Opinion

D. Best v. United Steel Paper & Forestry Rubber Mfg. Energy Allied Industrial & Service Workers Int'l. Union

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed: Jul 18, 2023
Status: Published
On the bench: Cohn Jubelirer, President Judge
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 23.7%

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dennis Best, Gregory S. Miller, :

Joseph Bruno, Robert Lanshcak, :

Eric A. Garrett, Richard Schenker, :

Robert M. Yeager, Bruce Rosa, :

Anthony Tedesco, Renee Miller, :

Heidi A. Kizak, Mary Lou Wilson, :

Patricia Napolitan, Cory Beck, Richard :

Arthur, Ryan Lechner, David J. :

Devenney, Chad Rowe, Benjamin :

Sharper, Luann Iacino, and Anthony :

Vendilli, :

Appellants :

v. : No. 1367 C.D. 2019

: Argued: May 10, 2023

United Steel Paper and Forestry Rubber :

Manufacturing Energy Allied Industrial :

and Service Workers International :

Union a/k/a United Steel Workers of :

America and The County of Mercer :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: July 18, 2023

Appellants Dennis Best, Gregory S. Miller, Joseph Bruno, Robert Lanshcak,

Eric A. Garrett, Richard Schenker, Robert M. Yeager, Bruce Rosa, Anthony

Tedesco, Renee Miller, Heidi A. Kizak, Mary Lou Wilson, Patricia Napolitan, Cory

Beck, Richard Arthur, Ryan Lechner, David J. Devenney, Chad Rowe, Benjamin

Sharper, Luann Iacino, and Anthony Vendilli (collectively, Employees) appeal the

Order dated July 2, 2018, and entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer

County (trial court) on July 9, 2018, sustaining the Preliminary Objection (PO) filed

by United Steel Paper and Forestry Rubber Manufacturing Energy Allied Industrial

and Service Workers International Union a/k/a United Steel Workers of America

(USW) and the PO filed by County of Mercer (Mercer County) (collectively,

Appellees), alleging the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

Employees’ Complaint. Following our review, we reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The trial court detailed the facts herein as follows:

[Employees] are all present and past employees of the Mercer County

Sheriff’s Department. In 1996, the employees of the Mercer County

Sheriff’s Department sought to form a public employee union which

was to be represented by USW, having the name of USW Local Union

No. 1355. While employed by the Mercer County Sheriff’s

Department, each of the [Employees] executed a USW Check-Off

Authorization [Authorization(s)] which authorized Mercer County to

deduct union dues from their pay each month while each [Employee]

was “in employment with the collective bargaining unit in the

employer.” The individual [ ] [A]uthorizations were executed by each

[Employee] at the time of their initial employment with the Mercer

County Sheriff’s Department, were identical in their form, and

authorized Mercer County to remit the deducted dues to the USW.

This labor union was never certified by the Pennsylvania Labor

Relations Board (“PLRB”), however, as a collective bargaining unit.

The Pennsylvania Public Employe[] Relations Act [PERA]1 requires

certification of any collective bargaining unit by the PLRB before it

becomes official. Both [ ] Mercer County and [ ] USW were

informed by the PLRB that their attempt to certify the employees of

the Mercer County Sheriff’s Department as a collective bargaining unit

had been denied. However, even with that knowledge, both [ ] Mercer

County and [ ] USW negotiated and entered into numerous collective

bargaining agreements between 1996 and 2016. Also during that time,

[ ] Mercer County deducted union dues from the pay of [Employees],

and remitted the dues to [ ] USW.

FN 1 Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, art. 1, [as

amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301].

(Trial Court’s Memorandum Opinion, filed 7/9/2018 (Op.), at 1-3 (unnumbered)

(emphasis added).)

Employees filed a Complaint in the trial court alleging a claim for breach of

contract against Mercer County and a claim for breach of duty of fair representation

against USW. (Complaint ¶¶ 12-22, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 11a-14a.)

Employees sought individual judgments in their favor and to recover monetary

damages against both Mercer County and USW for the improperly deducted and

remitted dues plus interest. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 22, R.R. at 11a-12a, 14a.) Employees

also sought to recover punitive damages against USW. (Id. at 6 (Wherefore Clause),

R.R. at 14a.)

