Quinn v. Cardenas

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

TIMERA QUINN, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

JULIO CARDENAS, Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0398

FILED 8-1-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2018-007278

The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Bradley & Associates, Goodyear

By Percival R. Bradley

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix

By John T. Masterson, Michele Molinario, Justin M. Ackerman,

Derek R. Graffious

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

QUINN v. CARDENAS

Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Following a minor traffic accident, Timera Quinn (“Quinn”)

and Julio Cardenas (“Cardenas”) got into an altercation. What made this

conflict different is that, unbeknownst to Quinn, Cardenas was an off-duty

City of Phoenix Police Officer. The altercation quickly escalated until

Cardenas pulled his service weapon, revealed his status as a police officer,

and detained Quinn while on-duty officers arrived.

¶2 Quinn brought four claims against Cardenas in superior

court: a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for excessive force), and three

state law claims for assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction

of emotional distress. After Cardenas removed the case to federal court,

that court granted summary judgment for Cardenas on the § 1983 claim.

The federal district court remanded the three state-law claims to state court.

¶3 The primary issue we answer is whether, on remand, a federal

court’s final judgment binds the superior court in any way. And if so,

whether a final judgment is binding under preclusion principles (issue and

claim preclusion) or, instead, the law of the case principles.

¶4 We hold that a federal court’s final judgment is, upon remand,

binding on the superior court under preclusion principles. We also

conclude the federal court’s final judgment granting Cardenas qualified

immunity is, under the issue preclusion doctrine, fatal to her state law

claims for assault and false imprisonment. We, therefore, affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶5 Quinn and Cardenas were involved in a traffic accident on the

evening of May 14, 2017. The record is unclear how the accident came about

or who caused it, but those matters are immaterial. What we do know is

that Cardenas, who was off-duty, pulled off the interstate. Quinn, who was

accompanied by two male passengers, drove behind him. At some point,

their vehicles collided.

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Opinion of the Court

¶6 Cardenas then drove to a nearby gas station; Quinn followed.

There, Quinn’s male passengers exited the vehicle and one of them

discussed the collision with Cardenas. Quinn’s passengers returned to the

vehicle, and Quinn began driving away before the parties exchanged

identification or insurance information. Cardenas began running after

Quinn’s vehicle, causing Quinn to turn around and park. Quinn exited her

vehicle and confronted Cardenas about who caused the accident and who

failed to remain at the scene. At some point during the discussion, Quinn’s

two male passengers also exited.

¶7 Cardenas then utilized an “impact push” against Quinn.

Using his two hands against her upper chest, Cardenas pushed Quinn

while taking a step back. Quinn still did not know Cardenas was a police

officer. So Quinn responded, pushing Cardenas. Cardenas then revealed

his occupation; he drew his service weapon, announced he was a police

officer, and ordered Quinn to return to her vehicle. Quinn complied.

Eventually, on-duty police arrived and took control.

¶8 Quinn sued Cardenas in the superior court under § 1983 for

allegedly violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive

force. Quinn also asserted state law tort claims for assault, false

imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cardenas

removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, where it was assigned to the Hon. Michael T. Liburdi. The parties

completed fact and expert discovery, after which Cardenas moved for

summary judgment on all claims. The federal court granted Cardenas’

motion concerning Quinn’s § 1983 claim on qualified immunity grounds.

Having disposed of the lone federal claim, the court remanded Quinn’s

state law claims back to the superior court. Quinn did not appeal the

federal court’s order and judgment.

¶9 On remand, Cardenas moved for summary judgment on the

remaining tort claims, arguing in part that the federal judgment precluded

re-litigation of the federal court’s qualified immunity decision. The court

granted the motion on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim

based on evidentiary shortcomings, but it otherwise denied the motion.1

¶10 A different superior court judge rotated onto the case. Shortly

before trial, the parties filed a joint pretrial statement, with Cardenas again

raising issue preclusion arguments. But this time, Cardenas’ arguments

1 Quinn did not appeal this ruling, so the only claims at issue are her

assault and false imprisonment claims.

