disorder would be “really unstable,” have “a very

poor sense of themselves,” “overreact to stimuli,” and “at times be-

come very dramatic” and “impulsive.” Dr. D’Alesandro stated that

a person with antisocial personality disorder “doesn’t really care

about the rights of others,” “do[es] things that are in conflict with

society,” and “know[s] what they’re doing, but at the same time

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 15 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 15

they’re willing to go ahead and suffer the consequences.” Dr.

D’Alesandro agreed that this “severe disorder” would “influence

[Heidler’s] decision-making capacity.”

Dr. D’Alesandro said that, “[f]rom the information [he] got,

[Heidler] did experience hallucinations . . . during a time that he

was doing some type of drug.” Dr. D’Alesandro also testified that,

in examining Heidler’s mental history, “[t]here was a suggestion”

that Heidler had experienced “psychotic episodes.” Although he

“did not find sufficient evidence to validate that [Heidler] actually

was psychotic,” Dr. D’Alesandro explained that “people with this

type of diagnosis sometimes will get to such an extreme that they

may temporarily at least function in a psychotic-like state, but it’s

usually very transient,” meaning that it “[c]omes and goes very

quickly” in a matter of “[m]inutes.”

Dr. D’Alesandro testified that Heidler’s mental health prob-

lems “seemed to be pretty much right from childhood, early child-

hood.” Dr. D’Alesandro described Heidler’s childhood as “chaotic”

and “dysfunctional” and said that Heidler was “[d]eprived of the

familial love and support that one normally would expect to get as

he’s being brought up.” Dr. D’Alesandro explained that Heidler’s

mental health issues resulted from “the chaos of someone being

brought up in that type of environment.” And Dr. D’Alesandro

agreed that Heidler “ha[d] been subjected to serious traumatic ex-

periences in his childhood at a very early age.”

Dr. D’Alesandro gave the jury a few examples of Heidler’s

traumatic childhood experiences. Dr. D’Alesandro testified, for

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 16 of 112

16 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

example, that “there was some indication of voodoo and cultism

brought in that was practiced in [Heidler’s] family.” He explained

that, “as a child, [Heidler] evidently was placed in a number of fos-

ter homes throughout his developmental years, and as a result this

in effect caused some type of lasting effect on him in terms of where

he had problems or he felt abandoned by his family.” Dr.

D’Alesandro told the jury that Heidler’s records showed that he

had “attempted on several occasions to smother his sister,”

“bec[ame] involved in fights in school,” and “was engaged in sui-

cidal and homicidal episodes when he was eight and nine years

old.”

Dr. D’Alesandro described Heidler’s suicidal episodes. He

said that “[t]here were indications from the record that at times

past [Heidler] would stand in the middle of the road waiting for a

car to try and hit him,” and one time, “a tractor-trailer jackknifed

in [an] attempt[] to avoid hitting him.” Dr. D’Alesandro testified

that Heidler had a history of “recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures,

or threats, or self-mutilating behavior,” and that “the first time [he]

saw him [Heidler] had cigarette burns up and down his arms,”

which “certainly would signify self-mutilation.” And Dr.

D’Alesandro said there were at least two instances in Heidler’s

childhood where he “was brought to the mental health center after

attempting suicide.”

Thus, Dr. D’Alesandro said, there was “no question about”

whether Heidler “ha[d] some mental health issues,” and he

thought that “there [was] sufficient clinical documentation to

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 17 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 17

substantiate a consideration of a guilty but mentally ill [verdict] if

that would be the [c]ourt and the jury’s decision.” Dr. D’Alesandro

explained that “the qualification for the guilty but mentally ill [ver-

dict] [was] not predicated on the personality disorder, [or] on the

antisocial,” but was instead “predicated on some of the behaviors

that [Heidler] demonstrated in the past,” including “examples of

depression that in some occasions led [Heidler] to self-mutilate or

to attempt suicide.” This was evidence, not of a “personality dys-

function,” but of a “mental disorder.”

On cross examination, Mr. Garrett asked Dr. D’Alesandro

whether he had “an opinion within a reasonable degree of psycho-

logical certainty whether the facts support[ed] a finding of guilty

but mentally ill.” Dr. D’Alesandro answered that he was “going to

hedge on that,” saying that “[t]he ultimate decision [he] th[ought]

would be in the trier of fact, the jury or the judge, on whether the

information [he] provide[d] me[t] that legal standard.” But Dr.

D’Alesandro conceded that the pretrial report that he had prepared

and signed said that the facts of Heidler’s case “could also support

a finding of guilty but mentally ill.”

And when Mr. Garrett asked whether Heidler was taking

medication when Dr. D’Alesandro evaluated him, Dr. D’Alesandro

answered that he “believed he was” but couldn’t recall the name of

the medication. Dr. D’Alesandro told the jury that Heidler “con-

ceivably could have been” taking Haldol at the time, which he ex-

plained was “an antipsychotic medication” that “help[ed a patient]

reorganize or organize their thinking process” and “aid[ed] in

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 18 of 112

18 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

behavioral control.” Dr. D’Alesandro assumed that “the physician

that consults with the jail probably” prescribed Haldol to Heidler.

On cross examination by the state, Dr. D’Alesandro con-

ceded that he “wouldn’t know” if Heidler had fooled him about his

mental illness since “[t]hat’s the nature of being fooled,” but that

he “felt [Heidler] was fairly forthcoming” during his two clinical

interviews and didn’t think Heidler tried to “fool” him. While

“[t]here were some indications that [Heidler] may have been not

totally cooperative,” “for the most part [Dr. D’Alesandro] w[as]

able to get enough information [that he] felt comfortable in [his]

assessment.” And based on his interaction with Heidler “in the last

several months,” Dr. D’Alesandro thought that “the symptoms [of

Heidler’s mental illness] seem[ed] to be somewhat in remission”

because “[s]ome of the things that [they] looked at or [they] saw

from early childhood d[idn]’t appear to be happening right now”

and the seriousness of his mental illness was “not so bad that he

require[d] hospitalization.”

Dr. Ifill

Dr. Ifill, a board-certified psychiatrist at Georgia Regional

Hospital in Savannah, testified that he and Dr. D’Alesandro per-

formed a psychiatric evaluation of Heidler. Dr. Ifill explained that

their evaluation of Heidler consisted of “a review of an extensive

number of reports from several sources,” “two separate inter-

views,” “the completion of a mental status examination,” and “a

complete neurological evaluation” to “rule out organic brain dam-

age.” The records that Dr. Ifill reviewed included “reports from

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 19 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 19

school,” “reports from DF[A]CS,” reports from mental health cen-

ters, “reports from the police investigations,” and “a report from a

private psychiatric evaluation.”

Dr. Ifill testified that he asked Heidler “a lot of questions

about his background, his childhood, his upbringing, [and] his fam-

ily relationships” and reviewed “[m]any records . . . with regard to

his childhood, treatments received, referrals made, [and] evalua-

tions that were done.” Dr. Ifill also “reviewed some historical in-

formation which described some bizarre behaviors” and “behav-

iors [that were] out of control and self-destructive.” The records

showed that Heidler had exhibited “these kinds of behaviors since

childhood.” Dr. Ifill “found that [Heidler] was suffering from se-

vere emotional disorders beginning in childhood and continuing

up until the present.” Like Dr. D’Alesandro, Dr. Ifill said that he

saw self-inflicted cigarette burn marks on Heidler’s skin. Dr. Ifill

also told the jury that Heidler’s “history recorded recurrent

thoughts of wanting to kill himself and several attempts to do so,”

including a time when he was admitted to “the hospital in Savan-

nah.”

Dr. Ifill testified that Heidler’s childhood records “indicated

that the household was chaotic, disorganized, that [Heidler] was

unable to get the ordinary nurturing that a growing child would

need to have for normal development in the household, [and] that

there was violence or threats of violence or neglect within the

household.” He said that the records also “suggested that there

was a lot of drinking in the home, there was alcoholism in the

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 20 of 112

20 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

household.” And he said that the records “indicated emotional and

physical abuse.” According to Dr. Ifill, Heidler’s childhood envi-

ronment was “likely . . . a significant contributing factor” to

Heidler’s personality disorders.

Based on his evaluation, Dr. Ifill concluded that Heidler

“was suffering from many elements of the borderline personality

disorder” but was “able to distinguish between right and wrong”

and was not “mentally retarded.” Dr. Ifill thought that Heidler was

“responsible” for his actions and was not “insane.” Dr. Ifill testified

that Heidler had “a long history of out of control behavior” and

“discreet episodes of bizarre behavior.” But Dr. Ifill said that he did

not have any evidence that Heidler was suffering a “psychotic epi-

sode” on the night of the murders and that he did not think that a

psychotic episode had anything to do with Heidler’s actions that

night. And as to Heidler’s neurological examination, Dr. Ifill said

that the results “were all normal.”

On cross, Dr. Ifill testified that there was “one reference to

one of the evaluations where [Heidler’s] behavior at one point

might have been thought of being psychotic.” He also explained

that “there are many instances where a person who is not normally

psychotic may have psychotic episodes.” Mr. Garrett also asked

Dr. Ifill if those suffering from a personality disorder may be “trig-

gered into a psychotic episode.” In response, Dr. Ifill said: “[t]here

is only one personality disorder with which a brief or transient psy-

chotic episode is associated[,] . . . and that is the borderline person-

ality disorder.”

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 21 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 21

When asked by Mr. Garrett whether he had an opinion

about “whether [Heidler] would be eligible or meet the criteria as

[he] underst[ood] the[m] for guilty but mentally ill under Georgia

law,” Dr. Ifill answered that Heidler “d[id] not qualify on the basis

of a serious mental disease or disorder of thinking or mood,” but

“[w]hether a personality disorder [would] qualify [he] l[eft] to the

judgment of the trier of fact and to the [c]ourt.” When Mr. Garrett

pointed out that Dr. Ifill had signed a report stating that the evi-

dence in Heidler’s case “could support a verdict of guilty but men-

tally ill,” Dr. Ifill said that the evidence “could be considered . . . in

making such a decision.”

Dr. Kuglar

Dr. Kuglar, a psychiatrist, testified that he examined Heidler

and reviewed Heidler’s records, including reports from Georgia

Regional Hospital in Savannah, written neurological reports from

Central State Hospital, and “some reports by Dr. James Maish.”

Dr. Kuglar testified that Heidler’s records showed he “had a terrible

childhood . . . . He was sort of kicked around from pillar to post,

his home environment was not very good, et[ ]cetera.” Dr. Kuglar

said that Heidler “was constantly . . . off and on during those years

threatening to kill himself, doing disruptive things.” Heidler had

been “admitted after some sort of self-harm attempts on a couple

of occasions to the Regional Hospital, and at times he was threat-

ening to kill other people.”

When he interviewed Heidler, Dr. Kuglar saw “where

[Heidler] had cut himself and what appeared to be cigarette burns,

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 22 of 112

22 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

some kind of burns on his body, and where he had . . . pick[ed] at

small lesions on his face until he had sort of created sores.” Dr.

Kuglar said that while Heidler’s behavior “was certainly a little bit

weird, odd, or bizarre” when he interviewed him, Heidler “pre-

sented himself as someone who was in contact with reality at the

time that [Dr. Kuglar] talked to him.” Dr. Kuglar also said that

Heidler “seemed to show . . . some probable degree of depression.”

It “was [Dr. Kuglar’s] understanding that [Heidler] had been on

some medicine while he was incarcerated in the county detention

center.”

Dr. Kuglar said that during his interview, Heidler “basically

indicated that he committed the crime with which he [was] ac-

cused, that he did the actual acts” because “he was upset over the

very recent death of his infant child by a lady who was not part of

the crime scene . . . and that he was upset because of conflicts be-

tween one of the young ladies who was killed by him who was

about age [fifteen] or [sixteen] . . . and his other girlfriend.”

