Opinion

Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, D/B/A Panda Power Funds Panda Sherman Power Holdings, LLC Panda Sherman Power Intermediate Holdings I, LLC Panda Sherman Power Intermediate Holdings II, LLC Panda Sherman Power, LLC Panda Temple Power Holdings, LLC Panda Temple Power Intermediate Holdings I, LLC Panda Temple Power Intermediate Holdings II, LLC Panda Temple Power, LLC Panda Temple Power II Holdings, LLC Panda Temple Power II Intermediate Holdings I, LLC

Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Jun 23, 2023
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 23.5%

reviewing English common-law tradition, debates 100 between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and early American court cases

How later courts described this case

  • reviewing English common-law tradition, debates 100 between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and early American court cases
  • addressing regulatory fees, which “support a regulatory regime governing those who pay the fee”
  • “If immunity is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such immunity.”
  • discussing the historical anomaly of relying on the legal fiction that the king could do no wrong

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 22-0056

══════════

CPS Energy,

Petitioner,

v.

Electric Reliability Council of Texas,

Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

~and~

══════════

No. 22-0196

══════════

Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc.,

Petitioner,

v.

Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC d/b/a Panda

Power Funds; Panda Sherman Power Holdings, LLC; Panda

Sherman Power Intermediate Holdings I, LLC; Panda Sherman

Power Intermediate Holdings II, LLC; Panda Sherman Power,

LLC; Panda Temple Power Holdings, LLC; Panda Temple Power

Intermediate Holdings I, LLC; Panda Temple Power

Intermediate Holdings II, LLC; Panda Temple Power, LLC;

Panda Temple Power II Holdings, LLC; Panda Temple Power II

Intermediate Holdings I, LLC; Panda Temple Power II

Intermediate Holdings II, LLC; and Panda Temple Power II,

LLC,

Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE BOYD and JUSTICE DEVINE, joined by Justice Lehrmann

and Justice Busby, dissenting.

At the heart of sovereign immunity—the doctrine that the

Sovereign cannot be sued without its consent—lies a contest between

2

core values of constitutionalism.1 On the one hand, constitutionalism

entails a commitment to the rule of law: “the fundamental principle that

government is subordinate to the law”2 and the “very essence of civil

liberty” that every individual has the right “to claim the protection of

the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”3 “[I]f the laws furnish no

remedy for the violation of a vested legal right,” our government will

“cease to deserve this high appellation” of “a government of laws, and

not of men.”4

On the other hand, sovereign immunity is essential as “a

structural protection for democratic rule,” preserving the separation of

governmental powers and protecting legislative and executive

policy-making—for example, the allocation of the public coffers—from

judicial interference and control.5 Although “protecting the purse comes

1See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,

Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 521

(2003).

2Phillips v. McNeill, 635 S.W.3d 620, 627 (Tex. 2021) (citing TEX.

CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 19).

3 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803); see also TEX. CONST.

art. I, §§ 13 (“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him,

in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of

law.”), 19 (“No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property,

privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by due course

of the law of the land.”).

4 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163 (“In Great Britain the king himself is sued in

the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment

of his court.”).

5See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND.

L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1992); see also TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The powers of the

Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct

departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of

3

at the expense of ensuring accountability under the law for the

government’s breaches,”6 the political process often serves as a

substitute for private lawsuits to deter arbitrary and imprudent

governmental action. But immunizing the Sovereign creates

considerable tension with the “very essence of civil liberty”: it burdens

injured individuals with the costs and consequences of the government’s

improvident actions and “foreclose[s]—absent a legislative waiver—the

litigation and judicial remedies that would be available to the injured

person had the complained-of acts been committed by private persons.”7

In the face of this conflict of values, the touchstone for applying

sovereign immunity must be the public’s trust that the rules of the game

are established for their benefit and by the proper institutions.8 While

sovereign immunity was once theoretically justified by the feudal fiction

that the “king can do no wrong,”9 “in our system of government, the

magistracy[.]”); Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 409

(Tex. 2020) (“Sovereign immunity restrains judicial interference in the

executive and legislative branches so that ultimately the people, not the courts,

strike the policy balance between immunizing the government’s actions and

providing a judicial remedy.”). Bolstering the doctrine are also modern

political, pragmatic, and pecuniary justifications. Rosenberg Dev. Corp. v.

Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex. 2019).

6 Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 741.

7 Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. 2015).

8 See, e.g., Krent, supra note 5, at 1530 (“The dominant justification for

sovereign immunity must be that we trust Congress, unlike any other entity,

to set the rules of the game.”).

9Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 740; see also Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of

Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 431 n.5 (Tex. 2016) (discussing the historical

anomaly of relying on the legal fiction that the king could do no wrong).

4

people”—not a king—“are the sovereign,”10 and immunity must be for

the benefit of that sovereign.11 In applying the doctrine for the people’s

benefit, history and tradition serve as lodestars for ensuring trust.12

Although public trust may be challenging to earn, and even

harder to sustain, the judiciary and the Legislature both play a vital

role. “To facilitate equipoise in the doctrine’s operation,” the judiciary

first determines its applicability, pruning and shaping its boundaries

and contours.13 And the Legislature, composed of the people’s duly

elected representatives, maintains the prerogative to waive any existing

immunity.14

10Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 253 (Tex. 2017) (Brown, J.,

concurring).

11 See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the

people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted

for their benefit.”).

12 The application of immunity to the Sovereign rests on a common-law

tradition long predating this State’s constitutional founding. See Hosner v.

DeYoung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847) (“[N]o state can be sued in her own courts

without her consent[.]”); see also Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 331

(Tex. 2006) (noting that at the time of Hosner, the common-law doctrine was

“then more than six centuries old”). And “[l]ike sovereign immunity itself, its

common-law limitations and exceptions have deep historical roots” and are

“designed to ensure the rule of law.” Phillips v. McNeill, 635 S.W.3d 620,

627-28 (Tex. 2021) (discussing the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity

and noting that the sovereign-immunity doctrine’s limitations and exceptions

“trac[e] their lineage to courts’ issuance of writs of habeas corpus, mandamus,

and injunction against government officials to check acts in excess of lawful

authority or compel the performance of a clear legal duty”).

13 Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 741; see also Wasson Ints., 489 S.W.3d at

432.

14 Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 741.

5

But the public’s trust is undermined when the judiciary extends

sovereign immunity, contrary to history and tradition, to what is

undeniably not sovereign: purely private entities. Recently, the battle

over the doctrine’s conflicting values has protruded into a debate on

whether private entities should be garbed with the Sovereign’s

immunity when they act as government contractors or legislatively

authorized entities. For private entities acting as government

contractors, this Court has contemplated but declined to apply

derivative sovereign immunity in a conduct-specific inquiry based on the

government’s degree of control and the contractor’s lack of discretion.15

For entities the Legislature has specifically authorized to exist or act by

statute, the Court has extended sovereign immunity if (1) the

authorizing statute “evinces ‘clear legislative intent’ to vest the entity

with the ‘nature, purposes, and powers’ of an ‘arm of the State

government’”16 and (2) extending immunity “fits within the doctrine’s

underlying nature and purposes.”17 In both cases, the root justification

for possibly protecting private entities with the Sovereign’s immunity is

that, by statute or contract, they act as arms of the state: the

See Nettles v. GTECH Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Tex. 2020); Brown

15

& Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. 2015).

16Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 405 (Tex. 2020)

(quoting Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 750, and Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol.

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol. Subdivs. Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212

S.W.3d 320, 325 (Tex. 2006)).

17 Id. at 401 (quoting Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 750).

6

government acted through the entity and the actions are effectively

attributed to the government as “action taken by the government.”18

Until today, however, this Court had never “extend[ed] sovereign

immunity to a purely private entity—one neither created nor chartered

by the government—even when that entity performs some

governmental functions.”19 Broadly expanding the doctrine and

primarily relying on the statutory oversight authority of the Public

Utility Commission of Texas (the PUC), the Court declares that a purely

private corporation, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT),

may shield itself under the Sovereign’s cloak of immunity as a

legislatively authorized entity.20 Yet unlike any other entity previously

granted immunity by this Court, no statute designates ERCOT as a part

of the government.21

18 Id. at 407 (quoting Brown & Gay, 461 S.W.3d at 125).

19 Id. at 401.

20 Ante at 29-31, 34-35, 39-40.

21 This Court has considered extending immunity to legislatively

authorized entities four times and granted immunity twice. See El Paso Educ.

Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Props., LLC, 602 S.W.3d 521, 527, 530 (Tex. 2020)

(extending immunity to open-enrollment charter schools); Redus, 602 S.W.3d

at 405, 413 (denying immunity to a private university for law-enforcement

activities); Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 750, 752 (denying immunity to an

economic-development corporation created and operated by a municipality);

Ben Bolt, 212 S.W.3d at 325-26 (extending immunity to a self-insurance fund

composed of local political subdivisions). In Amex Properties, the Legislature

expressly designated open-enrollment charter schools as part of the public

school system and immune from suit and liability, 602 S.W.3d at 528-29

(quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 12.105, .1056(a)), and in Ben Bolt, “[b]ecause the

term ‘local government’ includes a combination of political subdivisions,” the

self-insurance fund composed of local political subdivisions was itself a local

governmental body, 212 S.W.3d at 324-25 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 791.003(4)(A), (E)). Ben Bolt derived the test for legislatively authorized

7

For the reasons the Court explains, we join Parts I, II, and III of

the Court’s opinion and agree that ERCOT qualifies as a “governmental

unit” under the Tort Claims Act (and thus can pursue an interlocutory

appeal) and that the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction over the issues

underlying the parties’ claims against ERCOT. But because Texas law

has not vested the private corporation ERCOT with the nature of an arm

of the state, we respectfully disagree that sovereign immunity should

broadly prohibit courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims against

it. Specifically, we first address ERCOT’s “nature” as an entity, then

consider the “control” the State exerts over ERCOT, and finally evaluate

whether extending sovereign immunity to ERCOT would promote the

doctrine’s nature and purposes. We conclude that none of these factors

supports the monumental alteration of the crucial concept of sovereign

immunity the Court announces today.