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Opinion of the Court

focused on the federal court’s factual findings and how they might impact

jury instructions. The court ordered Quinn to address Cardenas’ preclusion

arguments. After oral argument, the court concluded that because there

was a final federal judgment involving the same parties and the same

issues, issue preclusion prohibited Quinn from moving forward with her

assault and false imprisonment claims.

¶11 Quinn timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S.

§ 12-2101.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Timing

¶12 Before addressing the meat of the appeal, we address two

preliminaries. First, Quinn asserts that the superior court’s ruling stemmed

from an untimely renewed motion for summary judgment tucked into

Cardenas’ joint pretrial statement. Cardenas responds that the court raised

the summary judgment issue on its own under Rule 56(f). We review

whether the superior court properly heard a motion, even an untimely one,

for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Vincent, 147 Ariz. 6, 9 (App. 1985).

¶13 Under Rule 56(f)(3), “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable

time to respond, the court may: . . . consider summary judgment on its own

after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be genuinely in

dispute.” After unsuccessfully moving for summary judgment on two of

Quinn’s claims, Cardenas, in the joint pretrial statement, again addressed

the federal court’s order and judgment and their impact on the surviving

claims. The superior court held a status conference where this issue was

discussed, and the court allowed Quinn to file a brief explaining why the

surviving claims should be tried. While Quinn’s brief is not part of the

record because Quinn emailed it directly to opposing counsel and the court

without ever filing it, Quinn concedes she complied with the court’s order

by providing a brief.2 The court then held oral argument and ultimately

concluded that the federal judgment precluded the state tort claims.

Because the parties were given notice and an opportunity to respond, the

superior court’s judgment was procedurally permitted under Rule 56(f).

¶14 Additionally, trial courts serve an important function as

gatekeepers to ensure only meritorious claims and defenses reach a jury.

2 To aid appellate review, counsel should ensure that any briefs

submitted directly to the superior court through email are also filed on the

court’s docket. Cf. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a).

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See, e.g., Booth v. State, 207 Ariz. 61, 68 ¶ 20 (App. 2004); Sign Here Petitions

LLC v. Chavez, 243 Ariz. 99, 102 ¶ 1 (App. 2017). Indeed, a superior court

has the authority to “eliminate nonmeritorious claims or defenses” at a

scheduling conference. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(d)(9). And courts must also

“manage a civil action” with the objectives to (1) manage the court’s

calendar to eliminate unnecessary trial settings; (2) adhere to “applicable

standards for timely resolution of civil actions”; and (3) conserve the

parties’ resources. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(A); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 1. The court

did not abuse its discretion in disposing of claims it thought were non-

meritorious in lieu of conducting an unnecessary jury trial.

II. Horizontal Appeal

¶15 Second, Quinn contends Cardenas asked Judge Astrowsky

for an impermissible “horizontal appeal” of Judge McCoy’s earlier decision

denying summary judgment. “We review the superior court’s

reconsideration of an earlier ruling for an abuse of discretion.” Humphrey

v. State, 249 Ariz. 57, 67 ¶ 36 (App. 2020).

¶16 We refer to a request for “a second trial judge to reconsider

the decision of the first trial judge in the same matter, even though no new

circumstances have arisen in the interim and no other reason justifies

reconsideration” as a “horizontal appeal.” Powell-Cerkoney v. TCR-Mont.

Ranch Joint Venture, II, 176 Ariz. 275, 278–79 (App. 1993). A court cannot

turn away a horizontal appeal simply to “justify [its] refusal to reconsider a

ruling when an error in the first decision renders it manifestly erroneous or

unjust[.]” Id. at 279. In such circumstances, “a second judge does not abuse

his discretion by agreeing to reconsider an earlier decision.” Id.; Humphrey,

249 Ariz. at 68 ¶ 39.

¶17 Cardenas argues the superior court did not violate the

horizontal appeal doctrine because Judge Astrowsky was permitted to

revisit a prior ruling if it was “palpably erroneous.” Because summary

judgment should have been granted earlier based on issue preclusion, he

argues, any decision holding otherwise was erroneous.

