The opinion
Filed 7/5/23 P. v. Doram CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D080513
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS320393)
CHARLES ANTHONY DORAM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Enrique Camarena, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Deanna L. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
After a jury trial in which Charles Anthony Doram was convicted of a
felony offense, the trial court found true an allegation that Doram was
previously convicted of first degree burglary, a violent or serious felony
offense constituting a strike prior for purposes of the Three Strikes law.
Doram claims substantial evidence did not support the court’s strike prior
finding because the finding was based exclusively on evidence from outside
the burglary case’s record of conviction. We agree. Therefore, we reverse the
judgment and remand the matter solely so that the People may retry Doram
on the strike prior allegation, if they elect to do so, and so that the trial court
may conduct resentencing proceedings.
II
BACKGROUND
Doram was charged by amended information with felony receipt of
stolen property exceeding $950 in value (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); count 1)1
and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11377, subd. (a); count 2). The amended information also alleged Doram
suffered prior felony offenses including:
1. A burglary conviction (§ 459), dated June 22, 2007, in case SCE272058;
2. Convictions for burglary (§ 459) and receipt of stolen property (§ 496,
subd. (a)), dated December 15, 2008, in case SCE283870;
3. A conviction for vandalism causing $400 or more in damage (§ 594,
subds. (a), (b)(1)), dated May 24, 2012, in case SCD240784; and
4. A conviction for reckless evasion of a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2,
subd. (a)), dated February 4, 2016, in case SCD265217.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The amended information alleged the burglary conviction in case SCE272058
was a violent or serious felony conviction, and thus constituted a strike prior,
under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 668, 1170.12).
The trial court bifurcated the determination of whether Doram
perpetrated the charged offenses and the determination of whether the prior
conviction allegations were true. After a trial, a jury found Doram guilty of
both charged offenses and Doram waived his right to a jury trial on the prior
conviction allegations.
At the ensuing bench trial on the prior conviction allegations, the
prosecution did not seek to admit a certified prior packet from case
SCE272058, the case in which Doram was alleged to have been convicted of a
strike prior. However, it sought to admit, and the court admitted, a certified
prior packet for case SCE283870, which included the information, the change
of plea form, the abstract of judgment, a fingerprint form, and criminal
minutes for case SCE283870. The information alleged Doram suffered a
strike prior for burglary (§§ 459, 460) in case SCE272058. On the change of
plea form, Doram admitted an enhancement under section 667,
subdivisions (b)–(i), and a prior conviction for burglary (“459/460”) under
section 667, subdivisions (b)–(i), in case SCE283870. He also stated his
attorney explained to him the consequences of his change of plea, including
the following consequence that was circled on the form as applicable to his
case: “Prior strike(s) (No credit to max. 20%).” The abstract of judgment
stated the court imposed a low term for Doram’s receipt of stolen property
conviction and sentenced him to 32 months—double the low term—under “PC
667(b)–(i) or PC 1170.12 (two strikes).” Finally, the criminal minutes include
the following notation: “[A]dmits 1 strike per PC 667(b)(1).”
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Additionally, the prosecution sought to admit, and the trial court
admitted, a certified prior packet for case SCD240784, which consisted of the
felony complaint, the change of plea form, the abstract of judgment, felony
minutes, and an addendum to the felony minutes from case SCD240784. The
felony complaint alleged Doram suffered a strike prior for burglary (§ 459) in
case SCE272058. On the change of plea form, Doram agreed to a sentence of
“16 months state prison (Prior ‘strike’ conviction being dismissed).”
Finally, the prosecution sought to admit, and the trial court admitted, a
certified prior packet for case SCD265217, which was comprised of the felony
complaint, the change of plea form, the abstract of judgment, and felony
minutes for case SCD265217. The felony complaint alleged Doram suffered a
strike prior for burglary (§ 459) in case SCE272058. On the change of plea
form, Doram admitted he suffered a prior conviction under “667(b)–(i),
1170.12, 668” for burglary in case SCE272058. The felony minutes indicate
Doram had a prior conviction under “PC667(b)–(i)/1170.12,” faced sentencing
under “PC667(b)–(i)/1170.12,” and admitted a prior conviction under “PC
667/1170.12/668.” The abstract of judgment states Doram was being
sentenced “per PC 667(b)–(i) or PC 1170.12 (strike prior).”