Based on his evaluation, Dr. Kuglar concluded that Heidler

“d[id] not meet the [s]tate of Georgia’s criteria for a defense of be-

ing not guilty by reason of insanity” because “he d[id] not have a

mental illness which prevent[ed] him from appreciating the differ-

ence between right and wrong, nor d[id] he have delusions, that is,

ideas that exist[ed] only in his head which played a role in the al-

leged crime.” Dr. Kuglar did not think that Heidler was mentally

disabled.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 23 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 23

But Dr. Kuglar testified that Heidler met the criteria for a

guilty but mentally ill verdict based on his “primary diagnosis” of

borderline personality disorder. Dr. Kuglar also explained that peo-

ple with borderline personality disorder have “very poor” judg-

ment, “often make poor decisions,” and have “outbursts of anger”

which they “certainly have a problem controlling.” Dr. Kuglar ex-

plained that people with borderline personality disorder “often

have very brief episodes of being psychotic.” Dr. Kuglar said that

Heidler talked about “the hearing of voices” and hearing “a baby

crying,” but Dr. Kuglar thought that “based upon the time and

other things [that he] c[ouldn’t] be absolutely certain that what

[Heidler was] saying [was] true there.”

Mr. Garrett’s Closing Argument

In his guilt-phase closing argument, Mr. Garrett explained to

the jury that all he was “asking for in this case[] [was] a verdict

based on the evidence.” He noted that Heidler was not “trying to

get away with murder.” Heidler had “told the police what hap-

pened.” “It is obvious,” Mr. Garrett said, “that there is overwhelm-

ing evidence that [Heidler] did it.” Mr. Garrett explained that he

“would be insulting [the jury] if [he] said find him not guilty.” So,

rather than focusing on guilt, Mr. Garrett argued that “[t]he issue

in this case [he] th[ought] that [the jury] should pay the most atten-

tion to and spend the most time on [was] whether [Heidler] was

mentally ill as defined by Georgia law when these acts occurred.”

To support this guilty but mentally ill defense, Mr. Garrett

highlighted: (1) Dr. D’Alesandro’s testimony that there was

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 24 of 112

24 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

evidence from which the jury could determine that Heidler was

guilty but mentally ill; (2) Dr. Ifill’s testimony that there was evi-

dence that could support a guilty but mentally ill verdict; and

(3) Dr. Kuglar’s testimony that Heidler met the criteria for being

mentally ill at the time of the offense. Mr. Garrett argued that, alt-

hough Drs. D’Alesandro and Ifill had hedged their opinions on

whether Heidler qualified for a guilty but mentally ill verdict as be-

ing “for the jury” to decide, they only hedged their opinions be-

cause they did “not want to do what we lawyers call invading the

province of the jury.”

Mr. Garrett pointed to testimony about how Heidler said

“he just went berserk” and how Heidler described the scene as “like

being in a dream.” He reminded the jury of expert testimony that

Heidler was “self-abusive, that he mutilate[d] himself, he burn[ed]

himself with cigarettes, he cut[] himself on the arms, . . . [and he]

pick[ed] at his face until there [were] open sores.” Mr. Garrett re-

called the expert testimony about Heidler’s self-mutilation and the

testimony that Heidler “began at the age of eight and nine to show

bizarre and self-destructive behavior,” including standing “out on

the highway in front of trucks and [not] mov[ing].” Mr. Garrett

also emphasized Dr. D’Alesandro’s testimony that Heidler was be-

ing given Haldol, a “very strong antipsychotic drug.” Mr. Garrett

ended his closing argument by asking the jury to “consider the very

strong and unrebutted evidence that [Heidler] was mentally ill as

defined by Georgia law at the time” of “this horrible tragedy” in

rendering its verdict.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 25 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 25

The jury’s verdict

The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict on four counts

of malice murder, three counts of kidnapping, one count of aggra-

vated sodomy, one count of aggravated child molestation, one

count of child molestation, and one count of burglary. The jury

did not find that Heidler was guilty but mentally ill.

The state’s penalty phase presentation of aggravation evidence

Then, the penalty phase began. The state called five wit-

nesses: (1) a patrol officer with the Toombs County Sheriff’s Office

who testified that he found a “shank” hidden in Heidler’s prison

uniform; (2) a booking officer at the Toombs County Detention

Center who testified that Heidler said he “wasn’t through collect-

ing souls” and likened himself to a fictional character who “went

around killing families while they slept”; (3) a jailer at the Toombs

County Detention Center who testified that Heidler had removed

the brass locks from his cell door, placed them in a sock, and threat-

ened to kill the jailer and other prison officials; (4) a jail administra-

tor at the Toombs County Detention Center who testified that

Heidler had removed locks from his cell door and had also escaped

from the jail for almost twelve hours by sawing through a bar of

his cell window with a hacksaw blade; and (5) a prosecutor with

the Georgia Bureau of Investigation who testified that Heidler

called him from prison and identified himself by saying “nine little

piggies, four dead” in reference to the Daniels family.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 26 of 112

26 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Trial counsel’s penalty phase presentation of mitigation evidence

Mr. Garrett and Ms. Palmer called nine witnesses, including

Heidler’s family members, DFACS workers, and Dr. Maish, to tes-

tify about Heidler’s difficult childhood and mental health prob-

lems. They also introduced Heidler’s mental health and DFACS

records.

Mary Mosley

Mary Mosley, Heidler’s mother, testified about Heidler’s up-

bringing and his mental health. She testified that she divorced

Heidler’s father when Heidler was four years old. Mrs. Mosley said

that Heidler’s father was an alcoholic and “wasn’t all that good” to

their children. When Heidler was six years old, Mrs. Mosley mar-

ried Heidler’s stepfather. She said that Heidler’s stepfather was also

an alcoholic, but he “didn’t beat [Heidler]” and only sometimes got

into “fusses” and used “bad words” with Heidler.

Mrs. Mosley testified that Heidler “had mental problems”

growing up. Mrs. Mosley told the jury that Heidler had attempted

to commit suicide by “jump[ing] in front of a semi truck on a main

highway” and by “tr[ying] to hang hi[m]self by a store to get atten-

tion from people at the store.” She also testified that Heidler had

“imaginary friends” since he was a small child. Mrs. Mosley added

that Heidler was “really upset” after his son was stillborn.

Lisa Aguilar

Lisa Aguilar, Heidler’s sister, testified about their childhood.

She explained that their family “move[d] a lot,” that their father

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 27 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 27

“was a[n] alcoholic,” and that their stepfather “did drink.” She also

said that their stepfather “was mean to everybody” but “only

talked” and “never hit [her] or nobody.” Ms. Aguilar did not re-

member whether Heidler had been hospitalized because of a sui-

cide attempt. She asked the jury not “to kill [her] brother.”

William Johnston

William Johnston was a program manager with the Georgia

Department of Juvenile Justice who had worked with Heidler and

his family. Mr. Johnston testified that Heidler entered the juvenile

justice system at age fourteen or fifteen because of an “altercation”

between Heidler and his stepfather. Mr. Johnston supervised

Heidler after he was placed on probation.

Mr. Johnston testified that he went to Heidler’s home and

could tell “from the odor and from discussions” that Heidler’s step-

father had been drinking. He also said that “there was some dis-

cussion” that Heidler’s family “may [have] be[en] involved in . . .

devil worship.” Mr. Johnston testified that Heidler’s family

“move[d] a lot” and normally lived in “small houses” that were in

“poor” condition. But Mr. Johnston testified that Heidler “didn’t

give any indication that he had a problem with his family.”

When Ms. Palmer asked Mr. Johnston if he remembered

taking “action” to have Heidler evaluated by mental health profes-

sionals, Mr. Johnston said he did remember but that he no longer

had any records on Heidler. Ms. Palmer moved for the state trial

court to allow her to question Mr. Johnston as a hostile witness

because “his answers [were] not those answers that he ha[d] given

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 28 of 112

28 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

[her] in the past and [she] would ask to be able to use leading ques-

tions.” The state trial court granted Ms. Palmer’s request, but Mr.

Johnston continued to testify that he didn’t remember anything

else about Heidler.

Cathy McMichael

Cathy McMichael, a social services case manager with

DFACS’s foster care unit, explained that she worked with Heidler’s

family when his sister entered foster care in 1995. During Ms.

McMichael’s “aftercare” visits to the family’s home to check on

Heidler’s sister, Ms. McMichael saw Heidler but said that he did

not “cause [her] any problem.” Ms. McMichael also testified that

she had brought Heidler’s DFACS records to the trial pursuant to

the state’s subpoena.

Willene Wright

Willene Wright, a social services worker with DFACS, testi-

fied that she first contacted Heidler’s family in 1985 when she in-

vestigated Heidler’s mother’s failure to enroll her children in

school after they moved to a different county. Ms. Wright testified

that DFACS started another investigation of Heidler’s family in

1986 because of “unsupervision of the children.” In 1987, Ms.

Wright “investigated a complaint concerning inadequate supervi-

sion of [Heidler]” and recommended that Heidler’s mother “make

an appointment with mental health” because Ms. Wright was con-

cerned that Heidler had “some mental health problems.” And in

1988, Heidler was placed into foster care, but his foster mother

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 29 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 29

requested that Heidler be removed from her home “because of be-

havior.”

Based on her interactions with Heidler’s family, Ms. Wright

said that Heidler’s mother wasn’t “affectionate towards [Heidler]”

and wasn’t a “nurturing mother.” Ms. Wright explained that

Heidler’s mother did not “praise the children for doing good,

work[] with affection, touch[] or hug[] them or show[] signs of af-

fection towards the children.” Ms. Wright also testified that

DFACS provided Heidler’s family with Christmas gifts, transporta-

tion to get to and from health care and mental health care appoint-

ments, and energy assistance to keep gas, lights, and heat on in their

home because the family “needed that kind of assistance.”

Joanne Oglesby

Joanne Oglesby, a DFACS employee, testified that she met

Heidler in 1990 during a “child protective services case.” She ex-

plained that DFACS “received a report alleging physical abuse,

emotional abuse, [and] neglect,” and that DFACS “confirmed ne-

glect” and worked with Heidler’s family until the family moved to

a different county.

Ms. Oglesby testified that she had received a report that

Heidler “had tried to tie a rope to a tree in the yard and hang him-

self” but Heidler denied that it happened when Ms. Oglesby went

to investigate. And, although DFACS “had numerous reports that

maybe [physical abuse] was occurring,” DFACS “couldn’t” confirm

it. Ms. Oglesby described Heidler’s family as “very closed” because

“they knew how to talk to DF[A]CS and not tell them anything.”

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 30 of 112

30 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

And Ms. Oglesby explained that it was “really difficult to prove”

emotional abuse and neglect, even though she knew that “there

[were] some issues going on with some inappropriate parenting

things going on.”

Sylvia Boatright

Sylvia Boatright testified that she was Heidler’s foster

mother from August 1988 until March 1989, when Heidler was

eleven years old. Ms. Boatright said that Heidler “was afraid of the

dark and always talked about a knife cutting him, could a knife

come through a ceiling and cut him.” Ms. Boatright also testified

that Heidler attended a school for children with learning disabili-

ties. And she told the jury that Heidler “always had an imaginary

mouse” that he would talk to.