¶18 We agree that Quinn’s horizontal appeal argument ultimately

turns on the correctness of Judge Astrowsky’s final preclusion ruling. As

an appellate court, we primarily review the content of final judgments. The

horizontal appeal argument does not really get Quinn anything her

challenges to the final judgment would not already get her—once final

judgment is entered, the horizontal appeal argument largely collapses into

the merits of the appeal. Think about it—if Judge Astrowsky correctly

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decided the preclusion issue (reflected in the final judgment), Quinn’s

horizontal appeal argument (along with the rest of her appeal) fails. If he

incorrectly decided the preclusion issue, we would reverse the final

judgment on that basis, even if a prior ruling by the superior court once got

the merits right. To the extent Quinn argues Judge Astrowsky might have

been right in the end but the ruling he reversed was also not “palpably

erroneous,” we reject the argument as slicing the onion a bit too thin.

III. The Merits of the Superior Court’s Preclusion Decision

¶19 Turning to the merits, Quinn argues the superior court

erroneously granted summary judgment by concluding the federal order

and judgment precluded her assault and false imprisonment claims. We

review the superior court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming

if there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Williamson

v. PVOrbit, Inc., 228 Ariz. 69, 71 ¶ 11 (App. 2011). We may affirm the grant

of summary judgment on any grounds raised in the superior court. See Zuck

v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 42 (App. 1988).

A. Preclusion vs. Law of the Case

¶20 Quinn first questions whether a federal court judgment has

preclusive effect when state law claims return after removal. Quinn argues

that a federal court judgment should not have preclusive effect on remand

because the state court action is the same as the action removed. With the

mere continuation of an already-existing case, there is no second action in

which to apply preclusion. Although Quinn’s argument makes some sense,

we conclude that preclusion, rather than law of the case, principles apply

when litigation is removed to federal court, a final federal court judgment

issues, and the case then completes the round trip back to state court for

resolution of pendant state law claims.

¶21 Ordinarily, claim preclusion (once referred to as res judicata)

“bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could

have been raised in the prior action” resulting in a final judgment. Clem v.

Pinal County, 251 Ariz. 349, 353 ¶ 8 (App. 2021) (emphasis added).

Similarly, issue preclusion (once referred to as collateral estoppel) prohibits

the re-litigation of an issue actually litigated and decided in a final

judgment. See Brown v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 199 Ariz. 521, 524 ¶ 11 (App.

2001). Litigants ordinarily invoke issue preclusion when, in a subsequent

action, a party tries to litigate an issue decided after final judgment in a

prior lawsuit.

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¶22 To enforce rulings made in the same case, the best a party can

usually do is invoke the law of the case doctrine. That doctrine reflects the

“judicial policy of refusing to reopen questions previously decided in the

same case by the same court or a higher appellate court.” Powell-Cerkoney,

176 Ariz. at 278 (emphasis added).

¶23 The situation here does not fit perfectly within preclusion

principles or the law of the case doctrine. On the one hand, the federal

judgment is not a judgment from a prior action—it is a judgment on the

federal claims in this action before remand. The superior court case number

pre-remand is the same post-remand. So applying preclusion is a bit

awkward. On the other hand, a federal district court is neither the same as

the superior court nor a court maintaining appellate jurisdiction over the

superior court. So applying the law of the case doctrine is likewise

awkward.

¶24 This quandary has split other state courts—some have

applied preclusion principles after remand from federal court, and others

have used the law of the case doctrine. Compare Stewart v. City of Hammond,

322 So. 3d 1253, 1257 (La. Ct. App. 2021) (applying preclusion principles);

Massad v. Greaves, 977 A.2d 662, 668 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (same), with

Cordova v. Larsen, 94 P.3d 830, 834 ¶ 10 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the

law of the case doctrine); Hess v. Wojcik-Hess, 86 A.D.3d 847, 848 (N.Y. App.