Because the Court holds otherwise, the Legislature could, and in

our opinion should, correct the Court’s error. To circumscribe the

Court’s broad expansion of the doctrine, the Legislature could enact a

entities from a 1940 decision that did not involve sovereign immunity and

instead concerned whether a statutorily created flood-control district

constituted a separate and distinct governmental entity from the county. See

Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Mann, 140 S.W.2d 1098, 1101 (Tex. 1940).

As noted in later decisions, these flood-control districts are entitled to

governmental immunity as constitutionally recognized “governmental

agencies.” See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(b) (Flood-control “districts shall be

governmental agencies and bodies politic and corporate with such powers of

government[.]”); Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Mihelich, 525 S.W.2d 506,

508 (Tex. 1975) (“Districts formed in accordance with Section 59 of Article XVI

have been recognized to be governmental agencies and bodies politic and

corporate, ‘governed by the law applicable to counties,’ with the same

immunities from tort actions as were enjoyed by the State and its counties[.]”).

8

rule of construction that it does not intend to grant private entities the

“nature, purposes, and powers” of an arm of the state for the purposes

of sovereign immunity unless it explicitly designates the entity as part

of the government. The Legislature could also waive some or all of

ERCOT’s newfound immunity. In this way, the Legislature could begin

restoring the public’s trust following this Court’s erroneous extension of

sovereign immunity to a purely private corporation.

I. ERCOT, Inc.

As mentioned, we have recognized that sovereign immunity may

apply to an entity when a Texas statute “evinces ‘clear legislative intent’

to vest the entity with the ‘nature, purposes, and powers’ of an ‘arm of

the State government.’”22 This standard requires us to begin by

considering ERCOT’s nature as an entity, not just the nature of its

functions. That ERCOT performs governmental functions and serves a

public purpose “says nothing about the nature of the entity itself.”23 We

thus begin by considering ERCOT’s history leading up to its current

status as an entity, which indisputably establishes that ERCOT exists

as a purely private entity created and operated by purely private

industry participants and, although selected to perform important

governmental functions, has never been designated, considered, or

characterized as an arm of the state.

22Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 401, 405 (quoting Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 750,

and Ben Bolt, 212 S.W.3d at 325).

23 Id. at 407 (quoting Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 750).

9

A. ERCOT’s History

The “electrification of America” occurred rapidly.24 Within a year

after Thomas Edison invented the incandescent electric light bulb in

1878, major cities were using electricity to light streets and selected

buildings.25 Pouncing on the obvious economic opportunities, private

firms scrambled to construct generators to serve individual buildings

and properties. Seeing the bigger picture, Edison and his General

Electric Company opened the first central power plant in 1882.26 Within

two months, the Pearl Street station in New York City boasted 203

customers, and then 513 the following year.27 By 1889, Edison had built

500 small power plants to serve individual buildings and fifty-eight

larger plants to serve several of America’s larger cities.28

Initially, the scattered power plants and their

electricity-distribution systems were “isolated, competitive, and

unregulated.”29 The private firms (along with a few cities and rural

24 Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins of Political Electricity: Market

Failure or Political Opportunism?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 59, 61 (1996).

25 Id. at 59-60.

26Gina S. Warren, Vanishing Power Lines and Emerging Distributed

Generation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 347, 351 (2014); Hon. Richard D.

Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate

(Re)regulation After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35,

39 (2005).

27 Warren, supra note 26, at 350.

28 Id. at 350-51.

29 Mary Katherine Strahan, Connecting Currents: Toward the

Integration of North American Electricity Markets, 21 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 291,

292 n.8 (1999).

10

cooperatives) that constructed and operated the facilities enjoyed

“vertically integrated monopolies,” each generating, transmitting, and

distributing electricity to its own eager consumers.30 With very few

interconnections between their grids, they each served (and charged)

their own local customers and, in reality, rarely competed against one

another.31

That situation began to change in 1892, when Edison’s long-time

personal assistant, Samuel Insull, left General Electric for the Chicago

Edison Company and embarked on a storied career producing huge

electric monopolies and, ultimately, the nation’s electric grid.32 By the

early 1930s, eight companies controlled two-thirds of the nation’s

private power producers, and three of them controlled half.33 Not

surprisingly, complaints quickly arose that the nation’s electricity

system gave “tyrannical power and exclusive opportunity to a favored

few.”34

To promote the on-demand availability of electricity and the

reliability of its delivery system at the lowest possible cost, the private,

30Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260,

267 (2016); see also Emily Hammonde & David B. Spence, The Regulatory

Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 149-50 (2016).

31 New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002).

See Stephanie Phillips, Federal Regulation for A “Resilient” Electricity

32

Grid, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 415, 418 (2019); Warren, supra note 26, at 353-54;

Cudahy & Henderson, supra note 26, at 41; Strahan, supra note 29, at 292 n.8.

33Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of

1992—A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE

J. ON REG. 447, 450 (1993).

34 Id. at 451.

11

investor-owned utilities began interconnecting their individual grids

and exchanging power between themselves.35 Instead of constructing

multiple expensive transmission lines to cover the same areas, they

began sharing their lines and charging each other for the transmission

service.36 As the electricity they each produced separately combined in

the transmission grids, areas suffering shortages could purchase extra

amounts and pass the costs along to their customers.37 Eventually,

three main electricity grids developed within the U.S. mainland: “the

Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Texas

Interconnection.”38

The federal government and most states bought in to Insull’s idea

that the privately owned electric utilities were “natural monopolies.”39

Instead of fighting against the monopolies, the governments legitimized

them in exchange for the right to heavily regulate their rates and

services.40 After the United States Supreme Court held in 1927 that the

Constitution’s commerce clause prohibits the states from regulating

35W. Tex. Utils. Co. v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 470 F. Supp. 798, 807 (N.D.

Tex. 1979).

36 New York, 535 U.S. at 8-9; see also Phillips, supra note 32, at 422.

37 See Hammonde & Spence, supra note 30, at 150-51.

38 Id. at 149-50.

39 Warren, supra note 26, at 353-54.

40See Phillips, supra note 32, at 422; Hammonde & Spence, supra note

30, at 150-51.

12

most interstate electricity transactions,41 Congress passed the Federal

Power Act of 1935, authorizing the Federal Power Commission to

regulate interstate electricity transmissions and wholesale sales and

prohibiting unreasonable rates and undue discrimination.42 Congress

left it to the states, however, to regulate intrastate transactions and

retail sales made directly to consumers.43

The uniquely intrastate Texas power grid began its development

in 1924 when two privately owned Texas utilities interconnected and

later joined with others to create the North Texas Interconnected

System.44 In the 1940s, other Texas utilities joined to create the South

Texas Interconnected System to support the nation’s World War II

efforts.45 In the 1960s, the North Texas System and the South Texas

System joined with other Texas utilities to create the Texas

Interconnected System (TIS).46 The members of TIS adopted their own

41See Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S.

83, 89-90 (1927); see also Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n,

577 U.S. 260, 266 (2016); New York, 535 U.S. at 5-6.

New York, 535 U.S. at 6-7; see also Gulf States Util. Co. v. Fed. Power

42

Comm’n, 411 U.S. 747, 758 (1973); Strahan, supra note 29, at 292 n.8.

43 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. at 266-67; see also Phillips, supra

note 32, at 423-24.

44W. Tex. Utils. Co. v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 470 F. Supp. 798, 808 (N.D.

Tex. 1979).

45Id.; see also Daniel M. Gonzales, Shockingly Certain: Why Is the

Public Utility Commission of Texas Steadfast in Its Resolve to Keep Texas’s

Energy Market Deregulated Amidst Turmoil?, 10 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 497,

500 (2009); Jared M. Fleisher, ERCOT’s Jurisdictional Status: A Legal History

and Contemporary Appraisal, 3 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 4, 10 (2008).

46 W. Tex. Utils., 470 F. Supp. at 808.

13

rules and guidelines to govern their interconnected system and their

purchases of power from one another.47

Seeking to increase the national grid’s reliability, hundreds of the

industry’s participants joined together in 1968 to create the North

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)—a “not-for-profit

international regulatory authority”—to operate as the national grid’s

“electric reliability organization.”48 Operating as a private,

independent, membership-based association, NERC adopted voluntary

rules and reliability standards to govern the “bulk power system”—the

“entire connection of power plants and transmission lines for the United

States, Canada, and Baja California in Mexico that make up the

continental system of electricity generation and transmission.”49

NERC’s primary purpose was to ensure “that the bulk power system has

enough resources to provide electricity to customers at all times, and

that electricity will be continuously delivered despite sudden or

unexpected shocks to the system.”50

Pub. Util. Comm. of Tex. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 53

47

S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex. 2001); see also Gonzales, supra note 45, at 500.

48Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Env’t Control v. E.P.A., 785 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.

Cir. 2015); see also About NERC, NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY

CORPORATION (2023), https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx;

Ryan Suit, Charging Forward with NERC: An International Approach to

Solving North America’s Grid Problem, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 15-16 (2018).

49Suit, supra note 48, at 15. In 2007, NERC’s reliability standards

became legal mandates governing participants in the bulk power system. Id.

at 16.

50 Id. at 15-16.

14

Two years later, in 1970, TIS—joined by municipal utilities and

rural electric cooperatives operating only within Texas—formed ERCOT

to comply with NERC’s new voluntary reliability requirements.51

Established as a “voluntary membership organization” serving as a

“regional electric reliability council” under NERC’s oversight, ERCOT’s

primary role was to coordinate electricity transfers among its members

and to ensure reliability by maintaining the best possible balance

between supply and demand on the Texas grid.52

In 1975, the Texas Legislature made its first major effort to

regulate the intrastate and retail electric industry by enacting the first

version of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA75).53 Like the 1935

Federal Power Act, PURA75 adopted the regulated-monopoly approach,

declaring that electric utilities are “by definition monopolies in the areas

they serve” and establishing a “comprehensive and adequate regulatory

system” to ensure “just and reasonable” rates, operations, and services

as a substitute for “the normal forces of competition.”54 It also created

the PUC and empowered it to regulate and supervise the intrastate

51 See Fleisher, supra note 45, at 10-11.

52 Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184,

186 (Tex. 2007); see also W. Tex. Utils. Co. v. Tex. Elec. Serv. Co., 470 F. Supp.

798, 808 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Gonzales, supra note 45, at 500; Fleisher, supra note

45, at 10-11.

53 Gonzales, supra note 45, at 501-02. Before 1975, some municipalities

regulated rates through franchise agreements allowing electric utilities to run

distribution lines along city streets. Id. at 501.

54 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 11.002.

15

electricity industry.55 PURA75 did not alter the nature or functions of

ERCOT, however, which continued serving as its members’ private

coordinating organization for their Texas power grid.56

In the late 1970s, an international energy crisis, fears about

nuclear power, and environmental concerns led Congress to pass the

Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act.57 This Act sought to promote

increased electricity generation by directing the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (FERC)—a federal agency created to replace

the Federal Power Commission—to pass rules requiring private electric

utilities to purchase power at a fair price from “qualifying facilities” that

generated electricity using renewable, efficient sources.58 The addition

of these nonutility generators increased both competition in electricity

generation and the demand for affordable access to the grids’

transmission lines.59

By the late 1980s, however, policy views had shifted away from

the regulated-monopolies approach in favor of electricity competition.60

In 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act, which amended the

1935 Federal Power Act to authorize FERC to combat “undue” rate

55 See Gonzales, supra note 45, at 501-02; Fleisher, supra note 45, at 11.

56 See Fleisher, supra note 45, at 11.

57 Watkiss & Smith, supra note 33, at 452-54.

New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2002); see also

58

Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 751 (1982); Phillips,

supra note 32, at 424; Watkiss & Smith, supra note 33, at 452-54.

59 Hammonde & Spence, supra note 30, at 151.

60 See Phillips, supra note 32, at 424.

16

discrimination by ordering utilities that owned transmission lines to

make their lines available to their competitors.61 In 1996, FERC

exercised that authority by ordering all utilities that owned interstate

transmission lines to “functional[ly] unbundl[e]” their operations by

separating their electricity-sales business from their transmission

services and grant all wholesale buyers and sellers equal access to the

transmission lines.62 FERC’s orders also encouraged the industry to

establish “independent systems operators” (ISOs) to coordinate the

companies’ shared use of the transmission lines and the sale of power

using those systems.63 These orders “laid the groundwork for

competition in wholesale electricity sales.”64

Texas soon joined these national deregulation efforts. In 1995,

the Legislature amended PURA to deregulate the wholesale electricity

market.65 These amendments required utilities that owned

transmission lines to make their lines available to wholesale

transmission customers.66 ERCOT, as the industry-created, private,

61New York, 535 U.S. at 9; see also Phillips, supra note 32, at 424;

Watkiss & Smith, supra note 33, at 455-56, 487.

62 New York, 535 U.S. at 10-12; see also Phillips, supra note 32, at

424-25.

63 See Phillips, supra note 32, at 424-25; Hammonde & Spence, supra

note 30, at 152-53.

64 Hammonde & Spence, supra note 30, at 152.

65Pub. Util. Comm. of Tex. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 53

S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex. 2001).

66 Id.

17

nonprofit corporation, continued to serve as the industry’s coordinator

of its privately owned transmission grid.

In 1999, the Legislature “overhauled” PURA “to create a ‘fully

competitive electric power industry’ in Texas.”67 The thoroughly

amended PURA now required all Texas electric utilities operating

within the Texas power region to unbundle their services “into three

distinct units: (1) a power-generation company; (2) a retail electric

provider; and (3) a transmission and distribution utility,” no later than

January 1, 2002.68 Under this new structure, the PUC continues to

regulate rates charged by transmission and distribution utilities, but

instead of regulating retail electricity rates, PURA created “a

competitive retail electric market that allows each retail consumer to

choose the customer’s provider of electricity.”69

To encourage the creation of generation and retail companies and

vigorous competition between them, PURA now also required the PUC

to ensure that all participants in the retail market would have equal

access to the Texas power region’s grid. The retail providers pay the

transmission companies for the right to use the grid and then pass those

67 State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 344 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Tex. 2011).

68Id. PURA allowed the utilities to unbundle “through the creation of

separate nonaffiliated companies, the creation of separate affiliated companies

owned by a common holding company, or the sale of assets to a third party.”

City of Corpus Christi v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 51 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex.

2001).

69Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 507 S.W.3d 706,

711-12 (Tex. 2017); see also Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 344 S.W.3d at 352; Tex.

Indus. Energy Consumers v. CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 324 S.W.3d

95, 97-98 (Tex. 2010); Gonzales, supra note 45, at 502-03.

18

costs along to their customers by incorporating them into their retail

rates.70

The 1999 statutory amendments did not, however, create

ERCOT, which had already existed as the industry-created, privately

owned coordinating organization since 1970. Nor did the statute

designate ERCOT as the ISO or give ERCOT any particular functions,

duties, or powers. Instead, PURA requires industry participants in each

“power region” to “establish one or more independent organizations” to

serve as the region’s coordinating organization and empowers the PUC

to “certify” the selected organizations to perform that function.71 In

2001, the PUC certified ERCOT—which the industry had created in

1970 and formally established as a Texas nonprofit corporation in

1990—as the Texas power grid’s ISO.72 As a certified ISO, ERCOT’s

duties include managing the wholesale power market and ensuring the

industry maintains generation capacity to meet projected demands.73

70 Oncor Elec. Delivery, 507 S.W.3d at 712.

71 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(a), (c). An “independent organization” is an

ISO “or other person that is sufficiently independent of any producer or seller

of electricity that its decisions will not be unduly influenced by any producer

or seller.” Id. § 39.151(b).

See Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, In re ERCOT, Docket No. 22061, 2000

72

WL 33959260, at *4 (Apr. 4, 2000) (order); Fleisher, supra note 45, at 11; About

ERCOT, ERCOT (2023), http://www.ercot.com/about/profile.

73 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(a); see also Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n. v.

Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 268 (2016) (explaining that ISOs

“administer[] a portion of the grid, providing generators with access to

transmission lines and ensuring that the network conducts electricity

reliably”); Hammonde & Spence, supra note 30, at 152-53.

19

B. ERCOT’s Nature, Purposes, and Powers

With ERCOT’s history and current status in mind, we now turn

to whether PURA evinces clear legislative intent to vest ERCOT with

the nature, purposes, and powers of an arm of the state government.

ERCOT essentially concedes that the legislative scheme did not vest it

with the nature of an arm of the state before the 1999 PURA

amendments, but it insists that ERCOT’s subsequent certification as the

Texas power region’s ISO fundamentally altered ERCOT’s nature,

purposes, and powers and transformed it into an arm of the state. We

disagree.

As we have explained, ERCOT, an industry-created, private

entity acting as the industry-designated, PUC-certified ISO for the

Texas power region, is statutorily empowered to perform uniquely

governmental functions as part of the state’s electricity-regulation

system: overseeing the region’s transmission facilities, coordinating its

participants’ market transactions, transmissions planning, and network

reliability, and—most significantly—exercising rule-making authority

to govern the participants’ operations.74 Although ERCOT enjoyed

many of these powers and performed many of these functions before

1999, its functions took on a different—and necessarily governmental—

character when it began taking these actions as the certified ISO as part

of the state’s management of the competitive electricity market. Its

nature as an entity, however, did not change.

74 TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 31.002(9), 39.151.

20

Because ERCOT exercises statutorily authorized powers to

perform governmental functions as part of the state’s larger

electricity-regulation program, we agree with the Court that it qualifies

as a “governmental unit” under the Texas Tort Claims Act.75 But

whether it also qualifies as an “arm of the state” that sovereign

immunity protects presents a “separate question[]” and a “separate

analytical framework[].”76 To answer the sovereign-immunity question,

we must focus on ERCOT’s nature as an entity and not just the nature

of its functions. That it performs governmental functions and serves a

public purpose “says nothing about the nature of the entity itself.”77

As an entity, ERCOT began as a membership-based association

of electric-industry participants, which later incorporated it as a private,

nonprofit corporation. Its members consist mostly of private entities

that participate in the deregulated electricity market, including

electricity generators, marketers, utilities, retailers, and consumers.78

The state did not create ERCOT or authorize its creation, and it has

remained a private entity even after PURA’s 1999 amendments. Its

employees are not government employees and do not receive

government retirement or other benefits.79 It is funded not by tax

75 Ante at 13-16.

76 Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 518 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex.