Marilyn Dryden

Marilyn Dryden testified that she taught Heidler during his

middle school years at the Cedarwood Psychoeducational Pro-

gram, which she described as a school for students “that were emo-

tionally behavior disordered.” In describing Heidler, Ms. Dryden

told the jury that Heidler “was a loner” but “was not physically ag-

gressive to the other students.” She also said that Heidler would

“pick at his skin ‘til sometimes it would bleed” and would some-

times “arrive to school . . . with marks on his body where he appar-

ently had carved his initials and things on his skin.” According to

Ms. Dryden, Heidler “would sometimes refer to some type of im-

aginary friend” and “act like it was in his hand and he would talk to

it sometimes.”

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 31 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 31

Dr. James Maish

Dr. Maish, the psychologist hired by Heidler’s trial counsel,

testified about his “extensive[]” pretrial evaluation of Heidler and

his review of Heidler’s background records. Dr. Maish testified

that Heidler wasn’t mentally disabled and didn’t meet the standard

for a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict because Heidler did

not have “a delusional idea” or “an inability to resist the urge to . . .

commit the criminal act.” Dr. Maish also concluded that Heidler

was competent to stand trial because Heidler “ha[d] a rational as

well as reasonable understanding” of his criminal proceedings.

But Dr. Maish explained that, like Drs. D’Alesandro, Ifill,

and Kuglar, he had diagnosed Heidler with borderline personality

disorder and said that “apparently you have four people who came

to the same conclusion” as to Heidler’s diagnosis. According to Dr.

Maish, having four psychologists reaching the same conclusion

about an individual’s diagnosis “was unheard of.” Dr. Maish testi-

fied that Heidler “met eight of the nine” criteria for borderline per-

sonality disorder, including: (1) “recurrent suicidal behavior . . . or

self-mutilating behavior”; (2) a “markedly and persistently unstable

self-image” caused by “a chaotic type of family situation”; (3) “im-

pulsivity in at least two areas that [were] potentially self-damag-

ing”; (4) “affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood”;

and (5) “inappropriate, intensive anger or difficulty controlling an-

ger.”

Dr. Maish testified that Heidler met the standard for a guilty

but mentally ill verdict “with plenty of room to spare.” He also

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 32 of 112

32 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

explained that Heidler met the standard for a guilty but mentally ill

verdict because Heidler had borderline personality disorder. Dr.

Maish described Heidler’s borderline personality disorder as “se-

vere” and said that it affected his ability to make decisions because

“any kind of stress . . . [would] go[] straight to rage.”

Dr. Maish testified that he did not think Heidler was “psy-

chotic,” explaining that Heidler “was never overtly psychotic at

any of the six times that [he] saw him.” At the same time, Dr.

Maish explained that “there are times when” people with border-

line personality disorder “would probably meet the criteria for be-

ing psychotic or out of touch with reality.” Dr. Maish said that he

had reviewed Heidler’s records and that those records “talk[ed] of

hallucinations” and “transient psychotic disturbances,” but Dr.

Maish didn’t think that Heidler “was ever overtly psychotic” during

the thirteen hours he spent interviewing him. Dr. Maish thought

it was “debatable” whether Heidler had experienced “transient,

stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms”

because Dr. Maish “didn’t see it.”

Dr. Maish said that Heidler “acknowledged to [Dr. Maish]

that he committed” the murders but “didn’t have an answer” for

why he murdered the Danielses and their two children. Dr. Maish

said that Heidler expressed remorse “about what happened” and

that Dr. Maish had “seen him cry.” Dr. Maish explained that

Heidler’s actions on the night of the murders resulted from his “se-

vere” borderline personality disorder that “impair[ed] virtually

every area of his functioning” and “a combination” of: (1) “some

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 33 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 33

neurological difficulties”; (2) “a chaotic background in family”;

(3) “the lack of a solid family background”; (4) “a father that was

for the most part gone”; and (5) “emotional difficulties” and “years

of being in and out of mental health centers, . . . hospitals, . . . [and]

judicial settings.”

Heidler’s Background Records

At the close of their penalty phase presentation, Heider’s

trial counsel entered into evidence two sets of Heidler’s back-

ground records. The first set was Heidler’s DFACS records—over

1,100 pages worth—which Ms. McMichael had brought with her

to trial pursuant to the state’s subpoena. The second set was “a

certified and authenticated copy of the records of the Georgia Re-

gional Hospital . . . in Savannah,” which consisted of 109 pages of

documents. With that, the trial came to a close.

Heidler’s death sentences

The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty for

each of the four murders, finding two aggravating circumstances:

(1) that each murder “was committed while [Heidler] was involved

in the commission of other capital felonies”—the other three mur-

ders; and (2) that each murder “was committed while [Heidler] was

involved in the commission of the offense of burglary of the home

of Danny and Kim Daniels.” The state trial court sentenced

Heidler to death consistent with the jury’s recommendation.4 The

4

The state trial court also sentenced Heidler to life imprisonment for kidnap-

ping with bodily injury, twenty years for each kidnapping, life imprisonment

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 34 of 112

34 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

state trial court denied Heidler’s motion for a new trial and his mo-

tion to vacate his death sentences.

Heidler’s direct appeal

On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed

Heidler’s murder convictions and death sentences.5 Heidler v. State,

537 S.E.2d 44 (Ga. 2000). In affirming Heidler’s convictions, the

Georgia Supreme Court rejected Heidler’s argument that his state-

ment to police had been involuntary. Id. at 49–50. The Georgia

Supreme Court pointed out that “[t]he police read Heidler his

rights” and that Heidler “signed” the “waiver-of-rights form.” Id.

at 49. Heidler “was lucid, not intoxicated, and he appeared to un-

derstand his rights.” Id. “He was not handcuffed, and was provided

with cigarettes and a soft drink.” Id. “He was neither coerced,

threatened, nor promised anything in exchange for his statement.”

Id. Nor did he “request a lawyer or ask that the questioning cease.”

Id. Heidler’s confession was voluntary. Id.

Against all that, Heidler pointed to the fact that, when the

investigating officers asked him “about the sequence of events and

why they occurred, [he] said several times that he was unsure be-

cause it was like ‘a dream.’” Id. “One of the interrogating officers

for aggravated sodomy, thirty years for aggravated child molestation, twenty

years for child molestation, and twenty years for burglary, with all sentences

to be served consecutively.

5

The Georgia Supreme Court reversed Heidler’s conviction for aggravated

child molestation because it “merged into the aggravated sodomy conviction

as a matter of fact.” Heidler, 537 S.E.2d at 55.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 35 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 35

volunteered to ‘get in the dream with him,’ and Heidler claim[ed]

that this was coercive.” Id. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed,

explaining that “a review of the record show[ed] that the offer was

simply an attempt on the part of the officer to prod Heidler’s

memory.” Id. The Georgia Supreme Court, “[v]iewing the totality

of the circumstances,” concluded “that the trial court properly de-

nied Heidler’s motion to suppress his statement on the ground that

it was involuntary.” Id. at 49–50.

The United States Supreme Court denied Heidler’s petition

for a writ of certiorari. Heidler v. Georgia, 532 U.S. 1029 (2001), reh’g

denied, 533 U.S. 965 (2001).

F. State Habeas Proceedings

Heidler filed a habeas petition in the Superior Court of Butts

County, Georgia. Heidler asserted a general ineffective assistance

of counsel claim and listed instances of his “[t]rial counsel’s ineffec-

tiveness” in forty-two bullet points. Three of the bullet points

claimed that trial counsel were ineffective in their investigation and

presentation at trial because they: (1) “failed to conduct an ade-

quate pretrial investigation into the . . . defenses available to

[Heidler], including but not limited to the psychological, medical,

and psychiatric factors affecting [Heidler’s] mental state during, be-

fore, and after his alleged participation in the murders”; (2) “failed

to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation into [Heidler’s] life

and background to uncover and present to the jury evidence in mit-

igation of punishment, failed to present a complete picture of

[Heidler’s] background, and failed to locate, interview, and present

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 36 of 112

36 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

as witnesses numerous individuals who had compelling mitigating

evidence regarding [Heidler]”; and (3) “failed to obtain those rec-

ords, including educational, medical, and mental health records of

[Heidler] and his family which would have assisted in formulating

and supporting defenses in the guilt/innocence phase.”

In another set of three bullet points, Heidler claimed that

trial counsel were ineffective in failing to suppress Heidler’s confes-

sion because they: (1) “failed to adequately raise and litigate that

[Heidler’s] statement to law enforcement was the result of an ille-

gal arrest and should be suppressed”; (2) “failed to conduct an ade-

quate pretrial investigation into the voluntariness of [Heidler’s]

statements to law enforcement personnel, and specifically failed to

investigate the effect of [Heidler’s] mental capacity, and his medical

and psychological history on [Heidler’s] mental state at the time he

provided the incriminating statements”; and (3) “failed to ade-

quately present information and evidence in pretrial motions and

proceedings at trial relating to [Heidler’s] allegedly voluntary

waiver of constitutional rights during interrogation by police.”

Heidler’s state habeas evidence

In 2006, the state habeas court held an evidentiary hearing

on Heidler’s petition. At the hearing, Heidler presented live testi-

mony, affidavits, and deposition testimony from more than thirty

witnesses. Heidler’s witnesses included Ms. Palmer and Mr. Gar-

rett, one of Heidler’s former foster parents, his teachers, his family

members, medical providers who had treated Heidler as a child or

as an inmate, two mental health experts retained by Heidler’s state

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 37 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 37

habeas counsel, and Dr. Kuglar. Most of the witnesses who testi-

fied at this state habeas proceeding hadn’t spoken with Heidler’s

counsel before trial and didn’t testify on Heidler’s behalf. Heidler

did not present evidence on his claim that trial counsel were inef-

fective in investigating and litigating the suppression of his state-

ment to police.

Ms. Palmer

Ms. Palmer, who by then had become a state superior court

judge, testified that she met Heidler in jail about five days after the

murders. During Ms. Palmer’s meeting with Heidler, Heidler was

“[d]isheveled,” “not willing to make any contact with [her],” and

“not helpful.” Ms. Palmer spoke with the chief jailer, who de-

scribed Heidler’s strange behavior to her. Based on her initial ob-

servations of Heidler and the chief jailer’s description of his behav-

ior, Ms. Palmer “knew that [Heidler] was mentally ill.” Ms. Palmer

testified that Heidler continued to provide only “minimal infor-

mation” about his background after their first meeting.

Ms. Palmer said that she and Mr. Garrett decided that their

theory of the case would be “[t]hat [Heidler] was mentally ill and

that we were going to concentrate on the mental illness” because

“it [was] a rather difficult and bad crime, but [Heidler’s] life had

been so bad, and, of course, the [s]tate’s examiners said he was

mentally ill[, o]ur forensic psychologist said he was mentally ill,”

and “the court’s expert witness [Dr. Kuglar] . . . said that [Heidler]

was mentally ill.”

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 38 of 112

38 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Ms. Palmer testified that she would follow up on investiga-

tive leads that Investigator Gillis identified because she was “sort of

a hands-on kind of defense attorney” who “like[d] to interview and

talk to the witnesses [her]self” and did not “want to depend on an

investigator’s little synopsis to [her] about what someone is going

to say.” Ms. Palmer testified about her efforts to go “door to door”

in Heidler’s community and schools to learn about his background.

Ms. Palmer also testified about the many hours she spent piecing

together Heidler’s DFACS records. And when questioned about

her billing records for work she performed in Heidler’s case, Ms.

Palmer explained that she “th[ought she] did a lot more work that

[she] didn’t document.”

