Opinion

Aubrey Beasley v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Jul 19, 2023
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 23.7%

holding that the Board may overturn credibility determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so

How later courts described this case

holding that the Board may overturn credibility determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

AUBREY BEASLEY, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, CH-0752-17-0273-I-1

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: July 19, 2023

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Aubrey Beasley, Chicago, Illinois, pro se.

Robert Vega, Esquire, Hines, Illinois, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

mitigated the appellant’s removal to a 30-day suspension. For the reasons

discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s petition for review . We AFFIRM the

initial decision to the extent that it sustained the charge of inappropriate language

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

and found nexus. We REVERSE the administrative judge’s decision to mitigate

the penalty and AFFIRM the agency’s removal action.

BACKGROUND

¶2 At all times relevant to the present appeal, the appellant held the position of

Practical Nurse at the Jesse Brown Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in

Chicago, Illinois. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 5 at 8. The agency

removed him based on the charges of inappropriate language (two specifications),

conduct unbecoming (one specification), and inappropriate conduct towards a

coworker (one specification). IAF, Tab 5 at 8-19. The charges related to

behavior towards a female coworker in November 2015 and November 2016, and

the resulting December 2016 investigation into the incidents. Id. at 17-18. 2

¶3 The appellant timely appealed his removal. IAF, Tab 1. After holding a

hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining the charge

and two specifications of inappropriate language. IAF, Tab 39, Initial Decision

(ID) at 3-4. Specification one of the inappropriate language charge in the

proposed removal stated that, on November 30, 2016, while the appellant was in

the breakroom with a male coworker, a female coworker called that individual on

the telephone and the appellant “yelled out something along the lines of kill that

bitch.” IAF, Tab 5 at 17. Specification two stated that, during a December 12,

2016, meeting with management regarding the appellant’s alleged interpersonal

conflicts with the female coworker, he admitted to calling the coworker a “bi tch”

on one unspecified occasion after she had allegedly lied about him acting

inappropriately towards her. Id. The administrative judge did not sustain the

charges of conduct unbecoming and inappropriate conduct towards a coworker.

ID at 4-7. The administrative judge found that, although the appellant seemingly

The removal became effective March 24, 2017, IAF, Tab 5 at 10, prior to the

enactment of the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower

Protection Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862. Neither party has argued

that that act has any bearing on this appeal.

raised an affirmative defense of disability discrimination, he failed to respond to

the affirmative defenses order or present any evidence into the record or during

the hearing regarding this issue. ID at 7-8. Therefore, the administrative judge

found that the appellant had failed to prove his affirmative defense by

preponderant evidence. 3 ID at 8.

¶4 The administrative judge mitigated the penalty of removal to a 30 -day

suspension. ID at 8-14. She did not grant deference to the agency’s penalty

determination, in large part because she sustained only the “least serious” of the

three charges. ID at 8-9. In determining that the agency’s penalty of removal

exceeded the tolerable limits of reasonableness, the administrative judge focused

on the context in which the appellant used the inappropriate language and the

appellant’s past discipline, both of which the deciding official considered

aggravating factors. ID at 9-14. The administrative judge issued an interim relief

order, stating that, should either party file a petition for review, the agency must

provide the appellant with interim relief in accordance with 5 U.S.C.

§ 7701(b)(2)(A), effect the appellant’s appointment to his former position of

Practical Nurse, and provide the pay and benefits of that position while the

petition for review was pending. ID at 15-16.

¶5 The agency has timely filed a petition for review asserting th at the

appellant’s removal should be sustained. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1

at 5-19, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The agency has substantially complied with the interim relief order.

¶6 When, as here, the appellant was the prevailing party in the initial decision

and interim relief was ordered, a petition for review filed by the agency must be

A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable

person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a

contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).

accompanied by a certification that it has complied with the interim relief order.

5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a). On review, the agency submitted as evidence of

compliance with the interim relief order a letter sent to the appellant instructing

him to report to duty as a Practical Nurse on a date certain and informing him that

it would provide him with pay, compensation, and benefits effective from the date

of the initial decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2), and replace his

March 24, 2017 removal decision letter with documentation of a 30-day

suspension in his personnel file no later than 20 days from the date of the letter.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 20.