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court described the
prosecution’s evidentiary showing as “unorthodox,” but nonetheless found
true the allegation that Doram suffered a strike prior for his burglary
conviction in case SCE272058. The court sentenced Doram to 2 years 8
months in state prison, calculated as follows—the low term of 16 months for
the felony receipt of stolen property conviction, doubled due to the strike
prior. For the misdemeanor conviction of possession of a controlled
substance, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of 77 days with credit for
time served.
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III
DISCUSSION
Doram challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial
court’s finding that he suffered a strike prior in case SCE272058. He
contends the evidence was insufficient because the court relied exclusively on
evidence outside the record of conviction from case SCE272058 to prove the
substance of the previous conviction constituting the strike prior. For the
reasons set forth below, we agree with Doram.
A. Legal Principles
“The Three Strikes law was ‘[e]nacted “to ensure longer prison
sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have
been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses,” ’ ” known
colloquially as strike priors. (People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 43
(Henderson).) “Generally, the Three Strikes law ‘increases punishment for
second strike defendants by doubling any determinate terms they otherwise
would have received ....’ [Citation.] Third strike offenders were made subject
to an indeterminate life sentence for the current felony.” (Ibid.)
“The prosecution is required to prove each element of an alleged
sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt,” including an allegation
that the defendant suffered a strike prior. (People v. Learnard (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 1117, 1122.) “A common means of proving the fact and nature of
a prior conviction is to introduce certified documents from the record of the
prior court proceeding and commitment to prison, including the abstract of
judgment describing the prior offense.” (People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th
1059, 1066 (Delgado).) The trier of fact is entitled to draw “ ‘reasonable
inferences’ ” from the documents contained within the record of conviction.
(Ibid.) “ ‘[O]fficial government records clearly describing a prior conviction
5
presumptively establish that the conviction in fact occurred, assuming those
records meet the threshold requirements of admissibility.’ ” (Ibid.)
“On review, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to ascertain whether it is supported by substantial evidence. In
other words, we determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found
that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the elements of the
sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Delgado, supra, 43
Cal.4th at p. 1067.)
B. Application
The previous conviction forming the basis of the trial court’s strike
prior finding was a burglary conviction from 2007 in case SCE272058.
Section 459, the general burglary statute, provides in relevant part, “Every
person who enters any house ... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny
or any felony is guilty of burglary.” Section 460 distinguishes between first
degree burglary and second degree burglary, stating in pertinent part,
“(a) Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house ... is burglary of the first
degree. [¶] (b) All other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.”
“In order to constitute a ‘strike [prior],’ a prior conviction must qualify
under the statutory definitions of a serious or violent felony.” (Henderson,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 44.) “Serious felonies are defined in section 1192.7,
subdivision (c), while the violent felony definition appears in section 667.5,
subdivision (c).” (Ibid.) Section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), defines “violent
felony” to include “[a]ny burglary of the first degree, as defined in
subdivision (a) of Section 460, wherein it is charged and proved that another
person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the
commission of the burglary.” Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18) lists “any
burglary of the first degree” as a “serious felony.” Thus, a conviction for first
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degree burglary—that is, a conviction for burglary of an inhabited dwelling
house—is a strike prior, while a conviction for second degree burglary is not.
Relying on People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343 (Guerrero), Doram
claims the trial court erred insofar as it looked to evidence beyond the record
of conviction from case SCE272058 to support its finding that his burglary
conviction in case SCE272058 was a conviction for a violent or serious felony.
