Ruby Green v. Howard Finkelstein

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13894

____________________

RUBY GREEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HOWARD FINKELSTEIN,

individually, in his capacity as Public Defender for Broward

County,

THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR BROWARD

COUNTY,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13894

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-62160-BB

____________________

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

BRASHER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to consider whether the First

Amendment protects a public employee’s statements attacking her

supervisor during a political campaign to replace him. Ruby Green

argues that former Broward County Public Defender Howard

Finkelstein fired her from her position as a public defender in vio-

lation of her First Amendment rights. Finkelstein fired Green after

she made public comments during her campaign to replace Finkel-

stein, who was not seeking reelection. Specifically, Green claimed

on a political podcast that Finkelstein played golf rather than work,

did not hire racial minorities or support black social justice organi-

zations, and had used illegal drugs while practicing law earlier in

his career. Based on these comments, Finkelstein terminated

Green’s employment after the primary election, which Green had

lost to another employee of the office.

The district court granted summary judgment to Finkel-

stein. It concluded that many of Green’s statements about Finkel-

stein were eligible for First Amendment protection because they

were made on matters of public concern. But, balancing Green’s

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21-13894 Opinion of the Court 3

interests against her employer’s interests, the district court con-

cluded that her interest in making these statements did not out-

weigh the government’s interest in the effective management of

the public defender’s office.

We have yet to consider whether and how a public em-

ployee’s political campaign to replace her supervisor impacts her

interest in criticizing that supervisor. Although we recognize that

an employee seeking public office has a strong interest in criticizing

the elected official currently holding that position, we believe the

employer’s interest in effective management outweighs the em-

ployee’s interest when the employee’s criticisms are likely to frus-

trate the employer’s mission. Because we conclude that Green’s

criticisms of Finkelstein fit this mold, we conclude that her termi-

nation cannot support a claim for retaliation in violation of the First

Amendment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I.

During his fourth term as Broward County Public Defender,

Howard Finkelstein announced that he was retiring and would not

be running for reelection in the November 2020 primary. Ruby

Green, a Broward County Assistant Public Defender, later an-

nounced her candidacy to replace him. Before Green declared her

candidacy, Gordon Weekes, who served as one of three executive

chiefs at the office, entered the race and received Finkelstein’s en-

dorsement. Finkelstein is white; both Green and Weekes are black.

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13894

Office policy permitted Green and Weekes to run for office

while remaining employed so long as they “follow[ed] campaign

laws, submit[ted] vacation requests for any campaigning during

working hours, and refrain[ed] from using office computers or sup-

plies for any campaign purpose.” Finkelstein also emailed Green

and Weekes, reiterating this campaign policy, and explaining that

their campaigns “have the potential of pulling the office apart and

distracting our employees from our very important mission.”

Finkelstein stressed that he “worked too hard to de-politicize [the]

office to allow it to devolve into chaos before [he] retires” and that

he trusted both Green and Weekes would “conduct [themselves]

professionally” during the campaign.

As part of her campaign, Green appeared as a guest on a pub-

licly disseminated podcast that discusses political issues in South

Florida. On the podcast, she discussed her candidacy as well as

what she believed to be issues with how Finkelstein either ran the

office or conducted himself as public defender. Green’s statements

on the podcast fall broadly into three categories: (1) Finkelstein’s

present performance as a lawyer or supervisor; (2) Finkelstein’s hir-

ing of minority employees and attitudes towards social justice is-

sues; and (3) Finkelstein’s alleged drug use earlier in his career.

As for the first category, Green claimed Finkelstein told her

“not to go to the courtroom, not to train [the Office’s] attorneys.”

She claimed that Finkelstein “c[ame] to work maybe once or twice

a week for maybe an hour or two” and did not “know people’s

names.” Additionally, Green claimed that Finkelstein “hasn’t had

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21-13894 Opinion of the Court 5

any cases. Hasn’t had any . . . jail visits . . . any jail calls, [or] any-

thing like that.” Instead, she told the host, Finkelstein “just get[s]

to go home and play golf.” Finally, she stated that Finkelstein

treated his employees “like trash.”

