Skanska USA Civil Southeast, Inc. and Skanska USA v. Bagelheads, Inc.

USCA11 Case: 21-13850 Document: 88-1 Date Filed: 08/02/2023 Page: 1 of 40

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13850

____________________

SKANSKA USA CIVIL SOUTHEAST INC.

AND SKANSKA USA, INC.,

as owners of the Barge KS 5531 praying for

exoneration from or limitation of liability,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

BAGELHEADS, INC.,

FLOWERS BY YOKO,

GULF BREEZE BAIT & TACKLE, INC.

DOG HOUSE DELI II, INC.

JLO, INC., et al.,

Claimants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC

____________________

____________________

No. 22-10203

____________________

SKANSKA USA CIVIL SOUTHEAST INC. AND

SKANSKA USA, INC.,

As owners of the Barge KS 5531

praying for exoneration from or limitation of liability,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

BAGELHEADS, INC.,

FLOWERS BY YOKO,

GULF BREEZE BAIT & TACKLE INC,

DOG HOUSE DELI II INC,

JLO INC, et al.,

Claimants-Appellees.

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21-13850 Opinion of the Court 3

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-05980-LC-HTC

____________________

Before BRANCH, GRANT, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,* District

Judge.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

Hurricane Sally hit Pensacola Bay with a vengeance in

September 2020, and 28 barges moored in the Bay were not spared.

The barges slammed around the Bay after their moorings snapped,

leading to significant damage—including to the Pensacola Bay

Bridge, which was closed for months. Skanska, the construction

company that owned the barges (and was working on replacing the

Bay Bridge) faced hundreds of potential lawsuits. Some were

directly related to property damage, but most were economic loss

claims from nearby businesses that lost customers during the

months-long closure of the bridge.

Skanska filed what are called petitions for limitation of

liability, one for each of its 28 barges. These petitions invoked the

Limitation Act, a federal law that allows the owner of a maritime

vessel to limit its damages in a negligence suit to the combined

* The Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the

Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.

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value of the vessel and its cargo—but only where the owner has

neither privity nor knowledge of the negligent acts at issue. After

extensive discovery and a bench trial, the district court decided that

Skanska could not limit its liability because its own corporate

officials were responsible for the negligent acts that led to the

barges getting loose in the storm. And once it decided that no

limitation of damages could apply, it dismissed the Limitation Act

petitions—freeing the claimants to pursue litigation in state court.

Skanska says the district court acted too fast, because the

Limitation Act entitles it to more than a decision on limitation of

damages (the denial of which it does not contest). It claims that the

Limitation Act required the district court to decide whether it was

liable to each and every claimant and only then to determine

whether it had a right to limit that liability. Here, it says, that

would have meant dismissing the economic loss claims because it

had no duty as the owner of the barges to prevent that sort of

indirect damage.

Skanska’s approach would turn the Limitation Act on its

head, and our precedents have already rejected it. We have been

clear that the purpose of the Act is limitation, not exoneration. And

the statute’s text is equally clear—we see no mandate to enforce

the two-step process that the company insists is necessary. The

Limitation Act allows a federal court to take over all negligence

claims to preserve the vessel owner’s right to limit its liability and

then proportionally distribute the available assets to the successful

claimants. But only to the extent necessary to protect the right to

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limitation; it does not create an independent right to have the full

merits of each individual claim decided in federal court when no

limitation is available.

Skanska also disputes several of the district court’s other

decisions, including multiple evidentiary rulings, the conclusion

that it committed negligent acts when it left the barges in the Bay,

and the imposition of spoliation sanctions for the destruction of

cellphone data. Here too we disagree. We see no reversible error

in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, its findings of fact, or its

spoliation sanctions. We therefore affirm the district court.

I.

A.

Pensacola is a city in the westernmost part of the Florida

panhandle. It is known for its access to beaches, which attract both

locals and tourists from across the country. But Pensacola Bay

separates the actual city of Pensacola from the area’s major

beaches (and from several smaller towns such as Gulf Breeze).

Pensacola remains connected to its beaches thanks to the Pensacola

Bay Bridge—a roughly three-mile bridge across the Bay that has

existed in some form since the 1930s.

Around 2010, the bridge needed replacing. Skanska USA

Civil Southeast Inc.—which is wholly owned by Skanska USA,

Inc.—won a contract to build two new spans and then to destroy

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the old bridge. 1 Those tasks required construction barges—lots of

them. Skanska had a hurricane preparedness plan for the project.

If winds of 58 miles per hour or greater were expected within the

next 72 hours, the plan called for the construction barges to be

moved to Butcherpen Cove on the south side of the Bay, a process

that would take at least 30 hours.

The first major warning sign of Hurricane Sally came on

Thursday, September 10, 2020, five days before Skanska’s barges

began to break loose. That’s when the National Hurricane Center

issued its notice of a potential storm. Skanska had 55 barges

working on the project, and the record does not show that anyone

at Skanska was yet aware of the notice. The next day, the National

Hurricane Center issued Advisory 1 about what it then called

“Tropical Depression 19.” Though it projected that the storm

would most likely land at the border between Louisiana and

Mississippi, Pensacola Bay fell in the possible 5-day path. Still no

sign that Skanska was aware of the storm.

By Saturday morning, that had changed. The National

Hurricane Center’s 72-hour report showed a 16% chance that

winds of 58 miles per hour or greater would reach Naval Air

1 The district court sat in admiralty and made findings of fact after a bench

trial. “When reviewing the judgment of a district judge sitting in admiralty

with no jury, we may not set aside the court’s findings of fact unless they are

clearly erroneous.” Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 446 F.3d 1377,

1380 (11th Cir. 2006). So—other than those findings of fact that Skanska

challenges, which we review for clear error—we take all of the district court’s

findings of fact as true.

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Station Pensacola (a few miles west of the bridge) by Tuesday.

Skanska decisionmakers conferenced on Saturday afternoon. By

that point, the storm had been upgraded to Tropical Storm Sally

and forecasters thought it would be a hurricane by Monday

evening. The storm was still projected to make landfall near the

Louisiana-Mississippi border—but Pensacola Bay remained on the

outskirts of the storm’s three-day probable path. Skanska

management decided to begin preparations to move and secure the

barges if necessary. But—in part because of logistical issues with

moving the barges over the weekend—the group largely took a

“wait and see” approach and agreed to meet again the next

morning.