In preparing for trial, Ms. Palmer and Mr. Garrett “talked

about all the witnesses and who to use and who not to use.” For

example, they decided to call only the DFACS caseworkers, teach-

ers, and foster parents who “could better articulate [Heidler’s] true

behavior and had seen significant evidence of mental illness and

could convey that to the jury in a heartfelt way.” Ms. Palmer chose

to call only the DFACS caseworkers who were “the most articu-

late,” “had the most contact with Heidler,” and “were the most

sympathetic towards his plight.” And Ms. Palmer explained that

she was “trying to bring out some specific highlights” in Heidler’s

DFACS records through the caseworkers’ testimony and “tried to

hit the really tough parts, where [Heidler] was truly harmed” be-

cause “we would have spent days and days with the jury had we

tried to go through that entire stack of records.”

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 39 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 39

Ms. Palmer explained that she “struggled with whether or

not to put [Heidler’s mother] on the witness stand” because she

was “explosive” and “irrational.” Ms. Palmer explained that she

decided to put Heidler’s mother on the stand for only a few ques-

tions because “[w]e could not get to her, we couldn’t ask her to ask

the jury to spare her son’s life,” and there was not “one helpful bit

of information we ever got out of that woman.” Ms. Palmer testi-

fied that “everybody said that” Heidler’s stepfather beat him but

that Heidler’s mother and Ms. Aguilar testified that his stepfather

didn’t abuse Heidler because of “[f]amily protectiveness.”

Ms. Palmer said that she and Mr. Garrett relayed “all the bi-

zarre episodes that happened with [Heidler] at the Toombs County

Jail” to Dr. Maish. According to Ms. Palmer, she and Mr. Garrett

met with Drs. D’Alesandro and Ifill and “made sure that they knew

all of those kinds of things [about Heidler’s behavior in prison],

too.” And they “spent most of [a] day” with Dr. Kuglar preparing

for trial and knew that “Dr. Kuglar was totally and 100 percent con-

vinced that . . . Heidler was very, very, very mentally ill.” Ms.

Palmer and Mr. Garrett also knew that Drs. D’Alesandro and Ifill

“were on [their] page” about Heidler’s mental health problems.

Ms. Palmer confirmed that she gave Drs. Maish, D’Alesandro, Ifill,

and Kuglar “everything [she] had” about Heidler’s bizarre behav-

iors and told them about reports that Heidler had imaginary

friends.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 40 of 112

40 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Mr. Garrett

Like Ms. Palmer, Mr. Garrett concluded that Heidler “obvi-

ously needed a psychological evaluation” during their first meeting

because “everything he did screamed out that he was having men-

tal health problems.” Mr. Garrett said that he “couldn’t communi-

cate with [Heidler] at all” and that Heidler “didn’t provide [him]

with any kind of information in his case.”

Mr. Garrett explained that his and Ms. Palmer’s trial strategy

was to approach Heidler’s trial like “one long penalty phase, with

the psychiatric evidence put at the front end and then mitigation

put in afterwards.” Mr. Garrett said that he and Ms. Palmer “be-

lieved that if [they] argued to the jury that [Heidler] was guilty but

mentally ill, that it would be consistent with the evidence and that

[they] would retain credibility with the jury and that perhaps the

jury would be sympathetic and spare [Heidler’s] life.”

Mr. Garrett testified that he interviewed Drs. Maish,

D’Alesandro, Ifill, and Kuglar before trial and gave them all the ev-

idence from Ms. Palmer’s background investigation. Mr. Garrett

thought that all four doctors agreed that Heidler was mentally ill

and he intended to use Drs. D’Alesandro’s, Ifill’s, and Kuglar’s tes-

timony to show “[t]hat [Heidler] was qualified for a verdict of

guilty but mentally ill, that he was mentally ill at the time that the

killings were committed.”

Mr. Garrett “believe[d] that [he] had developed evidence

that [Heidler] was at periods psychotic” and said that Dr. Maish had

explained that people with borderline personality disorder “could

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 41 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 41

have psychotic features such as [they] had seen with [Heidler],” like

“hallucinations and hearing voices.” Mr. Garrett testified that he

had discussed Heidler’s “psychotic episodes” and Heidler’s “audi-

tory or visual hallucinations” with Drs. Ifill and Kuglar but

that“[e]verybody’s conclusion [was] that [Heidler] could have

been” having “a psychotic episode on the night of the crime” but

there was “no way of knowing it.”

Mr. Garrett explained that he and Ms. Palmer selected the

witnesses that they called at trial based on who they “thought could

help the most.” And, like Ms. Palmer, Mr. Garrett testified that

“there probably was” a “significant amount of work [he] did on

[Heidler’s] case that [he] didn’t bill for.”

Heidler’s foster parents, teachers, and family members

Heidler presented testimony from his foster parents, teach-

ers, and family members. Ms. Boatright, Heidler’s foster mother

who had testified at trial, submitted an affidavit in which she said

that Heidler “spoke often about an invisible creature he called a

‘mouse’” and would often “beat the mouse with a belt” as a form

of disciplining the mouse. Ms. Boatright said that she had spoken

with Ms. Palmer before Heidler’s trial “for a short time on the

phone,” and she’d spoken to Ms. Palmer again “only one more

time” in the hotel lobby the night before her trial testimony.

Joan Pickren testified that she taught Heidler at the Cedar-

wood Center, that Heidler was “very unkempt,” seemed de-

pressed, and constantly “cut himself.” Ruth Davis, the parent liai-

son at the Cedarwood Center when Heidler was a student,

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 42 of 112

42 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

submitted an affidavit in which she said that Heidler “was one of

the most ill, emotionally disturbed kids [she] h[ad] ever seen,” “was

always pretty dirty and looked sickly,” “had a malnourished look

about him,” and “had some sort of imaginary friend” that he would

talk to.

George Heidler, Heidler’s father, submitted an affidavit in

which he said that Heidler’s mother “beat on her stomach very

hard, screaming ‘I’ll kill this bastard’” many times while she was

pregnant with Heidler. And Ms. Aguilar, Heidler’s older sister who

had testified at trial, submitted an affidavit in which she said that

their stepfather was “usually” drinking and “was mean when he

was drinking.” She also said that their stepfather would hit Heidler

and “threatened to kill him; he threatened to slit his throat.” And

Ms. Aguilar said that Heidler “talked to himself a lot.”

Ms. Aguilar explained that she “did not understand the pur-

pose of [her] testimony” when she testified at Heidler’s trial and

remembered that she had met with Mr. Garrett twice and had met

with Ms. Palmer “for a few minutes” before she took the stand.

Ms. Aguilar said that “no one had ever asked [her]” “many of the

questions [she] was asked on the stand,” and she “just wasn’t ready

to be asked so many personal questions about [Heidler].” Accord-

ing to Ms. Aguilar, “[i]f anyone had taken the time to prepare [her]

about what [she] would be asked and why it mattered, [she] would

have been able to tell the stories” that she included in her affidavit.

Elaine Towns, Heidler’s aunt, submitted an affidavit in

which she said that “each time [she] visited [Heidler’s family], [she]

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 43 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 43

saw [Heidler’s] father beating on one of his kids with a belt.” Ms.

Towns also said that Heidler’s stepfather “beat” Heidler and that

she “saw some of the beatings when [she] was over to their house”

and “saw a lot more of the marks [Heidler’s stepfather] left on

[Heidler].”

Junior Towns, Ms. Towns’s son, submitted an affidavit in

which he said that he was friends with Heidler while they were

growing up. Mr. Towns said that Heidler’s stepfather “laid a hand

on [Heidler] whenever any one of us got on his nerves” and would

beat Heidler with “his hand, a belt, a cord, a shoe, and a water

hose.” Mr. Towns also remembered that Heidler “held a pocket

knife to his wrist and talked about cutting himself.”

Medical treatment providers

Dr. Adrienne Butler, a pediatrician at Satilla Medical Center,

testified that she treated Heidler when he was twelve years old. Dr.

Butler’s notes from her encounter with Heidler said that “[i]n the

office today he [was] obviously having auditory hallucinations,”

that Heidler’s “eyes [were] darting,” and that Heidler “smiled and

respond[ed] to voices which [were] calling his name.” Dr. Butler’s

notes also stated that she had referred Heidler to Georgia Regional

for in-patient evaluation. Dr. Butler testified that she had an inde-

pendent recollection of her encounter with Heidler because she

“almost never saw a psychotic child in that setting, and [Heidler]

stuck in [her] memory.” On cross examination, Dr. Butler con-

ceded that she was “probably not” qualified to give a mental illness

diagnosis.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 44 of 112

44 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Lisa Fesperman, a school psychologist, submitted an affida-

vit in which she said that she evaluated Heidler in 1988. Ms. Fesper-

man said that she determined “that . . .Heidler was severely emo-

tionally disturbed,” partly because he “told [her] he sometimes saw

things coming off the wall.”

George Dykes, a nurse at the Toombs County Detention

Center, testified that Heidler told him, while he was in jail after the

murders, that he was afraid to go to sleep because “he was seeing

people who w[ere] trying to get him.” Nurse Dykes said that he

thought that Heidler was burning himself with cigarettes to help

him stay awake. Nurse Dykes referred Heidler to Pineland Mental

Health Center for treatment because Heidler was “hallucinating

and he was hearing voices” and “continuing to injure himself.”

Dr. David Faulk, a psychiatrist at Pineland Mental Health

Center, submitted an affidavit in which he said that he treated

Heidler five times between July 1998 and January 1999 (i.e., pend-

ing Heidler’s trial). Dr. Faulk said that following his third visit with

Heidler in 1998, he diagnosed Heidler with “psychotic disorder, not

otherwise specified” and stated the diagnosis in his clinical notes.

Dr. Faulk prescribed Haldol to “help control [Heidler’s] psychotic

symptoms,” including seeing “visions of people” and “hear[ing] a

baby crying all the time.” But Dr. Faulk confirmed that Heidler’s

discharge diagnosis from Pineland Mental Health Center “d[id] not

incorporate” Dr. Faulk’s findings about Heidler’s psychotic symp-

toms and stated only that Heidler had been diagnosed with “adjust-

ment disorder with anxiety and antisocial personality disorder.”

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 45 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 45

Dr. Faulk also noted that he “did not receive any background in-

formation” about Heidler prior to making his diagnosis.

Dr. Jack Matteson, a licensed psychiatrist at Georgia Diag-

nostic and Classification Prison, testified that he had been Heidler’s

treating psychiatrist in prison since March or April 2003 and saw

Heidler “on a regular basis.” Dr. Matteson testified that Heidler

“ha[d] a mood disturbance as well as a psychotic disturbance” and

that “[t]he psychotic component comes and goes.” Dr. Matteson

said that he had observed Heidler “in a psychotic state” and ex-

plained that Heidler reported “hearing voices.” On cross examina-

tion, Dr. Matteson conceded that his “work with [Heidler] ha[d]

been done primarily through [Dr. Matteson’s] contact with him,”

and was “based on [Heidler’s] current presentation” and not “all of

[Heidler’s] previous volumes of records.” Dr. Matteson agreed

that his “sole purpose” was to evaluate Heidler’s “mental health

now” and that he did not know “what sort of mental illnesses

[Heidler] was suffering from at the time of the [murders].”

Mental health experts

Heidler’s state habeas counsel retained two mental health

experts to evaluate Heidler. The first, Dr. Sarah DeLand, was a

board-certified forensic psychiatrist who evaluated Heidler in Oc-

tober, November, and December 2005—shortly before the state

habeas court’s evidentiary hearing. Dr. DeLand’s evaluation of

Heidler included a review of his medical and mental health records,

school records, DFACS records, jail records, and some of the trial

testimony and state habeas affidavits.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 46 of 112

46 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Dr. DeLand diagnosed Heidler with “schizoaffective disor-

der,” “probable post-traumatic stress disorder,” and “a borderline

personality disorder.” She also said that Heidler “was psychotic on

every day that [she] saw him,” including a time when he was “ac-

tively hallucinating while [she] was speaking to him.” Dr. DeLand

testified that Drs. D’Alesandro’s, Ifill’s, Kuglar’s, and Maish’s pre-

trial evaluations of Heidler happened while Heidler was taking Hal-

dol, which “improve[d Heidler’s] psychotic symptoms.” Thus, Dr.