2015).

Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. 2020)

77

(quoting Rosenberg Dev. Corp. v. Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571 S.W.3d

738, 750 (Tex. 2019)).

78 About ERCOT, ERCOT (2023), http://www.ercot.com/about/profile.

79 See Careers, ERCOT (2023), http://www.ercot.com/careers.

21

dollars or legislative appropriations but by fees paid by its members and

a system administration fee paid by wholesale electricity buyers.80 It is

governed by articles of incorporation and bylaws adopted by its

members.81 It is directly managed not by the PUC or another state

agency but by its own board of directors.82

But as the Court notes, due to ERCOT’s selection and certification

as an ISO, PURA indirectly restricts and regulates ERCOT in numerous

ways and indirectly grants it various functions and powers that are

inherently governmental.83 As we discuss further below, PURA’s

indirect grant and regulation of ERCOT’s functions and powers are

insufficient to alter its nature as a private entity. But our consideration

of those functions and powers must begin with the recognition that all

PURA’s effects on ERCOT are indirect. Through all its provisions that

empower, impede, or otherwise impact ERCOT, PURA never directly

addresses ERCOT. Instead, it empowers, impedes, and impacts

whatever ISO or other independent organization the “ERCOT” power

80 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(e); see also About ERCOT, ERCOT (2023),

http://www.ercot.com/about/profile.

81 See Amended and Restated Certificate of Formation of Electric

Reliability Council of Texas, Inc., ERCOT (Jan. 31, 2019),

https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2019/02/06/Amended_and_Restated_Certific

ate_of_Formation__eff_01.31.2019_.pdf; Amended and Restated Bylaws of

Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc., ERCOT (Oct. 12, 2021),

https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2022/09/09/01_Current%20ERCOT%20Byla

ws.pdf.

82 About ERCOT, ERCOT (2023), http://www.ercot.com/about/profile.

83 Ante at 29-32, 34-35.

22

region84 has selected and the PUC has certified. PURA does not address,

and therefore certainly does not alter, the private, nongovernmental

nature of whatever entity is selected and certified as an ISO.

As an independent, privately owned, nonprofit corporation,

ERCOT is subject to PURA’s restrictions and requirements only because

it applied for and was granted the PUC’s certification as the power

region’s ISO. The restrictions apply to ERCOT not because of its nature

as an entity but because of its position as the PUC-certified ISO. The

Legislature could have assigned an existing governmental entity or

created a new one to serve as the ISO, or it could have amended PURA

to directly address and regulate ERCOT itself in ways that could

indicate an intent to transform it into a governmental entity that is, by

nature, an arm of the state. But instead, the Legislature has authorized

the PUC to select a private entity to fulfill the ISO’s functions.85 That

choice was consistent with the 1999 PURA amendments, which

deregulated the retail electricity market so that it would be subject to

“normal forces of competition” and “customer choices,” rather than state

84 See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151. Somewhat confusingly, PURA

designates the Texas power region for which ERCOT serves as the ISO as the

“Electric Reliability Council of Texas” or “ERCOT.” Id. § 31.002(5) (“‘Electric

Reliability Council of Texas’ or ‘ERCOT’ means the area in Texas served by

electric utilities, municipally owned utilities, and electric cooperatives that is

not synchronously interconnected with electric utilities outside the state.”);

Texas v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 829 F.3d 405, 431 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that

the Texas grid “shares the name of its governing board, the Electric Reliability

Council of Texas (ERCOT)”).

85 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(a), (c).

23

regulation.86 Instead of governmentalizing the ISO, PURA authorizes

the PUC to select a private entity to fill that role.

The PUC, in turn, chose to certify ERCOT as the ISO, but it has

not understood the ISO, or ERCOT in particular, to be a governmental

entity or otherwise protected by sovereign immunity. The PUC has

adopted rules that purport to grant ERCOT protection against liability

for certain specified actions.87 Because sovereign immunity protects the

government against both suit and liability, these rules would be

unnecessary if ERCOT enjoys sovereign immunity. To the contrary, the

PUC has expressly recognized that ERCOT may be subject to “civil relief

that may be available under federal or state law.”88

PURA never identifies the ISO as a governmental entity or

expresses any intent that it be protected by sovereign immunity. It

subjects the ISO to substantial regulation, but “heavily regulating an

entity does not equate to conferring governmental-entity status.”89 Nor

does it change the entity’s “nature.” In light of ERCOT’s original and

persistent nature as an industry-created, privately owned, nonprofit

corporation, and in the absence of anything in PURA that purports to

86 See id. § 39.001(a).

87 See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 25.43(o)(2) (protecting ERCOT from

liability for transitioning or attempting to transition a customer from a retail

electric provider to a provider of last resort), .200(d) (protecting ERCOT from

liability for negligently causing service interruptions while attempting to

maintain system stability and safety), .361(c) (protecting ERCOT from liability

for events beyond its control that could not reasonably be anticipated).

88 Id. § 25.362(j)(6).

89Rosenberg Dev. Corp. v. Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571 S.W.3d

738, 750 (Tex. 2019).

24

alter that nature, we conclude that PURA did not vest ERCOT with the

nature, purposes, and powers of an arm of the state.

II. State Control

Even if we were to ignore the fact that PURA never attempts to

directly empower, impede, or impact ERCOT and instead assumed that

all PURA’s provisions addressing a PUC-certified ISO directly address

ERCOT itself, we would still conclude that those provisions do not

transform ERCOT’s nature into that of an arm of the state. By indirectly

granting the PUC “complete authority to oversee and investigate”

ERCOT’s operations, finances, and budget “as necessary” to ensure

accountability and adequate performance,90 PURA provides the PUC

with broad oversight authority over ERCOT (as the ISO). But for the

PUC to act through ERCOT such that its actions are effectively

attributed to the government,91 the PUC first must exercise its oversight

authority to control ERCOT’s actions, and, under PURA, the exercise of

that authority must be “necessary.”

As described below, our cases instruct that if a private entity has

not been designated as part of the government and the government does

not control the entity’s conduct, the complained-of actions are considered

the entity’s independent and discretionary actions and it did not act as

an arm of the state. Fundamentally, authority to oversee is not actual

control. If the Court’s inquiry rests on control, the proper question

should be whether the PUC exercised its oversight authority to

90 See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d).

91Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. 2020)

(quoting Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. 2015)).

25

“sufficient[ly] control” ERCOT’s complained-of actions such that they

were “effectively attributable” to the government and were not ERCOT’s

discretionary actions.92 As the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction over the

issues underlying the parties’ causes of action, we would, to “ensure[] an

orderly procedure,” at least wait for the PUC to “apply its expertise,”

“develop a complete factual record,”93 and make relevant factual

findings about any exercise of its oversight authority before determining

whether or what type of immunity should be extended to ERCOT based

on any government control.94

The Court instead concludes that PURA evinces clear legislative

intent to vest ERCOT with the nature of an arm of the state because

“ERCOT operates under the direct control and oversight of the PUC.”95

The Court relies largely on PURA provisions indirectly (1) granting the

PUC “complete authority” over ERCOT’s operations, finances, and

budget, (2) making ERCOT “directly responsible and accountable to” the

PUC, and (3) allowing the State to exercise some control or influence

over ERCOT through various means, including by appointing members

92 See Nettles v. GTECH Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Tex. 2020).

93 See Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex.

2016).

See Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 408 n.58 (surveying other state decisions

94

and noting that (1) “[s]ome states hold that sovereign immunity does not

extend to a private entity regardless of government control,” (2) “[o]ther states

hold that, if derivative immunity exists, it provides ‘immunity’ from liability if

the defendant was not otherwise culpable,” and (3) “to the extent it is

recognized as ‘immunity,’ it is most often considered ‘immunity from liability,’

not immunity ‘from suit’”).

95 Ante at 29.

26

to the ERCOT board selection committee.96 The Court, however,

overreads both our case law and PURA and glosses over whether the

complained-of conduct was not ERCOT’s “‘independent action,’ but

rather ‘action taken by the government.’”97

A. Relevant Case Law

The common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity rests on a

historical tradition that precedes the constitutional founding of this

State and even of the Union.98 But there is no history or tradition of

extending common-law sovereign immunity to private corporations. As

noted recently by Judge Oldham on the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit, “[i]t’s evident that at common law, both in England

and the early American Republic, incorporated entities were not entitled

to sovereign immunity,” “regardless of whether they exercised

governmental functions.”99 After extensive historical analysis,100 Judge

Oldham distilled the following rule: “If an entity has a separate legal

96 See id. at 29-31 (citing TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 39.151(d), (d-1), (d-4)(3),

(e), (g), (g-1), .1513).

97 Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 407 (quoting Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v.

Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. 2015)).

98See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999) (“[T]he doctrine that

a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States

when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”); Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197

S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex. 2006) (noting that in 1847, when this Court first

recognized the doctrine in its second term, the rule was “then more than six

centuries old”).