On March 15, 2018, Mercer County filed POs in the nature of a demurrer,

pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1),1 alleging the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the Complaint because the dispute falls within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the PLRB. (Mercer County POs ¶¶ 9-12, R.R. at 19a.) Mercer County

further alleged the breach of contract claim was legally insufficient as the Complaint

did not set forth all the elements of a breach of contract claim and that the Complaint

should be stricken due to Employees’ failure to attach a copy of the contract and a

This Rule provides that POs may be filed by any party to any pleading for “lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or the person of the defendant, improper venue or

improper form or service of a writ of summons or a complaint[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1).

verification to the Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 13-37, R.R. at 19a-23a (citing Pa.R.Civ.P.

1028(a)(4),2 Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(i),3 and Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024(a)4).)

On March 15, 2018, USW also filed POs alleging lack of subject matter

jurisdiction as to both counts of the Complaint pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1).

The parties filed briefs in support of their respective positions and the trial court

heard argument on the POs.

Relying upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding in Hollinger v.

Department of Public Welfare, 365 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1976), the trial court concluded

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Employees’ Complaint because the

Complaint alleged violations which fall within PERA and, therefore, subject matter

jurisdiction was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PLRB. (Trial Court’s

Memorandum Op. at 6 (unnumbered).) The trial court sustained Mercer County’s

Pursuant to this Rule, POs may be filed by any party to any pleading for “legal

insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer)[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4).

Pertaining to contents of pleadings, this Rule states:

[w]hen any claim or defense is based upon a writing, the pleader shall attach a copy

of the writing, or the material part thereof, but if the writing or copy is not accessible

to the pleader, it is sufficient so to state, together with the reason, and to set forth

the substance in writing.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(i).

Rule1024(a) requires:

[e]very pleading containing an averment of fact not appearing of record in the

action or containing a denial of fact shall state that the averment or denial is true

upon the signer’s personal knowledge or information and belief and shall be

verified. The signer need not aver the source of the information or expectation of

ability to prove the averment or denial at the trial. A pleading may be verified upon

personal knowledge as to a part and upon information and belief as to the

remainder.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024(a).

PO asserting the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Employees’ breach of

contract claim, sustained USW’s PO asserting the court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the breach of the duty of fair representation claim, and dismissed

Employees’ Complaint. (Id.) Based upon its disposition, the trial court did not

address the remaining POs. Employees appealed to the Superior Court. In its

Memorandum filed on August 23, 2019, the Superior Court determined jurisdiction

is properly vested in this Court because the matter draws into question the

applicability, interpretation, or enforcement of PERA and transferred the appeal.

On appeal, Employees argue the trial court erred in determining it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the breach of contract claims asserted against Mercer

County in light of Hollinger. Employees also argue the trial court’s finding that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the breach of duty of fair representation

claims brought against USW was contrary to law and in contravention to this Court’s

holding in Case v. Hazelton [sic] Area Educational Support Personnel Association,

928 A.2d 1154 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). We address these issues in turn.

II. BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST MERCER COUNTY

A. Parties’ Arguments

Employees argue the trial court erred in finding it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over Employees’ action against Mercer County because the case

concerns individual claims of breach of contract, not unfair labor practices.

Employees contend the County breached the terms and conditions of their

Authorizations when it deducted union dues from each of their paychecks and

remitted that money to USW from 1996 through 2016 with the knowledge that

Employees were not members of a collective bargaining unit. (Employees’ Brief

(Br.) at 6.) Employees assert the facts herein are distinguishable from those

presented in Hollinger because the “dues deductions in the instant case were not

performed by [Mercer County] in the absence of valid authorization, as was the case

in Hollinger, but in violation and breach of the terms and conditions of the

[Authorizations] executed by [Employees].” (Id. at 13.) Thus, Employees maintain

that they have a basis for asserting individual breach of contract claims against

Mercer County and have pled those claims in their Complaint by alleging that the

Authorizations allowed the County to deduct dues from Employees only when they

were employed by the County and were members of a collective bargaining unit.

(Id.) Although the Authorizations were valid, the County violated the terms thereof

by deducting union dues with the knowledge that Employees were not members of

a collective bargaining unit. (Id.) Thus, Employees reason that their individual

breach of contract claims are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court,

even if they also implicate an unfair labor practice. (Id. at 14.)

