United States v. Salvador Magluta

USCA11 Case: 21-13477 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 06/29/2023 Page: 1 of 18

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13477

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SALVADOR MAGLUTA,

a.k.a. Sal,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:99-cr-00583-PAS-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13477

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant Salvador Magluta, a federal prisoner at USP Al-

lenwood, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) for compassionate release. After careful re-

view, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was indicted in 1999 on multiple counts involv-

ing obstruction of justice, witness tampering, bribery, producing

perjured testimony, and money laundering. 1 The indictment arose

from Defendant’s attempts to avoid prosecution as the head of a

drug trafficking organization that was active beginning in the 1970s

and continuing into the 1990s.

At the time of his indictment, Defendant had a long history

of drug-related arrests and convictions. He was convicted of co-

caine trafficking in Florida in 1980 and sentenced to serve 14

months in prison, but he failed to report for his sentence and re-

mained at large with an outstanding warrant for several years. De-

fendant was arrested in California on drug charges in 1985, but he

avoided rearrest for his prior Florida cocaine trafficking case by us-

ing an alias. Defendant was arrested again in 1987 when an officer

1 Multiple superseding indictments followed but the charges against Defend-

ant did not materially change.

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21-13477 Opinion of the Court 3

involved in the California case saw him being interviewed during

an ESPN boat racing broadcast using his real name, but he fled after

being bonded out of jail and never returned to California to face

the charges against him there. He was rearrested in 1988 by a Mi-

ami detective who encountered him at a local supply store and rec-

ognized him. Defendant tried to avoid the outstanding arrest war-

rants against him by using an alias, but the detective thwarted De-

fendant’s attempt. Defendant was transported to county jail, but

he was released from jail a week later due to an alleged paperwork

“error” that he later acknowledged was engineered by a jail em-

ployee who owed him a favor. Another arrest warrant was subse-

quently issued, which Defendant again defied.

By 1991, Defendant was wanted not only in the Florida and

California cases but also in federal drug trafficking and currency

structuring cases. In October 1991, federal agents captured De-

fendant at a home in Miami that he had been renting for four years

under an alias. Defendant refused to surrender to the federal mar-

shals who arrived at the home to arrest him, but he was appre-

hended after the marshals fired tear gas into the home and tracked

Defendant with the assistance of a police dog. He subsequently

was acquitted of the charges against him, but it was later deter-

mined that the juror foreperson in that case had been bribed.

Defendant was then charged in a separate case with various

false document offenses based on evidence found during the search

of his Miami home. Trial in the false documents case began in late

January 1997, but Defendant fled the courthouse on February 6,

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13477

1997, and he remained at large for several weeks. The trial contin-

ued in Defendant’s absence, and he was convicted in absentia on

all counts.

Police rearrested Defendant on April 13, 1997, in Lake

Worth, Florida. When he was arrested Defendant, who had

shaved his head and was wearing a wig, claimed to be “Juan Al-

fonso.” A search of his car yielded numerous false identification

documents, notes with instructions to associates who were helping

Defendant hide from authorities and launder drug proceeds, and

two key cards for a room at the Palm Beach Ritz Carlton that were

found to contain a small amount of cocaine. Thereafter, Defendant

was charged with and convicted of federal charges related to con-

spiring to commit fugitive harboring, making false statements, us-

ing false identification documents, and jumping bond.

While Defendant was in hiding, and after he was appre-

hended and in custody awaiting trial on the charges described

above, federal agents continued their investigation into his drug

trafficking activities. Defendant was kept apprised of the investiga-

tion by his attorney, Mark Dachs. Dachs advised Defendant on the

status of the investigation as well as who was cooperating with po-

lice and who was not. Evidence discussed in the PSR suggests that

Defendant’s associates used the information from Dachs to target

potential witnesses against him and his organization for murder.

Three potential witnesses were murdered, and attempts were

made to murder several other witnesses, during the relevant time

frame.

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Meanwhile, Defendant continued to run his criminal organ-

ization while in custody via fake legal visits with a team of associ-

ates, including local lawyers and individuals claiming to be parale-

gals and private investigators. During the visits, Defendant in-

structed his associates on payments to make for him using drug

proceeds, provided them records of criminal activities to maintain

for him, received messages from other conspirators in his organi-

zation, and smuggled prohibited items into prison, including

Xanax. In addition to substantial money laundering operations,

Defendant and his associates used the visits to arrange for bribes of

favorable jurors and witnesses and intimidation and harassment of

witnesses who were cooperating with the Government. This con-

duct ultimately resulted in the obstruction of justice, bribery, wit-

ness tampering, and money laundering charges against Defendant

in this case.

