refusing opportunity to amend because even if plaintiffs amended their petition, “the true nature of their complaint would not change”
How later courts described this case
- refusing opportunity to amend because even if plaintiffs amended their petition, “the true nature of their complaint would not change”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-22-00723-CV
Benedict C. Ogbodiegwu, Appellant
v.
Bryan Daniel, in his Official Capacity; Edward Serna, in his Official Capacity;
Isabel Camarilla, in her Official Capacity; J. Tucker, in his Official Capacity; C. Gloria, in
his Official Capacity; Texas Workforce Commission; Julian Alvarez, in his
Official Capacity; Aaron Demerson, in his Official Capacity; and B. Grayson, in his
Official Capacity, Appellees
FROM THE 425TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
NO. 22-0929-C425, THE HONORABLE BETSY F. LAMBETH, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a dispute over the Texas Workforce Commission’s denial of
Benedict C. Ogbodiegwu’s application for unemployment benefits. Ogbodiegwu appeals from
the trial court’s judgment granting the Commission’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss and sustaining
its plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Ogbodiegwu filed his first claim for unemployment benefits on November 29, 2020.
The Commission approved his claim, and he received $535 per month in benefits
from November 28, 2020, to November 26, 2021. Ogbodiegwu filed a second claim on
November 28, 2021. The Commission denied his claim because Ogbodiegwu’s wages in the
previous year did not meet the statutory threshold. See Tex. Lab. Code § 207.021(a)(7)
(requiring applicant to have made at least “not less than six times the individual’s benefit
amount” in previous benefit year). Ogbodiegwu challenged the denial using the Commission’s
internal processes. During those proceedings, Ogbodiegwu requested, pursuant to the Public
Information Act (PIA), see generally Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.001–.376, that the Commission
supply him with audio recordings of his phone calls with Commission staff and the record of a
hearing. According to Ogbodiegwu’s pleadings, each request was refused. The Commission
ultimately issued a final decision denying Ogbodiegwu’s second application.
Ogbodiegwu sued the Commission, the commissioners, and several staff members
(collectively, “the Commission”). He sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision,
see Tex. Lab. Code § 212.201 (authorizing aggrieved party to file suit for judicial review of
Commission’s decision), and money damages for purported violations of the PIA. The
Commission filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss the judicial-review claim and a plea to the
jurisdiction on the PIA claim. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss
and sustained the plea. Ogbodiegwu timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Ogbodiegwu argues in two issues that the trial court erred by dismissing
his claims. 1
1 As he did in the trial court, Ogbodiegwu appears here pro se. Although we construe
pro se pleadings liberally, we hold pro se appellants to the same standards as those represented
by counsel. See Crenshaw v. Thomas, No. 03-21-00064-CV, 2022 WL 2162933, at *1 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Austin June 16, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Housing Auth. of City of Austin
v. Elbendary, 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.).
2
Rule 91a
First, Ogbodiegwu argues that the trial court erred by granting the Commission’s
Rule 91a motion to dismiss his suit for judicial review of the denial of his second
benefits application.
Rule 91a allows a party to “move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that
it has no basis in law or fact.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. “A cause of action has no basis in law if
the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not
entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” Id. When ruling on a Rule 91a motion, a trial court
“may not consider evidence but ‘must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the
cause of action, together with any [permitted] pleading exhibits.’” In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut.
Ins., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1). We
review a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 91a motion de novo because “whether a defendant is
entitled to dismissal under the facts alleged is a legal question.” Id.
The Labor Code provides that an unemployed individual is eligible to receive
benefits if, relevant here, “after the beginning date of the individual’s most recent prior
benefit year,” the individual “earned wages in an amount equal to not less than six times the
individual’s benefit amount.” Tex. Lab. Code § 207.021(a)(7). To be eligible for additional
benefits, Ogbodiegwu’s wages in the previous benefit year must have been “not less” than six
times $535, which is $3,210. The Commission asserted in its motion that nothing in
Ogbodiegwu’s pleadings or exhibits allege that his wages for the previous year met that
threshold. Ogbodiegwu does not address this issue but argues, without citation to authority, that
the Commission could not deny his second application after granting his first.
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We agree with the Commission. Nothing in Ogbodiegwu’s pleadings allege that
he earned any wages in the previous benefit year. In fact, Ogbodiegwu challenged the
Commission’s initial findings that he earned $2,646 in the previous year working for a
construction company, arguing that this payment was “a refund for [his] medical insurance” from
a previous employer. The Commission ultimately agreed, stating in its final decision that he
earned no wages during the previous benefit year. We conclude the trial court did not err in
granting the motion to dismiss because Ogbodiegwu’s allegations, taken as true, do not entitle
him to the relief sought. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. We overrule Ogbodiegwu’s first issue.
Plea to the Jurisdiction
Ogbodiegwu next argues that the trial court erred by sustaining the Commission’s
plea to the jurisdiction asserting that sovereign immunity barred his claims for violation of
the PIA.