In Guerrero, the Supreme Court addressed whether a trier of fact may rely on
the entire record of conviction from a prior conviction or, instead, whether the
fact finder is restricted to the judgment of conviction from the prior
conviction, when determining the truth of a prior-conviction allegation. After
reviewing prior Supreme Court precedent, the Guerrero court concluded that,
in determining the truth of a prior-conviction allegation, a trier of fact “may
look to the entire record of the conviction.” (Id. at p. 355.) As the court
explained, this rule is “reasonable” because “it promotes the efficient
administration of justice.” (Ibid.)
At the same time, the Guerrero court placed boundaries on its rule
about the evidence a trier of fact may consider when assessing the nature or
circumstances of a prior conviction for purposes of a prior-conviction
allegation. According to the court, a trier of fact may “look to the record of
the conviction—but no further,” a limitation that “effectively bars the
prosecution from relitigating the circumstances of a crime committed years
ago and thereby threaten[s] the defendant with harm akin to double jeopardy
and denial of speedy trial.” (Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355; see People
v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 138 [“Our precedent instructs that
determinations about the nature of prior convictions are to be made ... based
on the record of conviction.”]; People v. Scott (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 905, 913
(Scott) [under Guerrero, “evidence other than the ‘record of conviction’ may
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not be utilized to prove that appellant’s [previous] conviction met the
definition of a ‘serious felony’ ”]; cf. People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106,
117–118 [noting that Guerrero governs “the permissible scope of proof to
establish the substance of a prior conviction, i.e., the nature and
circumstances of the underlying conduct,” but not the scope of “proof relating
to other aspects of a prior conviction, such as the identity of the defendant or
service of a prior prison term”].)
In the present case, the trial court looked entirely outside the record of
conviction from case SCE272058 in order to assess the nature and
circumstances of Doram’s burglary conviction in case SCE272058. Indeed,
the admitted evidence consisted solely of certified prior packets from criminal
proceedings that occurred after case SCE272058 was final—namely, Doram’s
certified prior packets in cases SCE283870, SCD240784, and SCD265217.
Clearly, this evidence was not part of the record of conviction from case
SCE272058, which culminated in a final judgment of conviction before cases
SCE283870, SCD240784, and SCD265217 were even initiated.
Further, because not all burglary convictions are violent or serious
felonies, the evidence at issue was admitted to prove the nature and
circumstances of Doram’s previous burglary conviction—i.e., to prove he
burglarized an inhabited residence, such that his conviction was a strike
prior.2 Under Guerrero, the court was prohibited from relying on evidence
2 Even the People appear to concede the evidence was admitted to prove
the nature of Doram’s burglary conviction from case SCE272058. For
instance, the People state in their appellate brief that the evidence “proved
appellant’s prior 2007 offense qualified as a strike prior,” not merely that
Doram suffered a prior burglary conviction. Further, when discussing the
change of plea forms Doram executed in cases SCE283870, SCD240784, and
SCD265217, the People contend the change of plea forms were “sworn judicial
admissions which established the nature of the crime” in case SCE272058.
8
outside the record of conviction from case SCE272058 to establish the nature
and circumstances of Doram’s conviction in that case. Because the trial court
relied exclusively on such evidence in order to establish the nature and
circumstances of Doram’s burglary conviction, we conclude the admitted
evidence was insufficient to support the strike prior finding. (See Scott,
supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 913–914 [reversing finding that defendant
suffered prior conviction for serious felony because trial court relied
exclusively on evidence outside record of conviction to support its finding].)
The People urge us to affirm the strike prior finding on grounds that
the question whether Doram’s previous burglary conviction from case
SCE272058 constituted a violent or serious felony has “already been
litigated” in cases SCE283870, SCD240784, and SCD265217. According to
the People, claim preclusion prevents Doram from relitigating this settled
issue in the current proceeding.3 We are not persuaded.