A jury acquitted Defendant of certain charges, but found

him guilty of conspiring to obstruct justice, conspiring to resist a

court order by transferring millions of dollars in drug trafficking

proceeds, obstruction of justice through witness and juror bribery,

and multiple counts of money laundering. This Court reversed

Defendant’s conviction on one count of juror bribery based on an

erroneous evidentiary ruling,2 after which the district court resen-

tenced Defendant, imposing a prison term of 195 years. This sen-

tence was affirmed on appeal, the Supreme Court denied certiorari,

2 See United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1180 (11th Cir. 2005).

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13477

and the district court denied Defendant’s motion for relief under

§ 2255.

In December 2020, Defendant filed a motion for compas-

sionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 3 As amended

by the First Step Act of 2018 (the “First Step Act”), that statute au-

thorizes a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the re-

duction is warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons”

and if it is consistent with the sentencing factors set forth in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable Guidelines policy statements.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 4 Defendant filed his § 3582(c) mo-

tion with the assistance of counsel, and he has been counseled

throughout the proceedings related to his motion below and on

appeal.

In support of his motion for compassionate release, Defend-

ant cited his age (66 at the time) and the fact that he had spent many

of the last 25 years in solitary confinement at ADX Florence, a su-

permax facility with limited access to environmental stimulation or

social interaction. Defendant was housed at another supermax fa-

cility, USP Marion, from 2003 to 2006, after which time he was

transferred to ADX Florence when USP Marion was redesignated

3 Defendant first exhausted his administrative remedies by submitting a re-

quest for compassionate release to the warden of his facility on July 1, 2020.

4 Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also authorizes a sentence reduction under certain cir-

cumstances if “the defendant is at least 70 years of age,” but it is undisputed

that Defendant does not yet qualify for compassionate release under that pro-

vision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).

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as a medium security prison. He was transferred to USP Terre

Haute in 2010 pursuant to a civil settlement with the BOP that chal-

lenged his confinement in extended isolation, but he was returned

to ADX Florence in 2013 after staff found two illegal cell phones,

one of which was linked to a relative of Defendant’s, near Defend-

ant’s bunk in a shared cell. The Government has advised the Court

in its appellate brief that Defendant recently was transferred from

ADX Florence to USP Allenwood, a high-security prison.

Defendant argued in his motion below that his conditions of

confinement at ADX Florence had caused a rapid decline in his

physical and mental health, resulting in mental illness, symptoms

of dementia, and other deleterious health outcomes. He also

claimed to suffer from medical conditions—including kidney dis-

ease, diabetes, hypertension, hypothyroidism, hyperlipidemia,

dysmetabolic syndrome, obesity, ulcerative colitis, preglaucoma,

dental and gum disease, temporomandibular joint (TMJ) disorder,

dyspepsia, and major depressive disorder—that placed him in the

highest risk category for developing serious illness or dying if he

contracted Covid-19. Citing his advanced age and his rehabilitative

efforts while incarcerated, Defendant stated that he no longer pre-

sented a threat to society and that his release at this point would be

consistent with the sentencing factors of § 3553(a).

The district court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding

that he did not establish an extraordinary or compelling reason for

his release as required to obtain relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As

an initial matter, the court rejected Defendant’s claim that his

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-13477

release was justified by the conditions of his confinement at ADX

Florence. Specifically, the court stated that it lacked authority to

consider Defendant’s “Eighth Amendment-related claims” per this

Court’s decision in United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir.

2021), in which the Court held that relief is only authorized under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) based on one of the “extraordinary and compel-

ling reasons” expressly set forth in USSG § 1B1.13—that is, a quali-

fying medical condition, certain family circumstances, or age-re-

lated physical or mental health deterioration. See Bryant, 996 F.3d

at 1248. As to his claim for release based on a qualifying medical

condition or age-related deterioration, the court determined that

the record evidence did not support such a claim. Having con-

cluded that Defendant did not establish an extraordinary and com-

pelling reason for his release, the district court did not consider

whether his release was consistent with the § 3553(a) sentencing

factors.