As for the second category of statements, Green made sev-

eral comments related to race and Finkelstein’s treatment of racial

issues. Green implied that Finkelstein did “not want to hire people

who look . . . like the people that are filling the boxes.” Further, she

claimed that Finkelstein “t[old] the entire office that [the employ-

ees] can’t march in solidarity with Black Lives Matter.” Finally,

Green claimed that Finkelstein refused to “donate or come to an

event that was, you know, of blackness, . . . because . . . he was mad

that some of the people in that organization called him racist.”

Finally, as for the third category, Green implied that Finkel-

stein had used drugs earlier in his career. Comparing herself to

Finkelstein, Green said, “[i]f we were drug addicts and we used to

come to court with cocaine on their noses, you know, would we

be able to be in a position that he would be able to be in?”

When he learned about the podcast, Finkelstein determined

that Green made a series of statements that were “untruthful, per-

sonally and professionally offensive, and which had the ability to

undermine and inhibit the Office relations and ability of the Office

to accomplish its Mission.” Finkelstein told Renee Dadowski, a su-

pervisor in the office, and Weekes that Green had “attacked [him]

professionally and personally, the office and fellow pds,” and that

Green’s statements “ha[d] the ability to inhibit the ability to do [his]

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job[].” Finally, he explained that he took specific offense because

Green “lied and said [the Office] wouldn’t allow people in the office

to be involved with marching for [Black Lives Matter].”

Five days later, Finkelstein emailed Dadowski and Weekes

outlining his plan to terminate Green. In that email, he cited

Green’s “disrespect for [him] personally and for the office and its

lawyers.” He also stated that Green’s comments “[i]nhibit[] [the Of-

fice in its] ability to do [its] job,” and that the comments “bring[]

disrepute down on [the office] and [its] clients.” Finally, Finkelstein

stated that Green’s “lack of truthfulness should prevent her from

being a lawyer [a]s well but that is another issue for others[.]”

A few days later, on August 19, 2020, the morning after

Green lost the primary election, Finkelstein terminated Green.

That same day, Finkelstein told the South Florida Sun Sentinel that

Green was terminated because of her “unprofessional” and

“[un]truthful” statements on the podcast.

Green sued Finkelstein both in his personal and official ca-

pacity in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

During their respective depositions, both Finkelstein and Green

discussed Green’s statements on the podcast and her termination

at length. Regarding her comments about Finkelstein’s work

schedule, Green testified she did not actually know what Finkel-

stein did outside of work or his work hours. Regarding Finkelstein’s

rationale for terminating Green, he testified that he believed her

comments “created a split in the office” based on race that he be-

lieved could cause lawyers in the office to avoid working with and

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21-13894 Opinion of the Court 7

consulting the leadership of the office. Ultimately, he believed

keeping Green on board after her comments would be like “a dis-

ease in the office.” And as for the personal attacks, Finkelstein ex-

plained that there was “no way [he] could have [Green] be on [his]

staff working for [him] because of the contempt [and] hatred” he

believed she had for him after her statements, which included

“call[ing him] an old racist that doesn’t care.”

After discovery, the parties filed their summary judgment

motions. Finkelstein moved for summary judgment of the entire

action, and Green filed a partial motion for summary judgment

with respect to liability only. The district court concluded that

three of Green’s eight statements involved matters of public con-

cern. But it concluded that the government’s interest in the effi-

cient administration of the office outweighed Green’s interest in

making the statements. Accordingly, the court denied Green’s mo-

tion and granted Finkelstein’s.

Green timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo the resolution of cross-motions for sum-

mary judgment. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328,

1331 (11th Cir. 2005). We “apply[] the same legal standards as those

that control the district court.” Jackson v. State of Ala. State Tenure

Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). To succeed on a sum-

mary judgment motion, the movant must show he is entitled to

prevail on questions of law, and “that there are no genuine issues

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13894

of material fact pertinent to those questions of law.” Rich v. Dollar,

841 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988).

III.

