Parker v. LeBlanc

Case: 21-30446 Document: 00516823315 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/17/2023

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

July 17, 2023

No. 21-30446

Lyle W. Cayce

____________

Clerk

Robert Parker,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of Department of Public Safety and

Corrections,

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:18-CV-1030

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:

Robert Parker filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit in Louisiana state

court against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

Secretary James LeBlanc. Among other claims, Parker argues that LeBlanc

violated his constitutional rights by misclassifying him as a sex offender and

thereby illegally extending his detention in prison for 337 days past his release

date. LeBlanc sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, but the district

court denied the motion. On this interlocutory appeal, we AFFIRM.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 21, 2016, Parker was arrested while on probation and

placed in the Orleans Parish Prison. On March 27, 2017, a Louisiana state

court sentenced Parker to two years of imprisonment for violating his

probation but awarded him credit for the months he served in the parish

prison. Three days later, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and

Corrections (“DPSC”) assumed custody of Parker.

On May 4, 2017, a DPSC employee identified as “L. Cato”

determined that Parker had a “Must Serve” date of October 9, 2017. Parker

alleges he should have been released on that date. Sometime in September

2017, however, DPSC employee Brenda Acklin reviewed Parker’s file,

crossed out the October 9, 2017, date, then wrote above it an acronym for

“unapproved sex offender registry plan.” Under Louisiana law, the DPSC

must verify the legality of sex offenders’ post-release residences before they

can be released from prison. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:543.

During the course of his imprisonment at Richwood Correctional

Center, Parker submitted several inmate request forms. In his first two

requests, Parker asked to meet with Warden Ray Hanson about his release

date. He filed two other forms in an attempt to provide the DPSC with

addresses detailing where he could reside upon his release. Parker also

consistently disputed that he was a sex offender.

On August 24, 2018, a public defender, Aaron Zagory, who had

previously represented Parker, emailed the reentry program manager for the

DPSC probation and parole division. Zagory’s email stated that he did not

“believe Mr. Parker has a conviction that requires him to register as a sex

offender.” Zagory did note that Parker had been convicted in 1997 of

indecent behavior with a juvenile and unauthorized entry into an inhabited

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dwelling, but that Parker “was permitted to withdraw that plea and pleaded

guilty to a single amended count of simple burglary.”

Rebecca Ikner, the reentry program director for the DPSC probation

and parole division, responded that she was not involved in sex offender cases

or time computation. Ikner copied her supervisor on the reply, who

forwarded it to Charles Romero, the sex offender unit coordinator of the

DPSC’s probation and parole office in New Orleans. Twelve days later, on

September 5, 2018, Romero acknowledged the “honest mistake in the

investigation” and explained that it had been corrected. Romero stated that

“Mr. Parker can be released immediately (assuming there is nothing else

holding him there)” and noted that Romero had informed the DPSC that

Parker was not a sex offender. Parker was held an additional five days, until

September 10, 2018, when he was finally released from prison.

Parker filed a civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against the

DPSC, Secretary of the DPSC James LeBlanc, Ray Hanson, Brenda Acklin,

“Does 1-10,” and ABC Insurance Companies. Parker alleged that the

defendants violated his constitutional rights by detaining him past his release

date. He also claimed that the defendants committed similar violations

against other state inmates. LeBlanc and the other defendants removed the

case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction, specifically the

claims Parker raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Parker filed a First Amended Complaint in April 2019. Hanson

moved to dismiss the claims against him based upon misjoinder. The district

court denied the motion but ordered Parker “to amend the operative

complaint to add specificity and cure any deficiencies therein.” Parker then

filed a Second Amended Complaint in November 2019.

LeBlanc, the DPSC, and Acklin filed a motion to dismiss Parker’s

claims against them. LeBlanc and Acklin argued that Parker failed to state a

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claim upon which relief could be granted because they were entitled to

qualified immunity. The district court again granted Parker leave to amend

his complaint after holding that Parker’s Second Amended Complaint lacked

sufficient detail and that Parker had not adequately alleged deliberate

indifference in “fail[ing] to allege, even on information and belief, that

LeBlanc was aware” of the deficiencies in the prison systems.