DeLand agreed that it “would be important for those mental health

experts to understand that [Heidler was] being medicated with an-

tipsychotropic drugs.”

Dr. DeLand didn’t know what Heidler’s mental state was on

the day of the murders but she thought that, “in light of everything

that [she’d] reviewed,” it “would be most likely” that Heidler

would meet the criteria for a guilty but mentally ill verdict. On

cross examination, Dr. DeLand conceded that her diagnosis of

Heidler was “on the same page” as the diagnoses of Drs.

D’Alesandro, Ifill, Kuglar, and Maish. The only thing Dr. DeLand

could have added to the testimony of the four mental health ex-

perts who testified at trial was “more information about the

longstanding nature of [Heidler’s] illness” and Heidler’s “repeated

psychotic episodes.”

The second mental health expert retained by Heidler’s state

habeas counsel was Dr. John Carton, a Ph.D. in clinical psychiatry

and an expert in forensic psychiatry. Dr. Carton testified that he

evaluated Heidler and found him “to be a very mentally ill

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 47 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 47

individual, who struggled with a thought and mood disorder as

well as a variety of other illnesses, and that there had been a

longstanding history of these problems.” Dr. Carton reviewed the

state habeas affidavits submitted by people who had witnessed the

physical abuse and “deplorable conditions” during Heidler’s child-

hood and testified that Heidler’s background “help[ed] provide” a

“theory for why [Heidler] was behaving the way he was when [Dr.

Carton] met him.” According to Dr. Carton, the state habeas affi-

davits were “very important . . . in terms of corroborating what

[he] was seeing in [Heidler’s] history.”

Dr. Carton testified that he was “certain” that, on the day of

the murders, Heidler was suffering from a mental illness as defined

under Georgia’s guilty but mentally ill verdict statute. On cross

examination, Dr. Carton explained that he “underst[ood] why

[Drs. D’Alesandro, Ifill, Kuglar, and Maish] gave [Heidler] a border-

line personality disorder” and that he “probably would have given

[Heidler] that [diagnosis], too.” But Dr. Carton said that he would

have also “given [Heidler] an additional diagnosis” based on

Heidler’s “other mood and thought disorder symptoms.”

Dr. Kuglar

Dr. Kuglar submitted an affidavit in which he stated that

“the records [he] had at the time of [his pretrial] evaluation [of

Heidler] suggested that [Heidler] experienced brief psychotic

breaks during his history.” But, Dr. Kuglar said, “[he] did not have

background materials that indicated a history of more longstanding

or recurrent psychotic episodes nor did [he] have concrete

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 48 of 112

48 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

examples or descriptions of [Heidler’s] psychotic episodes that [he]

could have described to a jury.” Dr. Kuglar testified that Heidler’s

state habeas counsel had given him additional information, includ-

ing: (1) letters written by Heidler to trial counsel from jail;

(2) Heidler’s jail medical logs; (3) Heidler’s treatment records from

Pineland Mental Health Center; and (4) the state habeas affidavits

submitted by Heidler’s foster parents, teachers, family members,

and healthcare providers.

Dr. Kuglar explained that these other records “docu-

ment[ed] many more symptoms of mental illness than [he] was

aware existed” when he testified at Heidler’s trial. For example,

Dr. Kuglar explained that Nurse Dykes’s affidavit stated that

Heidler “reported hearing voices and seeing dead people in his cell”

and that Heidler “burned himself with cigarettes in order to stay

awake and avoid having dreams of people telling him to kill him-

self.” And Dr. Kuglar noted that Heidler’s letters to trial counsel

said that he “was hearing voices and wanted to kill himself” and

that “[t]he incident reports from the jail also recount several suicide

attempts by [Heidler].”

According to Dr. Kuglar, the other records “present[ed] a

fuller history of [Heidler’s] psychotic episodes.” For example, Dr.

Kuglar pointed to Dr. Butler’s observation that Heidler was “hear-

ing voices” and “actively hallucinating” and said that affidavits

from other individuals who knew Heidler “at different points in his

life also describ[ed] behavior indictive of probable psychosis, such

as [Heidler] carrying on conversations when no one was around,

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 49 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 49

cutting himself, and having an imaginary pet who he disciplined.”

Dr. Kuglar also explained that Heidler’s jail records showed that

Heidler was taking Haldol—an anti-psychotic medication—and

that Haldol was “a likely explanation why [Heidler] was not psy-

chotic during our meeting and why it had been ‘some time’ since

[Heidler] heard voices.” Dr. Kuglar said that he “had no knowledge

that [Heidler] was prescribed Haldol” when he evaluated him.

Dr. Kuglar explained that the other records also “contain[ed]

evidence that [Heidler] was suffering from an extreme mental or

emotional disturbance at the time of the offense” because of the

death of his stillborn son. Dr. Kuglar said that he had “recently

learned that [Heidler] wrote letters to his trial attorneys, repeatedly

complaining that he was hearing his baby son . . . crying for him

every day” and that Heidler’s Pineland Mental Health Center rec-

ords “reiterate[d Heidler’s] complaints that he was hearing a baby

crying and also state[d] that on the night of the offense, [Heidler]

woke up on top of his son’s grave.” According to Dr. Kuglar, “at

minimum, this information indicate[d] that [Heidler’s] mental

health was severely impacted by the death of his child.”

In sum, in his affidavit, Dr. Kuglar said that the added infor-

mation that Heidler’s state habeas counsel provided was “signifi-

cant.” If trial counsel had provided Dr. Kuglar with the same infor-

mation, then Dr. Kuglar “would have testified with more certainty

that [Heidler] ha[d] a serious mental illness” because the “new in-

formation confirm[ed] the presence of a thought disorder

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 50 of 112

50 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

component of his mental illness in addition to a mood disorder

component.”

The state habeas court denied Heidler’s habeas petition

The state habeas court denied Heidler’s petition. Applying

Strickland, the state habeas court denied Heidler’s ineffective assis-

tance of counsel claim. The state habeas court determined that

trial counsel’s investigation of Heidler’s background and mental

health wasn’t deficient because trial counsel: (1) “conducted an ex-

haustive investigation of [Heidler’s] background by interviewing

family members, teachers, friends, DFACS caseworkers, and

[Heidler’s] juvenile probation officer”; (2) interviewed “employees

of the Toombs County Detention Center”; and (3) “gathered volu-

minous documents from the various schools, including the psycho-

educational centers [Heidler] attended, the numerous mental

health centers records, DFACS records, [Heidler’s] Toombs

County Detention Center records[,] and medical records.” The

state habeas court also concluded that Heidler had not shown that

he “was prejudiced by trial counsel’s investigation” into his back-

ground and mental health.

The state habeas court determined that trial counsel reason-

ably presented evidence on Heidler’s mental health during the guilt

phase because trial counsel “provided all background records they

obtained” to all of the mental health experts and because Drs.

D’Alesandro, Ifill, and Kuglar “testified that they were aware of

[Heidler’s] auditory and visual hallucinations, yet they concluded

that this was a feature of his [b]orderline [p]ersonality [d]isorder, in

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 51 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 51

that [Heidler] could have brief psychotic episodes.” The state ha-

beas court also found that trial counsel made a “logical and effec-

tive” strategic decision not to call Dr. Maish during the guilt phase.

The state habeas court determined that Heidler wasn’t prejudiced

by trial counsel’s presentation of his mental health “given the ab-

horrent nature of the crimes committed and the extensive mental

health evaluations conducted by the mental health experts at trial.”

The state habeas court determined that trial counsel’s miti-

gation presentation during the penalty phase wasn’t deficient be-

cause “[t]rial counsel diligently sifted through” the information

they gathered during their investigation of Heidler’s background

and “chose the witnesses they felt would provide the best testi-

mony.” The state habeas court found that the witnesses trial coun-

sel called during the penalty phase “testified to the terrible child-

hood [Heidler] had to endure and to his mental illnesses” and that

trial counsel presented an “abundant amount of mitigating evi-

dence.” The state habeas court found that “trial counsel’s strategy

of presenting [Heidler’s] DFACS records en mass, without a

lengthy and cumulative review with the jury, was reasonable.”

And trial counsel’s presentation of mitigation evidence during the

penalty phase didn’t prejudice Heidler, the state habeas court con-

cluded, “given the copious amount of mitigating evidence pre-

sented at trial and the nature of [Heidler’s] crimes.”

The state habeas court did not specifically address Heidler’s

claim that trial counsel were ineffective in their efforts to suppress

his statements to police. The state habeas court “deem[ed] . . .

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 52 of 112

52 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

abandoned” claims for which Heidler “failed to present evidence

[to] support” at the evidentiary hearing. But the state habeas court

also said that, “[u]nless otherwise specified, to the extent that

[Heidler] ha[d] not briefed the other claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel, [it] f[ound] that [Heidler] ha[d] failed to establish the

requisite prongs of Strickland as to these claims.”

The Georgia Supreme Court denied Heidler a certificate of prob-

able cause to appeal

Heidler applied to the Georgia Supreme Court for a certifi-

cate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his state habeas peti-

tion. Heidler’s application did not include argument about trial

counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in investigating and litigating the

suppression of Heidler’s statement to police. Instead, in a footnote,

Heidler’s application said,

Heidler does not abandon any of the claims he previ-

ously made in his amended petition and briefs or at

hearings in this case, which are not herein addressed.

He incorporates by this reference all of the claims and

arguments raised in his Petition, Amended Petition,

Second Amended Petition, briefs and all other plead-

ings he has filed, and in the evidentiary hearing.

Heidler requested an extension of the 30-page limit

for this pleading, but was only allowed 40 pages. The

page limitation has prevented him from setting out all

his claims herein.

The Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied Heidler’s applica-

tion.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 53 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 53

G. Federal Habeas Proceedings

Heidler filed a section 2254 petition in the Southern District

of Georgia. Heidler claimed that trial counsel were ineffective in

investigating and presenting his mental health and background. In

support of his claim, Heidler asserted that trial counsel: (1) “failed

to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation into the [s]tate’s case

and defenses available to [Heidler], including but not limited to the

psychological, medical[,] and psychiatric factors affecting

[Heidler’s] mental state during, before, and after his alleged partic-

ipation in the murders”; (2) “failed to conduct an adequate pretrial

investigation into [Heidler’s] life and background to uncover and

present to the jury evidence in mitigation of punishment, failed to

present a complete picture of [Heidler’s] background, and failed to

locate, interview, and present as witnesses numerous individuals

who had compelling mitigating evidence regarding [Heidler]”; and

(3) “failed to present evidence and to raise defenses at the guilt/in-

nocence phase of the case, including but not limited to evidence

and defenses based upon [Heidler’s] mental state at the time of the

alleged offenses, [and Heidler’s] actions in the days surrounding the

offense.”

Heidler also claimed that trial counsel were ineffective in in-

vestigating and litigating the suppression of his statement to police.

In support of his claim, Heidler asserted that trial counsel:

(1) “failed to adequately raise and litigate that [Heidler’s] statement

to law enforcement was the result of an illegal arrest and should be

suppressed”; (2) “failed to conduct an adequate pretrial

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 54 of 112

54 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

investigation into the voluntariness of [Heidler’s] statements to law

enforcement personnel, and specifically failed to investigate the ef-

fect of [Heidler’s] mental capacity, and his medical and psycholog-

ical history[,] on [Heidler’s] mental state at the time he provided

the incriminating statements”; and (3) “failed to adequately present

information and evidence in pretrial motions and proceedings and

at trial relating to [Heidler’s] allegedly voluntary waiver of consti-

tutional rights during interrogation by the police.”