By then, Sunday, the National Hurricane Center had issued

a tropical storm warning for the panhandle coast. The 72-hour

forecast was slightly better than it had been on Saturday, but it still

showed a 9% chance that winds of 58 miles per hour or greater

would hit Naval Air Station Pensacola by Wednesday. Skanska

began moving its barges, but decided not to take them all the way

to Butcherpen Cove. Instead, it moored the barges to various pipe

pilings in the Bay—generally within 500 feet of the bridge. Most,

but not all, of the barges were tied down by Monday morning,

which is also when Tropical Storm Sally was upgraded to

Hurricane Sally and the Governor of Florida issued a State of

Emergency for the greater Pensacola area. By Monday afternoon,

Pensacola Bay was squarely within the hurricane warning zone.

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On Tuesday morning, Naval Air Station Pensacola reported

winds from 15–26 miles per hour, with gusts reaching almost 45

miles per hour. Skanska’s barges began to break loose in the Bay,

and multiple barges crashed into the bridge. At first, Skanska tried

to secure its unmoored barges, but by Tuesday evening it was too

dangerous to continue the recovery attempts. On Wednesday,

when Hurricane Sally passed through the Bay, it brought winds

from 47 to 74 miles per hour, with gusts as high as 92 miles per

hour—causing even more barges to slip their moorings. In the end,

28 barges came loose, slamming into the bridge and other property

along the Bay’s edge.2 The bridge was closed to traffic for many

months because of the damage. This dramatically increased the

amount of time it took to get between Pensacola and the towns

and beaches on the other side of the Bay.

B.

In short order, Skanska found itself facing state-court

lawsuits—many lawsuits—about the damage caused by its barges.

Seeking both to limit its liability and to consolidate the multiplying

claims in a single forum, Skanska initiated proceedings in federal

district court under the Limitation Act. The core of that Act is

relatively simple: when a vessel causes “loss, damage, or injury by

2 The district court mentioned 27 barges that broke loose. But Skanska

initiated Limitation Act proceedings for 28 barges, and on appeal, both parties

refer to 28 barges as having broken loose. We adopt the parties’

characterization that 28 barges broke loose for clarity, but we do not hold one

way or the other whether the district court’s finding that 27 barges broke loose

was erroneous.

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collision” without the vessel owner’s “privity or knowledge,” the

owner’s liability is limited to the value of the vessel and its pending

freight. 46 U.S.C. § 30523.

To initiate a limitation proceeding, a vessel owner brings a

civil action and deposits the value of the vessel and its freight with

the district court. Id. § 30529; Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. Admiralty &

Mar. Claims (Supplemental Rules) F(1), F(2), F(9). This creates a

single equitable proceeding about the damage caused by the vessel.

All other litigation about the incident—whether in state or federal

court—must “cease.” 46 U.S.C. § 30529(c); Supplemental Rule

F(3); Beiswenger Enters. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1036 (11th Cir.

1996). At the same time, those injured by the vessel retain rights

under the “saving to suitors” clause. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. That clause,

which accompanied the original grant of admiralty jurisdiction to

federal district courts, ensures that federal admiralty jurisdiction

does not eliminate traditional remedies, including state jury trials.

Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443–46, 453–55

(2001).

Between December 2020 and March 2021, Skanska filed 28

petitions for exoneration or limitation of liability—one for each

barge that broke loose during the storm. Following Skanska’s

unopposed motion, all 28 proceedings were consolidated. 3 The

consolidated proceedings followed standard Limitation Act

3 Twenty-two of the proceedings were consolidated in an order on February

15. The remaining six proceedings were filed on March 26 and were treated

as part of the consolidated proceeding.

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procedure: Skanska deposited the value of each of the barges with

the district court, initiating a Limitation Act proceeding for each

barge, and the court enjoined the filing or prosecution of all related

proceedings in other courts. Parties alleging that they had suffered

harm from the loose barges then filed claims in the consolidated

proceeding, generally with “reservation of rights to proceed in

state court.”

Some of these claims came from people and entities whose

property was directly damaged by the barges—the United States,

for example, alleged that multiple barges caused millions of dollars

of damage when they allided with property at Naval Air Station

Pensacola. But most of the filings came from businesses claiming

not direct physical damage, but economic loss suffered after the

closure of the Pensacola Bay Bridge. As an example, the top-line

plaintiff here is Bagelheads, Inc., a bagel shop immediately next to

the bridge on the Pensacola side. It says it suffered more than

$90,000 in damages from the bridge outage because the dramatic

increase in travel time from Pensacola to the beach and to the

residential towns on the other side of the bridge cut the shop’s sales

by 35%. And Bagelheads was not alone—hundreds of similar

claims followed. Skanska moved to dismiss these claims from the

limitation proceeding, arguing that it owed no duty to any party

whose property did not suffer direct physical damage from the

barges.

The district court entered a scheduling order setting a

deadline for claimants to join the proceeding and directing all

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claimants to join in two amended master complaints—one for

direct property damage and one for economic damage arising from

the bridge outage. The court also announced a bifurcated bench

trial. First, the court would consider whether Skanska was entitled

to limitation of liability. That involved deciding whether the

accident was caused by any negligent acts and, if so, whether

Skanska had privity or knowledge of the negligence. Next—but

only if that first inquiry showed that Skanska had a right to limit its

liability—the parties would conduct damages discovery and the

court would schedule any necessary further proceedings. Neither

Skanska nor the claimants objected to this scheduling order.

In the end, over 1,000 claimants joined the proceedings—

more than 900 of whom alleged economic loss damages from the

bridge outage. After the window closed for new filings, Skanska

renewed its motion to dismiss the economic loss claims. The court

deferred consideration of that issue, in part to better protect the

claimants’ right to litigate in the forums of their choice if Skanska

were denied limitation.

During discovery, Skanska sought evidence about the

claimants’ storm preparations, including extensive discovery from

the United States Navy about steps it had taken at the nearby naval

air station. A magistrate judge handling pretrial issues held that the

Navy’s preparations were of minimal relevance because it operated

seagoing vessels (not barges) and that Skanska’s discovery of the

Navy was not proportional to the needs of the case. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(b). Despite that discovery order, Skanska requested

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depositions from fifteen individuals under the control of the

United States Navy, and the magistrate judge granted the Navy a

protective order.

After discovery, the district court conducted a five-day bench

trial on two issues: Skanska’s negligence and Skanska’s right to

limit its liability. Yet again, an evidentiary dispute arose. Skanska

examined a tugboat captain who had two barges moored to a

wharf in Pensacola Bay during Hurricane Sally, with the court

repeatedly warning Skanska’s counsel that his questions about the

captain’s personal experience up to and during the hurricane were

mostly irrelevant and directing him to get to the point. After about

14 minutes, the court dismissed the captain, but Skanska was

allowed to proffer the rest of his testimony, which showed that the

captain would have testified about his experience with storms and

about his decision to moor his barges in Pensacola Bay during

Hurricane Sally.