99Springboards to Educ., Inc. v. McAllen Indep. Sch. Dist., 62 F.4th 174,

191 (5th Cir. 2023) (Oldham, J., concurring).

Id. at 191-98 (reviewing English common-law tradition, debates

100

between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and early American court cases).

27

status from the State (e.g., as a corporation, LLC, or § 501(c)(3) nonprofit

organization) . . . the entity is not ‘the State’ and hence is not entitled to

sovereign immunity.”101 But Judge Oldham noted that this rule would

concern “what enjoys the State’s sovereign immunity in federal court,”

and “States are obviously free to cloak non-State entities with all

manner of governmental immunities in state court,” citing as an

example Section 12.1056(a) of the Texas Education Code.102

Texas’s common-law history has followed a similar trajectory of

considering private entities with a separate legal status from the State

as not being an arm of the government. Indeed, we have departed from

this rule as to private entities only once before today—in 2020.103 But

there, we relied on the same statute Judge Oldham referenced in his

opinion, which directed that certain private entities have immunity to

the same extent as public entities, and on a statutory designation that

those entities were part of the state government.104

In that case, El Paso Education Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Properties,

LLC, this Court extended governmental immunity105 for the first time

101 Id. at 198.

102 Id. at 199 n.6.

103See El Paso Educ. Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Props., LLC, 602 S.W.3d

521, 524 (Tex. 2020).

104 See id. at 528-31 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 12.105, .1056(a)).

105Cf. Rosenberg Dev. Corp. v. Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571

S.W.3d 738, 746 (Tex. 2019) (although not sovereign entities, political

subdivisions share the State’s immunity under the governmental-immunity

doctrine when performing governmental functions as the State’s agent).

28

to a private entity—open-enrollment charter schools.106 Although these

schools are typically “private, nonprofit organization[s],” the Legislature

expressly designated open-enrollment charter schools as “part of the

public school system of this state” and directed that “[i]n matters related

to operation of an open-enrollment charter school, an open-enrollment

charter school or charter holder is immune from liability and suit to the

same extent as a school district.”107 Because these charter schools

“expressly operate as part of the State’s public education system,” are

“accountable to State government through oversight of their charters

and the receipt of substantial public funding,” and “exercise the same

powers and perform government tasks in the same manner as

traditional public schools,” the Court concluded that they “act as an arm

of the State government.”108

On the same day as Amex Properties, the Court issued University

of the Incarnate Word v. Redus.109 There, the Court considered whether

a private university, neither created nor chartered by the State, was

entitled to sovereign immunity for actions taken by its legislatively

authorized campus police department.110 Specifically contrasting the

Legislature’s “limited authorization to private universities to

commission peace officers” with its express “incorporation of

106 Amex Props., 602 S.W.3d at 529-30.

107 Id. at 528-29 (quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 12.105, .1056(a)).

108Id. at 529-30; see also Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602

S.W.3d 398, 406 n.51 (Tex. 2020).

109 602 S.W.3d at 398.

110 Id. at 404.

29

open-enrollment charter schools into the State’s public-education

system,” the Court noted that “no similar declaration exists” designating

a private university as part of the government or directing that private

universities have immunity from suit.111 The Legislature did not

“categorically transform[]” the private university’s status to

“government-entity status.”112

In conducting its analysis, the Redus Court found “instructive”

the “control” requirement contemplated in the government-contractor

case Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc. v. Olivares.113 The Court explained

that “the extent to which the government exercises control . . . is

relevant” and “sovereign immunity potentially extends to the University

if the complained-of conduct was not the University’s ‘independent

action,’ but rather ‘action taken by the government.’”114 Because the

university’s administration and governing board “are alone responsible

for its police department’s day-to-day operations and decision making”

and not accountable to the taxpayers or public officials, the necessary

control for the private university to be an arm of the state was absent.115

111 Id. at 411-13 & n.79.

112 Id. at 412.

113 Id. at 407 (citing Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d

117, 125 (Tex. 2015)).

114 Id. (emphases added) (quoting Brown & Gay, 461 S.W.3d at 125). In

Brown & Gay, the Court considered cases where “the complained-of conduct

for which the contractor was immune was effectively attributed to the

government. That is, the alleged cause of the injury was not the independent

action of the contractor, but the action taken by the government through the

contractor.” 461 S.W.3d at 125.

115 Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 407-08.

30

Although the Court contemplated the entity’s accountability to the

government as a component of control, it did not hold that accountability

would have been sufficient on its own to conclude that a private entity

had the nature of an arm of the state; it held only that the absence of

accountability demanded the conclusion that the government did not

sufficiently control the entity for it to be considered an arm of the

state.116

A month after Redus, the Court expounded on the Brown & Gay

“control” requirement in the government-contractor case Nettles v.

GTECH Corp.117 At issue in Nettles was whether a government

contractor for the Texas Lottery Commission had derivative

immunity.118 Because the Court concluded the control-based standard

was not satisfied, it expressly declined to recognize derivative sovereign

immunity for contractors, just as it had declined to recognize such

immunity in Brown & Gay.119 But the Court clarified the standard as,

put simply, asking “(1) did the government tell the contractor what to

do and how to do it (as opposed to the contractor having ‘some discretion

in performing the contract’); and, if so, (2) did the contractor do as it was

told?”120

116 Id.

117 606 S.W.3d 726, 731-36 (Tex. 2020).

118 Id. at 728.

119 Id. at 733.

120 Id. at 732 (footnote omitted) (quoting Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v.

Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 130 n.6 (Hecht, C.J., concurring)); see also Brown &

Gay, 461 S.W.3d at 125-26 (“In this case, the [plaintiffs] do not complain of

harm caused by [the government contractor]’s implementing the

31

As the Court explained in Nettles, applying this control-based

standard requires looking “first to the ‘complained-of conduct’ in the

pleadings” and then to any evidence “‘necessary to resolve the

jurisdictional issues raised.’”121 Ultimately, this control-based standard

asks whether the government “had sufficient control over” the entity’s

actions such that they were “effectively attributable” to the government

and were not the entity’s “independent actions” or whether the entity

“had some discretion.”122 Under the governing statute and the contract

with the Texas Lottery Commission’s contractor, “[f]inal decisions

regarding the direction or control of the Lottery are always the

prerogative of the [Commission] in its sole discretion,”123 and the

Commission has “broad authority and shall exercise strict control and

close supervision over all lottery games.”124 But the Court held that

“close supervision and final approval of work over which a contractor

has discretion” do not make actions effectively attributable to the

government.125

From these cases, we can derive a few controlling principles

regarding the nature of an arm of the state. Private, incorporated

[government]’s specifications or following any specific government directions

or orders.”).

606 S.W.3d at 733-34 (quoting Brown & Gay, 461 S.W.3d at 125, and

121

Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)).

122 Id. at 733.

123 Id. at 735-36.

124 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 466.014(a); Nettles, 606 S.W.3d at 736.

125 Nettles, 606 S.W.3d at 736.

32

entities have a distinct legal status separate from the State and, as a

general proposition, are not an arm of the state. But when the

Legislature expressly designates a private entity as part of the

government and makes the entity accountable through government

oversight—thereby “categorically transforming” the entity’s status to

“government-entity status”126—the government need not exercise actual

control over the entity’s actions for the entity to have the nature of an

arm of the state.127 If there is no express designation, however,

sovereign immunity, at most, “potentially extends” to the private entity

only if it is accountable to the government and the government

“exercises control over the activities” such that the “complained-of

conduct” is not “‘independent action,’ but rather ‘action taken by the

government.’”128 For a private entity’s action to be “effectively

attributable” to the government based on control, close supervision and

final approval is insufficient when the entity has discretion to perform

the work.129

126 Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 412 (Tex.

2020).

See El Paso Educ. Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Props., LLC, 602 S.W.3d

127

521, 528-30 (Tex. 2020).

Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 407-08 (quoting Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v.

128

Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. 2015)). The Court notes that “we have

never held that a complete lack of discretion is required for immunity in an

arm of the state analysis for a legislatively authorized entity.” Ante at 33. But

we also have never held that an entity not expressly designated as part of the

government—like ERCOT—is entitled to sovereign immunity as a legislatively

authorized entity.

129 Nettles, 606 S.W.3d at 731-37.

33

B. Oversight or Control

The Legislature has not designated ERCOT as part of the

government but has indirectly directed that ERCOT (as a PUC-certified

ISO) “is directly responsible and accountable to” the PUC.130 Applying

the above-mentioned case-law principles, our inquiry concerns the

extent to which the government exercised control such that ERCOT’s

actions could be effectively attributed to the government.

The Court asserts that “ERCOT operates under the direct control

and oversight of the PUC” and “the state has complete authority over

everything ERCOT does to perform its statutory functions.”131 But this

reads PURA too broadly. PURA grants the PUC “complete authority to

oversee and investigate the organization’s finances, budget, and

operations as necessary to ensure the organization’s accountability and

to ensure that the organization adequately performs the organization’s

functions and duties.”132 Only if ERCOT, as the PUC-certified ISO,

“does not adequately perform the organization’s functions or duties or

does not comply with this section” is the PUC authorized to “take

appropriate action . . . including decertifying the organization or

assessing an administrative penalty against the organization.”133

Insofar as ERCOT, through its discretionary and independent actions,

130 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d).

131 Ante at 29-30.

132 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d) (emphases added).