The district court denied Heidler’s section 2254 petition.

The district court denied Heidler’s claim that trial counsel were in-

effective in investigating and presenting evidence of his mental

health because “the state habeas court’s thorough discussion of

[Heidler’s] trial counsel’s investigatory efforts” showed that the

state habeas court reasonably concluded that trial counsel per-

formed a reasonable investigation and presentation of evidence

about Heidler’s mental health. The district court denied Heidler’s

claim that trial counsel were ineffective in investigating and pre-

senting mitigating evidence because the state habeas court didn’t

unreasonably decide that trial counsel’s investigation and presenta-

tion of mitigation evidence was constitutionally adequate. The dis-

trict court reasoned that “the record show[ed] that Ms. Palmer

spoke with [Heidler’s] family members, located witnesses, and

found records within a timely manner” and “the state habeas court

listed numerous pieces of mitigating evidence that [Heidler’s] trial

counsel presented in its decision,” showing “that [Heidler’s] trial

counsel were not deficient in their investigation or presentation of

mitigating evidence.”

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 55 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 55

The district court denied Heidler’s ineffective assistance

claim relating to the suppression of his statement to police for four

reasons. First, the district court concluded that the claim was “not

properly before the [district court]” because “Heidler generally

raise[d] the[] claim[] in his [section 2254 petition]” but did not “pro-

vide[ a] factual basis for [it].” Second, even if the claim had been

properly pleaded, the district court concluded that the claim was

unexhausted because Heidler “failed to include [it] in his applica-

tion for a [certificate of probable cause to appeal to] the Georgia

Supreme Court.” Third, the state hadn’t waived its exhaustion de-

fense. And fourth, the district court found that Heidler “ha[d] not

attempted to show cause and prejudice for this failure [to exhaust]

or that procedural default would result in a miscarriage of justice.”

The district court denied a certificate of appealability.

Heidler appealed, and we granted a certificate of appealability as to

three issues:

1. Whether the district court erred in concluding

that the state habeas court did not unreasonably

apply Strickland . . . in finding that trial counsel

was not ineffective in investigating and presenting

evidence of Mr. Heidler’s mental health for the

guilt phase of the trial.

2. Whether the district court erred in concluding

that the state habeas court did not unreasonably

apply Strickland . . . in finding that trial counsel

was not ineffective in investigating and presenting

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 56 of 112

56 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

mitigating evidence for the penalty phase of Mr.

Heidler’s trial.

3. Whether the district court erred in concluding

that Mr. Heidler did not sufficiently plead[,] and

did not exhaust, his claim that trial counsel was in-

effective by failing to adequately present infor-

mation and evidence in pretrial motions relating

to Mr. Heidler’s waiver of constitutional rights

during interrogation by the police.

In other words, we granted a certificate of appealability on

(1) trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of mental health ev-

idence during the guilt phase, (2) trial counsel’s investigation and

presentation of mental health and background evidence in the penalty

phase, and (3) trial counsel’s efforts to exclude Heidler’s statements

to police.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C.

[section] 2254 petition.” Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 924

F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2019). This appeal is governed by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Id.

When a state court has adjudicated a habeas petitioner’s claim on

the merits, we review its decision under AEDPA’s “highly deferen-

tial standards.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 269 (2015). Under

those highly deferential standards, a federal court may not grant a

section 2254 petition unless the state court’s adjudication was

(1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 57 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 57

established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court’s factual findings—both express and implied—

are “presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner bears “the burden

of rebutting [that] presumption of correctness by clear and con-

vincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1); see Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,

28 F.4th 1089, 1145 (11th Cir. 2022) (explaining that the petitioner

“has the added burden under [section] 2254(e)(1) of rebutting by

‘clear and convincing evidence’ the presumption of correctness

given to state court factual findings, both express and implied”); see

also Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir.

2012) (“[O]ur review of findings of fact by the state court is even

more deferential than under a clearly erroneous standard of re-

view.” (quotation omitted)).

A habeas petition “must show far more than that the state

court’s decision was merely wrong or even clear error.” Shinn v.

Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 523 (2020) (quotation and citation omitted).

The question is not whether we “believe[] the state court’s deter-

mination was incorrect but whether that determination was unrea-

sonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan,

550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). A state court’s decision is not unreasona-

ble “so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness

of the . . . decision.” See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)

(quotation omitted). In other words, we may only grant habeas

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 58 of 112

58 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

relief if the state court’s decision is “so obviously wrong that its er-

ror lies beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”

Shinn, 141 S. Ct. at 523 (quotation omitted). “If this standard is dif-

ficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Harrington, 562

U.S. at 102.

Our focus under section 2254(d) is on the “last reasoned”

state court decision. See McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d

1252, 1261 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). When the

final state court decision on the merits doesn’t come with rea-

sons—as here, where the Georgia Supreme Court summarily de-

nied Heidler a certificate of probable cause to appeal—we “‘look

through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court de-

cision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “then presume

that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson

v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

But, in assessing whether the state court’s decision was rea-

sonable, a “federal habeas court reviews only the state court’s de-

cision and is not limited to the particular justifications that the state

court supplied.” Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025,

1037–38 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). What that means is that we

look to “the reasons for the state court’s decision” and then “con-

sider any potential justification for those reasons.” Id. at 1036. So,

for example, if “the specific reason for a state court’s decision to

deny habeas relief was that the petitioner wasn’t prejudiced by his

counsel’s deficient performance, we can, in evaluating whether

that reason was reasonable, consider additional rationales that

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 59 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 59

support the state court’s prejudice determination.” Id. at 1036

(cleaned up). And we defer to the state court’s determination so

long as it was not “so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. (quotation omit-

ted).

DISCUSSION

Our review is limited to the three issues specified in

Heidler’s certificate of appealability. Murray v. United States, 145

F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n an appeal brought by an un-

successful habeas petitioner, appellate review is limited to the is-

sues specified in the [certificate of appealability].”). First, we con-

clude that the Georgia Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply

Strickland in denying Heidler’s claim that trial counsel were ineffec-

tive in investigating and presenting evidence of his mental health

during the guilt phase of trial. Second, we find that the Georgia

Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland in denying

Heidler’s claim that trial counsel were ineffective in investigating

and presenting mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of trial.

And third, even if Heidler sufficiently pleaded and exhausted his

claim that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to suppress his

inculpatory statements to police, we explain that the claim fails on

the merits under de novo review.

But before we get there, we’ll start with the law that governs

Heidler’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Under Strickland,

“[a] petitioner asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice—that

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 60 of 112

60 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reason-

ableness’ and that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.’” Hitchcock v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 745 F.3d

476, 485 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88).

“Because the failure to demonstrate either deficient performance

or prejudice is dispositive . . . , there is no reason for a court decid-

ing an ineffective assistance claim to address both components of

the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”

Windom v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 578 F.3d 1227, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009)

(cleaned up).

The performance inquiry is “highly deferential,” and courts

must not succumb to the “all too tempting” impulse “to conclude

that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable” after

counsel’s defense “has proved unsuccessful.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of rea-

sonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. “No absolute rules dic-

tate what is reasonable performance for lawyers.” Chandler v.

United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89). Instead, “the performance inquiry

must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering

all the circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

In short, if a reasonably competent attorney in counsel’s

shoes could—but not necessarily would—have performed the

same, then the representation was adequate. See White v.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 61 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 61

Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992) (“We ask only

whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in

the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.”); Rompilla v.

Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (referring to “[a] standard of reason-

ableness applied as if one stood in counsel’s shoes”). “Strickland

does not guarantee perfect representation, only a reasonably com-

petent attorney.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 110 (quotation omitted).

In reviewing a state court’s determination that an attorney’s

performance was not unreasonable, we decide only whether the

state court’s conclusion about reasonableness was itself reasonable.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). So we give “both the state court and the

defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Woods v. Etherton, 578

U.S. 113, 117 (2016) (quotation omitted). In other words, “because

the standards created by Strickland and [section] 2254(d) are both

highly deferential,” our review is “doubly” deferential “when the

two apply in tandem.” Jenkins v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 963

F.3d 1248, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

As to Strickland’s second prong, the prejudice inquiry

doesn’t ask whether “the errors had some conceivable effect on the

outcome of the proceeding.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. In-

stead, where a defendant challenges a death sentence, we ask

“whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,

the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggra-

vating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Hitch-

cock, 745 F.3d at 485 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). “A rea-

sonable probability means a substantial, not just conceivable,

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 62 of 112

62 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

likelihood of a different result.” Shinn, 141 S. Ct. at 523 (quotation

omitted). “It is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.’” Hayes v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 10 F.4th 1203, 1210

(11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

A. Heidler’s Claim that Trial Counsel Were Ineffective in Investigat-

ing and Presenting Evidence of His Mental Health During the

Guilt Phase

With that, we turn to Heidler’s claim that trial counsel were

ineffective in investigating and presenting evidence of his mental

health during the guilt phase of his trial. Because the Georgia Su-

preme Court summarily denied that claim, we look to the “last rea-

soned” state court decision. See McGahee, 560 F.3d at 1261 n.12. In

our case, that’s the state habeas court’s decision. The state habeas

court denied Heidler’s claim, reasoning that Heidler failed under

Strickland’s performance and prejudice prongs. We conclude that

fairminded jurists could agree with those determinations about the

guilt phase: that trial counsel’s investigation was not deficient, that

trial counsel’s presentation was not deficient, and that Heidler has

failed to show that he suffered any prejudice.

Deficiency – Investigation

The state habeas court concluded that Heidler’s trial coun-

sel’s investigation into his mental health for the guilt phase was not

deficient. Under our “doubly” deferential standard of review, we

can’t say that the state habeas court unreasonably concluded that

trial counsel weren’t deficient under the circumstances. See Jenkins,

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 63 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 63

963 F.3d at 1265 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105). Mr. Garrett

and Ms. Palmer thoroughly investigated Heidler’s mental health.

For starters, both Mr. Garrett and Ms. Palmer visited

Heidler in jail within days of the murders. Even based on those

initial meetings with Heidler, Mr. Garrett and Ms. Palmer were

“totally convinced” that Heidler was mentally ill. Ms. Palmer, for

example, saw that Heidler “was making babies out of toilet paper

and doing strange things in his cell.” Ms. Palmer continued to visit

Heidler every six weeks or so and talk with the chief jailer every

Thursday “to see how [Heidler] was doing, was he taking his med-

ication.” Mr. Garrett also met with Heidler at least a dozen times

before the trial. Trial counsel concluded that Heidler “obviously

needed a psychological evaluation.”

Trial counsel’s mental health investigation also included in-

terviewing Heidler’s family members, including his mother, aunt,

uncle, and his sister, Lisa Aguilar. Ms. Palmer recounted that

Heidler’s “family members” all said “[t]hat he had always been

mentally ill.” At the same time, Heidler’s family members

“weren’t real helpful” with giving “specific examples of mental

health problems.” Ms. Palmer also spoke with some of Heidler’s

teachers and foster parents. One of those teachers, Ms. Dryden,

worked with Heidler at the Cedarwood School for “mentally ill stu-

dents.” Ms. Dryden was able to talk about “how sick [Heidler] was

during the time.” And one of Heidler’s foster parents, Ms. Boat-

right, explained that Heidler “hallucinated that he had this pet

friend that was [a] white mouse.” To gather more information,

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 64 of 112

64 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Ms. Palmer also went “to the jails,” to the “Juvenile Court,” and to

the DFACS to speak with caseworkers and gather Heidler’s rec-

ords. And she hired Investigator Gillis, who sought out Heidler’s

“aunts and uncles and cousins” and some of Heidler’s friends.

