Doucet v. FCA US LLC

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SJC-13354

AMY DOUCET1 & another2 vs. FCA US LLC3 & another.4

Essex. February 8, 2023. - June 8, 2023.

Present: Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,

& Georges, JJ.

Jurisdiction, Personal, Long-arm statute, Nonresident. Due

Process of Law, Jurisdiction over nonresident. Practice,

Civil, Motion to dismiss.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on

May 17, 2021.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Janice W. Howe, J.; a

motion for reconsideration was considered by her, and entry of

separate and final judgment was ordered by her.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

1 As guardian of Paul Gregory Doucet.

2 Denise Sutton, as guardian of Paul Gregory Doucet.

3 Formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC.

4 Sudbay Chrysler Dodge, Inc.

2

Deepak Gupta, of the District of Columbia (Andrew D.

Nebenzahl, Carly J. LaCrosse, & Matthew W.H. Wessler also

present) for the plaintiffs.

Peter M. Durney (Christopher J. Hurst also present) for FCA

US LLC.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Ben Robbins & Daniel B. Winslow for New England Legal

Foundation.

Jeffrey R. White & Robert S. Peck, of the District of

Columbia, Peter J. Ainsworth, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers,

& Kyle A. Camilleri for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys

& another.

Cassandra Burke Robertson, Charles W. Rhodes, & Linda

Sandstrom Simard, pro se.

Larry E. Coben, of Pennsylvania, Michael Brooks, of the

District of Columbia, & Michael K. Gillis for Center for Auto

Safety & another.

KAFKER, J. Paul Doucet was rendered incapacitated by an

automobile accident in New Hampshire in 2015. His guardians

(the plaintiffs) have brought a tort suit against the

manufacturer of the car in which he was a passenger, FCA US LLC

(FCA US), and the Massachusetts distributor-dealership, Sudbay

Chrysler Dodge, Inc. (Sudbay).5 The car in question, a 2004

Chrysler Sebring, was first sold by Sudbay in Massachusetts and

later purchased in New Hampshire by Doucet, a New Hampshire

resident. At issue is whether Massachusetts has personal

jurisdiction over one of the defendants, FCA US, under the

Commonwealth's long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the due

5 Sudbay, which is incorporated in and maintains a principal

place of business in Massachusetts, is not involved in this

appeal.

3

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. We conclude that it does, and we vacate the trial

court's dismissal of FCA US as a party to this case.6

1. Background. At this stage of the proceedings, we

"accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and draw[]

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Harrington

v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 724 (2014). FCA US is a Delaware

limited liability company with its principal place of business

in Michigan. FCA US's predecessor in interest7 manufactured the

Sebring around which this case revolves.

A dealership in Rhode Island first received the Sebring

from the manufacturer before transferring it to Sudbay, a

dealership in Gloucester. Sudbay initially leased the car to a

Massachusetts resident in 2003. The car was then purchased by a

Massachusetts resident in 2006, and it subsequently was sold to

two other Massachusetts residents, before a New Hampshire

resident purchased the vehicle in 2011. This resident then sold

6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by New England

Legal Foundation; Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and

American Association for Justice; civil procedure and Federal

courts professors; and Center for Auto Safety and Attorneys

Information Exchange Group.

7 FCA US is the successor in interest to Chrysler Group LLC

and inherited certain of its liabilities, including the products

liability claim at issue. Previously, FCA US argued that it did

not acquire liability for the claims brought by the plaintiffs,

but it has since abandoned that argument.

4

it in a private sale to Doucet, also a New Hampshire resident,

in 2013.

In 2015, Doucet was riding in the front passenger's seat of

the Sebring when it was involved in a front-end collision in New

Hampshire. He suffered a traumatic brain injury after the

passenger's side A-pillar (windshield and roof support) struck

his head. Consequently, the plaintiffs first brought a products

liability action solely against FCA US in the Superior Court in

New Hampshire. FCA US removed the case to the United States

District Court for the District of New Hampshire, where a judge

ruled in FCA US's favor that New Hampshire lacked personal

jurisdiction over it, and dismissed the case.