In response, Mercer County contends that Hollinger is controlling. (Mercer

County’s Br. at 9-13.) Mercer County reasons the effect of Appellees’ alleged act

of intentionally withholding information that Employees’ union was not certified by

the PLRB, and collecting union dues notwithstanding, is an interference with

Employees’ right to choose their labor union. This type of claim constitutes an unfair

labor practice within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PLRB because interfering with

an employee’s right to join a union is one of the enumerated unfair labor practices

listed in PERA and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PLRB. (Id. at 6, 13.)

Mercer County also asserts that Employees’ attempt to show their Authorizations

constitute their own, separate contracts with Mercer County is unavailing, as there

was no bargained-for exchange, mutual promises, or consideration when Employees

endorsed those Authorizations. (Id. at 6, 13-15, 17.) According to Mercer County,

the Authorizations establish only union membership and are a “one-way directive”

for the payment of union dues in accordance with a provision in a collective

bargaining agreement. (Id. at 6, 15.)

B. Discussion

“When reviewing orders disposing of preliminary objections, our standard of

review is clear: well-pled factual averments are admitted; conclusions of law are

not.” Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist., 926 A.2d 1260, 1265 n. 5. (Pa. Cmwlth.

2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, “[w]hen preliminary

objections raise a question of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court’s function is

to determine whether the law will bar recovery due to a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In considering

whether the PLRB has exclusive jurisdiction of the within matter, we must ascertain

whether Employees’ cause of action seeks to rectify an unfair labor practice under

PERA. Hazleton, 928 A.2d at 1160. If it does, then the PLRB is vested with

exclusive original jurisdiction by Section 1301 of PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.1301.

However, as discussed more fully below, this rule does not divest a court of

jurisdiction to entertain suits for breach of contract merely because the alleged

breach may be an unfair labor practice. Id.

Section 1201(a)(1) of PERA states: “[p]ublic employers, their agents or

representatives are prohibited from [ ] [i]nterfering, restraining or coercing employes

in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Article IV of this act.” 43 P.S.

§ 1101.1201. Article IV addresses employee rights and guarantees and provides:

It shall be lawful for public employes to organize, form, join or assist

in employe organizations or to engage in lawful concerted activities for

the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection

or to bargain collectively through representatives of their own free

choice and such employes shall also have the right to refrain from any

or all such activities, except as may be required pursuant to a

maintenance of membership provision in a collective bargaining

agreement.

Section 401 of PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.401.

Section 1201(b)(1) of PERA enumerates the categories of unfair practices as

follows:

(b) Employe organizations, their agents, or representatives, or public

employes are prohibited from:

(1) Restraining or coercing employes in the exercise of the rights

guaranteed in Article IV of this act.

(2) Restraining or coercing a public employer in the selection of

his representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or

the adjustment of grievances.

(3) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with a public

employer, if they have been designated in accordance with the

provisions of this act as the exclusive representative of

employes in an appropriate unit.

(4) Violating any of the rules and regulations established by the

board regulating the conduct of representation elections.

(5) Refusing to reduce a collective bargaining agreement to writing

and sign such agreement.

(6) Calling, instituting, maintaining or conducting a strike or

boycott against any public employer or picketing any place of

business of a public employer on account of any jurisdictional

controversy.

(7) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual

employed by any person to engage in a strike or refusal to

handle goods or perform services; or threatening, coercing or

restraining any person where an object thereof is to (i) force or

require any public employer to cease dealing or doing business

with any other person or (ii) force or require a public employer

to recognize for representation purposes an employe

organization not certified by the board.

(8) Refusing to comply with the provisions of an arbitration award

deemed binding under section 903 of Article IX.

(9) Refusing to comply with the requirements of “meet and

discuss.”

43 P.S. § 1101.1201(b)(1). In addition, Section 1301 of PERA provides:

The [PLRB] is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any

person from engaging in any unfair practice listed in Article XII of this

act.[] This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any

other means of adjustment or prevention that have been or may be

established by agreement, law, or otherwise.