A citizen does not surrender her First Amendment rights by

accepting a position as a public employee, but a public employee’s

right to speak as a private citizen is not absolute. Determining

whether the First Amendment protects the speech of a public em-

ployee requires “a careful balance ‘between the interests of the

[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public

concern and the interest of . . . an employer[] in promoting the ef-

ficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’”

Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231 (2014) (first alteration in original)

(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty.,

391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).

Applying this test, we have held that, to prevail on a First

Amendment claim of unlawful retaliation, an employee must make

three showings. See Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565–

66 (11th Cir. 1989). First, the employee must show that the speech

was made as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Id. Second, the

employee’s free speech interest must outweigh the employer’s in-

terest in effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities. Id.

And third, the speech must have played a substantial part in the

adverse employment action. Id. The first two inquiries are ques-

tions of law for the court. See Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d

613, 617-18 (11th Cir. 2015).

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Here, it is undisputed that Finkelstein fired Green because

of her speech. But the parties dispute which of Green’s statements,

if any, involved matters of public concern and whether Green’s in-

terest in making those statements outweighed Finkelstein’s inter-

est in promoting the effective fulfillment of the public defender’s

responsibilities.

A.

Turning to the first disputed issue, we must determine

which of Green’s statements, if any, are eligible for First Amend-

ment protection. An employee’s speech is protected only when

made as a citizen and “when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating

to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the commu-

nity,’ or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest.’” Snyder v.

Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (citations omitted). To determine

whether speech is made as a citizen on a matter of public concern,

we must examine “the content, form, and context of a given state-

ment.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).

As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Green was

speaking as a citizen, not an employee, when she was critical of

Finkelstein and the office. When an employee makes “statements

pursuant to [her] official duties,” the First Amendment “does not

insulate [her] communications from employer discipline.” Battle v.

Bd. of Regents for Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 760 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation

omitted) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)). But

“the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information ac-

quired by virtue of [her] public employment does not transform

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13894

that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech.” Lane,

573 U.S. at 240. Indeed, “speech by public employees on subject

matter related to their employment holds special value [to the pub-

lic] precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters

of public concern through their employment.” Id. Here, Green ap-

peared on the podcast in her personal capacity, as a candidate for

public office, and not as a representative of the public defender’s

office or a lawyer representing a client. She was, therefore, speak-

ing as a citizen, not a public employee, when she criticized Finkel-

stein.

We now turn to the content, form, and context of Green’s

statements to determine whether they can be “fairly considered as

relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the

community,” or “a subject of legitimate news interest.” Snyder, 562

U.S. at 453. Finkelstein argues that most of Green’s statements

were “personal concerns of her own employment” and not on mat-

ters of public concern. For its part, the district court held that three

statements were directed to matters of public concern: that Finkel-

stein (1) would not hire minority employees; (2) would not allow

employees of the office to march in support of the Black Lives Mat-

ter movement; and (3) did not support black organizations. But the

district court concluded that five of Green’s statements are not on

matters of public concern: (1) regarding the office not allowing her

to “go to the courtroom” and “train attorneys”; (2) that Finkelstein

treated employees like “trash”; (3) criticizing Finkelstein’s work

schedule; (4) suggesting Finkelstein’s prior drug use, and (5) imply-

ing that Finkelstein was not “in the trenches.”

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We think all of Green’s statements were sufficiently directed

to matters of public concern to warrant protection under the First

Amendment. Although the content of some of Green’s statements

may be akin to an employee grievance when read in isolation, we

cannot ignore that these statements were made in the form of a

publicly disseminated political podcast in the context of a campaign

for elected office. In light of this form and context, we ultimately

conclude that Green’s statements were made on matters of public

concern.

Starting with content, we have little trouble concluding that

the content of at least some of these statements suggests they are

on matters of public concern. Like the district court, we recognize

that Green’s allegations that Finkelstein had racially discriminatory

hiring practices and forbade employees from participating in race-

related protests raise matters of public concern. Our law recognizes

that public employers “must act in accordance with a ‘core purpose

of the Fourteenth Amendment’ which is to ‘do away with all gov-

ernmentally imposed discriminations based on race.’” Wygant v.

Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (quoting Palmore v. Si-

doti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)). See also Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (as amended); Unlawful

Employment Practices, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a) (2023). Likewise,

the Supreme Court has held that public employers cannot condi-

tion employment on an employee’s political affiliation. Elrod v.

Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); see

also Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 377 (11th Cir. 1989). Green’s allega-

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13894

tions that Finkelstein was violating these constitutional and statu-

tory commands—not only as to herself, but with respect to other

members of the office—resemble allegations “[e]xposing govern-

mental . . . misconduct,” which “is a matter of considerable signifi-

cance” under the First Amendment. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.

On the other hand, we agree with Finkelstein that the con-

tent of many of Green’s other statements is more personal in na-

ture. In particular, Finkelstein’s supposed instructions to Green not

to train junior public defenders and her allegation that he treated

office employees “like trash” are akin to private employee griev-

ances. Although these statements have some public import be-

cause Green was a government employee complaining about her

elected boss, “a public employee may not transform a personal

grievance into a matter of public concern by invoking a supposed

popular interest in the way public institutions are run.” Ferrara v.

Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir. 1986).

Nonetheless, despite the content of these statements, we be-

lieve their form and context establish that they addressed matters

of public concern and legitimate news interest. Green made these

statements on a political podcast (form) as a candidate campaigning

for public office (context). Even if the content of some of her state-

ments are not newsworthy when read in isolation, the form and

context of these statements establish that they are eligible for First

Amendment protection.

Turning to the form of these statements, we cannot over-

look that Green made these allegations during an interview on a

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news and politics podcast. Our First Amendment retaliation prece-

dents have not often delineated what differentiates the form of a

public employee’s speech from its context. See, e.g., Lane, 573 U.S. at

241 (simultaneously analyzing the form and context of the speech).

But the most heavily emphasized factor when considering the form

of a public employee’s speech has been whether, and how, the

speech was disseminated to the public. See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker,

567 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[P]ublic employees ‘retain

some possibility of” constitutional protection when they “make

public statements . . . .” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423–24)). In-

deed, publicly disseminated speech lies at the very core of the right

to openly criticize one’s employer that the Supreme Court recog-

nized in Pickering.

Although no direct analog exists in our precedents, we see

no reason why statements made during an interview on a publicly

disseminated podcast would not be afforded First Amendment pro-

tection. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (“The critical question . . . is

whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of

the employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those du-

ties”). Appearing on a podcast is the modern-day equivalent of the

letter-to-the-editor that the Supreme Court analyzed in Pickering.

Compare Audio and Podcasting Fact Sheet, Pew Research Center

(June 15, 2023) (showing the percentage of podcast listeners in-

creasing by more than 100% since 2008) 1 with Newspapers Fact

1 https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/audio-and-podcast-

ing/ [https://perma.cc/F4RG-4VU4].

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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13894

Sheet, Pew Research Center (June 29, 2021) (showing sharp de-

clines in newspaper readership). 2 Green’s speech is comparable to

cases in which a public employee “seek[s] to inform the public that

[a government] office was not discharging its governmental re-

sponsibilities,” or where the employee “seek[s] to bring to light ac-

tual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part

of [a public official].” Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. See, e.g., Watters v.

City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 892-93 (3d Cir. 1995) (statements

made to newspaper reporter, by director of police department’s

employee assistance program, about lack of formal written policies

was speech on a matter of public concern). Accordingly, the form

of Green’s speech—an interview on a publicly disseminated news

and politics podcast—supports a conclusion that her statements in-

volve matters of public concern.

Lastly and perhaps most importantly, the context of Green’s

statements—a campaign for elected office in which she was a can-

didate—underscores that her statements were of legitimate news

interest. Under the context factor, we consider the constitutional

protections afforded to the specific category of speech at issue. For

instance, in Lane, the Supreme Court emphasized that the state-

ments at issue were made in the context of a judicial proceeding,

which may form the basis for government action and “affect[] the

rights and liberties of others.” 573 U.S. at 238 (quoting United States

v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (plurality opinion)). Likewise,

2 https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/newspapers/

[https://perma.cc/7DZ6-3RKP].