The district court ultimately concluded that Skanska had

acted negligently. It began with “the Louisiana rule,” which creates

a rebuttable presumption that a vessel is negligent when it collides

with a stationary object. See In re Skanska USA Civil Se. Inc., 577 F.

Supp. 3d 1302, 1313–14 (N.D. Fla. 2021) (citing Bunge Corp. v.

Freeport Marine Repair, Inc., 240 F.3d 919, 923 (11th Cir. 2001)); The

Louisiana, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164, 173 (1866). The court rejected

Skanska’s assertion that it was “caught off guard” by the storm and

found that Butcherpen Cove would have been a safer place to moor

the barges. 577 F. Supp. 3d at 1314–18. The “only surprise” to

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Skanska, the court said, “was that its unreasonable choice to

discount—or even ignore—the clear warnings of an approaching

tropical storm turned out to have harsh consequences.” Id. at 1322.

The court quickly rejected Skanska’s “perfunctory”

argument that it lacked privity or knowledge of the negligent acts,

pointing out that those acts “sprung wholly from executive

decision-making that resulted in the failure to take reasonable

measures to protect its barges from the impending storm.” Id. at

1324. It then dismissed Skanska’s petitions for exoneration from or

limitation of liability and dissolved the injunction barring

prosecution of all related litigation. Id. The court never ruled on

Skanska’s motion to dismiss the economic loss claims.

C.

Along with the adverse verdict, Skanska was sanctioned for

spoliating electronic evidence under Rule 37(e); the data from five

out of thirteen discovery custodians’ cell phones was destroyed.

Even with an active litigation hold and actual litigation, Skanska did

not back up the relevant employees’ cell phones. Nor did it suspend

its ordinary cell phone data destruction policies.

Two phones were deliberately reset according to Skanska’s

ordinary employee departure procedures when their owners left

the company. Another was somehow “disabled” and became

inaccessible after the owner left Skanska. Yet another was allegedly

lost overboard. And still another had all text messages deleted

under disputed circumstances.

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The district court ruled that Skanska “acted with the intent

to deprive” the claimants of the cell phone data and sanctioned the

company under Rule 37(e)(2). 4 The court emphasized that it saw

no cogent explanation, apart from bad faith, for Skanska’s

systematic failure to make any effort to preserve cell phone data

until at least seven months after the litigation hold was (technically)

in place. So it made two adverse inferences against Skanska and

ordered it to pay the claimants’ costs and attorneys’ fees for the

sanctions motion.

Skanska appeals both the district court’s final judgment and

its sanctions order, and we consolidated the appeals. Skanska also

moved to stay the dissolution of the district court’s injunction

pending appeal to prevent the lawsuits from proceeding against it

in state court, but we denied its request.

II.

We begin by addressing Skanska’s core argument—that the

district court violated the Limitation Act by failing to first

adjudicate the full merits of the claims before deciding whether its

liability could be limited. In particular, we consider Skanska’s

argument that it was entitled to have the economic loss claims

dismissed, which would have barred the claimants from bringing

4 The claimants’ spoliation motion was referred to a magistrate judge, who

issued the opinion sanctioning Skanska. But the district court denied Skanska’s

objections to the order and “wholly concur[red]” with the magistrate judge,

so we refer to the magistrate judge’s order as coming from the district court

for clarity.

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those claims in another forum. We review questions of law about

the scope of the Limitation Act de novo. See Dresdner Bank AG v.

M/V Olympia Voyager, 446 F.3d 1377, 1381 (11th Cir. 2006). And we

review the district court’s decision to dismiss the entire Limitation

Act proceeding for abuse of discretion. See Lewis, 531 U.S. at 454.

A.

The Limitation Act is a difficult statute. It was written in

1851 to address economic realities that are unrecognizable today. 5

Lewis, 531 U.S. at 446–47. And it was “badly drafted even by the

standards of the time.” Id. at 447 (quoting 2 T. Schoenbaum,

Admiralty and Maritime Law 299 (2d ed. 1994)). Of course, that does

not change this Court’s job—we apply the law as it exists, no matter

how poorly it may have aged. But, keenly aware of the

inscrutability of this statute, we offer relevant background about

the basic history and substance of the Act (and its implementing

rules), the petitioner’s ability to demand exoneration, the

5 Nearly fifty years ago, our predecessor Court referred to the Act as

“hopelessly anachronistic”—largely because it was a creative way to limit

liability “in an era before the corporation, with its limited shareholder liability,

had become the standard form of business organization and before the present

range of insurance protection was available.” Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at

Galveston v. United States, 557 F.2d 438, 441, 454 (5th Cir. 1977). It also quoted

a leading 1950s admiralty treatise that said the Act “has been due for a general

overhaul for the past seventy-five years.” Id. at 441 & n.3 (quoting Grant

Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty 677 (1st ed. 1957)). If

Gilmore and Black were right, then we are at 141 years and counting.

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injunction against ongoing litigation, and the Act’s relationship

with the equally mysterious saving to suitors clause.

First, the history. In 1851, Congress thought the American

shipping industry was disadvantaged as compared to its foreign

competitors. See Lewis, 531 U.S. at 446–47. Unlike their

counterparts in England, American courts did not limit the

potential liability of vessel owners. See generally Joseph C. Sweeney,

Limitation of Shipowner Liability: Its American Roots and Some

Problems Particular to Collision, 32 J. Mar. L. & Com. 241, 243–52

(2001). Congress stepped in, enacting the Limitation Act “to

encourage ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest money

in this branch of industry.” Lewis, 531 U.S. at 446 (quoting Norwich

Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 121 (1872)). To that end, the

Act limits a vessel owner’s liability for any “loss, damage, or injury

by collision . . . done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity

or knowledge of the owner.” 46 U.S.C. § 30523(b). 6 And

“consistent with the statutory purpose to protect innocent

investors, ‘privity or knowledge’ generally refers to the vessel

owner’s personal participation in, or actual knowledge of, the

specific acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness which

caused or contributed to the accident.” Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc.

6 While this appeal has been pending, Congress restructured and renumbered

the codified Limitation Act and limited the extent to which the Act applies to

certain small passenger vessels. James M. Inhofe National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117–263, § 11503, 136 Stat.