The plaintiffs then filed their suit in the Superior Court

in Suffolk County against both FCA US and Sudbay (collectively,

the defendants). Again, FCA US removed the case to the Federal

District Court in the State in which the plaintiffs had filed

suit -- this time, the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts. The Federal District Court judge

ruled that Massachusetts has personal jurisdiction over FCA US

but remanded the matter to the Superior Court for lack of

subject matter diversity jurisdiction in the Federal court, as

the inclusion of the defendant Sudbay as a Massachusetts

corporation prevented complete diversity.

5

FCA US then filed a motion to dismiss for want of personal

jurisdiction and improper venue in the Superior Court in Suffolk

County. The motion judge transferred the case to the Superior

Court in Essex County, the county in which Sudbay operates its

sole place of business. There, after a hearing on the motion,

the judge ultimately concluded that Massachusetts lacked

personal jurisdiction over FCA US under both the Commonwealth's

long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the Federal

Constitution's due process clause.8 The judge dismissed FCA US

as a party to the case, and the plaintiffs appealed.9 We

transferred the case sua sponte from the Appeals Court.

2. Discussion. "Jurisdictional questions are questions of

law, which we review de novo." Bask, Inc. v. Municipal Council

of Taunton, 490 Mass. 312, 316 (2022). "For a nonresident to be

subject to the authority of a Massachusetts court, the exercise

of jurisdiction must satisfy both Massachusetts's long-arm

statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the requirements of the due

8 In evaluating personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal

due process, the judge in the Superior Court in Essex County

found that the plaintiffs failed to establish "relatedness";

therefore, the judge did not consider other components of this

analysis.

9 The plaintiffs first filed a motion for reconsideration

or, in the alternative, entry of separate and final judgment on

two counts of their complaint against FCA US. The trial court

denied the former and allowed the latter, paving the way for

this appeal.

6

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 312, 314 (2018), cert. denied,

139 S. Ct. 794 (2019) (Exxon Mobil). The plaintiffs argue that

these requirements are satisfied with respect to FCA US, a

nonresident of Massachusetts, while FCA US maintains that they

are not. We address each argument in turn, beginning with our

long-arm statute to "avoid unnecessary consideration of

constitutional questions." SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478

Mass. 324, 325 (2017) (SCVNGR). We conclude that Massachusetts

has personal jurisdiction over FCA US, pursuant to both State

and Federal law, vis-à-vis the plaintiffs' claims. We therefore

reverse the motion judge's dismissal of FCA US as a defendant to

this case and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.10

a. Long-arm statute. "General Laws c. 223A, § 3, sets out

a list of specific instances in which a Massachusetts court may

acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant."

Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 767 (1994). Among the

enumerated options provided is "transacting any business in this

commonwealth." G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a). We routinely have

10The plaintiffs have requested that, should we conclude

they have not demonstrated personal jurisdiction on the facts

before us, we grant them jurisdictional discovery. Because we

conclude that personal jurisdiction exists on these facts, we

need not reach that issue.

7

construed this clause broadly. Tatro, supra. To meet this

criterion, a plaintiff must allege facts that "satisfy two

requirements -- the defendant must have transacted business in

Massachusetts, and the plaintiff's claim must have arisen from

the transaction of business by the defendant." Id.

Here, the plaintiffs argue that their claims arose from FCA

US's predecessor's transaction of business in the Commonwealth

as demonstrated by a Massachusetts distributor-dealership first

leasing and selling the Sebring, all in the stream of commerce.

In response, FCA US counters that neither it nor its predecessor

in interest "transact[ed] any business" in connection with the

plaintiffs' claims. First, the Sebring was initially sent to a

Rhode Island -- not a Massachusetts -- dealership, and second,

the assumption of liability as a successor in interest does "not

qualify as" the transaction of business. Furthermore, FCA US

argues, even if it has transacted business in Massachusetts, the

plaintiffs' claims did not arise from any such transactions

because Doucet did not purchase the Sebring in Massachusetts.