Heidler’s trial counsel also collected extensive records from

DFACS, medical service providers, mental health centers, and

schools (including psycho-educational centers). For example, trial

counsel received records from:

(1) Harrell Psychoeducational Program; (2) First Dis-

trict Cooperative Educational Service Agency; (3) Ap-

pling County Special Education Program; (4) Okefe-

nokee RESA Child Development Center; (5) Bacon

County Elementary; (6) Jeff Davis Middle School; (7)

Georgia Regional of Savannah; (8) Cedarwood Psy-

choeducational Program; (9) Daisy Youth Clinic (Sa-

tilla Community Mental Health); (10) Bacon County

Juvenile Court; (11) DFACS [in] Appling, Bacon and

Jeff Davis Counties; (12) Pineland Mental Health; and

(13) Toombs County Detention Center.

These records revealed, for example, that Heidler was “extremely

suicidal,” that he “kill[ed] animals,” that he “attempt[ed] to harm

himself” by “standing in front of logging trucks” and tying “a rope

around his neck,” and that Heidler had “tremendous [amounts] of

pent up anger . . . that exhibit[ed] itself in inappropriate and some-

times psychotic manners.” The records also included Heidler’s

medication log from while he was detained pending trial, which

showed that he was prescribed Haldol, “an antipsychotic

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 65 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 65

medication.” Trial counsel also collected letters that Heidler had

sent to them leading up to trial, including a letter in which Heidler

said that he “hear[d] a dead baby crying.”

In assessing Heidler’s mental health, trial counsel also hired

two experts. Specifically, Mr. Garrett retained Drs. Maish and Ol-

son to evaluate Heidler. Mr. Garrett testified that he and Ms.

Palmer gave Dr. Maish reports of Heidler’s behavior in jail and “all

documents” comprising Heidler’s background records. Dr. Maish

met with Heidler six times, interviewed him “extensively,” and

gave him a “battery of tests.” Mr. Garrett also retained Dr. Albert

Olson to evaluate Heidler for “pathological issues,” “brain dam-

age,” or a “head injury” and to do “neurological testing.” Beyond

hiring experts, Mr. Garrett also interviewed the court-appointed

experts, Drs. D’Alesandro, Ifill, and Kuglar, and gave them

Heidler’s background records too.

In short, the record shows that trial counsel’s investigation

of Heidler’s mental health was comprehensive and thorough.

We’ve previously held that similar—and even less extensive—in-

vestigations were constitutionally adequate. See, e.g., Gissendaner

v. Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The state habeas

court’s finding of no deficient performance was also reasonable

with respect to trial counsel’s mental health investigation, which

included obtaining [the petitioner’s] mental health records and

consulting with [an expert].”); Raheem v. GDCP Warden, 995 F.3d

895, 919 (11th Cir. 2021) (finding that trial counsel “conducted an

extensive [and adequate] investigation into [the petitioner’s]

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 66 of 112

66 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

mental health before trial” where trial counsel “consulted with four

different mental health experts,” “spoke with [one of the experts]

often,” and “me[t] with [the petitioner’s] family”). The state habeas

court’s conclusion that trial counsel performed an adequate inves-

tigation of Heidler’s mental health was not unreasonable.

In response, Heidler makes six main arguments—all unper-

suasive. First, Heidler argues that trial counsel “[f]ailed to investi-

gate and develop evidence of Heidler’s continuing severe mental

illness while awaiting trial.” But trial counsel did investigate

Heidler’s mental health as he awaited trial. For example, Mr. Gar-

rett and Ms. Palmer visited Heidler every few weeks. At these vis-

its, trial counsel learned that Heidler “was making babies out of

toilet paper and doing strange things in his cell.” When they vis-

ited, trial counsel saw that Heidler “colored every cement block in

[his] cell” with crayons, tore up his “sink” and “toilet,” and engaged

in “self-mutilation within the jail.” Ms. Palmer also spoke with the

chief jailer every week to check in on Heidler and whether he was

taking his medication.

Heidler’s trial counsel also requested—and received—at

least some records from Pineland Mental Health, including

Heidler’s medication log from while he was detained, which

showed that he was prescribed Haldol, an antipsychotic medica-

tion. The state habeas court also credited Mr. Garrett’s testimony

that he spoke with Nurse Dykes, the nurse at the Toombs County

Detention Center, who referred Heidler to Pineland Mental Health

Center for treatment. Mr. Garrett read his notes from the time as

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 67 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 67

stating that Nurse Dykes “said that [Heidler] needed to go to men-

tal health.” Given all this, we can’t say that the state habeas court

unreasonably concluded that trial counsel adequately investigated

Heidler’s mental health while he was detained pending trial.

Pushing back, Heidler faults trial counsel for “never

reach[ing] out to [Nurse] Dykes or to Dr. Faulk, the treating psy-

chiatrist.” He also criticizes trial counsel for failing to collect cer-

tain records from Pineland Mental Health Center, which (among

other things) documented Dr. Faulk’s findings, including a nota-

tion that Heidler appeared “psychotic.” But the state habeas court

found that trial counsel did reach out to Nurse Dykes. Even if

Heidler could undermine that finding by clear and convincing evi-

dence—and even if trial counsel failed to interview Nurse Dykes

and Dr. Faulk and failed to obtain certain Pineland Mental Health

records—that wouldn’t render the state habeas court’s decision un-

reasonable. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 951 n.17 (5th Cir.

2001) (“[I]t is possible that, while the state court erred with respect

to one factual finding under [section] 2254(e)(1), its determination

of facts resulting in its decision in the case was reasonable under

[section] 2254(d)(2).”).

Here’s why. We’ll start with the interviews. “A claim of

failure to interview a witness may sound impressive in the abstract,

but it cannot establish ineffective assistance when the person’s ac-

count is otherwise fairly known to defense counsel.” Eggleston v.

United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States

v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)). Here,

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 68 of 112

68 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Nurse Dykes referred Heidler to Pineland Mental Health Center

because Heidler was “hallucinating and he was hearing voices” and

“continuing to injure himself.” And Dr. Faulk diagnosed Heidler

with “[p]sychotic [d]isorder” and prescribed him Haldol to “help

control [Heidler’s] psychotic symptoms,” including seeing “visions

of people” and “hear[ing] a baby crying all the time.” But trial

counsel already knew about the hallucinations, self-mutilation, and

signs of psychosis. The state habeas court didn’t unreasonably con-

clude that this information was fairly known to trial counsel and

was thus cumulative. See Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 11 (2009)

(“[T]here comes a point at which evidence . . . can reasonably be

expected to be only cumulative, and the search for it distractive

from more important duties.”).

The same goes for the Pineland Mental Health records. A

petitioner can’t prove ineffective assistance simply by pointing to

undiscovered records that were “cumulative to what was uncov-

ered during counsel’s investigation.” Raheem, 995 F.3d at 922; see

also Darling v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.

2010) (“No reasonable jurist could debate the holding that the fact

that [a petitioner] now has gathered additional evidence about his

[mental health] that differs in some minor respects from the evi-

dence actually presented at trial does not render his attorneys’ per-

formance deficient[.]”). And the state habeas court did not err in

finding that the Pineland Mental Health records were cumulative

to what trial counsel already discovered. Those records generally

reflected that Heidler experienced “suicidal/homicidal ideations,”

had “attempted suicide” in the past, displayed “antisocial

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 69 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 69

personality traits,” was diagnosed with “antisocial personality dis-

order,” “[r]eport[ed] hearing voices and seeing things” (including

“a baby cry”), showed signs of “psychosis,” and was prescribed

“Haldol.” But counsel were already aware of these things. And

they already had five mental health experts evaluating Heidler.

Trial counsel were not required to “scour the globe on the off

chance” they’d find more evidence of what they already knew.

Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383. At the very least, the state habeas court

was not unreasonable in concluding as much.

Second, Heidler similarly points to other witnesses that (in

his view) trial counsel should have interviewed—like Dr. Butler (a

pediatrician who treated Heidler when he was twelve and saw him

experiencing “auditory hallucinations”), Ms. Fesperman (a school

psychologist whom Heidler had told he “sometimes saw things

coming off the wall”), and Ms. Pickren (a teacher who saw

Heidler’s “severe depression”). Heidler says that trial counsel’s fail-

ure to interview these people rendered their investigation consti-

tutionally inadequate.

Heidler’s argument doesn’t work. For one thing—this bears

repeating—trial counsel were aware of Heidler’s mental health

problems and made them a focal point of trial. And so the state

habeas court did not unreasonably conclude that these accounts

were “fairly known” to trial counsel. See Eggleston, 798 F.2d at 376

(quotation omitted). For another, while Heidler faults trial counsel

for not interviewing some witnesses who (he says) would have of-

fered helpful testimony, trial counsel’s “duty to investigate does

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 70 of 112

70 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

not necessarily require counsel to investigate every evidentiary

lead.” Raheem, 995 F.3d at 909 (quotation omitted). We must af-

ford a “heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments,” mind-

ful of the “reality that lawyers do not enjoy the benefit of endless

time, energy, or financial resources.” Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d

1223, 1237 (11th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). Here, trial counsel inter-

viewed Heidler’s family, friends, teachers, and foster parents. They

went door to door around the community, and they spoke to peo-

ple at the jails, the juvenile court, and DFACS. They hired two

mental health experts and worked closely with three others. They

collected binders (and binders) of Heidler’s records. We can’t say

that the state habeas court unreasonably found this sufficient.

Third, Heidler asserts that trial counsel performed unrea-

sonably because they “failed to ensure the experts had additional

important information, such as Heidler’s own letters documenting

ongoing psychosis.” In those letters, Heidler said he could hear his

stillborn baby crying. But Ms. Palmer testified at the state habeas

court hearing that the “letters that [Heidler] had written to [trial

counsel] . . . were . . . turned over to Dr. Maish and the other men-

tal health expert[s].” And the state habeas court credited this testi-

mony. Even if Heidler could show by clear and convincing evi-

dence that this finding was erroneous (and we doubt he could), the

evidence shows that the experts were equipped with the

knowledge that Heidler suffered from hallucinations. By the time

they testified at trial, for example, Dr. Kuglar knew about Heidler’s

“auditory delusion[s],” including a “baby crying”; Dr. D’Alesandro

was aware that Heidler was taking medication that “conceivably

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 71 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 71

could have been” Haldol, an antipsychotic; and Dr. Maish had seen

“talk in the records” of “hallucinations” and “psychotic disturb-

ances.” The state habeas court did not unreasonably conclude that

trial counsel adequately prepared the experts.

Fourth, Heidler argues that the state habeas court’s factual

findings about the scope of trial counsel’s pretrial investigation are

clearly erroneous. Specifically, Heidler argues that the state habeas

court: (1) “ignored the fact that many of [trial counsel’s] conversa-

tions [with witnesses] happened in the middle of trial and that most

of their witness contacts failed to cover critical mitigation topics”;

(2) “credited” trial counsel with hiring Investigator Gillis even

though Investigator Gillis “did practically no work on this case”;

and (3) “took at face value” Ms. Palmer’s testimony about her in-

vestigation even though Ms. Palmer’s billing records didn’t corrob-

orate her testimony.

But Heidler hasn’t shown by clear and convincing evidence

that the state habeas court’s factual findings about the scope of trial

counsel’s investigation were incorrect. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

To the contrary, the state habeas court’s factual findings are sup-

ported by Ms. Palmer’s testimony at the state habeas evidentiary

hearing about the pretrial interviews she conducted, her preference

not to rely on Investigator Gillis to interview witnesses, and that

she “did a lot more work” than what was documented in her billing

records. We have “no license” to question the state habeas court’s

determination that Ms. Palmer’s testimony was credible. See Mar-

shall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983) (“28 U.S.C.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 72 of 112

72 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

[section] 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license to redeter-

mine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed

by the state trial court, but not by them.”).