2395, 4130–31 (2022).

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v. Shubert, 86 F.3d 1060, 1064 (11th Cir. 1996). 7 In other words, the

Act limits the liability of vessel owners who were not in some sense

responsible for the specific negligent acts or conditions of

unseaworthiness that caused the accident. Id.

If a vessel owner is entitled to limitation, then its liability is

limited to the post-accident value of the vessel and its pending

freight. 46 U.S.C. § 30523(a); Tug Allie–B, Inc. v. United States, 273

F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 2001). That means that the owner’s total

loss—its liability plus the loss from the accident itself—will be no

greater than the value of the vessel and its cargo. The Act also

recognizes that multiple would-be plaintiffs might need to share in

these limited funds, so it provides that—if the funds are insufficient

to pay all claims—injured parties will be “paid in proportion to

their respective losses.” 46 U.S.C. § 30525(1).

When courts first began to apply the Limitation Act, they

encountered a major problem: it had no procedures. In the

Supreme Court’s first case about the Act, the Court observed that

it was “reduced to the dilemma of inferring that the legislature has

7 Linguistically, the idea of a vessel owner having “privity or knowledge” of

specific “negligent acts” is a little awkward; ordinarily, one thinks of privity as

being with actors, not of acts. But the meaning of this clause can be clarified

by thinking about the archetypical case of limitation: a nineteenth century

shipowner whose ship was thousands of miles away, completely outside of his

control, when the crew unexpectedly acted negligently. In such cases, the

vessel owner might be in a formal sense in privity with the negligent actors,

but would not be thought to have had “privity or knowledge” of the crew’s

specific negligent acts.

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passed a law which is incapable of execution.” Norwich, 80 U.S. (13

Wall.) at 123. So the Court took matters into its own hands,

promulgating rules of admiralty to implement the Act. Lewis, 531

U.S. at 447 (citing Supplementary Rules of Practice in Admiralty, 80

U.S. (13 Wall.) xii–xiv (1872)). A vessel owner seeking limitation of

liability would deposit the value of his interest in the vessel and its

freight before the court. Id. Then, the district court would order

all claimants to appear. Id. If the vessel owner was entitled to

limitation, the court would distribute the limited fund among the

claimants. Id. at 448.

Congress eventually codified the basic bond posting

procedure for the Limitation Act, and the Supreme Court over time

has amended and restyled the limitation rules. See 46 U.S.C

§ 30529; Supplemental Rule F. But the same basic structure

remains, and the Act’s procedures are still primarily implemented

by court rule rather than statute.

One of those procedures is the injunction against existing

litigation. When a Limitation Act petition is filed, the district court

enjoins the prosecution of all pending litigation that overlaps with

the subject matter of that petition. 46 U.S.C. § 30529(c);

Supplemental Rule F(3). A pause in other litigation about the

incident is necessary to protect the limitation fund—after all, the

plaintiffs’ combined damages may well exceed the value of the

vessel and its cargo. But if one or more plaintiffs received final

judgments in other litigation that exceeded this value, then the

vessel owner’s right to limit its liability would be meaningless.

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Here, the injunction stopped lawsuits like the one the bagel shop

filed in Florida state court—but only while the limitation petitions

were pending. Skanska’s objection is that the district court

dissolved the injunction and allowed the lawsuits to proceed.

Finally, we discuss the complicated relationship between the

Limitation Act and the saving to suitors clause. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1333. That clause falls not in the Limitation Act, but in the

general grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal district courts.

Id. It gives federal district courts “original jurisdiction, exclusive of

the courts of the States” of any “civil case of admiralty or maritime

jurisdiction.” Id. But it does so while “saving to suitors in all cases

all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” Id. Both

this grant of federal jurisdiction and the clause’s corresponding

protection of suitors have existed in some form since the Judiciary

Act of 1789. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 443–44 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789,

ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77). The Supreme Court has “theorized that

the saving to suitors clause was ‘inserted, probably, from abundant

caution,’” so that the grant of admiralty jurisdiction was not

wrongly understood to eliminate “‘the concurrent remedy which

had before existed’”—state tort lawsuits. Id. at 444 (quoting N.J.

Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchs.’ Bank of Bos., 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344,

390 (1848)). This clause, then, makes it clear that the existence of

federal admiralty jurisdiction (which offers no jury right) does not

generally keep plaintiffs from seeking relief in other forums—

perhaps forums that do offer a jury trial. See id. at 445–46, 454–55;

see also, e.g., Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1063.

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20 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

Make no mistake—“tension exists between the saving to

suitors clause and the Limitation Act.” Lewis, 531 U.S. at 448. The

former protects the right to a jury trial. Id. at 445–46, 454–55. The

latter creates a proceeding with no jury trial and stays all litigation

in any other forum—including where a jury trial would be

available. Id. at 448. In light of these somewhat contradictory

provisions, the district court is charged with safeguarding a vessel

owner’s right to have the question of limitation adjudicated in

federal court while simultaneously ensuring that claimants retain

their choice of forum under the saving to suitors clause.

Both this Court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly

grappled with this interplay. See, e.g., Offshore of the Palm Beaches,

Inc. v. Lynch, 741 F.3d 1251, 1257–59 (11th Cir. 2014); Lewis, 531 U.S.

at 448–56; Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1063–64; Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at 1036–

40; Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 150–54 (1957); Langnes

v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541–44 (1931). At least a few clear principles

have emerged. To start, a vessel owner has an “absolute right to

claim the Act’s liability cap, and to reserve the adjudication of that

right in the federal forum.” Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at 1037 (quotation

omitted). This guarantee means that a primary duty of the

limitation court is to ensure that outside lawsuits do not undermine

its exclusive authority to decide limitation. And if that right to

limitation cannot be adequately protected with other lawsuits

proceeding elsewhere, the limitation court may adjudicate the

merits of the entire controversy—which means deciding both

liability and limitation. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 454. But if the right to

litigate and enforce limitation in federal court is protected, the

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saving to suitors clause counsels in favor of giving plaintiffs their

choice of forum. Id. at 454–55. In that case, the district court has

“discretion to stay or dismiss Limitation Act proceedings to allow a

suitor to pursue his claims in state court.” Id. at 454.

B.

With this background, we can address Skanska’s argument

that the Limitation Act requires a federal court to decide whether

it owed a duty to each and every claimant—or, to put it another

way, Skanska’s argument that it had a right to be exonerated in

federal court.