133 Id.; see also 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.364(d) (requiring the PUC to

find that the ISO “has committed significant violations of PURA or [PUC] rules

or failed to efficiently and effectively carry out the duties of an independent

organization” before decertification).

34

“adequately perform[s]” its ISO functions and duties, the PUC’s

statutory authority to control ERCOT’s operations appears to be limited.

The Court notes that ERCOT’s bylaws and protocols require input

from and approval by the PUC and that the PUC can “approve,

disapprove, or modify any item” in ERCOT’s proposed annual budget.134

But bylaws, protocols, and budgets set broad constraints within which

ERCOT can exercise its discretion, and this authority is akin to the

“close supervision and final approval” that this Court has found

insufficient to establish the necessary control.135

The Court points out that state officials, by appointing members

of a board selection committee, have the power to indirectly appoint

members of the board of directors for the PUC-certified ISO for the

ERCOT power region.136 But the power to appoint is the power to

influence, not control.137 Ultimately, no state official has been put in

charge of ERCOT, and a private board still runs the nonprofit

134 Ante at 30-31 (quoting TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d-1), (g-1)).

135 See Nettles v. GTECH Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 736 (Tex. 2020) (“But

close supervision and final approval of work over which a contractor has

discretion are not the same as the government specifying the manner in which

a task is to be performed.”).

136 Ante at 30 (citing TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 39.151(g), (g-1), .1513).

137 The provisions providing the appointment power do not give the

government any formal control over the board members’ decisions once

appointed. See TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 39.151(g)–(g-6), .1513; cf. In re Abbott, 645

S.W.3d 276, 280 n.1 (Tex. 2022) (“The Governor frequently appoints these

officers, but the state agencies’ enabling statutes rarely give the Governor

formal control over the officers’ decisions once appointed.”).

35

corporation.138 Two of the eleven-member board are state officials: the

PUC Chairperson and the Public Counsel of the Office of the Public

Utility Counsel.139 Only the latter is a voting director—one of nine

voting directors—and by statute, represents not the public at large but

“residential and small commercial consumer interests.”140

ERCOT is subject to some requirements typically reserved for

state entities: it is “subject to review (but not abolishment) under the

Sunset Act” and “required to open its board meetings to the public.”141

But ERCOT is also “not subject to state contracting standards, the Open

Meetings Act, Administrative Procedure Act, or other requirements

traditional state agencies must meet.”142 And “heavily regulating an

entity does not equate to conferring governmental-entity status.”143

Although the “PUC’s oversight of ERCOT’s finances, budget, and

operations is essential,” this oversight authority is necessary because

ERCOT, as a private corporation, “is not subject to other traditional

oversight mechanisms, such as the legislative appropriations

138 See Governance, ERCOT (2023),

https://www.ercot.com/about/governance.

139 See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(g-1).

140 See id. § 39.151(g-1)(2).

141 Ante at 32 (citing TEX. UTIL. CODE §§ 39.151(n), .1511).

142 SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT WITH COMMISSION

DECISIONS: PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS, ELECTRIC RELIABILITY

COUNCIL OF TEXAS, OFFICE OF PUBLIC UTILITY COUNSEL 3 (January 2023),

https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2023/01/20/PUC-ERCOT-OPUC-Staff-Report

-with-Commission-Decisions_1-19-23.pdf.

143 Rosenberg Dev. Corp. v. Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571 S.W.3d

738, 750 (Tex. 2019).

36

process.”144 And without a determination that ERCOT is not adequately

performing its functions and duties, the PUC’s oversight authority is

more like “close supervision” of ERCOT’s discretionary and independent

actions.145

If the PUC found that ERCOT did not adequately perform its

duties as the PUC-certified ISO, the PUC would be statutorily

authorized to “take appropriate action” and exercise its “complete

authority.”146 But whether the PUC exercised its oversight authority to

“sufficient[ly] control” ERCOT’s complained-of actions such that they

“were effectively attributable to” the PUC and were not “independent

actions”147 would depend on a factual and complaint-specific inquiry.

Currently, the PUC mainly uses rulemaking proceedings and contested

cases to guide and direct ERCOT’s actions.148 Although PURA “does not

clearly identify how [the] PUC can give ERCOT direction outside of a

contested case or rulemaking proceeding,” the PUC “has broadly

interpreted its statutory authority” to allow “informal mechanisms to

guide ERCOT’s actions, including verbal directives, memos, and

orders.”149 But even if the PUC desired to exercise its oversight

144 SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 142, at 80.

145 See Nettles v. GTECH Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 736 (Tex. 2020).

146 See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d).

147 See Nettles, 606 S.W.3d at 733.

148 SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 142, at 41.

149Id. (“While these informal methods may help the commission move

quickly, they do not always adhere to best practices for openness,

inclusiveness, and transparency.”). The Sunset Commission has also recently

found that the “PUC needs more formalized structures and processes when

37

authority over ERCOT, it may lack the necessary resources and

capabilities to do so.150 In short, without an additional factual showing

giving ERCOT direction that affects the electric industry and millions of

Texans,” id. at A1, and recommended that the Legislature “[a]uthorize [the]

PUC to issue directives to ERCOT through written memos and orders, in

addition to rulemaking and contested cases, and authorize stakeholders to

formally provide input on theses directives,” id. at A2. For emergency

situations, the Sunset Commission recommended to the Legislature:

Clarify that [the] PUC can only direct ERCOT outside of these

methods in an emergency or other urgent situation that poses

an imminent threat to public health, safety, or grid reliability.

If [the] PUC’s direction to ERCOT is still necessary 72 hours

after the emergency or urgent situation, [the] PUC must use the

more formal process established under the recommendation to

provide documentation of its direction to ERCOT.

Id. Neither the PUC nor ERCOT argues that the PUC used formal or informal

mechanisms to control ERCOT’s complained-of actions.

150 For example, the Sunset Commission’s Report explains:

[The] PUC currently lacks the expertise and staff resources to

independently analyze an abundance of electric data and

information to make fully informed regulatory decisions,

including evaluating their impacts on market participants and

the general public. . . .

While [the] PUC has complete authority to access ERCOT’s data,

which includes vast amounts of operational and financial data

about electricity generation, consumption, and pricing, it lacks

the technological capability to do so independently of

ERCOT. . . . Further, any analysis provided by ERCOT may still

carry inherent bias due to its focus on grid operations, which

prioritizes reliability over considering the cost of such

operations. Even if ERCOT were able to provide regulatory

impact analysis, [the] PUC staff’s current lack of analytical

capabilities forces the agency to rely on ERCOT’s analysis

without independent verification.

Id. at 37-38; see also id. at A1 (“The Sunset Commission found [the] PUC was

ill-prepared for the task [of being a more active overseer of ERCOT] and is

38

of actual control, the PUC’s oversight authority does not “evince[] ‘clear

legislative intent’” to vest the private corporation ERCOT with the

nature of an arm of the state.151

The Court claims ERCOT “is much like a state agency” based on

the “level of control and authority the state exercises over it, and its

accountability to the state.”152 But a state agency necessarily acts in the

government’s name as an express part of the government and does not

perform proprietary functions.153 There is two-way accountability:

(1) state agencies are accountable to the State and (2) the government

is directly accountable to the people for the state agency’s actions.

The same is not true for ERCOT. ERCOT is a private corporation

that has not been expressly designated as part of the government. The

PUC may be accountable to the people for failing to exercise its oversight

authority, or state officials may be accountable for appointing the wrong

people to the PUC or even to the ERCOT board selection committee. But

this is not direct accountability for ERCOT’s actions. The government

can politically disclaim responsibility for the private corporation’s

woefully under-resourced given its critical responsibilities and the work that

still lies ahead.”).

Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 405, 407 (Tex.

151

2020) (quoting Rosenberg Dev. Corp. v. Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571

S.W.3d 738, 750 (Tex. 2019)).

152 Ante at 29.

153See Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 433

(Tex. 2016). Of course, state officials could act ultra vires, which are not

considered acts of the state. See Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex.

2017) (“The basic justification for this ultra vires exception to sovereign

immunity is that ultra vires acts—or those acts without authority—should not

be considered acts of the state at all.”).

39

actions when ERCOT acts at its discretion and not under the PUC’s

control. In other words, ERCOT’s actions are not “effectively

attributable” to the government unless the PUC exercised sufficient

control over ERCOT’s actions; otherwise, ERCOT, as a private entity,

“had some discretion” to conduct “independent actions.”154

Indeed, legislatively authorizing private entities to perform

public purposes without designating them as part of the government

may provide the government with the political benefit of not having

express accountability for those entities’ actions.155 The government

could avoid blame or responsibility for any negative repercussions by

disavowing the private entity’s improvident actions, which could

encourage a hands-off approach with minimal oversight before any

public outcry.156 And if a private entity were granted broad sovereign

immunity regardless of the government’s actual control, the entity

would have little incentive to seek direction or guidance from the

overseeing governmental agency. But if immunity instead depended on

the government’s actual control, a private entity would be motivated to

collaborate with and seek direction from the overseeing governmental

agency to cloak its actions with the Sovereign’s immunity.

154 See Nettles v. GTECH Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Tex. 2020).

155See Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 750 (“[M]erely engaging in an act that

serves a public purpose says nothing about the nature of the entity itself[.]”).

156See, e.g., SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 142, at 1 (noting

that after blackouts in 2011 “signaled potential underlying problems,” the

PUC’s “business as usual continued,” and with ERCOT “generally managing

the grid, [the] PUC never had cause to take a step back and consider how

things were working, how it might improve operations, or what funding and

staff may be needed to do so”).