43 P.S. § 1101.1301.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court analyzed the interplay of the

aforementioned provisions in Hollinger. Therein, employees had joined a union,

which was certified as the exclusive representative of their bargaining unit and

authorized the deduction of union dues from their paychecks. The employees

eventually resigned from the union but were advised by their public employer that

because their resignations had not been timely, the resignations were ineffective. As

a result, dues were collected from their wages retroactively to the date deductions

had been terminated. Hollinger, 365 A.2d at 1247. The employees subsequently

filed complaints in equity in this Court’s original jurisdiction against their public

employer to enjoin further payroll deductions for union dues and to recover the dues

that previously had been subtracted from the employees’ paychecks. In response,

the public employer filed preliminary objections challenging, among other things,

this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and arguing that the employees’ claims

should have been brought before the PLRB. This Court disagreed and overruled the

preliminary objections. The Supreme Court reversed and in doing so determined

that the alleged unauthorized withholding of dues “arguably” constituted unlawful

labor practices listed under Sections 1201(a)(1) and (b)(1) of PERA. Id. at 1249.

The Supreme Court held that the PLRB, not the courts, has exclusive subject matter

jurisdiction over unfair labor practices pursuant to Section 1301 of PERA. Id. at

1248-49. In deciding whether jurisdiction for the dispute was with the PLRB or the

court of common pleas, the Supreme Court opined

that the deduction of union dues from employes’ salaries, if done

without valid authorization by the employes affected, arguably

constitutes an interference with or restraint upon their right to refrain

from joining or assisting in employe organizations of which the

employes do not wish to be members. As such, the acts of both

employers and unions in causing such unauthorized deductions to be

made, if proved to have occurred, may be unfair labor practices under

Section 1201(a)(1) and 1201(b)(1), respectively, of [] PERA, and

actions seeking to enjoin such deductions are within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the [PLRB] by virtue of Section 1301 of [] PERA.

Id. at 1249-50 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Relevant herein, the

Supreme Court also stated that PERA “does not, of course, divest a court of

jurisdiction to entertain suits for breach of contract merely because the alleged

breach may arguably be an unfair labor practice.” Id. at 1249 n.10 (italics in

original) (emphasis added).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later applied this principle in finding that

the purpose of the PLRB is to remedy statutory violations, such as unfair labor

practices, not to decide claims of contract violations; therefore, the trial court

exercised proper jurisdiction of a complaint which alleged a breach of contract in

City of Philadelphia v. District Council 33, American Federation of State, County

& Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 598 A.2d 256, 259 (Pa. 1991) (District Council).

In District Council, the trial court granted injunctive relief after the union sought to

enjoin the City of Philadelphia (the City) from enforcing a city pension plan

ordinance on the basis that it would have a detrimental impact on City employees’

pension plan under their collective bargaining agreement. The City appealed,

claiming that the PLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter because it

involved a labor dispute pertaining to the City’s failure to bargain collectively in

good faith with the union about the new pension system under Section 1201(a)(5) of

PERA. In response, the union asserted it had brought a breach of contract claim and

unconstitutional impairment of the contract claim, not an unfair labor practice action,

and, therefore, common pleas had proper jurisdiction. Relying upon Hollinger, the

Supreme Court held that the complaint clearly asserted contract claims, and the court

of common pleas had proper jurisdiction over the matter. District Council, 598 A.2d

at 259. In so holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that the complaint did not address

a failure to bargain or seek to force the City to bargain over a new pension plan. Id.

In addition, this Court has held that “[w]here a matter does not fall within the

list of unfair labor practices found listed in Section 1201 of PERA,[] PERA does not

deprive the [c]ourts of [c]ommon [p]leas [of] jurisdiction to consider the matter.”