Skanska primarily leans on a two-step procedure that we

have said is “typical” in a Limitation Act case: “First, the court must

determine what acts of negligence or conditions of

unseaworthiness caused the accident. Second, the court must

determine whether the shipowner had knowledge or privity of

those same acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness.”

Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida,

768 F.2d 1558, 1563–64 (11th Cir. 1985)); see also, e.g., Farrell Lines,

Inc. v. Jones, 530 F.2d 7, 10 (5th Cir. 1976); Hartford Accident & Indem.

Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207, 214–15 (1927); Providence & N.Y. S.S.

Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 595 (1883). 8 Skanska reads these

cases as creating a mandatory order of decision for nearly all

Limitation Act cases. And, in Skanska’s telling, that mandatory first

8 All published cases of the former Fifth Circuit decided before the close of

business on September 30, 1981, are precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v.

City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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22 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

step includes a decision on every element of negligence—duty,

breach, injury, and actual and proximate cause—for every claimant.

So, Skanska claims, the district court violated this order of decision

by reaching the question of privity and knowledge before fully

adjudicating its liability to each claimant.

This Court has already rejected Skanska’s rigid reliance on

the “typical” Limitation Act procedure. We have held that if it is

“impossible under any set of circumstances for the vessel owner to

demonstrate the absence of privity or knowledge,” then “the

admiralty court may decide the privity or knowledge issue without

first deciding the liability issue.” Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1064. Although

Suzuki articulated a summary judgment standard, the same basic

principle logically applies at every stage of the proceedings,

including after a trial. 9 Once it is apparent that the vessel owner

cannot establish a lack of privity or knowledge, then limitation is

not at issue. And if limitation is not at issue, then “the basis for

granting exoneration vanishes.” Id. (quoting Fecht v. Makowski, 406

F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1969)). So whenever the court finds that the

vessel owner cannot establish a lack of privity or knowledge, it is

appropriate to dismiss the petition to protect the claimants’ rights

under the saving to suitors clause—even if that means forgoing (in

part or in entirety) a decision on the vessel owner’s liability.

9 The district court declined to apply Suzuki at summary judgment, holding

that it was still possible at that point in the litigation for Skanska to show a lack

of privity or knowledge. But clearly, after trial, the court determined that

Skanska could not meet its burden to show a lack of privity or knowledge.

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This is consistent with decades of Limitation Act law about

claimants’ saving to suitors clause rights. The Act does “not create

a freestanding right to exoneration from liability in circumstances

where limitation of liability is not at issue.” Lewis, 531 U.S. at 453.

It is about limitation of liability, not immunity from liability or the

exclusivity of the federal forum. Lake Tankers, 354 U.S. at 152–53.

Courts should thus “give effect to both the Limitation Act and the

saving to suitors clause whenever possible” and “damage claimants

must be allowed to litigate the vessel owner’s negligence in state

court, ‘where it is apparent that limitation cannot be granted.’”

Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at 1037; Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1063 (quoting Fecht,

406 F.2d at 722). 10

Here, Skanska’s “perfunctory” claim that it lacked privity or

knowledge straightforwardly failed (indeed, Skanska did not even

appeal the district court’s finding that the company had privity or

knowledge). After all, the decision not to move the barges to safety

was made by Skanska executives, and when a corporation owns a

vessel, “the privity and knowledge of corporate managers vested

with discretionary authority is attributed to the corporation.”

Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1065 (quotation omitted). Once it was clear that

Skanska had privity or knowledge of any negligent acts that caused

10 Skanska claims that Beiswenger identifies the only instances in which district

courts may depart from the two-step Limitation Act procedure. But

Beiswenger did not attempt to identify every scenario where procedural

flexibility is appropriate. To the contrary, we read Beiswenger as blessing

procedural creativity by district courts in order to give effect to both the clause

and the Limitation Act “whenever possible.” See 86 F.3d at 1037.

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24 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

the barges to damage property, it was equally clear that the

company had no right to limit its liability. So there was no

continued need for a limitation proceeding. The district court thus

did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the consolidated

proceedings.11

While we can resolve this case on precedent alone, the text

of both the Limitation Act and its rules point in the same direction.

The operative provisions of the Limitation Act do not mention

exoneration. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30530. The only source of

positive law that even plausibly supports Skanska’s argument is

Rule F’s statement that a vessel owner “may demand exoneration

from as well as limitation of liability.” Supplemental Rule F(2). But

this argument misses the mark. The rule’s history clarifies its

narrow scope. The limitation rules’ exoneration language was

added to clarify that, unlike under the “very onerous” English rules,

an American vessel owner did not need to concede liability in order

11 The parties dispute, for what it is worth, whether the district court even

departed from the two-step procedure. Although the court did not determine

every element of negligence for every claimant, it did decide that Skanska’s

negligence in not moving the barges to Butcherpen Cove caused the damage

to the bridge and other property struck by the barges. The claimants argue

that this finding was enough to show what “acts of negligence caused the

accident,” satisfying the first step of the two-step procedure, while Skanska

argues that nothing short of a full adjudication of every element of negligence

for every individual claimant will do. But we think that this debate misses the

point; it does not matter whether the district court followed the ordinary two-

step procedure. All that matters is that Skanska’s right to have limitation

adjudicated in federal court was protected—and it was.

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to seek limitation of liability. Lewis, 531 U.S. at 447–48 (quotation

omitted). In light of this history, we see no reason to think that this

language does anything more than preserve the right to contest

liability while also seeking limitation; it certainly does not “create

a freestanding right to exoneration from liability in circumstances

where limitation of liability is not at issue.” Id. at 453.

Even if there were evidence that Rule F somehow expanded

vessel owners’ rights to a federal forum, we would not be able to

read it that way. Judicially promulgated rules cannot “abridge,

enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072; see also

In re Tidewater Inc., 249 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting an

aggressive reading of Rule F on this ground). Any tension between

the judicially adopted rules and the congressionally enacted saving

to suitors clause must be resolved in the clause’s favor. No matter

how Skanska frames its argument, it simply has no right to a

federal forum beyond the question of limitation.12

12 None of this is to say that the two-step approach articulated in many

Limitation Act cases is obsolete. After all, it is an intuitive way to approach

the problem. “Without negligence there can be no privity or knowledge,”

because the vessel owner’s privity or knowledge must be of a particular

negligent act. Farrell Lines Inc., 530 F.2d at 10 n.1 (quoting 3 Benedict on

Admiralty, § 41, p. 5-5). So it makes sense that courts often decide negligence

(either in part or in full) before deciding privity or knowledge. At the same

time, courts should not overread our discussions of the “typical” Limitation

Act case, including the occasional use of the word “must” when discussing the

steps of that procedure. “The language of an opinion is not always to be

parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute.” Nat’l Pork

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26 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

As a last resort, Skanska points to dicta saying that the Act

and its rules protect vessel owners from “being harassed by

litigation in other tribunals” which could lead to the “subversion of

the whole object and scheme of the statute.” Providence & N.Y. S.S.