Parker filed a Third Amended Complaint in August 2020. In his

Third Amended Complaint, Parker cited three pieces of evidence to establish

LeBlanc’s knowledge of deficiencies in the way the DPSC calculated and

implemented release dates: (1) testimony by DPSC employees in unrelated

cases regarding problems with the over-detention and release of inmates; (2)

a 2018 newspaper opinion-editorial by Louisiana Attorney General Jeff

Landry regarding the same issue; and (3) a legislative audit report. These had

also been cited in his Second Amended Complaint. In his Third Amended

Complaint, however, Parker alleged for the first time on information and

belief that Defendant LeBlanc was aware of the deficiencies in the system and

the specific evidence cited in the complaint. LeBlanc again moved to dismiss

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to cure the

main deficiency identified by the district court in its previous order —

namely, the lack of a pattern of similar constitutional violations.

The district court denied in part LeBlanc’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion

because Parker had “adequately pled that there were sufficiently similar prior

incidents in sufficient number and of which LeBlanc was aware to overcome

qualified immunity at this stage.” The court found that LeBlanc could not

“seriously dispute (1) that the prior incidents were sufficient in number and

(2) that LeBlanc did not have actual knowledge of them, particularly

considering the allegations on information and belief that he knew about the

Legislative Auditor’s report, Attorney General op-ed, and state court

testimony.” LeBlanc filed a timely notice of appeal.

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DISCUSSION

We have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to

review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified

immunity when the resolution turns on an issue of law. See Orr v. Copeland,

844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir.

2008).

Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissals when a complaint fails “to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). This court

reviews Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as

true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and

citation omitted). “In an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified

immunity, we have jurisdiction to consider only whether a certain course of

conduct would, as a matter of law, be objectively unreasonable in light of

clearly established law.” Brown, 519 F.3d at 236 (quotation marks and

citation omitted). A claim has facial plausibility “where a plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Morris, 739 F.3d at 745

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

“To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

acting under color of state law.” Pratt v. Harris Cnty., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th

Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

“Our precedent establishes that a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are

timely released from prison.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir.

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2011). Quite recently, and addressing the liability of this same defendant, we

held that “it is without question that holding without legal notice a prisoner

for a month beyond the expiration of his sentence constitutes a denial of due

process.” Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 188 (5th Cir. 2022).

This analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we examine whether Parker

has sufficiently alleged supervisory liability against LeBlanc. Second, we

determine whether LeBlanc’s alleged conduct violated a clearly established

constitutional right.

I. Has Parker sufficiently alleged supervisory liability?

“Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior

liability.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002). Nonetheless,

“[s]upervisory officials may be liable under § 1983 for their failure to adopt

policies if that failure causally results in a constitutional injury.” Crittindon,

37 F.4th at 186. “Liability only arises when the officials act, or fail to act,

with ‘deliberate indifference,’ a ‘disregard [for] a known or obvious

consequence of [their] action[s].’” Id. (quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 446)

(alterations in original). “[A] plaintiff must show either the supervisor

personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that there is a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the

constitutional violation.” Evett v. Deep E. Tex. Reg’l Narcotics Trafficking

Task Force, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

To show a causal connection between the wrongful conduct of a

supervisor and a constitutional violation, the plaintiff “must introduce

evidence that each Defendant had ‘actual or constructive notice’ that their

failure to adopt policies would result in constitutional violations.”

Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 447). “A pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily

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necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Connick v. Thompson, 563

U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Without notice

that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers

can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will

cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id.

As noted, Parker’s Third Amended Complaint cited three pieces of

evidence to support his allegations that LeBlanc implemented deficient

policies evinced by a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained

employees. See id. They are: (1) an October 2017 legislative audit report on

the Louisiana DPSC entitled “CFE Management of Offender Data:

Processes for Ensuring Accuracy Department of Corrections”; (2) a 2018

editorial by Senator John Kennedy and Attorney General Landry entitled,

“Criminal Justice Reform Actually Hurting Public Safety,” published in the

newspaper “The Advocate”; and (3) testimony by DPSC employees

admitting to rampant over-detention in a similar suit in Louisiana state court,

Chowns v. LeBlanc, La. 37th JDC 26-932. Parker also alleges on information

and belief that Defendant LeBlanc was aware of the three items we just

enumerated.