Defendant appeals, arguing that the district court erred and

abused its discretion when it denied his motion for compassionate

release. Specifically, Defendant claims the district court misinter-

preted the bases for his motion and misconstrued the record evi-

dence and the applicable Guidelines policy statement when it con-

cluded that his age-related deterioration did not constitute an ex-

traordinary and compelling reason for his immediate release. Al-

ternatively, Defendant argues this Court should reconsider Bryant

or disregard it in cases involving an inmate’s health decline and

premature aging related to unwarranted solitary confinement. We

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21-13477 Opinion of the Court 9

find no error in the court’s ruling denying compassionate release

and thus affirm.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for com-

passionate release under § 3582(c). United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th

1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). Once eligibility is established, we re-

view the denial of a defendant’s motion for compassionate release

pursuant to § 3582(c) motion for an abuse of discretion. See id. “A

district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal

standard, follows improper procedures in making the determina-

tion, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United

States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cordoba

v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation

marks omitted)). The abuse of discretion standard allows the dis-

trict court a “range of choice” that we will not reverse “just because

we might have come to a different conclusion had it been our call

to make.” See id. at 912 (quotation marks omitted).

As amended by the First Step Act, § 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes

the district court to grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate

release if the court finds that: (1) “extraordinary and compelling

reasons warrant” such relief and (2) the defendant’s early release is

consistent with the sentencing factors of § 3553(a) and the “appli-

cable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The relevant policy statement echoes the

statutory requirements, stating that a district court may grant a de-

fendant’s motion for compassionate release “if, after considering

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13477

the factors set forth in . . . § 3553(a),” the court determines that:

(1) “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” the defend-

ant’s release and (2) “[t]the defendant is not a danger to the safety

of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(g).” See USSG § 1B1.13. See also Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248

(holding that “1B1.13 is an applicable policy statement for all

[§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)] motions” and that district courts do not have

discretion “to develop other reasons that might justify a reduction

in a defendant’s sentence” (quotation marks omitted)).

The policy statement further identifies three extraordinary

and compelling reasons that can authorize a court to grant a mo-

tion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See USSG

§ 1B1.13 comment. n.1(A)-(C). First, a defendant’s medical condi-

tion can constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for re-

lease if the defendant can show he is suffering either from a “termi-

nal illness” or a “serious physical or medical condition, . . . a serious

functional or cognitive impairment, or . . . deteriorating physical or

mental health because of the aging process” that “substantially di-

minishes [his] ability . . . to provide self-care” in prison and “from

which he . . . is not expected to recover.” USSG § 1B1.13 comment.

n.1(A). Second, release is permitted if the defendant is at least 65

years old, has served the lesser of at least 10 years or 75 percent of

his sentence, and is experiencing a “serious deterioration in physi-

cal or mental health because of the aging process.” See USSG

§ 1B1.13 comment. n.1(B). Finally, a defendant’s family circum-

stances can create an extraordinary and compelling reason for re-

lease based on the “death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the

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defendant’s minor child” or the “incapacitation of the defendant’s

spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only

available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner.” USSG

§ 1B1.13 comment. n.1(C). The policy statement also contains a

catch-all provision that allows the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to

identify other extraordinary and compelling reasons for a particular

defendant’s release, but this Court has held that only the BOP—as

opposed to the court—has the authority to decide release is war-

ranted under that provision. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1263 (“We can-

not replace the phrase ‘[a]s determined by the Director of the

[BOP]’ with ‘as determined by a district court.’”).

As discussed, the district court concluded that Defendant

was not eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because (1) he

could not establish any of the extraordinary and compelling rea-

sons set out in USSG § 1B1.13 and (2) the statute does not authorize

compassionate release as a means for redressing Defendant’s com-

plaints about his conditions of confinement. We agree with the

district court as to the latter point. Defendant’s motion below fo-

cused on the harsh conditions of his imprisonment—specifically,

his prolonged assignment to solitary confinement at ADX Flor-

ence—as a reason for his release. In his argument on appeal, De-

fendant again focuses on his conditions of confinement at ADX

Florence, and he adds that his placement in solitary confinement is

particularly unfair given that he was convicted of “non-violent of-

fenses that resulted in no actual harm.” But as the district court

correctly held, § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) does not authorize an inmate’s re-

lease based on the conditions of his confinement or the fact that

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13477

those conditions are unfair. Rather, per Bryant, compassionate re-

lease under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is only authorized based on one of the

reasons expressly set out in USSG § 1B1.13: a qualifying medical

condition, deterioration related to the aging process, or family cir-

cumstances requiring the defendant to act as a caretaker to a minor

child, spouse, or registered partner. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1265

(“Because [the defendant’s] motion does not fall within any of the

reasons that 1B1.13 identifies as extraordinary and compelling, the

district court correctly denied his motion for a reduction of his sen-

tence.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Nor are we authorized to reconsider or limit the application

of Bryant, as Defendant urges us to do. In this circuit, a prior panel’s

holding is binding on all subsequent panels “unless and until it is

overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by . . . the Su-

preme Court” or by this Court sitting en banc. See United States v.

Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019). Because Bryant has not

been overturned by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en

banc, this Court is bound by it. Id. See also United States v. Archer,

531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Under [the prior panel prec-

edent] rule, a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent pan-

els unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of

abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en

banc.”). Defendant’s argument that we should disregard the hold-

ing of Bryant in this case is thus unavailing.

Proceeding to the three bases upon which relief under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is available per Bryant, Defendant did not allege

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family circumstances warranting his release and the district court

correctly held that he failed to establish a qualifying medical condi-

tion or aging-related deterioration. As to the medical condition

prong, Defendant cited in his motion below a laundry list of diag-

noses, including anxiety, depression, a panic disorder, and a mood

disorder. 5 But he did not claim to suffer from a “terminal illness”

nor explain how any of his documented medical conditions “sub-

stantially diminishe[ed][his] ability . . . to provide self-care” in

prison. See USSG § 1B1.13. And as the district court pointed out,

(1) Defendant’s medical records did not show that he was unable

to attend to the daily tasks of living in prison, including receiving

and taking medication for and otherwise participating in treatment

for his mental health issues and (2) while the records documented

Defendant’s mental illness, they also categorized him as having “no

medical restrictions” and as being “cleared for employment oppor-

tunities.” As such, the district court did not err when it concluded

that Defendant’s release was not warranted as a result of a qualify-

ing medical condition.

5 As noted, Defendant also argued below that he suffered from various medi-

cal conditions that put him at greater risk of severe illness related to COVID-

19, but he abandoned that argument by failing to raise it in his appellate brief.

See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004)

(“[T]he law is by now well settled in this Circuit that a legal claim or argument

that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits

will not be addressed.”). We note further that Defendant did not dispute the

Government’s data showing low infection and transmission rates among in-

mates and staff at ADX Florence, the facility that housed Defendant when he

filed his motion.

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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13477

Regarding the aging-related deterioration prong, Defendant

argued below that he was entitled to release because of his “rapidly

deteriorating” mental and physical health related to his harsh con-

ditions of confinement “exacerbated by his age.” The district court

acknowledged that Defendant met the first two requirements of

the age-related deterioration provision because he was over 65

years old and had served at least 10 years of his prison sentence

when he filed his motion. Nevertheless, the court rejected Defend-

ant’s argument that he satisfied the third requirement. Specifically,

the court found that Defendant “ha[d] not demonstrated . . . a seri-

ous deterioration in physical or mental health” that could be at-

tributed to aging.

Defendant relied primarily on his mental health issues to

support his aging-related deterioration claim. 6 The district court

noted Defendant’s documented history of recurring mental health

issues, but it found scant evidence as to the severity of any changes

in his mental health status. Relevant to this prong of the analysis,

6 Although Defendant cited in his brief below a list of diagnoses and conditions

suggesting he was in poor physical health, he did not explain or provide any

records to substantiate his claim to have experienced a “serious deterioration

in physical health. . . because of the aging process.” See USSG § 1B1.13 com-

ment. n.1(B). To the extent Defendant intended to pursue a claim based on

deteriorating physical health, we note that his medical records suggest several

of the physical conditions from which he previously suffered—including hy-

pothyroidism, type 2 diabetes, and kidney disease—were found to be resolved

or in remission by 2019. Thus, based on the records it appears that Defend-

ant’s physical health had generally improved rather than deteriorated just

prior to when he filed his motion.

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the court took note of a recent brain scan indicating “senescent

changes roughly commensurate” with Defendant’s age, but it em-

phasized that Defendant did not make any claim as to the severity

of the changes, which was not evident from the scan.