Co., 109 U.S. at 594–95; see also, e.g., Hartford, 273 U.S. at 215–16. But

the Court has long-since abandoned this dicta. For example, in

Lake Tankers, “the Court explicitly rejected the argument that the

Limitation Act protects the vessel owner against a multiplicity of

suits.” Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at 1039 (citing Lake Tankers, 354 U.S. at

153–54). If limitation is not implicated, the Court noted, there is

no reason why a vessel owner “should be treated any more

favorably than an airline, bus, or railroad company.” Lake Tankers,

354 U.S. at 153. To be sure, if Congress wishes to protect vessel

owners from a multiplicity of suits, it can always expand the

Limitation Act and contract the saving to suitors clause. But in the

meantime, courts and litigants alike must respect the relationship

between these laws.

Neither Skanska’s appeals to procedure nor its gestures to

policy sway our conclusion that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing Skanska’s limitation petitions without fully

addressing the question of Skanska’s liability. Yes, Skanska had the

right to have the question of limitation adjudicated in federal court.

And the question of limitation was adjudicated in federal court. But

Producers Council v. Ross, 143 S. Ct. 1142, 1155 (2023) (alteration adopted and

quotation omitted).

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21-13850 Opinion of the Court 27

that is as far as it goes. Once the district court decided that Skanska

was not entitled to limitation, it correctly dismissed the case so that

the claimants could pursue remedies in whichever forums that

they chose. 13

III.

Skanska also challenges two evidentiary rulings: the order

limiting its discovery of the Navy’s preparations during Hurricane

Sally and the court’s mid-testimony dismissal of Captain Towne at

trial. 14 “We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse

of discretion.” Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Wave Cruiser LLC, 36 F.4th 1346,

13 Skanska fleetingly briefs another procedural argument, saying that the

district court violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(i) by failing to rule

on its 12(b)(6) motion. If Skanska wished to argue that Rule 12(i) required the

district court to address the motion to dismiss before the first phase of the

bifurcated trial, then it needed to raise that issue before the first phase of the

bifurcated trial. It did not do so, instead raising the issue for the first time in

post-judgment motions. We review issues not timely raised before the district

court only for plain error, and rarely in civil cases. See SEC v. Diversified Corp.

Consulting Grp., 378 F.3d 1219, 1227 & n.14 (11th Cir. 2004). “Under the civil

plain error standard, we will consider an issue not raised in the district court if

it involves a pure question of law, and if refusal to consider it would result in

a miscarriage of justice.” Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc., 861 F.3d 1338, 1352 (11th

Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). Refusing to consider this argument does not

result in a miscarriage of justice, and we therefore do not consider it.

14 Skanska says that the order denying discovery of the Navy led them to

believe that the court would not allow discovery of other parties. It now

argues that, because this constructively denied additional discovery, the entire

discovery process was defective. But it goes without saying that Skanska

cannot challenge a hypothetical ruling of the district court. We therefore

review only the two specific evidentiary rulings that Skanska appeals.

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28 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

1353 (11th Cir. 2022). And “even a clearly erroneous evidentiary

ruling will be affirmed if harmless.” Id. (quotation omitted). An

error is harmless unless “it affects the substantial rights of the

parties” such that the reviewing court cannot confidently say that

“the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Furcron

v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation

omitted).

Starting with the Navy, under Rule 26(b), parties may only

obtain discovery that is both “relevant” and “proportional to the

needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The magistrate judge’s

discovery order limited discovery relating to the Navy because it

was irrelevant and because it was not proportional. On appeal,

Skanska only argues that its proposed discovery was relevant—it

never explains why the burdens were proportional to the benefits.

Skanska has therefore forfeited any challenge to proportionality, so

we affirm. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681

(11th Cir. 2014). 15

As for Captain Towne, the district court heard nearly fifteen

minutes of his testimony while repeatedly urging Skanska’s

counsel to get to the point. It then considered the captain’s

testimony via a one-sided proffer, and it explicitly stated that the

full testimony would not have affected its decision. Any exclusion

15 Because we affirm the limitation of the discovery as non-proportional, we

do not address whether the information Skanska sought was relevant.

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21-13850 Opinion of the Court 29

of relevant evidence that the captain might have offered was

harmless.

IV.

Moving to the factual basis for the district court’s final

judgment, Skanska challenges the finding that it did not exercise

reasonable care.16 For maritime tort cases, “we rely on general

principles of negligence law” and have consulted “in particular the

Restatement (Second) of Torts” to discern these general principles.

Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp., 965 F.3d 1170, 1178 (11th Cir. 2020)

(quotations omitted). Whether the defendant’s conduct violated

the standard of care is a question of fact. See Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 328C cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1965). Because the district

court sat in admiralty without a jury, we review its findings of fact

for clear error. Dresdner Bank, 446 F.3d at 1380. A factual finding is

clearly erroneous if “the entirety of the evidence leads the

reviewing court to a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed.” Id.

The core of the district court’s analysis was simple: Under

the Louisiana rule, Skanska bore the burden of disproving a

presumption that it failed to exercise reasonable care. Throughout

the weekend, the National Hurricane Center’s weather forecasts

showed a 9–16% chance of 58 mile per hour or greater winds

hitting Pensacola Bay. According to Skanska’s own hurricane

16 We do not read the district court as having decided whether Skanska

violated any duty to any particular claimant. So Skanska is still free to argue

in state court that it did not owe a duty to the economic loss claimants.

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30 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

preparedness plan, these wind speeds warranted moving the barges

to Butcherpen Cove. Skanska’s inability to get its barges to

Butcherpen Cove before high winds arrived was one of two things:

a deliberate choice or the consequence of a failure to act more

quickly. Either way, the court explained, Skanska left its barges in

a less safe location than Butcherpen Cove—and its gamble

backfired with disastrous consequences. Given the substantial

damage that the barges could do to others if the wind unmoored

them, the court found that a reasonable company facing a 9–16%

chance of these winds would have moved the barges. Thus, the

court held, Skanska acted unreasonably by leaving the barges by

the bridge.