¶7 Although the appellant thereafter “request[ed] enforcement” of the initial

decision, arguing that the agency had thus far failed to provide him with back

pay, he did not raise any allegations of noncompliance with the interim relief

order. PFR File, Tab 4 at 3. The administrative judge ordered the agency to pay

the appellant the appropriate amount of back pay no later than 60 calendar days

after the initial decision became final, and the agency filed a timely petition for

review of the initial decision, which has not become the final decision of the

Board. ID at 14-15; PFR File, Tab 1. The interim relief order did not require the

agency to provide the appellant with any back pay prior to the date of the initial

decision. ID at 15-16. Therefore, we find that the agency provided sufficient

evidence that it complied with the interim relief order. See Archerda v.

Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 13 (2014).

The administrative judge erred in mitigating the penalty.

¶8 On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred in

mitigating the agency-imposed penalty of removal to a 30-day suspension. PFR

File, Tab 1 at 12-15. We agree. The agency also asserts that the administrative

judge erred in not sustaining the conduct unbecoming and inappropriate conduct

towards a coworker charges. Id. at 6-12. The Board need not address these

allegations of error because, as discussed below, we find that the charge and

specifications the administrative judge sustained warrant the appellant’s removal.

See Luciano v. Department of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 10 (2001), aff’d,

30 F. App’x 973 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

¶9 When an agency proves fewer than all of its charges, the Board may not

independently determine a reasonable penalty; it may mitigate to the maximum

reasonable penalty so long as the agency has not indicated in its final decision or

during proceedings before the Board that it desires that a lesser penalty be

imposed on fewer charges. Alaniz v. U.S. Postal Service, 100 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶ 14

(2005). The Board may impose the same penalty imposed by the agency if, after

balancing the mitigating factors, it is the maximum reasonable penalty. Id. The

Board’s function in reviewing an agency’s penalty selection is not to displace

management’s responsibility but to determine whether management exercised its

judgment within the tolerable limits of reasonableness. Id. For the following

reasons, we find that the record supports the reasonableness of the removal

penalty.

¶10 During the hearing, the deciding official provided detailed testimony

regarding his consideration of the relevant Douglas 4 factors in sustaining the

appellant’s proposed removal. Hearing Transcript (HT) at 169-82, 206-16. The

deciding official testified that he viewed as aggravating factors the appellant’s

work in a healthcare setting with veterans, the high standard of conduct and

behavior towards patients and other VA employees expected of an individual in

the appellant’s position, and the notoriety of the offense in negatively affecting

the trust of veterans and the public in the level of patient care at the VA . HT

at 170-71, 175-76. Although the appellant had a good performance record, the

deciding official testified that the appellant’s inability to get along with fellow

workers outweighed his performance record in considering this Douglas factor.

HT at 173, 196-97, 212-213; IAF, Tab 5 at 23-47. The deciding official testified

In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board set

forth a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors that are relevant in assessing the penalty to be

imposed for an act of misconduct.

that he could not recall another case involving a removal penalty for an employee

who engaged in the charged conduct at issue in the present appeal, and therefore

he considered the consistency of the penalty a neutral factor. HT at 174, 215-16.

As noted by the administrative judge in her penalty analysis, the deciding offici al

testified that he viewed as neutral the impact of the charged misconduct on the

appellant’s ability to perform his position. HT at 173-74; ID at 14. Regarding

the effectiveness of an alternative penalty to deter such conduct in the future, the

deciding official testified that lesser penalties in the appellant’s two prior

disciplinary actions “had failed in the past” to deter his misconduct. HT

at 181-82.

¶11 We find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating or neutral

factors in this case. In considering the context in which the improper language

was used, the administrative judge correctly noted that the November 30, 2016

incident occurred in a breakroom and, according to hearing testimony, while the

appellant and the male coworker who received the telephone call from the female

coworker were eating lunch. ID at 10; HT at 11-12, 39. However, the context of

the telephone call over which the appellant shouted the abusive language towards

the female coworker was a work-related telephone call regarding one of the

patients on the floor on which the appellant and other employees worked. HT

at 11-12, 39-42. Moreover, the male coworker testified that the appellant’s

statements were loud enough for everyone in the breakroom to hear and that he

hung up the telephone because he did not want the female coworker to hear the

appellant’s statements. HT at 42. Therefore, the coworker ended a telephone call

about patient care because of the inappropriate language used by the appellant.

¶12 We disagree with the administrative judge that the interpersonal issues

between the appellant and his female coworker were a mitigating factor in

considering the context in which he used inappropriate language. As discussed

by the administrative judge, prior to the November 30, 2016 incident, the female

coworker had accused the appellant of touching her inappropriately. ID at 10.