40

Since the 2020 Amex Properties decision—the only previous

decision from this Court to extend sovereign or governmental immunity

to a private entity—the Legislature has known that this Court relies on

statutory provisions expressly designating an entity as part of the

government and directing that immunity applies to an entity.157 Yet,

the Legislature has not designated ERCOT as part of the government or

directed that it should have immunity, notwithstanding the Lieutenant

Governor’s announcement of ERCOT reform as a top priority for the

2021 Legislative Session158 and the Legislature’s significant enactments

reforming ERCOT (as the PUC-certified ISO).159 If the Legislature had

“categorically transform[ed]” ERCOT by designating the private

corporation as part of the government—as it did for open-enrollment

charter schools—this case might be different.160 But it did not.

157See El Paso Educ. Initiative, Inc. v. Amex Props., LLC, 602 S.W.3d

521, 528-29 (Tex. 2020); see also Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 412 (noting that “[t]he

statutory text demonstrates the legislature’s awareness of the ramifications of

government-entity status” and “[r]ather than categorically transforming a

private university’s status, the statute links immunity to the peace officers who

perform law enforcement functions”).

158 Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick Announces Top 31 Priorities for the 2021

Session, OFF. OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR (Feb. 23, 2021),

https://www.ltgov.texas.gov/2021/02/23/lt-gov-dan-patrick-announces-top-31-

priorities-for-the-2021-session/.

See Act of May 30, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 908, 2021 Tex. Gen.

159

Laws 2218, 2218-27; Act of May 28, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 950, 2021 Tex.

Gen. Laws 2465, 2465-72.

160See Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 412. Of course, the mere designation of a

private entity as part of the government is not sufficient to establish the entity

as an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity. See id. at 405.

41

The parties do not argue, and the record does not establish, that

the PUC exercised sufficient control such that the complained-of

ERCOT actions are “effectively attribute[able] to” the government.161 As

this Court has done in the government-contractor context,162 we would

not decide at this stage whether, under the standard for legislatively

authorized entities, the government’s exercise of some degree of actual

control would extend the Sovereign’s immunity to a private entity not

expressly designated as part of the government.163 Because the PUC

has exclusive jurisdiction over the underlying issues in these cases, the

PUC perhaps will develop the factual record and make fact findings

about any control it exercised over ERCOT’s complained-of conduct.164

161See Nettles v. GTECH Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tex. 2020) (citing

Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. 2015)). The

Court asserts that “the PUC had significant control and authority over the very

conduct at issue in these cases.” Ante at 33-34. But “ha[ving] significant

control and authority” is not the same as exercising control over the

complained-of conduct. CPS Energy expressly distinguishes between ERCOT’s

and the PUC’s actions, stating that it “is not contesting the entire five-day

period [of high wholesale electricity prices], or the PUC Orders, but only

ERCOT’s failure to follow those orders during the storm’s last 33 hours,” and

that “CPS Energy’s complaints do not concern these PUC Orders. The problem

lies in ERCOT’s decision not to follow them.” And although Panda may have

agreed that “the PUC could have controlled the CDR data output had it wanted

to,” id. at 34 (emphasis added), the issue is whether the PUC actually

controlled ERCOT.

162See Brown & Gay, 461 S.W.3d at 126 (“We need not establish today

whether some degree of control by the government would extend its immunity

protection to a private party; we hold only that no control is determinative.”).

163 Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 407 (noting that sovereign immunity

“potentially extends” if the complained-of conduct was effectively “action taken

by the government”).

164 The Court implies that we should not consider specific conduct

because “[s]overeign immunity is entity-based.” Ante at 33 (quoting Redus, 602

42

Should the parties pursue judicial relief after exhausting administrative

remedies, this Court could consider any sovereign-immunity arguments

based on control with the added benefit of a developed factual record.

This approach would respect the Legislature’s decisions to (1) not

designate ERCOT as part of the government, (2) grant the PUC

“complete authority” as specified in PURA over ERCOT’s operations,

and (3) establish a pervasive regulatory regime that provides the PUC

with exclusive jurisdiction over issues that fall under the PUC’s

“complete authority.”165

III. Sovereign Immunity’s Nature and Purposes

As mentioned, we have concluded that sovereign immunity might

reach a legislatively authorized private entity if (1) the entity’s

authorizing statute “evinces ‘clear legislative intent’ to vest the entity

with the ‘nature, purposes, and powers’ of an ‘arm of the State

government’”166 and (2) extending immunity “fits within the doctrine’s

underlying nature and purposes.”167 Even if we concluded that PURA

S.W.3d at 407). But the Court then holds that “ERCOT would not be immune

outside that role” as the ISO, distinguishing between ERCOT’s conduct as an

ISO and its conduct outside that role for immunity purposes. Id. at 40. To the

extent sovereign immunity possibly applies when the private entity is not

expressly designated as part of the government, it should depend on whether

the government has oversight authority and actually exercised that authority

and control over the conduct at issue.

165 See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d).

166Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 405 (quoting Rosenberg Dev. Corp. v. Imperial

Performing Arts, Inc., 571 S.W.3d 738, 750 (Tex. 2019), and Ben Bolt-Palito

Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol. Subdivs. Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund,

212 S.W.3d 320, 325 (Tex. 2006)).

167 Id. at 401 (citing Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 750).

43

has somehow altered ERCOT’s nature as an entity, we would

nevertheless conclude that extending sovereign immunity to ERCOT

would not promote the doctrine’s “political, pecuniary, and pragmatic”

purposes.168

Politically, we continue to recognize sovereign immunity because

it “preserves separation-of-powers principles by preventing the judiciary

from interfering with the Legislature’s prerogative to allocate tax

dollars.”169 By preserving the common-law doctrine of sovereign

immunity, the courts maintain an “equilibrium among the branches of

government” by allowing the Legislature to decide, as a policy matter,

when to “allow tax resources to be shifted ‘away from their intended

purposes toward defending lawsuits and paying judgments.’”170 In

short, sovereign immunity prevents the courts from “intruding into” the

policy-making branch’s role of managing and appropriating the public’s

funds.171

By requiring a legislative decision to make tax dollars available

to pay the costs of litigation and judgments, sovereign immunity serves

the pecuniary purpose of ensuring “that the taxes the public pays are

used ‘for their intended purposes.’”172 It “protects the public treasury by

168 Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 740.

169 Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex.

2015).

170 Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 740-41 (quoting Brown & Gay, 461 S.W.3d

at 121).

171 See Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Tex. 2019).

Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354, 361 (Tex. 2019) (quoting

172

Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Tex. 2006)); see also

44

shielding the public ‘from the costs and consequences of improvident

actions of their governments,’”173 particularly the “unforeseen” costs of

“defending lawsuits and paying judgments.”174

And pragmatically, sovereign immunity “serves to prevent

governmental paralysis”175 by protecting “the State and its political

subdivisions from endless litigation,” which “hamper[s] government

functions.”176 It safeguards “the public as a whole” by protecting its

governmental agencies from both the “distraction” of lawsuits and the

risks that litigants could control government action through the courts

instead of through the political process.177

Extending sovereign immunity to ERCOT would, at best, only

minimally promote these purposes. ERCOT does not receive tax dollars

or appropriated funds, so permitting judgments against it would not

require the unforeseen diversion of tax dollars from their legislatively

appropriated purpose or interfere with or usurp the Legislature’s policy

decisions on how to allocate tax revenues.178 The Court concludes that

Chambers–Liberty Cntys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 347 (Tex.

2019).

173 Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex.

2020) (quoting Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006)).

174 Brown & Gay, 461 S.W.3d at 123.

175 Hughes, 573 S.W.3d at 218.

176Ben Bolt-Palito Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol. Subdivs.

Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 326 (Tex. 2006).

177Hays St. Bridge Restoration Grp. v. City of San Antonio, 570 S.W.3d

697, 704 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547

S.W.3d 830, 839 (Tex. 2018), and Reata Constr., 197 S.W.3d at 382).

178 See Brown & Gay, 461 S.W.3d at 121.

45

although ERCOT’s funds are not taxes, they are effectively public funds

because PURA empowers the PUC to authorize and set the amounts of

the regulatory fees ERCOT charges to buyers and sellers of wholesale

electricity.179 But even if regulatory fees charged by state agencies

constitute public funds that are equivalent to tax dollars, ERCOT’s

funds are paid by private entities to a private entity and are never held

by a governmental entity. Like any other private entity, ERCOT can

procure insurance to protect its funds against liabilities.180 Sovereign

immunity exists to protect against “the payment of taxpayer dollars

subject to legislative discretion,” not the payment of private funds that

may be authorized or regulated by statute.181

ERCOT urges that judgments in the cases against them would be

financially devastating to ERCOT and could undermine PURA’s

regulatory scheme.182 But despite this “too big to fail” argument,

179 Ante at 31, 37; see also TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(e); TracFone

Wireless, Inc. v. Comm’n on State Emergency Commc’ns, 397 S.W.3d 173, 175

n.3 (Tex. 2013) (addressing regulatory fees, which “support a regulatory regime

governing those who pay the fee”).

180See Brown & Gay, 461 S.W.3d at 124 n.7 (“[P]rivate parties . . . have

an established means of protecting themselves from the specter of costly

litigation—insurance.”).

181 Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2019).