This conclusion was not clearly erroneous. Skanska does

not attempt to show that the district court’s finding that there was

a 9–16% chance of high winds hitting the Bay was incorrect. Nor

does it present us with evidence that a reasonable company would

have left its barges by the bridge notwithstanding those odds of

high winds. Indeed, it fails to engage with the factual findings of

the lower court, instead repeating its arguments below about how

its preferred weather reports did not show that a hurricane was

more likely than not to hit Pensacola Bay until Monday morning

(without ever suggesting exactly how likely the storm was to hit

the Bay) and emphasizing the difficulty of moving the barges over

the weekend. This argument is non-responsive to the district

court’s finding that reasonable care required Skanska to take

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precautions even with a 9–16% chance of high winds in the Bay.

Skanska has failed to show reversible error.17

V.

Finally, Skanska challenges spoliation sanctions it received

under Rule 37(e)(2) for the destruction of the data from five of its

custodians’ cell phones. We review that decision for abuse of

discretion. Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1177. In the spoliation context,

this Court has often articulated our abuse of discretion review as

asking whether the district court “has made a clear error of

judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” Mendez v. Wal-

Mart Stores E., LP, 67 F.4th 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation

omitted). But we see no difference between this formulation of the

abuse of discretion standard and our articulations of that standard

in other contexts. See, e.g., Callahan v. United Network for Organ

Sharing, 17 F.4th 1356, 1360 (11th Cir. 2021) (“A district court abuses

its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows

improper procedures in making the determination, makes findings

of fact that are clearly erroneous, or commits a clear error of

judgment.” (quotations omitted)). Accordingly, as is typical for this

Court’s abuse of discretion review, we review the district court’s

17 Relatedly, Skanska challenges the district court’s factual finding that its

hurricane preparedness plan was triggered at all. But we agree with the district

court that the core inquiry is “whether the decision to demobilize the barges

near the bridge was reasonable,” making the question of whether Skanska’s

plan was triggered largely beside the point. In re Skanska USA Civil Se. Inc., 577

F. Supp. 3d at 1317. In any event, the court’s interpretation of the plan was

not clear error.

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32 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

legal conclusions de novo and its subsidiary factual findings for

clear error. Common Cause Ga. v. Georgia, 17 F.4th 102, 107 (11th Cir.

2021). That means that we review the district court’s conclusion

that Skanska acted in bad faith—a factual finding—for clear error.

Cf. Mar. Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir.

2001).

A.

Spoliation sanctions are often imposed under the broad

discretion of the district court, which has inherent power to

“manage its own affairs and to achieve the orderly and expeditious

disposition of cases.” Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939,

944 (11th Cir. 2005). But sometimes other sources of federal law

provide more specific authority.

Rule 37(e) from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is one

such example. It was adopted in 2006 and modified in 2015 in

response to the explosion of electronic discovery. 2015 Committee

Notes on Rule 37(e). The Rule seeks to balance the centrality of

electronic information to modern litigation with the almost always

substantial (and sometimes unnecessary) costs of preserving

electronic data. Id.

By its text, Rule 37(e) creates a two-tiered sanctions

regime—with lesser sanctions under Rule 37(e)(1) and more severe

sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2). Both parts of the rule share two

preconditions: (1) “electronically stored information that should

have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation”

was “lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve

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it” and (2) that information “cannot be restored or replaced

through additional discovery.” The requirements diverge after that.

Rule 37(e)(1) sanctions are centered on the effect of a violation; they

apply only where lost electronic evidence causes “prejudice to

another party,” which then justifies sanctions “no greater than

necessary to cure the prejudice.” Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions, on the

other hand, look more to the cause of the violation. They require

a finding that “the party acted with the intent to deprive another

party of the information’s use in the litigation.” If so, the court is

justified in imposing more severe sanctions: adverse jury

instructions, and even dismissal or default judgment. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 37(e)(2). What’s more, Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions do not require

“any further finding of prejudice.” 2015 Committee Notes on Rule

37(e)(2). “This is because the finding of intent required by the

subdivision can support not only an inference that the lost

information was unfavorable to the party that intentionally

destroyed it, but also an inference that the opposing party was

prejudiced by the loss of information that would have favored its

position.” Id.

This is the first time we have had reason to thoroughly

consider Rule 37(e)(2). In previous cases, we have suggested or

assumed, but never held in a published opinion, that the Rule’s

“intent to deprive” standard is the same as the “bad faith” standard

our Court has used in other spoliation contexts. See ML Healthcare

Servs., LLC v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 881 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir.

2018); Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., No. 20-11141, 2022 WL

433457, at *15 (11th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022) (unpublished). Here, the

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34 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

district court and both parties have assumed that “intent to

deprive” and “bad faith” are the same.

We now explicitly agree: the “intent to deprive another party

of the information’s use in the litigation” is the equivalent of bad

faith in other spoliation contexts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2). In this

Circuit’s spoliation precedents, bad faith “generally means

destruction [of evidence] for the purpose of hiding adverse evidence.”

Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1184 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).

This standard is more than mere negligence and aligns with both

the text and advisory committee notes for Rule 37(e)(2). See id. at

1184–86; Rule 37(e)(2); 2015 Committee Notes on Rule 37(e)(2).

The phrase “intent to deprive” naturally requires that the spoliator

has a “purpose of hiding adverse evidence” from other parties.

And the advisory committee notes explain that “intent to deprive”

is more than negligence or even gross negligence. 2015 Committee

Notes on Rule 37(e)(2). So rather than adopt a new law of

spoliation from scratch for Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions, we will borrow

our identical and well-trodden standard of “bad faith.” See also

EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 878 F.3d 960, 965–66 (10th Cir.

2017) (conducting a similar analysis). 18

18 We reject, however, the applicability of the so-called “Flury factors” to a Rule

37(e) analysis. See Mendez, 67 F.4th at 1362 n.9 (recognizing that this question

was unresolved). Flury was decided before Rule 37(e) was written, and that

opinion borrowed from Georgia spoliation law because of a lack of federal

Circuit precedent on the precise issue in that case and because the parties and

the district court had relied upon Georgia law. See Flury, 427 F.3d at 944–45.

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B.

We now review the district court’s imposition of Rule

37(e)(2) sanctions. It is not entirely clear whether Skanska

challenges Rule 37(e)’s first requirement, that information that

“should have been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of

litigation” was “lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps

to preserve it.” Skanska concedes that it was “probably negligent.”

But it also seems to suggest in its briefs that its preservation failures

could be excused because it may not have reasonably anticipated

litigation.