In addition, the court cited several medical records suggest-

ing that Defendant’s own choices played a greater role than did the

aging process in causing any deterioration in Defendant’s mental

health. For example, a 2013 report indicated that Defendant was

“feeling very down” but that his mood issue was related to loneli-

ness stemming from being put in isolated housing due to behav-

ioral issues. Similarly, a 2017 report noted Defendant’s “lack of

willingness to engage in treatment” or to “consider alternative ac-

tivities to improve his mood [such as] exercise [or] extra time out

of [his] cell.” The report concluded that while Defendant presented

with some depressive symptoms, “his presentation suggest[ed] [an]

exaggeration of symptoms, likely as a means to assist with facilitat-

ing [his] transfer” from ADX Florence. Along those same lines, the

court cited evidence that a March 2019 incident—during which De-

fendant had put bags of medication in his mouth and had to be re-

strained to remove them—appeared to be strategic as the medical

note regarding the incident related Defendant’s statement that this

“was the only way he could get anyone to listen to him.”

Reviewing the district court’s conclusions on appeal, we em-

phasize that Defendant, as the movant, had the burden of showing

a serious, aging-related deterioration in his mental or physical

health to obtain relief under this prong of the compassionate

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16 Opinion of the Court 21-13477

release statute and policy statement. See United States v. Hamilton,

715 F.3d 328, 337 (11th Cir. 2013). Based on the available medical

records, the district court did not err by concluding Defendant

failed to meet that burden here. The record evidence as to Defend-

ant’s mental health—and particularly the alleged deterioration in

his mental health that might be related to the “aging process”—is

mixed. Defendant’s chronic mental health issues are well-docu-

mented in the record, but the issues appear to have been present

for most if not all of Defendant’s period of incarceration, with fluc-

tuating and episodic symptoms. And as the district court pointed

out, several records suggest that Defendant’s documented flare-ups

or worsening of symptoms were exaggerated by Defendant to fur-

ther strategic goals or could be attributed to Defendant’s own

choices rather than to age-related deterioration.

Indeed, only one report from July 2019 suggests that De-

fendant’s mental state was “worsening” or had “deteriorated.” The

doctor who drafted the report ordered a brain MRI to look for “pos-

sible cerebral vascular disease or any other signs that could help

explain dementia like symptoms.” But neither the July 2019 report

nor any other record describes the severity of the deterioration or

symptoms. Presumably the March 2019 medication bag incident

informed the July 2019 report. But as the district court noted, rec-

ords concerning that incident suggest it was a strategic effort by

Defendant to get someone “to listen to him.” Further, the ensuing

MRI merely indicated “[s]enescent changes roughly commensu-

rate with [Defendant’s] age” and “[t]race chronic small vessel is-

chemic changes.” No serious cerebral vascular disease was noted

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21-13477 Opinion of the Court 17

in the MRI and Defendant’s subsequent medical records do not

contain any indication of such disease, or of dementia. Thus, the

district court did not err when it determined that on balance De-

fendant did not meet his burden of showing a serious, age-related

deterioration in his mental health.

Nor did the district court erroneously eliminate deteriora-

tion related to “rapid aging associated with solitary confinement”

as a possible basis for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as Defendant

argues on appeal. Again, the applicable policy statement author-

izes relief only when an inmate can show that, in addition to meet-

ing the age and time-served requirements, he has suffered deterio-

ration that is both “serious” and related to “the aging process.” See

USSG § 1B1.13 comment. n.1(B). Based on the records described

above—in particular, records showing that Defendant’s physical

health was stable and that his mental health issues were chronic,

episodic but not necessarily worsening, and related to factors other

than aging—the court simply concluded that Defendant failed to

substantiate his claim to be suffering from serious, aging-related

deterioration.

Finally, Defendant suggests in his appellate brief that the dis-

trict court erred by failing to consider whether the § 3553(a) sen-

tencing factors supported his early release. Contrary to Defend-

ant’s argument, this Court has held that “a district court need not

analyze the § 3553(a) factors if it finds . . . that no extraordinary and

compelling reason exists” for granting a motion for compassionate

release under § 3582(c). See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1347. Here, like in

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18 Opinion of the Court 21-13477

Giron, the district court found that no extraordinary and compel-

ling reason exists to grant Defendant’s motion. Thus, it was not

necessary for the court to consider the § 3553(a) factors because the

lack of an extraordinary and compelling reason foreclosed a sen-

tence reduction in any event. Id. See also United States v. Tinker, 14

F.4th 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021) (emphasizing that all three re-

quirements must be met to grant relief under § 3582(c)).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order denying

Defendant’s motion for compassionate release under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is AFFIRMED.