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21-13894 Opinion of the Court 15

in O'Laughlin v. Palm Beach County, when examining the context of

statements made during a union election, we recognized that

“air[ing one’s] grievances in the run-up to [an] election,” “arguably

strengthens” an employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim. 30

F.4th 1045, 1052–53 (11th Cir. 2022). We reached this conclusion

because “campaign-related speech exists at the very core of the

First Amendment.” Id. at 1053 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections

Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1995)).

Our reasoning in O’Laughlin applies equally here. Whatever

their specific content, it is undisputed that Green made these state-

ments to the public in the context of a campaign for elected office

in which she was a candidate. And “the right of candidates for po-

litical office to make their case to the American people” is among

“the most fundamental First Amendment activities.” Fed. Election

Comm’n v. Cruz, 142 S.Ct. 1638, 1654 (2022). It is difficult to imagine

a context with a more direct implication for the public interest. Po-

litical speech, especially a candidate’s statements on the campaign

trail, “‘is the essence of self-government.’” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452

(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)). These

“expressive activities constituted the type of ‘classically political

speech’ lying at the ‘core of the First Amendment.’” Carter v. City of

Melbourne, 731 F.3d 1161, 1169 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Boos v.

Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988)). To deny a candidate’s campaign-

related statements any First Amendment protection would give

public employers free rein to censor an employee’s political speech.

But the Supreme Court has “never allowed the government to pro-

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16 Opinion of the Court 21-13894

hibit candidates from communicating relevant information to vot-

ers during an election.” Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536

U.S. 765, 782 (2002). We therefore decline Finkelstein’s invitation

to declare most of Green’s campaign-related interview to be un-

protected speech.

In short, we believe all of Green’s statements on the podcast

were made as a citizen on matters of public concern. The content

of several of her statements—that the office’s hiring practices were

racially discriminatory, for example—were clearly newsworthy. As

for other statements, we believe the context and form—made by a

candidate for elected office on a political podcast disseminated to

the public during a campaign—make them newsworthy and ad-

dressed to matters of public concern.

B.

Of course, our conclusion that Green’s statements are eligi-

ble for First Amendment protection says nothing about the gov-

ernment’s countervailing interest in terminating her. As both we

and the Supreme Court have recognized, governments have im-

portant interests that may justify precluding a public employee

from campaigning or electioneering. See United Pub. Workers of Am.

(C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947) (upholding the Hatch Act,

5 U.S.C. § 7323, which restricts federal employees from participat-

ing in political campaigns); see also Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 714

(11th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that running against a sitting district at-

torney would qualify as a “good legal reason to discharge” a public

employee “due to the state’s interest in office loyalty”). To that

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21-13894 Opinion of the Court 17

end, Pickering requires us to balance “the interests of the [em-

ployee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public con-

cern and the interest of . . . an employer[] in promoting the effi-

ciency of the public services it performs through its employees.”

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The key question is “whether the relevant

government entity had an adequate justification for treating the

employee differently from any other member of the general pub-

lic.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.

Finkelstein argues that Green’s termination was justified be-

cause her statements were likely to impede the functioning of the

public defender’s office. He testified that he believed keeping

Green on board after her comments would be like “a disease in the

office.” Green responds that there are genuine issues of material

fact that preclude summary judgment. But we agree with Finkel-

stein. We conclude that the government’s interests outweigh

Green’s for three reasons.

First, some of Green’s statements amount to baseless, un-

founded, or demonstrably false attacks on Finkelstein and should

be afforded little—if any—weight under Pickering. We have held

that the “First Amendment does not require a public employer to

tolerate an embarrassing, vulgar, vituperative, ad hominem attack,

simply because the employee recently has waved a political sign.”