We first consider whether FCA US, through its predecessor

in interest, transacted business in the Commonwealth. "Although

an isolated (and minor) transaction with a Massachusetts

resident may be insufficient, generally the purposeful and

successful solicitation of business from residents of the

8

Commonwealth, by a defendant or its agent, will suffice to

satisfy this requirement." Tatro, 416 Mass. at 767.

In Exxon Mobil, 479 Mass. at 317-318, we concluded that

Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon) had transacted business in the

Commonwealth when it executed franchise agreements with "a

franchise network of more than 300 retail service stations" in

Massachusetts. Business deals with "Massachusetts-based limited

liability compan[ies] . . . represent[ed] Exxon's 'purposeful

and successful solicitation of business from residents of the

Commonwealth." Id. at 318, quoting Tatro, supra. Similarly,

FCA US, formerly known as Chrysler Group LLC, contracts with

former Chrysler dealerships, like Sudbay, throughout

Massachusetts, to conduct business under the FCA US name.

Through these preexisting and ongoing business agreements with

Sudbay and other FCA US dealerships in Massachusetts, FCA US

engages in the "purposeful and successful solicitation of

business from residents of the Commonwealth," Exxon Mobil,

supra, by distributing cars manufactured by FCA US and Chrysler

as FCA US's predecessor in interest. We conclude, therefore,

that FCA US has transacted business in Massachusetts.

We turn next to whether the plaintiffs' claims arise from

FCA US's transaction of business in Massachusetts. To make this

determination, we employ a "but for" causation test. See Tatro,

416 Mass. at 770-771 (comparing proximate and "but for" cause

9

interpretations across several jurisdictions). The "but for"

causation test requires us to consider whether the distribution

of the Sebring in Massachusetts by FCA US's predecessor in

interest is "the first step in a train of events that results in

the personal injury." Id. at 770. We conclude that it is.

In Tatro, 416 Mass. at 765-768, the defendant, a California

hotel, contracted with a national organization to provide

accommodations at a special rate for an upcoming conference, and

the plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident and member of the

national organization, booked a room directly with the hotel

based on the mailing she received from the organization,

advertising the conference rate. During her stay, she fell and

was allegedly injured in her room. Id. at 766. We recognized

that, "but for the defendant's solicitation of business in

Massachusetts," id. at 771, including the hotel's contract with

the organization and "arrangements with several Massachusetts

corporations," id. at 766, "and its agreement to provide the

plaintiff with hotel accommodations in . . . California, the

plaintiff would not have been injured in a room of the hotel,"

id. at 771-772. The fact that the injury occurred out of State

did not mean the injury did not arise from those business

transactions in Massachusetts, see id. at 771, and so "the

requirements of G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a) [were] satisfied," id. at

774.

10

Recently, in von Schönau-Riedweg v. Rothschild Bank AG, 95

Mass. App. Ct. 471, 472, 474 (2019), the plaintiff, a Swiss

citizen, sought relief against a Swiss bank based on the actions

of its agent, a director at the bank, for significant monetary

losses stemming from the director's advice. The director had

advised the plaintiff to invest in "two Massachusetts-based

companies" with whom he had extensive business transactions.

Id. at 472, 489-490. Although the trial court dismissed the

bank for lack of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm

statute, the Appeals Court remanded for a hearing after

concluding that the plaintiff met her prima facie burden that

jurisdiction existed, should the director be an agent of the

bank. Id. at 473-474, 490-491. If the director was acting as

the bank's agent, then "a direct line [could] be drawn from his

Massachusetts contacts and [his] advice, such that 'but for'

[his] actions in Massachusetts" the plaintiff would not have

invested in the Massachusetts businesses. Id. at 490, quoting

Tatro, 416 Mass. at 771.