182 ERCOT admits, however, that although a “number of court cases

have been brought against ERCOT arising out of the February 2021 extreme

winter weather event,” it “does not believe that the outcome of this litigation

will affect its key functions.” ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEX. (ERCOT),

SELF-EVALUATION REPORT: A REPORT TO THE TEXAS SUNSET ADVISORY

COMMISSION 14 (Sept. 2021),

https://www.sunset.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/reports/ERCOT%20SER_9-

01-21.pdf.

46

ERCOT is not as indispensable to the legislative scheme as ERCOT

suggests. As explained, PURA does not designate ERCOT as the ISO;

it merely requires the power region to designate an organization to serve

as the ISO and authorizes the PUC to certify that organization.183 In

fact, PURA provides that the PUC might certify “one or more” ISOs for

the Texas power region and recognizes that an ISO may be decertified

and replaced by a “successor organization.”184 Under PURA, an ISO

may be critical to the State’s oversight of the electricity industry, but

ERCOT is not. Like the private university at issue in Redus, any

expense ERCOT “incurs will fall on” ERCOT, “not the government or its

taxpayers.”185

The interplay between the exclusive-jurisdiction and

sovereign-immunity doctrines provides further reason not to extend

immunity to ERCOT. Sovereign immunity is not necessary to preserve

“separation-of-powers principles”186 and maintain an “equilibrium

among the branches of government”187—the exclusive-jurisdiction

doctrine serves that function here. The PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction

respects the Legislature’s decision to provide the executive branch,

183 See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(a), (c).

184 See id. § 39.151(a), (d).

185 See Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 410 (Tex.

2020).

186 Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex.

2015).

Rosenberg Dev. Corp. v. Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571 S.W.3d

187

738, 740-41 (Tex. 2019).

47

through the PUC, with “complete authority” over ERCOT.188 It “honors

the Legislature’s intent that ‘the appropriate body adjudicates the

dispute’ first, and thereby ‘ensure[s] an orderly procedure to enforce

those rights.’”189 If litigation continues after the PUC has exercised its

exclusive jurisdiction, any PUC fact findings would be given significant

deference under the substantial-evidence rule.190 And because the PUC

applies its expertise in adjudicating issues first, litigation generally

would not disrupt any key services without the PUC’s first evaluating

any complaint and determining ERCOT’s continued fitness to serve as

the ISO.191 The PUC could determine whether decertification of ERCOT

is appropriate and, if so, certify a successor ISO and transfer assets

before any judicial litigation ensues.192

188 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d).

189 Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016)

(alteration in original) (quoting Essenburg v. Dallas County, 988 S.W.2d 188,

189 (Tex. 1998), and City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013)).

190 TEX. UTIL. CODE § 15.001.

191The PUC also purports to protect ERCOT from liability by mitigating

risks of unforeseen expenditures through promulgated rules. See 16 TEX.

ADMIN. CODE §§ 25.200(d) (protecting ERCOT from liability “for its ordinary

negligence” when it “cause[s] the interruption of transmission service for the

purpose of maintaining ERCOT system stability and safety”), .361(c) (“ERCOT

shall not be liable in damages for any act or event that is beyond its control

and which could not be reasonably anticipated and prevented through the use

of reasonable measures.”); cf. Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 751 (noting that “the

statutory scheme itself contains provisions limiting liability and financial

exposure” that prevent any “genuine risk of unforeseen expenditures”).

192 See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d) (“The commission by rule shall

adopt procedures governing decertification of an independent organization,

selecting and certifying a successor organization, and transferring assets to the

48

Although we acknowledge that extending sovereign immunity to

ERCOT could offer some benefits for the State’s efforts to ensure a

reliable and economical electricity grid, we must also “remain ever

mindful” of sovereign immunity’s costs.193 Sovereign immunity from

suit “allows the ‘improvident actions’ of the government to go

unredressed”194 and thus “places the burden of shouldering” the “costs

and consequences” of those actions “on injured individuals,” rather than

the entity that caused those consequences.195 In short, “just as

immunity is inherent to sovereignty, unfairness is inherent to

immunity.”196 Under these circumstances, the cost of authorizing such

“unfairness” to protect a purely private, nonsovereign entity outweighs

any benefits. We thus conclude that extending sovereign immunity to

ERCOT would not promote the doctrine’s purposes.

IV. The Public’s Trust

Finally, we must return to the concern over how the Court’s

decision will alter the public’s trust in our State’s justice system. The

private corporation ERCOT, once unknown to the general public, has

become a near-household name after more than 4.5 million people in

successor organization to ensure continuity of operations in the region.”); 16

TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.364 (“Decertification of an Independent Organization”).

193 See Rosenberg, 571 S.W.3d at 751.

194 Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 243 (Tex. 2017).

195 Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117, 121-22 (Tex.

2015).

City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 480 n.38 (Tex. 2007)

196

(Willett, J., dissenting).

49

Texas lost electric power during Winter Storm Uri.197 For every three

Texans, two lost power “for an average of 42 hours, during which they

were without power on average for one single consecutive bloc of 31

hours, rather than for short rotating periods.”198 Not only did the storm

expose needed improvements to the electric grid’s reliability, but it also

imposed a significant, tragic human toll:

The Texas Department of State Health Services confirmed

246 deaths related to Winter Storm Uri, which included

victims ranging from less than 1 year old to 102 years old.

Hypothermia was the primary cause of the death for 161

people. The storm and power outages also exacerbated

pre-existing illnesses, leading to the deaths of 25 people

like the 83-year old Katy resident who lost power to the

respirator he needed to live. . . . A grandmother and her

three grandchildren likely numbered among the 10 Texans

who died due to fires when attempts to warm their home

ended in tragedy.199

197 FED. ENERGY REGUL. COMM’N, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., &

REG’L ENTITIES, FERC, NERC AND REGIONAL ENTITY STAFF REPORT: THE

FEBRUARY 2021 COLD WEATHER OUTAGES IN TEXAS AND THE SOUTH CENTRAL

UNITED STATES 9 (Nov. 16, 2021),

https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-so

uth-central-united-states-ferc-nerc-and.

198 SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 142, at 105 (quoting

Winter Storm 2021 and the Lifting of COVID-19 Restrictions in Texas, UNIV.

OF HOUS. HOBBY SCH. OF PUB. AFFS. (Mar. 25, 2021),

https://uh.edu/hobby/winter2021/).

199 Id.

50

Many lawsuits have already been filed against ERCOT based on

damages resulting from the loss of electricity and the high wholesale

prices ERCOT charged during Winter Storm Uri.200

The public expects and trusts that those injured can claim the

protection of the laws and that those responsible—to the extent

responsibility exists—will be held accountable: the government through

the political process and at the ballot box201 and private entities in court.

But by granting sovereign immunity to a purely private entity that has

not been designated as part of the government and without requiring a

demonstration of the government’s actual control over the complained-of

conduct, the Court undermines this public trust.

The Legislature could, and in our opinion should, correct the

Court’s mistake. To specifically address the Court’s holding as to

ERCOT, the Legislature could waive ERCOT’s newfound immunity in

part or in full to give parties the right “to claim the protection of the

laws, whenever he receives an injury.”202 More importantly, however,

the Legislature could circumscribe this Court’s broad and erroneous

expansion of the sovereign-immunity doctrine to private entities.

Although the judiciary defines sovereign immunity’s boundaries,

200 See ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEX. (ERCOT), supra note 182,

at 14.

See Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 411 (Tex.

201

2020) (“Political accountability is a vital counterweight to sovereign

immunity’s inequity.”).

202See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803); see also Wasson

Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 435 (Tex. 2016) (“If immunity

is applicable, then the judiciary defers to the legislature to waive such

immunity.”).

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“[b]ecause the legislature ‘can modify or abrogate common law rules,’

provided its intent is clear, we consider legislative intent in establishing

the doctrine’s common-law contours.”203 To clarify its intent, the

Legislature could enact a law—a rule of construction for Texas courts to

apply—that it does not intend to grant private entities (including

private corporations like ERCOT) the “nature, purposes, and powers” of

an arm of the state for the purposes of sovereign immunity unless it

expressly designates the entity as part of the government.

Although such a rule of construction would generally establish

the outer limits to the judicial extension of sovereign immunity, a

governmental designation by the Legislature ultimately may or may not

be sufficient to demonstrate the necessary indications for the judiciary

to conclude that a private entity is entitled to sovereign immunity. But

that is how it should be. The rule of construction would begin restoring

the public’s trust that private entities will not be extended sovereign

immunity as legislatively authorized entities unless the people’s duly

elected representatives expressly designate the entity as part of the

government and the judiciary determines that the entity is entitled to

sovereign immunity.

This legislative rule of construction, however, should not be

necessary to cabin the judicial expansion of sovereign immunity.

Although “immunity is inherent to sovereignty, unfairness is inherent

Redus, 602 S.W.3d at 411 (footnote omitted) (quoting Abutahoun v.

203

Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 51 (Tex. 2015)).

52

to immunity,”204 especially when it is extended to what is not inherently

sovereign: purely private entities. We therefore respectfully dissent

from the Court’s decision to extend sovereign immunity to the private

corporation ERCOT.

Jeffrey S. Boyd

Justice

John P. Devine

Justice

OPINION FILED: June 23, 2023

204 Id. at 410-11 (quoting Hillman v. Nueces County, 579 S.W.3d 354,

361 (Tex. 2019)).

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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