The State of Texas and its agencies, including the Commission, “retain sovereign
immunity from suit unless the Legislature clearly and unambiguously waives it.” See Christ
v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 664 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. 2023), reh’g denied (May 5, 2023). 2
Because sovereign immunity “implicates a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, it is properly
asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Id. When a government entity challenges jurisdiction on
2 Ogbodiegwu also sued the commissioners and employees of the Commission in their
official capacities. The Commission’s immunity as a state agency “extends to its officials who
act consistently with the law but not to those who act ultra vires—that is, ‘without legal authority
or [by] fail[ing] to perform a purely ministerial act.’” Van Boven v. Freshour, 659 S.W.3d 396,
401–02 (Tex. 2022) (quoting City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009)
(footnotes omitted)). An ultra vires claim “must be brought against government officials in their
official capacity and may seek only prospective injunctive remedies.” Chambers-Liberty Cntys.
Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 348 (Tex. 2019). Although Ogbodiegwu sued the
individual defendants in their official capacities, he did not assert any ultra vires claims.
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immunity grounds, the plaintiff has the burden to “affirmatively demonstrate” a valid waiver of
immunity. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). In determining
whether the plaintiff has met that burden, a court construes the pleadings liberally, takes all
factual assertions as true, and looks to the pleader’s intent. Heckman v. Williamson County,
369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). We review the disposition of a plea to the jurisdiction de
novo. Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex. 2021).
The PIA “guarantees access to public information, subject to certain exceptions.”
Boeing Co. v. Paxton, 466 S.W.3d 831, 833 (Tex. 2015) (citing Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety
v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2011)). To enforce this right of
access, the PIA waives immunity and permits a requestor to “file suit for a writ of mandamus
compelling a governmental body to make information available for public inspection” when a
governmental body: (1) refuses to request a decision of the Attorney General on whether
information is public or (2) refuses to supply information that is public or that the Attorney
General has determined is public and not within one of the exceptions to disclosure. See Tex.
Gov’t Code § 552.321(a); Empower Texans, Inc. v. Dallas County, 648 S.W.3d 664, 671 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2022, pet. denied).
In his pleadings, Ogbodiegwu does not seek mandamus relief to compel the
Commission to disclose public information. Instead, he seeks $100,000 for the time spent
attempting to obtain the recording he sought and to compensate him for the “mental pains and
financial difficulties” caused by the Commission’s actions. Although a plaintiff who
“substantially prevails” in a suit for writ of mandamus may recover “costs of litigation and
reasonable attorney fees,” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.323(a), money damages are not available in a
mandamus suit seeking documents under Section 552.321, see City of Houston v. Kallinen,
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516 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Moore v. Collins,
897 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (reaching same conclusion
under PIA’s predecessor statute). We conclude that Ogbodiegwu has not alleged a valid waiver
of immunity for his claims for damages for violations of the PIA. 3
Generally, we allow parties the opportunity to amend “unless their pleadings
demonstrate incurable defects.” Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Tex.
2022). The right to amend “typically arises when the pleadings fail to allege enough
jurisdictional facts to demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Clint Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 559 (Tex. 2016). The jurisdictional bar here does not arise from
the lack of factual allegations but from the nature of Ogbodiegwu’s claim. To cure the defect
here would not entail adding new jurisdictional facts but would essentially require Ogbodiegwu
to plead a new claim. “Generally, remand is a mechanism for parties, over whose claims the trial
court may have jurisdiction, to plead facts tending to establish that jurisdiction, not for parties,
over whose claims the trial court does not have jurisdiction, to plead new claims over which the
trial court does have jurisdiction.” Id. We conclude that Ogbodiegwu is not entitled to an
opportunity to replead. See id. (refusing opportunity to amend because even if plaintiffs
amended their petition, “the true nature of their complaint would not change”); BCCC Soc.
Members Ass’n v. Barton Creek Resort LLC, No. 03-18-00708-CV, 2020 WL 2990577, at *6
(Tex. App.—Austin June 3, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Remanding the case would serve no
3Ogbodiegwu states in his live pleading that his claim for damages is “based on” Section
552.353 of the PIA. That statute makes it a misdemeanor offense not to comply with the PIA,
providing that “[a]n officer for public information, or the officer’s agent, commits an offense if,
with criminal negligence, the officer or the officer’s agent fails or refuses to give access to, or to
permit or provide copying of, public information to a requestor as provided by this chapter.”
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.353(a). Nothing in Section 552.353 addresses money damages for a
violation of the PIA. See generally id. § 552.353.
6
legitimate purpose because the Association’s pleading defects as to its money damages claim for
breach of bylaws cannot be cured and it has not suggested how the jurisdictional defect may be
cured for this claim.”).
We overrule Ogbodiegwu’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
__________________________________________
Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Theofanis
Affirmed
Filed: May 31, 2023
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