We conclude that the "but for" causation requirement is

satisfied in the instant case. The automobile was first sold in

Massachusetts and remained here for several years before it was

sold to a resident of a neighboring State. But for the first

sale here, the Sebring would not have ended up with Doucet. FCA

US argues, however, that "the only connection to Massachusetts

11

is a highly tangential one," because its predecessor initially

shipped the car to a Rhode Island dealership, and second, once

FCA US's distributor placed the Sebring into the stream of

commerce in Massachusetts with the initial lease and sale,

several others purchased it in Massachusetts and New Hampshire

before Doucet's purchase and injury in New Hampshire. Although

there are multiple links in the factual chain, our decision in

Tatro supports personal jurisdiction. But for FCA US's

extensive business transactions in Massachusetts, which included

distributing the Sebring through the Massachusetts dealership,

Doucet would not have been injured in New Hampshire, making FCA

US's distribution in Massachusetts "the first step in a train of

events that results in the personal injury." See Tatro, 416

Mass. at 770. Consistent with our broad construction of G. L.

c. 223A, § 3 (a), see id. at 767, we conclude that Doucet's

claims arose from FCA US's transaction of business in the

Commonwealth, in satisfaction of our long-arm statute.

b. Federal due process. Having first established

jurisdiction under our long-arm statute, we now consider whether

specific personal jurisdiction over FCA US in Massachusetts

comports with due process under the Federal Constitution. See

SCVNGR, 478 Mass. at 325. "The Fourteenth Amendment's Due

Process Clause limits a [S]tate court's power to exercise

jurisdiction over a defendant." Ford Motor Co. v. Montana

12

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (Ford

Motor). "The primary focus of" the Federal "personal

jurisdiction inquiry is the defendant's relationship to the

forum State." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of

Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (Bristol-Myers).

This long-standing constitutional requirement for personal

jurisdiction "depends on the defendant's having such 'contacts'

with the forum State that 'the maintenance of the suit' is

'reasonable, in the context of our [F]ederal system of

government,' and 'does not offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.'" Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1024,

quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-

317 (1945) (Int'l Shoe). Defendants, as well as plaintiffs,

must be treated "fairly," and the principles of "interstate

federalism" must be respected "to ensure that States with

'little legitimate interest' in a suit do not encroach on States

more affected by the controversy." Ford Motor, supra at 1025,

quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 263.

The plaintiffs assert that they have demonstrated these

requirements, whereas FCA US contends that the trial court

correctly determined that personal jurisdiction fails on the

ground that the plaintiffs' claims are not sufficiently related

to FCA US's contacts in the forum, especially in light of recent

United States Supreme Court decisions.

13

In analyzing these due process requirements, we focus our

attention on the case-specific facts, particularly the extensive

business FCA US undertakes in Massachusetts, as well as the

nexus between the plaintiffs' claims and FCA US's business in

Massachusetts -- specifically the sale of the automobile first

in Massachusetts, and then to Doucet in the neighboring State of

New Hampshire, where he was eventually injured. In this

circumstance, where FCA US engages in extensive business

dealings in Massachusetts, and a causal relationship between

those dealings and the plaintiffs' claims exists, we conclude

that Massachusetts's exercise of personal jurisdiction over FCA

US, with regard to the plaintiffs' claims, satisfies Federal due

process.

i. Purposeful availment. We begin with "the contacts

needed for" specific personal jurisdiction, which "often go by

the name 'purposeful availment.'" Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at

1024, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475

(1985) (Burger King). To satisfy this prong of the due process

inquiry for personal jurisdiction, the plaintiffs must

demonstrate that FCA US "has purposefully avail[ed] itself of

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,

thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws"

(quotation omitted). Knox v. MetalForming, Inc., 914 F.3d 685,

691 (1st Cir. 2019), quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,

14

253 (1958). Accord Ford Motor, supra at 1024-1025. This

"requirement ensures that the exercise of jurisdiction is

essentially voluntary and foreseeable, and is not premised on a

defendant's random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts"

(quotation and citations omitted). Knox, supra. Accord Burger

King, supra. Foreseeability means "the defendant's conduct and

connection with the forum State are such that he should

reasonably anticipate being haled into court there," World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (World-

Wide Volkswagen), while "[v]oluntariness requires that the

defendant's contacts with the forum [S]tate proximately result

from actions by the defendant himself" (quotation and citation

omitted), PREP Tours, Inc. v. American Youth Soccer Org., 913

F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 2019) (PREP Tours). Ultimately,

foreseeability and voluntariness ensure that the plaintiff's

"unilateral activity" does not form the basis for jurisdiction

over the defendant. Id., quoting Burger King, supra at 474.