Div. 2011) (same).

¶25 We think applying preclusion principles is the better path.

Under the U.S. Constitution, “both the Federal Government and the States

wield sovereign powers, and that is why our system of government is said

to be one of ‘dual sovereignty.’” Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,

138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018). The federal courts are part and parcel of that

dual sovereignty. Treating a final judgment from a federal court under

preclusion principles is most consistent with that system, particularly when

(as explained below) we apply federal law to determine the preclusive

effect of a federal judgment. See Clem, 251 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 7. Using preclusion

principles “helps maintain the integrity of federal judicial power and the

coherence of the federalist judicial system.” Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation &

Drainage Dist. v. Robertson, 211 Ariz. 485, 491 ¶ 38 (2005).

¶26 Ordinarily, when a party seeks to re-litigate a claim or issue

rejected by a federal court resulting in a final judgment issued in a different

action, preclusion principles apply. See id. at 491–92 ¶¶ 39–43 (applying

issue preclusion principle to a prior federal judgment). Moreover,

preclusion can apply in the same action when a trial court certifies a

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judgment as final under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See

Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1525

(9th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that “a 54(b) ruling in fact has res judicata

ramifications, which are potentially very important”). We see no

compelling reason—and Quinn offers none—why preclusion should not

also apply when a party seeks to re-litigate a claim or issue decided in a

final judgment issued in the same case after removal but prior to remand.

¶27 Applying the law of the case doctrine instead of preclusion is

less consistent with dual sovereignty. Treating a final judgment from a

federal court the same as a ruling issued in the same case by the superior

court or a higher appellate court, ignores that federal and state courts

operate within separate and sovereign judicial systems—a “federalist

judicial system.” Id. at 491 ¶ 38.

¶28 Moreover, it is doubtful that applying preclusion principles

instead of law of the case will make it easier for federal judgments to have a

binding effect. Rather, in most circumstances, applying preclusion

principles will make it more difficult to cut off state court litigation.

Compare Clem, 251 Ariz. at 356 ¶ 18 (discussing federal issue preclusion

standard), with Powell-Cerkoney, 176 Ariz. at 279 (discussing Arizona law of

the case doctrine). Using preclusion principles, thus, strikes the proper

balance between respecting federalism, by showing respect for federal

court judgments, and not prematurely cutting off additional state court

litigation.

¶29 The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that a federal

court’s decision before remand may have issue preclusive effects. See

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) (“If a federal court

dismisses a removed case for want of personal jurisdiction, that

determination may preclude the parties from relitigating the very same

personal jurisdiction issue in state court.”). This Court’s only prior opinion

dealing with the issue has, without discussion, implicitly followed that path

by applying preclusion principles. See S. Leasing Corp. v. Tufts, 167 Ariz. 133

(App. 1991). We now hold that the preclusive effect of a federal court

judgment travels back with it to the superior court after remand, even in

the same case.

B. Issue Preclusion Applies

¶30 We determine the preclusive effect of a prior judgment de

novo. Clem, 251 Ariz. at 353 ¶ 7. When a federal court entered the prior

judgment at issue, we apply federal law to determine whether the judgment

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precludes later state court litigation. Id. In any event, Arizona courts apply

the same issue preclusion test as federal courts. Compare Oyeniran v. Holder,

672 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 2012), with Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148

Ariz. 571, 573 (1986).

¶31 As explained, there are two types of preclusion—claim and

issue. Claim preclusion “treats a judgment, once rendered as the full

measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same

‘claim’ or ‘cause of action.’” Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 321 (9th

Cir. 1988). Issue preclusion, similarly based on the issuance of a prior final

judgment, “prevents relitigation of all ‘issues of fact or law that were

actually litigated and necessarily decided’ in a prior proceeding.’” Id. at 322

(citation omitted). An issue may be precluded from re-litigation “even if

the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553

U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Because Quinn’s § 1983 claim differs from her state-

law assault and false imprisonment claims, issue preclusion is the only

potentially applicable preclusion doctrine.