VA police investigated this allegation but found “no proof to substantiate” the

complaint, and the agency did not charge the appellant with misconduct related to

this alleged incident in the proposed removal. IAF, Tab 5 at 17 -19, 58-72.

Although the administrative judge noted that the female coworker had taken out a

civil no-contact order against the appellant, she did not acknowledge that VA

police advised the coworker to obtain the no-contact order and that it was in

effect at the time of the November 30, 2016 incident, having been extended by a

Cook County Circuit Court judge approximately 6 weeks prior. ID at 10; IAF,

Tab 5 at 61-64. Regardless of the outcome of any litigation or VA police

investigation of the appellant, we find it serious that the appellant used

inappropriate or abusive language towards or about the female coworker under

these circumstances. Furthermore, the deciding official testified that he had taken

the job tension and personal issues that the appellant discussed in his oral reply

into consideration, but he weighed this against the safety and well-being of

veteran patients and agency employees in the working enviro nment. HT

at 180-81.

¶13 The Board’s review of a prior disciplinary action challenged by an appellant

is limited to determining whether the action is clearly erroneous, provided that

the employee was informed of the action in writing, the action is a matter of

record, and the employee was permitted to dispute the charges before a

higher-level authority than the one that imposes the discipline. Bolling v.

Department of the Air Force, 9 M.S.P.R. 335, 339-40 (1981). A challenged prior

action will be discounted as clearly erroneous if it leaves the Board with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. at 340.

¶14 The proposed removal identified two prior disciplinary actions, as follows:

(1) an April 2014 three-day suspension, mitigated from a proposed 7-day

suspension, for disrespectful conduct towards a coworker; and (2) a 7 -day

suspension for bringing a child to work and creating a work slowdown. IAF,

Tab 5 at 18, 109-12, 114-17. During the prehearing conference, the appellant

stated that he wished to challenge the merits of these prior suspensions. IAF,

Tab 25 at 4-5. Therefore, the administrative judge ordered the agency to provide

additional documentary evidence regarding the prior disciplinary actions. Id.;

IAF, Tab 30. She found that, in each of the prior actions, the appellant was

informed in writing, the actions were a matter of record, and the appellant had the

opportunity to dispute the charges before a higher level of authority. ID at 12;

see Bolling, 9 M.S.P.R. at 339-40. The April 2014 suspension involved the

appellant using obscene, abusive language towards a fellow healthcare

professional in a work setting in front of patients and invading the coworker’s

personal space. IAF, Tab 30 at 6-32. The administrative judge made no finding

that the April 2014 three-day suspension was clearly erroneous, and, following

our review of the record, we see no reason to make such a finding. ID at 12; IAF,

Tab 30 at 6-32.

¶15 We disagree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s

7-day suspension for bringing a child to work and creating a work slowdown was

too harsh and should not have been considered as a second prior offense by the

deciding official. ID at 11-14; IAF, Tab 30 at 33-81. The administrative judge

stated that the appellant had testified that the rehabilitation floor on which he

worked was short-staffed on the day in question and that the “charge nurse told

him to stay.” ID at 12-13. However, a review of the hearing transcript reflects

that the appellant testified only that the charge nurse “knew that [his] child was

there.” HT at 189-90, 271-72. We note that the appellant stated in an interview

with management shortly after the incident that the nursing supervisor knew

“later in the day” that his daughter was on the ward. IAF, Tab 30 at 36.

Therefore, the record does not support the administrative judge’s conclusion that

management somehow instructed the appellant to remain at work with his

daughter on the ward. ID at 13. During the hearing, the deciding official

testified that he had not been involved in the November 2015 suspension action,

but he believed that a 7-day suspension for bringing a child to work in a VA

hospital was a reasonable application of discipline. HT at 211-12. In particular,

the deciding official contrasted an employee bringing his child into the medical

ward with children allowed under the visitor policy. HT at 208. He testified that

visitors are supervised by nursing staff to ensure that hand h ygiene and other

disease precautions are followed in the controlled environment. Id. Thus, the

record does not support the administrative judge’s conclusion that the agency’s

decision to discipline the appellant was clearly erroneous. ID at 12-14.

¶16 Further, the administrative judge’s opinion that a lesser penalty of a letter

of warning, reprimand, or an admonishment would have sufficed does not mean

the incident should not be considered as prior discipline. ID at 13. A letter of

warning, reprimand or admonishment would constitute a prior offense and

aggravating factor. See Richard v. Department of the Air Force, 43 M.S.P.R.