They also lend "a degree of predictability to the legal system"

by "allow[ing] potential defendants to structure their primary

conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct

will and will not render them liable to suit." PREP Tours,

supra, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, supra.

In the instant case, this requirement is readily satisfied.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that FCA US "transacts

15

business and contracts to supply services and/or things in this

Commonwealth and has derived substantial revenue therefrom."

That business includes the distribution of automobiles into the

stream of commerce within Massachusetts, including the Sebring

in the instant case. The defendant Sudbay, a Massachusetts

corporation, "operat[es] a car dealership that distributes FCA

[US] vehicles into the stream of commerce within the

Commonwealth," including the Sebring at issue. The plaintiffs

allege that FCA US and Sudbay are also both involved in the

"inspecting, . . . selling, advertising, and marketing" of these

automobiles. The plaintiffs further allege that Sudbay

initially sold or leased the Sebring "to a Massachusetts

resident in May 2003," and that Sudbay, and other Massachusetts

dealerships, serviced the vehicle up until it was "sold to a New

Hampshire resident in April of 2011." FCA US also has a

registered agent in the Commonwealth.

The plaintiffs have thus clearly alleged that FCA US,

through these ongoing distribution, maintenance, and marketing

channels, "has purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of

conducting activities within" Massachusetts as "the forum State,

thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws"

(quotation and citation omitted). Knox, 914 F.3d at 691. See

Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 (purposeful availment where

automobile manufacturer's "dealers . . . regularly maintain and

16

repair" its cars). Massachusetts's exercise of personal

jurisdiction over FCA US, therefore, results from FCA US's

"voluntary" acts and their "foreseeable" consequences and is not

premised on "random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts"

(citation omitted). Knox, supra.11

ii. Relatedness. Although FCA US's extensive, voluntary

business transactions in Massachusetts are a significant part of

the due process analysis, they are not dispositive, as there

must also be a relationship between the actions voluntarily

undertaken in the jurisdiction and the plaintiffs' claims. See

Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1025. After the plaintiffs

demonstrate that the defendant "'exploit[ed] a market' in the

forum State," id., quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285

(2014), they must also show that their claims "'arise out of or

relate to the defendant's contacts' with the forum," Ford Motor,

supra, quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262. Known as

relatedness, this prong of the due process analysis requires a

11 Plus, FCA US has already faced a products liability suit

for a car purchased from another Chrysler dealership in

Massachusetts, Costa v. FCA US LLC, 542 F. Supp. 3d 83, 90 (D.

Mass. 2021), without "rais[ing] personal jurisdiction

objections" in that suit, further "bolster[ing]" a "finding of

purposeful availment," Tom's of Me. v. Acme-Hardesty Co., 565 F.

Supp. 2d 171, 182 (D. Me. 2008). Literally speaking, FCA US has

already been "haled into court" in this forum State. See World-

Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.

17

"demonstrable nexus" between the claim and "the defendant's

forum contacts." Knox, 914 F.3d at 691.

In the context of a company doing extensive business in the

forum State, this requirement is most clearly articulated in the

United States Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers, 582

U.S. 255. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that a

California State court lacked personal jurisdiction over

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS), id. at 268, "a large

pharmaceutical company . . . incorporated in Delaware and

headquartered in New York," for the nonresident plaintiffs'[12]

claims for "injuries allegedly caused by" one of the

prescription drugs manufactured and sold by BMS, id. at 258-259.

In so holding, the Court noted that "[t]he nonresident

plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained [the drug] through

California physicians or from any other California source; nor

did they claim that they were injured by [the drug] or were

treated for their injuries in California." Bristol-Myers, 582

U.S. at 259. The nonresident plaintiffs also did not allege

that the drug "was designed and developed in BMS's California

research facilities" (citation and alteration omitted). Id. at

260-261. Instead, they relied on the claims raised by resident

12BMS did not argue against personal jurisdiction for the

claims brought by California residents in that mass tort action.

See Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 259.

18

plaintiffs who "prescribed, obtained, and ingested [the drug] in

California," id. at 265, seemingly in an attempt to forum shop

in a favorable State, Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1031.

Thus, the nonresident plaintiffs' claims had no actual

connection to the forum State because "all the conduct giving

rise to the nonresidents' claims occurred elsewhere." Bristol-

Myers, 582 U.S. at 265. Simply, there was no "adequate link

between the [forum] State and the nonresidents' claims." Id. at

264. Specific personal jurisdiction over BMS for these claims,

therefore, was inappropriate in California, regardless of BMS's

"extensive forum contacts that [were] unrelated to those

claims," because, as the Court explained, "a defendant's general

connections with the forum are not enough." Id.

In the instant case, unlike in Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at

264, not only did FCA US engage in extensive business dealings

in the forum, but there is also a causal connection between its

business dealings and the injury, albeit an indirect one, as the

automobile was first sold in Massachusetts and eventually

purchased by Doucet, a resident of a neighboring State. As

explained supra in our discussion of personal jurisdiction under

the Commonwealth's long-arm statute, "but for" the first sale of

the automobile in Massachusetts, Doucet would not have ended up

purchasing, driving, and being injured in the automobile in the

neighboring State of New Hampshire. FCA US, nonetheless, claims

19

that this causal connection is too attenuated to support

jurisdiction in Massachusetts.

In evaluating this attenuation argument, and whether these

facts are sufficient to establish the necessary nexus between

the defendant's contacts and the plaintiff's claims, both

parties turn to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ford

Motor, 141 S. Ct. 1017, for guidance, as do we. In that case,

the plaintiffs brought separate products liability suits against

Ford Motor Company (Ford) in the courts of two States where

serious car accidents occurred and where the victims resided.

Id. at 1022-1023. Ford had argued that the State courts lacked

personal jurisdiction "because the particular car involved in

the crash was not first sold in the forum State, nor was it

designed or manufactured there." Id. at 1022.13

The court, as well as the concurring opinions, rejected

this analysis as unduly constrictive. See Ford Motor, 141 S.

Ct. at 1026; id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the

judgment); id. at 1039 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the

13 Thus, Ford was making the exact opposite argument of the

one being made by the automobile company here: that is, that

due process required jurisdiction in the State of first sale,

not the State in which the injury occurred. See Ford Motor, 141

S. Ct. at 1022-1023. Indeed, FCA US successfully made the same

argument, albeit before the issuance of Ford Motor, when the

plaintiffs first sought to bring this suit in New Hampshire. As

a result, in this case, the plaintiffs have been placed in a

Kafkaesque procedural predicament by the defense.

20

judgment). They all concluded that the combination of extensive

business dealings in the forum State and an injury in that State

was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In so holding, none of

the opinions expressly ruled out that the combination of

extensive dealings in the forum State and the first sale of the

automobile at issue in the forum State would be sufficient.

Nonetheless, FCA US argues here that such an interpretation is

implicit in the Court's and the concurrences' reasoning. We

disagree.

In upholding jurisdiction, Justice Kagan, writing for the

Court, rejected Ford's strict "causation-only approach" as

unnecessarily narrowing the bounds of specific personal

jurisdiction. Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. In so doing, she

emphasized that causation is one -- but not the only -- way to

satisfy the "arise out of or relate to" requirement, which may

be read in two parts. Id. "The first half of that standard

asks about causation; but the back half, after the 'or,'

contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction

without a causal showing." Id. In other words, the "relate to"

clause captures more conduct than the "arise out of" clause,

which hews more closely to "proof of causation -- i.e., proof

that the plaintiff's claim came about because of the defendant's

in-[S]tate conduct." See id. Furthermore, in evaluating how

Ford's "conduct" in the forum States "relate[d] to the claims"

21

presented by forum State resident plaintiffs, the Court

explained that the plaintiffs' suits "ar[ose] from . . . car

accident[s] in" States where Ford "advertised, sold, and

serviced" the allegedly defective car models (emphases added).