¶32 A party asserting issue preclusion must prove: “(1) the issue

at stake was identical in both proceedings; (2) the issue was actually

litigated and decided in the prior proceeding; (3) there was a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was necessary to decide

the merits.” Oyeniran, 672 F.3d at 806. We conclude the federal court’s final

judgment satisfies each requirement.

1. Identical Issues

¶33 Quinn argues the federal judgment cannot preclude her tort

claims because those claims are not governed by federal qualified immunity

standards, and thus the issues are not identical. To determine whether

issues are identical, federal courts apply the following four factors from the

Restatement (Second) of Judgments:

(1) [I]s there a substantial overlap between the evidence or

argument to be advanced in the second proceeding and that

advanced in the first? (2) does the new evidence or argument

involve the application of the same rule of law as that

involved in the prior proceeding? (3) could pretrial

preparation and discovery related to the matter presented in

the first action reasonably be expected to have embraced the

matter sought to be presented in the second? (4) how closely

related are the claims involved in the two proceedings?

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Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2017); accord Clem,

251 Ariz. at 356 ¶ 20. We are not required to apply the factors mechanically

but should instead use them as a helpful guide in assessing whether issues

are identical. See Howard, 871 F.3d at 1041–44 (holding that the issues were

identical after finding only the first restatement factor was “illuminating”).

a. Substantial Overlap of Evidence

¶34 In the federal litigation, Cardenas maintained that his actions

were constitutional but also asserted qualified immunity as a defense to

Quinn’s § 1983 claim. Quinn points out that resolving a federal qualified

immunity defense does not address her assault or false imprisonment

claims. That is correct so far as it goes. But Quinn’s argument misses at

least two points. First, the evidence and arguments underlying her assault

and false imprisonment claims overlap substantially with the evidence and

arguments supporting her § 1983 claim based on excessive force. In fact,

the evidence underlying each of those claims is identical. Second, while

Quinn’s assault and false imprisonment claims may not have identical

elements as her § 1983 claim, Quinn does not dispute that, when the

applicable elements are satisfied, state-law qualified immunity can apply to

assault and false imprisonment claims, just as federal qualified immunity

applied to her § 1983 claim.3 The issues underlying those defenses are

substantially overlapping and thus governed by nearly identical

arguments.

¶35 Federal qualified immunity bars recovery of monetary

damages “unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Federal qualified immunity is said to combat “the risk

that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly

inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 638 (1987). The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[i]n excessive

3 Because Quinn does not argue that state-law qualified immunity is

wholly inapplicable to an assault or a false imprisonment claim, we assume

for purposes of our analysis that qualified immunity can apply to those

claims (and not just negligence claims). But see Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151

Ariz. 551, 558 (1986) (applying state-law qualified immunity to a

defamation claim); McKinney v. City of Tukwila, 13 P.3d 631, 641 (Wash. App.

2000) (“Having found that the officers’ use of force was reasonable, we find

that they are entitled to state law qualified immunity for the assault and

battery claims.”).

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force cases, the inquiry remains whether, under the circumstances, a

reasonable officer would have had fair notice that the force employed was

unlawful, and whether any mistake to the contrary would have been

unreasonable.” Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004)

(cleaned up).

¶36 Similarly, in Arizona, “qualified immunity generally

provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from

liability when ‘performing an act that inherently requires judgment or

discretion.’” Spooner v. City of Phoenix, 246 Ariz. 119, 123 ¶ 9 (App. 2018).

“The doctrine thus gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

Id. (quotation marks omitted). If an officer is performing a discretionary act

within the scope of his public duties, he can only be liable if he “knew or

should have known that he was acting in violation of established law or

acted in reckless disregard of whether his activities would deprive another

person of their rights.” Chamberlain, 151 Ariz. at 558. “If immunity applies,

an officer is shielded from liability unless the conduct rises to gross

negligence or recklessness.” Jennings v. Agne in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 254

Ariz. 174, __ ¶ 15 (App. 2022).