Pro. and Pub. Serv. Emps. Union Loc. 1300 v. Trinisewski, 504 A.2d 391, 393 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1986) (footnote omitted). In Trinisewski, a union had called upon the court

of common pleas to enforce collective bargaining agreements, and in doing so, the

court had to determine the validity thereof. We ultimately held that “[t]he validity

of the agreements and the capacity of the parties to enter into them are not issues

which the [c]ommon [p]leas [c]ourt is precluded from considering by PERA”

because “[t]he entering into a collective bargaining agreement by an uncertified

union is not listed as an unfair labor practice in Section 1201.” Id. at 393-94. Thus,

we held that the trial court properly had jurisdiction to grant summary judgment

therein. Id. Also, in Berks-Lehigh Regional Police Officers Association v. Upper

Macungie Township (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 786 C.D. 2016, filed Jan. 12, 2017), slip op.

at 10, 12,5 this Court repeated that every breach of contract claim related to a

collective bargaining agreement will not be deemed an unfair labor practice as a

matter of law. There, a police officers’ association filed a complaint in the trial court,

claiming its collective bargaining agreement was a valid contract, which was

breached when the police department was disbanded prior to the agreement’s

expiration. Id. at 4. We concluded that where “the [a]ssociation [ ] alleged only a

breach of contract claim and [ ] sought only relief in the form of compensatory

damages consistent with a breach of contract claim[, the] trial court ha[d] original

jurisdiction over the [a]ssociation’s breach of contract claim.” Id. at 12.

Herein, Employees alleged in their Complaint that they had desired to be

represented by a labor union certified by the PLRB and believed that they were part

of a collective bargaining unit when they executed the Authorizations permitting

Mercer County to deduct dues from their paychecks and remit those payments to

USW. (Complaint ¶¶ 4-6, 13, R.R. at 10a-11a.) Employees further argued they had

a basis for asserting individual breach of contract claims against Mercer County,

which, with the knowledge that Employees were not members of a collective

bargaining unit, deducted dues payments from their paychecks notwithstanding. (Id.

While not binding, this Court’s unreported opinions may be cited for their persuasive

authority pursuant to Rule 126(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P.

126(b)(1), and Section 414(a) of our Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code 69.414(a).

¶¶ 10-11, 13, R.R. at 11a.) As a result, they sought compensatory damages in the

form of repayment of their union dues. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15, R.R. at 11a-12a.) The trial

court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Employees’ cause of

action based on Hollinger because the Complaint essentially sought relief from

unfair labor practices. The trial court stated Hollinger stands for the proposition that

complaints pertaining to the improper deduction of union dues and actions seeking

to enjoin such deductions are within the PLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction. (Op. at 4-5

(unnumbered).) The trial court reasoned that the deduction of union dues from

Employees’ paychecks “potentially” interfered with their “right to ‘form, join, or

assist in employee organization’” in violation of Section 401 of the PERA. (Op. at

5-6 (unnumbered).) The trial court was not persuaded by the Supreme Court’s

statement in Hollinger regarding suits for breach of contract as the statement is in a

footnote, and the trial court ultimately dismissed the Complaint upon finding the

PLRB had exclusive jurisdiction. (Id. at 5 (unnumbered).)

Determining the facts in the matter sub judice were similar to those presented

in Hollinger, and, therefore, Hollinger is controlling, the trial court reasoned:

The terms of the [] Authorizations signed by [Employees] allowed

Mercer County to deduct union dues from their pay each month while

each [Employee] was “in employment with the collective bargaining

unit in the [County].” If the [A]uthorization signed by [Employees]

was that dues could be deducted as long as [Employees] were in a

collective bargaining unit, and [Employees] were never in a collective

bargaining unit, then there was no valid authorization.

Assuming that the taking of dues was improper, the taking of dues by

[Appellees] also potentially interferes with [Employees’] right to

“form, join, or assist in employee organization” under 43 P.S.

§ 1101.401 because if the dues were not being collected by [ ] Mercer

County and given to [ ] USW, and [Employees] were told that they were

not part of a collective bargaining unit, then [E]mployees would have

surely tried again to form a collective bargaining unit or perhaps [gone]

with a different union all together from [USW]. By collecting the dues,

and essentially lying to [Employees], [Appellees] would have

prevented [Employees] from properly forming a union. This clearly

would be in violation of [ ] [PERA], which further places this case

squarely within the purview of the [PLRB]. It is therefore the decision

of this court that jurisdiction for this case lies exclusively with the

PLRB and therefore the case should be dismissed. Because this [c]ourt

lacks jurisdiction in this matter, it declines to make a ruling on the other

preliminary objections set forth by [Appellees].