Id. at 1028. The Court concluded, therefore, that this behavior

established "a strong relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation -- the essential foundation of

specific jurisdiction" (quotations and citation omitted). Id.

As stated supra, the Court did not rule out jurisdiction

where the first sale of the automobile at issue occurs in the

State. Rather, the thrust of the opinion was to expand, not

contract, jurisdiction, beyond requiring "but for" causation.

See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. Nevertheless, FCA US argues

here that that was the Court's intent. It does so based mostly

on the discussion between the Court and Justice Gorsuch's

concurring opinion, particularly the footnote addressing the

concurrence written by Justice Gorsuch. See id. at 1027 n.3.

In that footnote, the Court wrote,

"In thus reiterating this Court's longstanding approach, we

reject Justice Gorsuch's apparent (if oblique) view that a

[S]tate court should have jurisdiction over a nationwide

corporation like Ford on any claim, no matter how unrelated

to the State or Ford's activities there. See [id.] at

1039. On that view, for example, a California court could

hear a claim against Ford brought by an Ohio plaintiff

based on an accident occurring in Ohio involving a car

purchased in Ohio. Removing the need for any connection

between the case and forum State would transfigure our

specific jurisdiction standard as applied to corporations.

22

"Case-linked" jurisdiction, see [id.] at 1024-1025, would

then become not case-linked at all."

Id. at 1027 n.3. See id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in

the judgment).

We reject this interpretation by FCA US of that footnoted

discussion and of the Court's decision as a whole. Where a

first sale of the automobile that caused the injury occurred in

the State, there is a relationship between the claim stemming

from that injury and the defendant's contacts in the forum. See

Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. There are not only extensive

business dealings by the defendant in the State in which

jurisdiction is sought, but also business dealings related to

the automobile that is the subject of the litigation. See id.

at 1022, 1026. Consequently, there is a "strong relationship

between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" (quotation

and citation omitted). Id. at 1028. See id. at 1035 (Gorsuch,

J., concurring in the judgment) (State in which allegedly

defective automobile at issue in suit is sold has "strong

interest in ensuring [it does not] become marketplace[] for

unreasonably dangerous products").14

14Our interpretation of Ford Motor is consistent with those

of Federal and other State courts that have applied Ford Motor

since its recent issuance. For example, in the United States

District Court for the District of Idaho, the court found

relatedness stemming from a "but for" causation relationship in

which a foreign corporation sold and shipped products to a

distributor in Idaho, who then sold the defective product to

23

iii. Reasonableness and interstate federalism. Lastly,

"[o]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully

established minimum contacts within the forum State, these

contacts may be considered in light of other factors to

determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would

comport with 'fair play and substantial justice,'" Burger King,

471 U.S. at 476, quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320, and the

principles of interstate federalism, Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at

1025, 1030. We conclude that specific personal jurisdiction in

Pennsylvania plaintiffs, causing injury to them there in their

State of residence. See McHugh vs. Vertical Partners W., LLC,

U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 2:20-cv-00581-DCN, slip op. at 2, 11-12 (D.

Idaho Apr. 19, 2021). Like this case, the plaintiffs brought

their suit not in their State of residence, but in the State

where the defective product was first sold. Id. at 2. Unlike

this case, however, the plaintiffs purchased the item directly

from the forum State distributor. Id. Regardless, "but for"

the foreign corporation first sending its defective product to

the forum State distributor, the injury would not have occurred

out of State. See id. That is the same scenario presented

here: but for FCA US sending the Sebring to a Massachusetts

dealership-distributor, Doucet's injury would not have occurred

in New Hampshire.