¶37 Both federal and state qualified immunity require an analysis

of whether Cardenas violated established law or unreasonably disregarded

the unlawful nature of his conduct. Because the evidence and arguments

required to resolve either qualified immunity defense are nearly the same

(at least in the context of excessive force), we conclude there is a substantial

overlap between the issues.

b. Remaining Identical Issue Factors

¶38 Additionally, the parties completed discovery and summary

judgment briefing on all issues in federal court before remand. No

additional discovery was later conducted back in state court. Indeed, in the

order remanding, the federal court “anticipate[d] that the parties could

refile the same or substantially similar summary judgment briefing on the

state law claims in state court with limited additional effort.” Quinn v.

Cardenas, 2020 WL 2512787, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2020). And that is exactly

what transpired. This factor supports Cardenas.

¶39 Both the second and fourth restatement factors also support

that the issues are identical. See Howard, 871 F.3d at 1041–44. As explained,

although Quinn’s assault and false imprisonment claims do not share

elements with her § 1983 claim, Cardenas’ federal and state qualified

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immunity defenses are substantially similar because both involve a similar

standard. In other words, both require the application of a similar rule of

law—whether Cardenas, under the circumstances, unreasonably violated

established law. Consequently, we hold that the issues are identical for the

purposes of issue preclusion.

2. Remaining Issue Preclusion Factors

¶40 The remaining issue preclusion factors are also satisfied. The

parties actually litigated, and the federal court decided, whether Cardenas

acted reasonably under the circumstances. Resolution of that issue was

necessary to determine the merits of the federal qualified immunity

defense. Finally, there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.

The parties completed discovery and full summary judgment briefing in

federal court, and Quinn does not argue that she was deprived in federal

court of the opportunity to fully develop any evidence necessary to

overcome Cardenas’ qualified immunity defense. Consequently, on

remand, the federal court’s resolution of issues was binding on the parties.

C. Effect of Issue Preclusion

¶41 The superior court correctly concluded that, applying issue

preclusion principles, the federal court’s resolution of federal qualified

immunity is fatal to Quinn’s state law claims. The federal court recognized

that the altercation between Quinn and Cardenas resulted in three events

that could “give rise to liability under § 1983”: (1) Cardenas’ impact push

against Quinn; (2) Cardenas pulling his weapon when he announced he

was a police officer; and (3) Cardenas ordering Quinn to remain in her car

until police arrived. Quinn, 2020 WL 2512787 at *3. These three

circumstances provide the underlying factual basis for Quinn’s assault and

false imprisonment claims. The federal court held that under each set of

facts, Quinn failed to meet her burden to show clearly established law

prohibited Cardenas’ actions, holding instead that Cardenas was justified

and acted as a reasonable officer would at each turn. Id. at *3–4.

¶42 First, the federal court recognized that for liability to arise

under § 1983, Cardenas had to have been acting under color of law during

the events in question. Id. at *3 n.5. The federal court found that “[t]he

parties agree that Officer Cardenas was acting under color of law during

his interaction with Ms. Quinn.” Id. The federal court then analyzed each

of the three events. Regarding the impact push, the federal court found as

follows:

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Here, Ms. Quinn has failed to satisfy her burden that clearly

established law would have prohibited Officer Cardenas’ impact

push under the presented circumstances. Officer Cardenas

utilized the impact push to create distance between himself,

on the one hand, and Ms. Quinn and her two male passengers,

on the other. Officer Cardenas and Ms. Quinn were engaged

in a shouting match at close proximity. From the perspective of

a reasonable officer, the situation could have deteriorated to a much

more serious altercation where Officer Cardenas would be

outnumbered three to one and without knowledge of whether any of

the individuals were armed.

Id. at *3 (emphasis added).