(Op. at 5-6 (unnumbered) (emphasis added).) However, the Supreme Court in

Hollinger and its progeny has recognized an exception to the PLRB’s exclusive

jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases where the cause of action sounds in

contract. In those types of cases, as the Supreme Court found in District Council,

the courts of common pleas do have proper subject matter jurisdiction.

Notably, a breach of contract claim consists of three elements: (1) whether a

contract exists, including its essential terms; (2) whether there was a breach of the

duty imposed by the contract; and (3) whether there are resultant damages. Sewer

Auth. of City of Scranton v. Pa. Infrastructure Inv. Auth., 81 A.3d 1031, 1041-42

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). While the trial court herein predicted what Employees “would

have” tried to do if they knew their union was not properly certified and

acknowledged Appellees’ actions “would have prevented [Employees] from

properly forming a union,” (Op. at 6 (unnumbered)), the trial court did not consider

Employees’ well-pled allegations in light of the relevant statutory authority and

caselaw. The basis for Employees’ individual breach of contract claims is that their

execution of the Authorizations, and Mercer County’s subsequent deduction of

union dues pursuant thereto, evinces a contractual agreement the terms of which

Mercer County breached when it made the deductions with the knowledge that

Employees were not members of a collective bargaining unit. In accordance with

Hollinger and District Council, even if this case encompasses characteristics of an

unfair labor practice action, this fact alone does not divest the trial court of subject

matter jurisdiction over this matter. Because the trial court concluded that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction, it never analyzed whether a contract existed between

Employees and Mercer County, nor did it consider the merits, if any, of Mercer

County’s remaining preliminary objections. Thus, the matter must be remanded for

the trial court to conduct such an analysis.

III. BREACH OF DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION AGAINST USW

A. Parties’ Arguments

Employees also argue the trial court erred in holding it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to consider their breach of duty of fair representation claims set forth in

Count II of their Complaint against USW. Employees assert USW breached its

fiduciary duty of fair representation to Employees and, acting in bad faith, never

disclosed to them the union’s lack of certification while continuing to receive

Employees’ union dues from Mercer County from 1996 through 2016. Employees

further argue the trial court erred by failing to consider the facts and holding of

Hazleton, which are more in line with those presented herein than those set forth in

Hollinger. (Employees’ Br. at 16-18.)

In response, USW argues that the crux of Employees’ Complaint, that union

dues were improperly deducted and remitted from their paychecks although they

never were in a collective bargaining unit, is an unfair labor practice and, as such,

Hollinger controls. (USW Br. at 4-5.) USW further reasons the PLRB has exclusive

jurisdiction over this case because

the basis of [Employees’] claim against USW is that it interfered with,

restrained, or coerced [Employees] in their right to belong to a certified

collective bargaining unit or another labor union altogether.

Accordingly, [Employees’] claims are based upon alleged conduct that

would constitute an unfair labor practice, if proven to the PLRB.

(Id. at 5-6.) According to USW, Employees’ contention that Hollinger is

distinguishable because their dues deductions were authorized as per their

authorization cards is inaccurate, for Employees authorized payments only if they

were part of a collective bargaining unit, which never existed. (Id. at 13-14.)

Moreover, USW states the Hazleton case is distinguishable because therein the

plaintiffs did not seek the repayment of union dues, which is the remedy Employees

request herein and the remedy sought in Hollinger. (Id. at 11-12.) For these reasons,

USW submits the basis of the Complaint is an unfair labor practice. (Id. at 12-13.)

B. Discussion

In Hazleton, a group of school district employees alleged that their labor union

had breached its duty of fair representation to senior employees when it negotiated

and agreed to contractual provisions that were more favorable to employees with

less seniority. 928 A.2d at 1161. In considering whether jurisdiction lay with the

PLRB or with the court of common pleas, this Court discussed prior inconsistent

case law on the issue and held:

Individual claims by employees against the union that allege a breach

of the duty of fair representation do not qualify as unfair labor practices

in violation of PERA. The PLRB’s expertise lies in resolving disputes

involving alleged violations of the provisions of PERA, not in

remedying an individual injustice to an employee by an employee’s

representative union.

Id. Thereafter, this Court further clarified that

[t]he duty of fair representation requires unions to “serve the interests

of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to

exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to

avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).