303, 308 n.4, aff’d, 918 F.2d 185 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Mitchell v. U.S. Postal

Service, 32 M.S.P.R. 362, 365 (1987) (finding that a prior written counseling may

serve as an aggravating factor).

¶17 Finally, we disagree with the administrative judge that removal for an

offense of inappropriate language is inconsistent with the agency’s table of

penalties. ID at 14. As discussed above, the sustained charge at issue in the

present appeal was the appellant’s third disciplinary offense overall and second

particular offense for disrespectful conduct or inappropriate language towards or

about a coworker within a period of less than 3 years. ID at 11; IAF, Tab 5 at 18.

Regarding the calculation of prior offenses, the VA Handbook states as follows:

Offenses need not be identical in order to support progressively more

severe disciplinary/adverse action against an employee. For

example, an employee who has received an admonishment for

AWOL can receive a reprimand for sleeping on duty, and possibly be

suspended or removed for a third offense unrelated to the two

previous infractions.

IAF, Tab 5 at 154. The deciding official testified that he considered the charges

at issue in the present appeal the appellant’s third disciplinary offense. HT

at 175. The agency’s table of penalties states that the penalty for a third offense

of “[d]isrespectful, insulting, abusive, insolent or obscene language or conduct to

or about supervisors, other employees, patients, or visitors” is removal. IAF,

Tab 5 at 159. The penalty for a second offense of such misconduct is a 14 -day

suspension to removal. Id. Therefore, we find that the agency’s chosen penalty

is also consistent with the table of penalties for the sustained charge.

¶18 Disrespectful conduct as manifested by the use of abusive language is

unacceptable and not conducive to a stable working atmosphere; an agency,

therefore, is entitled to expect employees to comport themselves in conformance

with accepted standards. Wilson v. Department of Justice, 68 M.S.P.R. 303, 310

(1995). Although the administrative judge considered the inappropriate language

charge the “least serious of the three charges,” ID at 9, removal may be a

reasonable penalty, even for relatively minor misconduct, when an employee has

a record of prior discipline, Alaniz, 100 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶ 16. The administrative

judge noted that not all cases before the Board involving conduct similar to the

appellant’s have resulted in removal. ID at 9-10. However, the cases cited by the

administrative judge involved employees with either no prior disciplinary history

or prior discipline for dissimilar conduct to that for which the agency removed the

employee. ID at 10 (citing Sublette v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 82,

89-90 (1995); Davis v. Department of Justice, 63 M.S.P.R. 360, 367-68 (1994);

Sternberg v. Department of Defense, 52 M.S.P.R. 547, 559 (1992); Theisen v.

Veterans Administration, 31 M.S.P.R. 277, 279-82 (1986); Kullenberg v. Veterans

Administration, 21 M.S.P.R. 513, 518 (1984)). In contrast, the appellant had a

prior disciplinary record, including a prior offense for disrespectful conduct

towards a coworker. IAF, Tab 5 at 109-12, 114-17. Therefore, the record

supports the reasonableness of the deciding official’s decision to sustain the

penalty of removal. Id. at 10-13.

¶19 The appellant does not challenge, and we see no reason to disturb, the

administrative judge’s findings that the agency proved the charge of inappropriate

language with two specifications by preponderant evidence. PFR File , Tab 4 at 3;

see Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no

reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the

evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions

on issues of credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services,

33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987); see also Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d

1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board may overturn credibility

determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so).

Similarly, we find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the

appellant failed to present any evidence or argument regarding his affirmative

defense of disability discrimination, which he does not challenge on review. PFR

File, Tab 4 at 3; ID at 7-8.

¶20 We conclude that management’s chosen penalty of removal falls within the

tolerable limits of reasonableness. See, e.g., Alaniz, 100 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶¶ 14-15;

Wilson, 68 M.S.P.R. at 309-10 (sustaining a removal for disrespectful conduct

and the use of insulting, abusive language); see also Lewis v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 80 M.S.P.R. 472, ¶¶ 7-10 (1998) (upholding removal for

disrespectful conduct towards a supervisor in the presence of coworkers,

particularly considering that the employee was previously disciplined for similar

misconduct). Accordingly, we reverse the administrative judge’s decision to

mitigate the penalty and affirm the agency’s removal action.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file withi n the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition f or review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the