3 “As the names suggest, claim preclusion prevents relitigation of entire
claims (or ‘causes of action’) [citation], while issue preclusion prevents
relitigation of specific issues.” (Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center (2022)
13 Cal.5th 313, 323.) The People purport to invoke principles of claim
preclusion, or res judicata, but in substance they appear to invoke the
doctrine of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel. For example, in their
appellate brief, the People state that Doram’s admissions in cases
SCE283870, SCD240784, and SCD265217 resolved “the question of whether
the 2007 burglary qualified as a strike prior,” i.e., it resolved the issue of
whether the conviction was a strike prior. Similarly, the People assert that
Doram’s admissions in cases SCE283870, SCD240784, and SCD265217
resolved “an issue related to his guilt of a past crime.” (Italics added.)
Elsewhere in their appellate brief, the People claim the question of “whether
appellant’s 2007 burglary offense qualified as a strike ha[s] already been
litigated, [so] this issue [is] subject to the principles of res judicata.” (Italics
added.) As these illustrative examples demonstrate, the People are, in
practice, invoking issue preclusion—not claim preclusion.
9
As an initial matter, the evidence does not demonstrate that a trier of
fact has returned a true finding on an allegation that Doram was convicted of
first degree burglary in case SCE272058, such that he was convicted of a
prior violent or serious felony constituting a strike. Rather, the evidence
shows that Doram admitted prior burglary conviction allegations when he
entered plea agreements in cases SCE283870 and SCD265217. “[A]
judgment based on a guilty plea is not entitled to collateral estoppel effect.”
(People v. Blackburn (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1528; see also People v.
Camp (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 651, 653 [“ ‘When a plea of guilty has been
entered in the prior action, no issues have been “drawn into controversy” by a
“full presentation” of the case. It may reflect only a compromise’ ”].)
Moreover, section 667, subdivision (f)(1), requires the prosecution to
“plead and prove each prior serious or violent felony conviction” anew before
a strike prior may be sustained in a criminal proceeding. Through this
statutory pleading and proof requirement, “[t]he Legislature has ... rejected
the application of collateral estoppel by the prosecutor to prior conviction and
has, instead, required the prior to be specifically proven in the new action
regardless of whether or not a previous [trier of fact] found the prior ‘true.’ ”
(People v. Rice (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 647, 654 (Rice); see also ibid. [rejecting
defendant’s attempts to invoke collateral estoppel for a not true finding on a
prior conviction and noting that “it would seem anomalous to allow the
defendant to raise the collateral estoppel doctrine when the prosecutor
cannot, particularly when the Legislature has stated its intent to have the
issue specifically pleaded and litigated anew in the trial of the new offense”].)
Further, “when the defendant is on trial for one substantive offense and
the prosecution charges one prior conviction, the issue before the [trier of
fact] is the defendant’s current status, i.e., whether the defendant is guilty of
10
the substantive offense and whether it is then true the defendant has a prior
conviction. The [trier of fact] is not asked to determine whether the
defendant was ‘guilty’ of the prior conviction or whether the prior conviction
was validly obtained or is void.” (Rice, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 654,
emphasis altered.) Thus, the question posed here—whether, at present,
Doram has suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction—is not
identical to the question that was presented in Doram’s previous cases—
whether, when those cases were pending, Doram had suffered a prior serious
or violent felony conviction. For all these reasons, we reject the People’s
efforts to foreclose Doram’s challenge to the prior strike finding.
Because the evidence was insufficient to support the prior strike
finding, the prior strike finding cannot stand. (Scott, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 913–914.) We reverse the judgment, remand the matter, and direct the
trial court to: (1) permit the People to retry Doram on the prior strike
allegation; and (2) resentence Doram. (See People v. Barragan (2004) 32
Cal.4th 236, 239 [after an appellate court reverses a strike prior finding for
insufficient evidence, a defendant may be retried on the strike prior].)
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IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded
with instructions that the trial court: (1) permit the People to retry the strike
prior allegation, if they elect to do so; and (2) resentence Doram.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, J.
CASTILLO, J.
12