Unions have a fiduciary obligation to represent all of their members

fairly and to protect the members’ rights. Connelly v. Steel Valley Educ.

Ass’n, 119 A.3d 1127, 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). “A union’s actions

can be considered arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal

landscape at the time of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so

far outside a wide range of reasonableness . . . as to be irrational.” Id.

(internal citations and quotations omitted). A civil claim based on a

union’s alleged breach of its duty of fair representation does not

implicate PERA because “[i]ndividual claims by employees against

[their] union . . . do not qualify as unfair labor practices.” Id. at

1133 (quoting . . . Hazleton. . . , 928 A.2d [at] . . . 1161 . . . .)

Therefore, jurisdiction over duty of fair representation claims is

within the local county court of common pleas, not the PLRB. Id.

Kiddo v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Local 2202 (Pa. Cmwlth., No.

468 C.D. 2019, filed August 3, 2020), slip op. at 6 n.5 (emphasis added).

Here, Employees’ Complaint alleges USW breached its duty of fair

representation and acted in bad faith when it both failed to disclose to Employees

that they were not members of a certified collective bargaining unit and intentionally

and fraudulently represented to them that they were part of a collective bargaining

unit while collecting dues and negotiating collective bargaining agreements it knew

were unenforceable. (Complaint ¶¶ 16-20, R.R. 12a-13a.) Employees further allege

that each has sustained damages that were deducted from his or her pay and

improperly remitted by Mercer County to USW from 1996 through 2016.

(Complaint ¶¶ 20-21, R.R. at 13a.) Employees seek both compensatory and punitive

damages from USW.

USW’s actions alleged herein do not fall under any of the categories of unfair

labor practices enumerated in Section 1201(b) of PERA, see supra, and Employees’

Complaint clearly sets forth a claim against USW for breach of its duty of fair

representation. Moreover, Employees seek redress in the form of compensatory and

punitive damages for this claim; however, the PLRB’s power to remedy unfair labor

practices is remedial in nature and not punitive. Uniontown Area Sch. Dist. v. Pa.

Lab. Rels. Bd. ex rel. Uniontown Area Educ. Ass’n, 747 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2000). Because the Complaint sets forth allegations which, if true, would

constitute a breach of USW’s duty of fair representation, jurisdiction lies with the

court of common pleas, not the PLRB. Kiddo, slip op. at 6 n.5.

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court determined that because Employees’ Complaint may implicate

PERA’s prohibitions, then the PLRB must have exclusive jurisdiction over the

claims raised therein. However, while the trial court correctly states that the PLRB

has exclusive jurisdiction over questions of unfair labor practices, it did not apply

well settled caselaw that a claim can sound in both breach of contract, over which

the trial court would maintain jurisdiction, and a violation of PERA, which would

be exclusively under the PLRB’s jurisdiction. In their Complaint, Employees raise

individual claims of breach of contract and breach of duty of fair representation, and

they seek both compensatory and punitive damages. While the alleged breaches

may involve unfair labor practices on the part of Appellees, this does not divest the

trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, which seek to remedy

individual injustices done to Employees by Appellees.6 Thus, we reverse the July 2,

We note that Section 1302 of PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.1302, authorizes the PLRB to issue unfair

labor practice complaints against public employers. However, Employees acknowledged during

oral argument that if this matter were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PLRB, the deducted

union dues payments fall outside the applicable statute of limitations. (See Section 1505 of PERA,

43 P.S. § 1101.1505 (stating “[n]o petition or charge shall be entertained which relates to acts

(Footnote continued on next page…)

2018, Order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

which occurred or statements which were made more than four months prior to the filing of the

petition or charge.”)). This Court has expressly held that “the four-month statute of limitations in

Section 1505 [of PERA] bars a complainant from filing an unfair labor practice charge based upon

evidence which has been in the complainant’s possession for more than four months.” Thomas v.

Pa. Labor Rels. Bd., 483 A.2d 1016, 1018 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). “The four-month limitations period

for the filing of an unfair labor practice charge under Section 1505 of the PERA is triggered when

the complainant has reason to believe that the unfair labor practice has occurred.” Lancaster Cnty.

v. Pa. Labor Rels. Bd., 62 A.3d 469, 473 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).