Morris v. Crow, 117 F.3d 449, 458 (11th Cir. 1997). Likewise, the Su-

preme Court has emphasized that “proof of false statements know-

ingly or recklessly made by” a public employee can “furnish the

basis for his dismissal from public employment.” Pickering, 391 U.S.

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18 Opinion of the Court 21-13894

at 574. See also Lane, 573 U.S. at 238 (emphasizing that “[t]ruthful

testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of

his ordinary job duties is” protected by the First Amendment (em-

phasis added)).

It is undisputed that several of Green’s statements are false

or, at the very least, baseless. Green testified during her deposition

that she did not know what Finkelstein did outside of work (i.e.,

she was not aware if he was playing golf as she claimed), and her

claims about his hours were based on how often she would person-

ally see him at the office. The same can be said of Finkelstein’s sup-

posedly discriminatory hiring practices. Green has not presented

any evidence that that Finkelstein did “not want to hire people who

look . . . like the people that are filling the boxes.” In fact, the record

reflects that a portion of Finkelstein’s selected office leadership was

black and Finkelstein, as public defender since 2004, hired a num-

ber of minority attorneys—including Green herself. Although the

hiring and promotion of minority attorneys does not necessarily

establish that the office did not engage in any discriminatory hiring

practices, we see little value in making a thoughtless charge of rac-

ism against one’s supervisor.

Second, as a lawyer, Green held a position of trust in the of-

fice, and she lost that trust when she so harshly criticized the of-

fice’s management. We have recognized that a “government em-

ployer’s interest in staffing its offices with persons the employer

fully trusts is given great weight when the pertinent employee

helps make policy, handles confidential information or must speak

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21-13894 Opinion of the Court 19

or act—for others to see—on the employer’s behalf.” Shahar v. Bow-

ers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (11th Cir. 1997). Put another way, the

“First Amendment does not require that an official . . . nourish the

viper in the nest.” Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1997).

As an attorney, Green was in a unique position in that she acted as

both a representative of her client and the public defender’s office

itself. An attorney’s perceived disloyalty provides “good legal rea-

son to discharge” her “due to the [government’s] interest in office

loyalty.” Randall, 610 F.3d at 714. Because of Green’s position as an

attorney, Finkelstein’s contention that he had lost trust in Green

because of her comments is an especially substantial justification

for terminating her.

Third, there is ample evidence in the record that Finkelstein

terminated Green due to his concerns over office harmony. Finkel-

stein’s emails to his colleagues rely on this rationale. Finkelstein

also testified that Green’s statements “created a split in the office”

based on race. When an employer determines that an employee’s

speech has a “detrimental impact on close working relationships or

destroys harmony among coworkers,” we must give “‘a wide de-

gree of deference to the employer’s judgment.’” Morales v. Stier-

heim, 848 F.2d 1145, 1149 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S.

at 151–52). Affording that deference, Finkelstein’s position strikes

us as reasonable: publicly accusing a supervisor of being a lazy, rac-

ist, former drug addict is likely to affect office harmony.

For her part, Green argues that Finkelstein’s justification is

insufficient because he could not identify any specific disruption

USCA11 Case: 21-13894 Document: 34-1 Date Filed: 07/17/2023 Page: 20 of 20

20 Opinion of the Court 21-13894

that her statements caused. We disagree. Both we and the Supreme

Court “have given substantial weight to government employers’

reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved

is on a matter of public concern.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,

673 (1994) (emphasis added). It is not necessary “for an employer

to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the

office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest be-

fore taking action.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. The obvious disrup-

tive potential of Green’s statements, the fact that Finkelstein’s de-

cision to terminate Green was based on these potential disruptions,

and the deference our precedents require, all support a conclusion

that the government’s interests outweigh Green’s.

In short, we cannot say that Green’s interest in making these

statements outweighs the government’s interest “in promoting the

efficiency of the public services [the office] performs through its

employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Because the undisputed facts

warrant a conclusion that the government’s interest in terminating

Green outweighed her interest in making the statements for which

she was terminated, the district court did not err in denying

Green’s motion for summary judgment and granting Finkelstein’s.

IV.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.