¶43 Regarding Cardenas pulling his weapon and announcing he

was a police officer, the federal court likewise found the following:

Ms. Quinn has similarly failed to show that established law would

have prohibited Officer Cardenas’ use of his service weapon under

the circumstances presented . . . . [Officer Cardenas] used [his

weapon] with the objective of calming a heated verbal

altercation, that could very well have led to a physical

exchange, while waiting for on-duty law enforcement to

arrive . . . . Ms. Quinn’s interaction with Officer Cardenas

cannot be described as peaceful. She engaged in a verbal

argument with him and, at one point, shoved him hard

enough that he was pushed back from where he stood . . . .

Officer Cardenas thought that Ms. Quinn was attempting to

leave the scene in her car . . . . Officer Cardenas was

outnumbered by Ms. Quinn and her two friends . . . . And

Officer Cardenas was not aware of whether any of the three

had a weapon that he did not know about. Under these facts, a

reasonable officer would be concerned for his or her safety and the

use of Officer Cardenas’ weapon was therefore justified for the

purposes of the qualified immunity analysis.

Id. at *3–4 (emphasis added).

¶44 Finally, the federal court concluded, “Ms. Quinn has not

identified any established law that prohibited Officer Cardenas from

holding Ms. Quinn, with his weapon in hand, while waiting for on-duty

officers to arrive.” Id. at *4. Based on these findings, the federal court

granted Cardenas’ request for qualified immunity. Id. at *5.

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¶45 The federal court’s resolution of the issues underlying federal

qualified immunity, unchallenged by Quinn, doom her state-law assault

claim. The federal court concluded Cardenas acted in his official capacity

during each of the underlying incidents. Id. at *3 n.5. The federal court then

found that Cardenas acted as a reasonable officer would; Cardenas was

justified in employing an impact push against Quinn and then pulling his

weapon and announcing himself as a police officer. Id. at *3–4. Those same

conclusions—that Cardenas acted as a reasonable officer would and did not

violate clearly established law—preclude the opposite finding in state court

(i.e., a finding that Cardenas violated established law and was grossly

negligent or reckless in doing so). The federal court’s findings entitle

Cardenas to state qualified immunity from that claim. See Chamberlain, 151

Ariz. at 558.

¶46 Turning to Quinn’s false imprisonment claim, the federal

court resolved qualified immunity against Quinn by finding that “Cardenas

thought that Ms. Quinn was attempting to leave the scene in her car.”

Quinn, 2020 WL 2512787 at *4. A “driver of a vehicle involved in an

accident” must give the other person certain information including their

name and address. A.R.S. § 28-663(A). Failure to do so can be a

misdemeanor offense. A.R.S. § 28-663(C). A police officer may arrest an

individual without a warrant “if the officer has probable cause to

believe . . . [a] misdemeanor has been committed in the officer’s presence

and probable cause to believe the person to be arrested has committed the

offense.” A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(2). And an officer cannot be liable for false

imprisonment if he “act[ed] in good faith in the lawful performance of his

duty.” A.R.S. § 13-1303(B)(1).

¶47 Both parties agree they had not exchanged information after

the accident when Quinn started to leave the scene, and Quinn is precluded

from re-litigating the federal court’s finding that Cardenas was acting in his

official capacity and reasonably believed Quinn was attempting to leave

before providing required information. Thus, Cardenas was lawfully

allowed to detain Quinn, who Cardenas reasonably believed had violated

the law. See A.R.S. § 28-663(A); A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(2). Based on the federal

court’s findings, the superior court correctly concluded Quinn cannot

succeed on her false imprisonment claim as a matter of law.

¶48 Because, for Quinn to prevail on her assault and false

imprisonment claims, a jury would have to reach conclusions contrary to

those the federal court reached, we hold the superior court properly

precluded further litigation of Quinn’s assault and false imprisonment

claims.

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QUINN v. CARDENAS

Opinion of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶49 We affirm the superior court’s judgment.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court

FILED: AA

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