LeBlanc argues that this complaint did not adequately allege the

requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees

“ordinarily necessary” under Connick to establish deliberate indifference for

purposes of failure to train. See 563 U.S. at 62. He contends that Parker’s

allegations “identify issues of an entirely different kind than the one that

allegedly caused Parker to spend too much time incarcerated.” Essentially,

LeBlanc insists that there is a meaningful distinction between Parker’s over-

detention due to his alleged misclassification as a sex offender, as opposed to

over-detention due to miscalculations of his sentence or his status being

generally lost in the system.

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The district court “decline[d] to draw the line as finely as LeBlanc

advances and limit the types of problems involved solely to those instances

where individuals have been misclassified as sexual offenders.” The court

noted that the real problem alleged in the Legislative Audit report was the

Department “not knowing when [inmates’] proper release date was” and

that “inmate sentences have been ‘done wrong’” as stated in testimony from

Chowns v. LeBlanc. We agree with the district court’s assessment.

In a similar case about over-detention — against the same defendant

— the plaintiff also relied on a study to show a pattern of constitutional

violations and allege supervisory liability. See Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186–87.

We held that “a reasonable jury could find that Defendants knew of a

‘pattern of similar constitutional violations,’ such that their inaction

amounted to a disregard of an obvious risk.” Id. at 187. The court there

noted that LeBlanc was “in a position to adopt policies that would address

this delay” and that he could not “avoid the evidence that the study exposed

unlawful detentions of prisoners.” Id. Much of the same is true here, though

unlike in Crittindon, this case is merely at the 12(b)(6) stage, rather than a

motion for summary judgment. See id. at 185. What LeBlanc may have done

to comply with his supervisory obligations is not yet part of the record.

Further, Parker has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery. His

complaint alleges that

despite his release date being properly calculated on the jail forms, he

was not released for 337 days. For some unknown reason, when his

properly calculated release date arrived, he was not released despite

his numerous attempts to correct the issue. One possible reason for

the over-detention is mistakenly classifying him as a sex offender and

then failing to release him even after he provided the addresses

requested.

The allegations in the complaint are that there is a “pattern of over-

detention” that renders Parker’s own case “neither unique nor even

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unusual.” The standard for deliberate indifference requires only a “pattern

of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees,” rather than an

exact duplication. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added). Parker has

alleged that he was detained for 337 days past his release date and has cited

three pieces of evidence to support his allegations that LeBlanc was aware of

the deficiencies of implemented policies that routinely led to errors like the

one that violated his constitutional rights. See id.

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept “all well-pleaded facts as true

and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Morris,

739 F.3d at 745 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim has facial

plausibility when a plaintiff has pled “factual content” that allows us “to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with Parker

that his complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite “pattern” of

constitutional violations by untrained employees to establish deliberate

indifference for purposes of failure to train. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. We

therefore hold that his complaint should proceed to the next stage of

litigation, i.e., tailored discovery. See Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th

Cir. 2022).

II. Did LeBlanc allegedly violate a right that was “clearly established”

at the time of the alleged misconduct?

Qualified immunity involves answering two questions: (1) “whether

the officer violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the ‘right at

issue was “clearly established” at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.’” 1

_____________________

1 There is variance in this circuit’s caselaw when articulating the second part of the

analysis for qualified immunity. An objective-unreasonableness component, dating from

some of our older caselaw, is sometimes applied to require a finding that “the defendant’s

actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the

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Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (alterations in original)). To determine

whether a right is “clearly established,” we “first look[] to Supreme Court

precedent and then to our own.” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quotation marks

and citation omitted). “Ultimately, the touchstone is fair warning: The law

can be clearly established despite notable factual distinctions between the

precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior

decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated

constitutional rights.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Analyzing the first part of the test is not difficult here: the Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

“Detention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in

the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation

of due process.” Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980). Parker

was detained 337 days past his release date. His pleading also adequately

alleged supervisory liability for LeBlanc. See infra.