Fifth, Heidler asserts that the state habeas court unreasona-

bly “blamed [him] for [trial] counsel’s own deficiencies during the

investigation” because Heidler’s inability to communicate was “a

symptom of his illness, not an ‘unwillingness to cooperate’” and

because “even if Heidler had intentionally withheld information,

counsel would still be obligated to conduct a reasonable investiga-

tion.” Heidler is correct that his lack of assistance did not relieve

trial counsel of their duty to perform a reasonable investigation.

See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (“Porter may have

been fatalistic or uncooperative, but that does not obviate the need

for defense counsel to conduct some sort of mitigation investiga-

tion.”).

But the state habeas court didn’t conclude that Heidler’s in-

ability or unwillingness to assist his counsel’s investigation obvi-

ated counsel’s duty to reasonably investigate his mental health. In-

stead, the state habeas court considered Heidler’s lack of coopera-

tion as context for assessing the reasonableness of trial counsel’s in-

vestigation. This was not unreasonable. See Johnston v. Singletary,

162 F.3d 630, 642 (11th Cir. 1998) (“In practical terms, counsel’s

ability to present certain types of evidence may be informed, if not

sharply curtailed, by a client’s refusal to cooperate”); Thomas v.

Wainwright, 767 F.2d 738, 743 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A criminal defend-

ant’s unreasonable refusal to communicate or cooperate with his

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 73 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 73

attorney is one of the ‘circumstances’ that must be considered in

determining whether an attorney’s assistance was reasonably effec-

tive.”); Gardner v. Ozmint, 511 F.3d 420, 427 (4th Cir. 2007)

(“[W]hen determining whether counsel has delivered a constitu-

tionally deficient performance, a state court also may consider a

defendant’s own degree of cooperation[.]”); Lorraine v. Coyle, 291

F.3d 416, 435 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Trial counsel cannot be faulted for

their client’s lack of cooperation.”); cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688

(“[T]he performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance

was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”).

And sixth, Heidler likens his case to Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d

1199 (11th Cir. 2011), where we found that “trial counsel’s mental

health investigation was unjustifiably and unreasonably circum-

scribed.” Id. at 1227. In Ferrell, trial counsel limited the mental

health expert “to answering only two questions: [1] whether [the

petitioner] was mentally retarded and [2] whether he suffered from

any problems that may have affected his waiver of rights for the

statements he gave to the police.” Id. “Notably,” the mental health

expert “had not been asked to look for evidence of brain damage,

was provided no material from counsel other than school records,

and was not asked to perform a clinical interview, or do anything

else for possible use in mitigation.” Id. “Nor, despite [the peti-

tioner’s] obvious mental disabilities, did defense counsel ever ask

any of [the petitioner’s] family . . . about any topics related to [his]

mental health.” Id. at 1228.

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 74 of 112

74 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

Our case is different. Unlike trial counsel in Ferrell, for ex-

ample, Heidler’s trial counsel (1) did not limit testimony to only

mental retardation or competence to waive rights; (2) did obtain a

second expert to look for evidence of “brain damage”; (3) did pro-

vide “several binders” of records to the experts, including DFACS

records, school records, mental health records, and juvenile rec-

ords; (4) did have their mental health expert interview their client

“extensively” across six visits; (5) did ask family members about

Heidler’s mental health; and (6) made his mental health the main

focus of their investigation. In other words, Heidler’s trial counsel

did all of the things that trial counsel didn’t do in Ferrell. This isn’t

a case where a criminal defendant had obvious mental health issues

and trial counsel simply did nothing. And so Ferrell doesn’t help

Heidler’s claim.

Deficiency – Presentation

The state habeas court concluded that trial counsel’s presen-

tation of mental health evidence in the guilt phase was reasonable.

Fairminded jurists could agree with that assessment. In assessing

the reasonableness of counsel’s presentation, we’ve explained that

“[i]t is especially difficult to succeed with an ineffective assistance

claim questioning the strategic decisions of trial counsel who were

informed of the available evidence.” Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diagnos-

tic Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2019). Indeed, where, as

here, “strategic choices”—like deciding what theories or witnesses

to present—are “made after [a] thorough investigation,” those de-

cisions “are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 75 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 75

U.S. at 690). Viewed in this light, the state habeas court’s decision

was not unreasonable.

As we’ve explained, trial counsel realized early on that

Heidler was “mentally ill.” Ms. Palmer testified that, as soon as she

“walked in[to] [Heidler’s cell] and saw [the] toilet paper babies,

[she] knew that he was mentally ill.” Mr. Garrett likewise testified

that he knew that “mental health” would be an issue in the case

“[a]lmost right away.” At the same time, trial counsel recognized

that it would be ineffective to argue that Heidler was innocent be-

cause “the facts were overwhelming as to what happened.” So trial

counsel landed on a strategy for the guilt stage of arguing that

Heidler was guilty but mentally ill. In explaining this strategy, Mr.

Garrett testified:

[T]he facts were overwhelming as to what hap-

pened[,] and it was not a mental health defense so

much as it was how to go through the guilt/inno-

cence phase seamlessly connected to the penalty

phase that was inevitable and . . . be consistent. And

so it was really one long penalty phase, with the psy-

chiatric evidence put at the front end and then miti-

gation put in afterwards. We believed that if we ar-

gued to the jury that he was guilty but mentally ill,

that it would be consistent with the evidence and that

we would retain credibility with the jury and that per-

haps the jury would be sympathetic and spare his life.

Heidler doesn’t contend that this strategy was unreasonable. Nor

could he. See Thomas, 767 F.2d at 747 (finding that trial counsel was

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 76 of 112

76 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

not ineffective where he “advance[d] arguments at sentencing con-

sistent with those he advanced at the guilt phase”); Watkins v. Mur-

ray, No. 92-4010, 1993 WL 243692, *9 (July 7, 1993) (4th Cir. 1993)

(“[I]t was an eminently reasonable trial strategy to offer a theory at

sentencing consistent with the theory offered at the guilt phase of

the trial.”); see also Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in

Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 323,

357–58 (1993) (noting the importance of “develop[ing] a consistent

theory to be used at the guilt and penalty phases” and using as an

example trial counsel “present[ing] an insanity defense at trial” and

then “present[ing] additional testimony relating to the defendant’s

mental impairment as mitigating evidence at the penalty trial”).

The state habeas court did not unreasonably conclude that

trial counsel weren’t deficient in implementing this strategy at trial.

Starting with opening statements, Ms. Palmer told the jury that she

“expected that mental health issues [were] going to be a very im-

portant part of this case.” After the state rested, trial counsel then

sought to present Drs. D’Alesandro, Ifill, and Kuglar during the

guilt phase to prove that Heidler was mentally ill. Over the state’s

objection, the state trial court ruled in Heidler’s favor, deciding that

it would call Drs. D’Alesandro, Ifill, and Kuglar as witnesses and

would permit Heidler to use the court-appointed experts to prove

his mental health condition in support of a guilty but mentally ill

verdict.

In light of the state trial court’s ruling, Heidler’s trial counsel

decided not to call Dr. Maish during the guilt phase. In explaining

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 77 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 77

this decision, Mr. Garrett noted that he and Ms. Palmer “thought

[Dr. Maish’s] testimony was going to be the strongest.” And so

they “wanted to let the jury hear the mental health evidence on the

front end with the other three, and then let them hear it all over

again from someone who [trial counsel] thought would . . . give

the strongest testimony.” We can’t say that the state court unrea-

sonably found this to be an effective strategy. Indeed, “[w]hich wit-

nesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is the epitome of a

strategic decision, and it is one that we will seldom, if ever, second

guess.” Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (en

banc).

Heidler’s trial counsel then questioned the three expert wit-

nesses, highlighting Heidler’s severe mental health issues. First,

Dr. D’Alesandro told the jury that he “found severe emotional

problems beginning in [Heidler’s] childhood” that Heidler “was

still suffering from” at the time of his evaluation. Dr. D’Alesandro

said that Heidler would probably be best identified as having bor-

derline personality disorder. Dr. D’Alesandro agreed that this “se-

vere disorder” would “influence [Heidler’s] decision-making capac-

ity.” The borderline personality disorder could also make Heidler

“really unstable,” have “a very poor sense of themselves,” “overre-

act to stimuli,” and “at times become very dramatic” and “impul-

sive.”

Dr. D’Alesandro testified that, “[f]rom the information [he]

got, [Heidler] did experience hallucinations . . . during a time that

he was doing some type of drug.” Dr. D’Alesandro also testified

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 78 of 112

78 Opinion of the Court 20-13752

that, in examining Heidler’s mental history, “[t]here was a sugges-

tion” in the records that Heidler had experienced “psychotic epi-

sodes.” Although he couldn’t validate the psychosis, Dr.

D’Alesandro explained that “people with this type of diagnosis

sometimes will get to such an extreme that they may temporarily

at least function in a psychotic-like state.” Dr. D’Alesandro further

mentioned that Heidler “conceivably could have been” taking Hal-

dol, “an antipsychotic medication.”

Dr. D’Alesandro also explained that Heidler had a history of

“depression” and “recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats,

or self-mutilating behavior.” He told the jury, for example, that the

records indicated that Heidler “would stand in the middle of the

road waiting for a car to try and hit him,” and one time, “a tractor-

trailer jackknifed in [an] attempt[] to avoid hitting him.” He also

explained that “the first time [he] saw him [Heidler] had cigarette

burns up and down his arms,” which “certainly would signify self-

mutilation.” And he shared his view that “there [was] sufficient

clinical documentation to substantiate a consideration of a guilty

but mentally ill [verdict] if that would be the [c]ourt and the jury’s

decision.”

Second, Heidler’s trial counsel reinforced this testimony

through Dr. Ifill. Dr. Ifill testified that he “found that [Heidler] was

suffering from severe emotional disorders beginning in childhood

and continuing up until the present.” Like Dr. D’Alesandro, Dr.

Ifill said that he saw “self-inflicted” cigarette burn marks on

Heidler’s skin. Dr. Ifill also told the jury that Heidler’s “history

USCA11 Case: 20-13752 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 79 of 112

20-13752 Opinion of the Court 79

recorded recurrent thoughts of wanting to kill himself and several

attempts to do so,” including a time when he was admitted to “the

hospital in Savannah.” Dr. Ifill explained that he’d “found that

[Heidler] was suffering from many elements of . . . borderline per-

sonality disorder.”

Dr. Ifill told the jury that there “were evaluations where

[Heidler’s] behavior at one point might have been thought of being

psychotic.” He explained that “there are many instances where a

person who is not normally psychotic may have psychotic epi-

sodes.” Mr. Garrett also asked Dr. Ifill if those suffering from a per-

sonality disorder may be “triggered into a psychotic episode.” And,

in response, Dr. Ifill said: “[t]here is only one personality disorder

with which a brief or transient psychotic episode is associated with,

. . . and that is the borderline personality disorder.” Dr. Ifill con-

ceded that Heidler’s case “could support a verdict of guilty but

mentally ill.”

Third, Dr. Kuglar testified (like the first two experts) that the

“primary diagnosis [he] arrived at” was “borderline personality dis-

order.” Dr. Kuglar saw “where [Heidler] had cut himself and what

appeared to be cigarette burns, some kind of burns on his body,

and where he had . . . pick[ed] at small lesions on his face until he

had sort of created sores.” Dr. Kuglar said that Heidler “seemed to

show . . . some probable degree of depression” and that Heidler

had previously been “admitted after some sort of self-harm at-

tempts.” Dr. Kuglar explained that people with borderline person-

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.