The facts reveal that argument’s folly. To start, within days

of Hurricane Sally, Skanska’s in-house counsel had orally informed

employees of an evidence retention policy. And about a month

later, counsel sent a formal legal hold letter about the Pensacola

Bay Bridge incident. Litigation started just a few weeks after that.

But even with an active litigation hold—and then active litigation—

Skanska did not back up its employees’ cell phones. Nor did it

suspend its ordinary cell phone data destruction policies—not even

But there is no reason to believe that Rule 37(e) borrows from Georgia

spoliation law. And one of the Flury factors, prejudice to the defendant, is

specifically disclaimed as a consideration for Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions by the

Advisory Committee. See Flury, 427 F.3d at 945; 2015 Committee Notes on

Rule 37(e)(2). So while we hold that the fourth Flury factor—bad faith—is the

same as “intent to deprive,” courts should not look to the five Flury factors (or,

for that matter, factors from other tests in different contexts) when

interpreting Rule 37(e). The right things to consider are the rule’s text, the

advisory committee notes, and our spoliation caselaw analyzing bad faith.

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36 Opinion of the Court 21-13850

for known electronic data custodians. It was, as we see it, entirely

predictable that cell phone data would be needed for litigation, and

that some of that data would be lost.

Next, Skanska more directly challenges the applicability of

Rule 37(e)’s second condition that the information could not have

been “restored or replaced through additional discovery.” It argues

that, because discovery of other Skanska employees included some

of the text messages and because the claimants were able to depose

the five custodians whose data was destroyed, nothing was actually

lost.

The district court was not moved; nor are we. While some

of the lost text messages were discoverable through other Skanska

employees’ text messages, others were not. And it should go

without saying that deposing workers well after an event is not a

perfect substitute for reviewing their contemporaneous text

messages.

Finally, Skanska challenges the district court’s finding that it

acted in bad faith when it failed to back up the custodians’ text

messages and suspend its destruction policies. The court found a

“lack of any cogent explanation” for Skanska’s complete failure to

make any effort to preserve the destroyed cell phones. In re Skanska

USA Civil Se. Inc., 340 F.R.D. 180, 189 (N.D. Fla. 2021). It focused in

particular on how the company “took no action” to educate its

custodians and administrators about the litigation hold and “made

no effort” to collect its custodians’ cell phone data until at least

seven months after the litigation hold was in place. Id. at 188–89.

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And it highlighted other egregious discovery behavior by Skanska,

like its representation to the court that “no documents relating to

Skanska’s storm preparations or efforts has [sic] been deleted or

destroyed”—a representation made before Skanska had even

bothered to check if its custodians’ cell phone data was still

available. Id. at 189 (alteration adopted and quotation omitted). In

the district court’s view, bad faith was the only thing that explained

the company’s actions.

If our review were de novo, this would be a close question.

On the one hand, we find Skanska’s utter failure to implement even

the most basic data-protection safeguards egregious—so egregious

that an inference of bad faith is easy to make. On the other, this is

not a case with direct evidence of bad faith; it is also plausible from

this record that Skanska was “just” grossly negligent.

But we review the district court’s finding of bad faith for

clear error. And an inference of bad faith here was not clear error.

Skanska can provide no reasonable explanation for its conduct

other than to plead negligence. True enough, much of the

evidence was destroyed through “routine” document destruction

policies. But a hands-off implementation of an ordinary corporate

destruction policy is not a silver bullet. We have already explained

that we would be “highly skeptical” of a claim that evidence was

unintentionally destroyed “pursuant to a routine policy” after a

request that the evidence be preserved. Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1186.

We will not second guess the district court’s skepticism in those

very circumstances.

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Our conclusion is further confirmed by the advisory

committee notes to Rule 37(e). The reasonableness of evidence

preservation efforts depends in part on “the party’s sophistication

with regard to litigation in evaluating preservation efforts.” 2015

Committee Notes on Rule 37(e). Skanska is a sophisticated

entity—a multinational company tasked with completing a

construction contract worth nearly $400 million. Skanska USA

even boasts on its website that it is “one of the largest, most

financially sound construction and development companies in the

U.S.” Even so, Skanska did not bother to take the most

fundamental of precautions—starting with backing up the

custodians’ cell phones and suspending its policy of wiping those

phones. And the company is not being held liable for a failure of

imagination—Skanska had an active litigation hold, but took no

steps to implement it.

Finally, Skanska argues that—as a per se rule—a finding of

bad faith premised on circumstantial evidence requires an

“affirmative act” by the spoliating party. 19 But that argument flouts

both the text of Rule 37 and our bad-faith caselaw. As we have

explained, the rule provides for sanctions when “electronically

stored information that should have been preserved in the

anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to

19 In Skanska’s defense, the district court framed its inquiry into “bad faith” by

applying a test that asked whether Skanska had committed an “affirmative

act.” In re Skanska, 340 F.R.D. at 188. But we may affirm the court’s ultimate

finding of bad faith on any ground supported by the record. In re Feshbach, 974

F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020).

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take reasonable steps to preserve it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (emphasis

added). Failure to act can thus—by definition—be a violation of

Rule 37.

Our caselaw on spoliation also shows that failures to act can

be just as harmful as affirmative acts of destruction. In Flury, we

affirmed sanctions after the spoliating party “failed to preserve” a

vehicle that the other party wished to inspect, “inexplicably

ignored” requests for the location of the vehicle, and “allowed the

vehicle to be sold for salvage without notification to defendant of

its planned removal.” 427 F.3d at 943, 947, 945. These are failures

to act—not affirmative actions. Even so, it “is no surprise that we

found bad faith on those facts.” Tesoriero, 965 F.3d at 1185.

So too here. Skanska’s passivity does not change the basic

fact that the evidence was destroyed. Given that other

circumstances pointed to a reasonable inference of bad faith by

Skanska, it is irrelevant whether an act or a failure to act directly

caused the spoliation. The court’s finding of bad faith thus was not

clear error, and its imposition of Rule 37(e)(2) sanctions was not an

abuse of discretion.

* * *

Under the Limitation Act, Skanska had a right to have the

issue of limitation litigated by a federal court. That’s exactly what

Skanska got. The claimants now have the right to determine where

any subsequent litigation about the damage caused by Skanska’s

barges during Hurricane Sally will occur. And Skanska has failed

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to show any other reason why the district court’s dismissal of its

petitions should be reversed.

We AFFIRM both the district court’s dismissal of the

Limitation Act proceedings and its sanctions order.