The second part of the test is “whether the right at issue was clearly

established at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874

_____________________

violation.” See Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. That language is a vestige of older case law that

predates the Supreme Court’s current test adopted in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001),

and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). See, e.g., Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918

F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1990). Another circuit has similar language in some of its

precedents but rejected it: “the test for qualified immunity has only two prongs — whether

the defendant violated a constitutional right and whether the right at issue was clearly

established; there is no separate ‘objective unreasonableness’ prong.” See Brown v. Lewis,

779 F.3d 401, 417 (6th Cir. 2015). We cannot precedentially resolve conflicting caselaw

today, but we mention one of our recent decisions that also opined there is no “standalone

‘objective reasonableness’ element to the Supreme Court’s two-pronged test for qualified

immunity.” See Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 251 n.10 (5th Cir. 2023).

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(quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). LeBlanc

argues that the district court committed reversible error by not delineating

between the two parts of the test for qualified immunity in its ruling or citing

a case that would have put LeBlanc on notice that his conduct violated clearly

established law. As support, he cites our decision in Joseph on behalf of Estate

of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020). In that case, on a motion

for summary judgment, the district court had denied qualified immunity to a

group of police officers in a failure to intervene claim. Id. at 328. We

reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to

demonstrate that the law was clearly established because the plaintiffs had

failed to “identify a single case to support the argument that any reasonable

officer would have known to intervene under these circumstances.” Id. at

345. We explained that “[w]ith no briefing and no district-court analysis to

review, we cannot justify a denial of qualified immunity on the grounds that

clearly established law shows that every officer acted unconstitutionally in

this case.” Id. at 346.

Parker counters that this case is distinguishable because, here, “[t]he

law is clear that a jailer like LeBlanc has a duty to ensure inmates are timely

released from prison,” citing Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We agree. Unlike the

plaintiffs in Joseph, Parker identified cases in his district court briefing, as well

as in his briefing to this court, that addressed the clearly-established-law

prong of the qualified immunity analysis. In his complaint, Parker also stated

that “[a]ccording to black-letter law, jailors may not imprison inmates longer

than their sentences,” and that “[r]ecent Fifth Circuit precedent recognized

that ‘There is a Clearly Established Right to Timely Release from Prison,’”

again citing Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We agree that there is sufficient clearly

established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from

prison and that Parker has sufficiently argued a violation of the right.

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Finally, as he does with the question of supervisory liability, LeBlanc

contends that defining the clearly established right as “timely release from

prison” is overbroad. We have already rejected that argument above in the

supervisory liability context, and we do so here as well. In Crittindon, we held

that the defendants had “‘fair warning’ that their failure to address this delay

would deny prisoners like Plaintiffs their immediate or near-immediate

release upon conviction” because the defendants knew of the delays in

prisoners’ timely releases. 37 F.4th at 188. Parker’s Third Amended

Complaint cured the deficiency of his Second Amended Complaint in that he

alleged on information and belief that LeBlanc was aware of DPSC

employees’ testimonies in Chowns v. LeBlanc regarding the regular pattern of

over-detentions, and that LeBlanc was aware of Attorney General Jeff

Landry’s op-ed and the Legislative Auditor report regarding the DPSC’s

problem in not knowing inmates’ proper release date. Parker’s complaint

sufficiently alleges that LeBlanc violated a right that was clearly established.

Construing these allegations in the light most favorable to Parker, we

agree they are sufficient to support the argument that LeBlanc had “‘fair

warning’ that [his] failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like

[Parker] their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction.” See

Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 188.

We close with a reminder. This appeal is from the denial of a motion

to dismiss solely on the pleadings. LaBlanc’s defense is yet to be stated. It

remains to be seen what an evidentiary record will show as to LeBlanc’s

efforts to deal with the widespread problems in determining and enforcing

release dates.

AFFIRMED.

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