In a products liability case this year, the First District

Appellate Court of Illinois recognized personal jurisdiction

over a South Korean corporation, which manufactured a battery

that allegedly exploded inside another product and caused injury

to the plaintiff. Kothawala v. Whole Leaf, LLC, 2023 IL App

(1st) 210972, ¶¶ 1, 4, 6. The court reasoned that "given that a

finding of relatedness requires something short of but-for

causation under Ford [Motor], it [was] difficult to see how

anyone could plausibly argue that [the] plaintiff's claims

[were] not at least 'related to'" the foreign corporation's

"activities in" the forum State, id. at ¶ 54, based on the

corporation's "direct shipment of battery packs to a distributor

for resale," id. at ¶ 51, in the forum State.

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Massachusetts over FCA US LLC for the plaintiffs' claims is

consistent with these "two sets of values." See id. at 1025,

citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.

As an initial matter, we emphasize that "a defendant who

has purposefully directed [its] activities at" the forum "must

present a compelling case that the presence of some other

considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Burger

King, 471 U.S. at 477. As discussed supra, and conceded by FCA

US at the motion hearing, there is no question that FCA US

"purposefully directed" its activities at Massachusetts. See

id. Indeed, those contacts are significant and widespread. The

first sale of the automobile in question also provides a causal

connection between those activities and the automobile in

question. See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. That automobile

also remained on the streets and highways of Massachusetts for

eight years before it was sold to Doucet in a neighboring State.

Although the Court in Ford Motor, and perhaps Justice Alito

in his concurrence in that case, may suggest that the connection

to the litigation is stronger in the State in which the injury

occurred (New Hampshire) than in the State in which the first

sale occurred (Massachusetts), both are strong enough where the

defendant does substantial business in the State at issue to

satisfy the requirements of due process. See Ford Motor, 141 S.

Ct. at 1030; id. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring in the

25

judgment). "When minimum contacts exist, due process demands no

more than a reasonable forum." O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel

Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 325 (3d Cir. 2007). It does not demand

"the best forum."15 Just because "principles of 'interstate

federalism' support jurisdiction" over the plaintiffs' suit in

the State in which Doucet was injured and lives does not mean

these principles do not also support jurisdiction in the State

of first sale when substantial business is done in that State.

See Ford Motor, supra at 1029-1030.

As emphasized by Justice Gorsuch in his concurrence in Ford

Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1035, a State has a significant interest in

protecting itself against the sale of defective products within

its borders. Accordingly, FCA US's purposefully directed

activities within Massachusetts enhance the Commonwealth's

interest in this litigation, where the allegedly defective

automobile at issue remained in Massachusetts for eight years

prior to its sale to a resident of a neighboring State, and

15Of additional consideration in this instance is the

presence of two defendants: Sudbay, which is "at home" only in

Massachusetts, and FCA US, which is not at home in either

Massachusetts or New Hampshire. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571

U.S. 117, 134-139 (2014). Although Massachusetts may exercise

its general personal jurisdictional powers over Sudbay, see id.,

the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that Sudbay has the

minimal contacts related to this suit in New Hampshire to bring

this suit against it there, see Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1024.

Massachusetts, therefore, provides an efficient forum for the

resolution of this case. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292

(discussing importance of "efficient" forum).

26

where there may be other defective vehicles within our borders,

by virtue of FCA US's ongoing contacts. Finally, there is no

issue of the plaintiffs bringing a suit in a State to which

their claims have no connection as a means of forum shopping, as

there was in Bristol-Myers. See Ford Motor, supra at 1031;

Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 265-266. The plaintiffs originally

filed their suit in New Hampshire, the State of residence and

injury, and only brought this suit in the State of first sale

after the defendants argued, and the Federal District Court in

New Hampshire concluded, prior to the Ford Motor decision, that

jurisdiction did not lie in the State in which the injury

occurred. As the defendants are now arguing the exact opposite

position, and the plaintiffs have been bounced from court to

court for years, the values of "fair play and substantial

justice," as well as interstate federalism, clearly now support

jurisdiction in Massachusetts. See Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at

1024, 1030, quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; Burger King,

471 U.S. at 476.

3. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude

that personal jurisdiction exists in Massachusetts over FCA US

for these claims, pursuant to both the Commonwealth's long-arm

statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore vacate the judgment

27

dismissing FCA US as a party to the case and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.