Dove v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

[Cite as Dove v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2023-Ohio-1840.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

KIMBERLY DOVE Case No. 2019-00969JD

Plaintiff Judge Patrick E. Sheeran

v. DECISION

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF

REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION

Defendant

{¶1} Plaintiff brought this action alleging failure-to-accommodate discrimination

and assault and battery claims against Defendant. The case was tried before a

Magistrate. On December 21, 2022, the Magistrate issued a Decision, in which he

recommended judgment in favor of Defendant.

{¶2} On January 4, 2023, Plaintiff filed Objections to the Decision of the Magistrate.

On January 13, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Leve to File, Instanter, Response to

Plaintiff’s Objections to the Decision of the Magistrate. Plaintiff’s Objections are now

before the Court for consideration. As an initial matter, Defendant’s Motion for Leave is

GRANTED and the Court will consider Defendant’s Response as well. For the reasons

set forth below, the Court will overrule Plaintiff’s Objections, in part, and sustain Plaintiff’s

Objections, in part.

Standard of Review

{¶3} “A party may file written objections to a magistrate’s decision within fourteen

days of the filing of the decision * * *.” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i). Objections “shall be specific

and state with particularity all grounds for objection.” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii). “An objection

to a factual finding, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact * * *, shall

be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to

that finding * * *.” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii).

Case No. 2019-00969JD -2- DECISION

{¶4} The court “shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters

to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and

appropriately applied the law.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). In reviewing the objections, the court

does not act as an appellate court but rather conducts “a de novo review of the facts and

conclusions in the magistrate’s decision.” Ramsey v. Ramsey, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

13AP-840, 2014-Ohio-1921, ¶ 16-17. However, “[i]f an objecting party fails to submit a

transcript or affidavit, the trial court must accept the magistrate’s factual findings and limit

its review to the magistrate’s legal conclusions.” Triplett v. Warren Corr. Inst., 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 12AP-728, 2013-Ohio-2743, ¶ 13. “Whether or not objections are timely

filed, a court may adopt or reject a magistrate’s decision in whole or in part, with or without

modification.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b).

Factual Background and Procedural History

{¶5} Plaintiff, Kimberly Dove, was formerly employed as a chaplain with Defendant,

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), at its Lebanon Correctional

Institution. For a period, former Deputy Warden Marva Allen was Plaintiff’s direct

supervisor. On Thursday, September 20, 2018, Allen pushed Plaintiff, without consent,

into a hallway where OC (oleoresin capsicum) or pepper spray had been deployed.

Plaintiff was affected by the pepper spray, causing her to choke. She responded to the

shove by stating “This is how you train people?” Plaintiff filed an incident report and soon

after spoke with incoming Warden Chae Harris regarding the incident. Warden Harris

was aware of prior complaints against Allen. By Monday, September 24, 2018, after

learning of the incident, Warden Harris had reviewed the security footage of the incident,

opened a formal investigation, reassigned another deputy warden to oversee Plaintiff and

the chapel and chaplain services, and ordered Allen to stay away from Plaintiff. Even

though ordered to stay away from Plaintiff, Allen had visited the chapel, parked near

Plaintiff, and even came into direct contact with her in the head of human resources, Chris

Brown’s, office. It was not until March 4, 2019, that Director Annette Chambers-Smith

issued Allen a two-day paid working suspension due to the incident after reviewing a

written conclusion of the incident and viewing the security camera footage. Chambers-

Smith did not know about the stay away order or Allen’s violations. Moreover, or possibly

Case No. 2019-00969JD -3- DECISION

as a result of that lack of knowledge, Chambers-Smith did not conduct any further

investigation into the incident before issuing the brief paid suspension.

{¶6} Plaintiff initiated her period of disability leave soon after the incident on

September 28, 2018. While on disability leave, Plaintiff started treating with a psychiatrist

who diagnosed her with major depression and acute stress disorder. These diagnoses

lead to the psychiatrist supporting Plaintiff’s leave as Plaintiff was unable to work. Plaintiff

communicated to her ODRC contact that she could return to work if either she or Allen

were moved to a different facility.

{¶7} In December 2018, Plaintiff applied for vacant chaplain position with ODRC’s

Northeast Reintegration Center. Hiring Manager Sherri Pennington stated that this was

a SEIU 1199 collective bargaining position. Another ODRC chaplain with more seniority,

John Tate, also applied for this position. Plaintiff did not get the position because Tate

had more seniority under the collective bargaining agreement, and thus, absent a

showing that Plaintiff was far more qualified for the position (which she did not do), he

had to be offered the position ahead of Plaintiff.

{¶8} In January 2019, ODRC held a hearing to determine whether Plaintiff would

be subject to an involuntary disability separation. The separation was based on her

continued inability to work and her psychiatrist’s written findings that Plaintiff was unable

to perform her job duties until at least April 1, 2019. Plaintiff was placed on involuntary

disability separation, which reflects in the ODRC employee file as a termination of

employment. Plaintiff had the ability to apply for reinstatement within two years from the

date she was no longer in active work status.

{¶9} In the fall of 2019, Plaintiff applied for a vacant chaplain position at Chillicothe

Correctional Institution. Plaintiff and a contract chaplain were both interviewed for the

position. Pennington stated that Plaintiff had the seniority of an external candidate

because of the involuntary disability separation. During the hiring process, Plaintiff did

not communicate to the hiring committee and Chillicothe or her contacts with Lebanon or

ODRC regarding her application and prior disability leave and involuntary disability

separation. Plaintiff was not hired for the position.

{¶10} Plaintiff filed this case in September 2019 alleging assault and battery claims

against ODRC. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint in March 2020 adding failure-

Case No. 2019-00969JD -4- DECISION

to-accommodate disability discrimination claims. After presentation of the evidence at

trial, the Magistrate found that ODRC did not fail to accommodate Plaintiff as she did not

make requests for reasonable accommodations and ODRC did not ratify Allen’s assault

and battery. Accordingly, the Magistrate recommended that judgment on all claims be

entered in favor of Defendant.

Plaintiff’s First Objection and Second Objection

{¶11} Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate’s conclusion that there was no disability

discrimination because Plaintiff’s requests for transfer to two other facilities did not

constitute reasonable accommodations. Plaintiff’s first objection relates to a potential

transfer to a vacant position at ODRC’s Northeast Reintegration Center. Plaintiff’s second

objection relates to a potential transfer to a vacant position at ODRC’s Chillicothe

Correctional Institution.

{¶12} “Employees can prove discrimination in two ways, either directly or indirectly,

and each has its own test.” Blanchet v. Charter Communications, LLC, 27 F.4th 1221,

1227 (6th Cir.2022). “Since failure to accommodate is expressly listed in the Act’s

definition of disability discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), ‘claims premised

upon an employer’s failure to offer a reasonable accommodation necessarily involve

direct evidence (the failure to accommodate) of discrimination.’” Id., quoting Kleiber v.

Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir.2007). The direct evidence

framework under which plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim is analyzed requires her

to “establish that (1) she ‘is disabled,’ and (2) that she is ‘“otherwise qualified” for the

position despite * * * her disability: * * * (c) with a proposed reasonable accommodation.’”

Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999 F.3d 400, 417 (6th Cir.2021), quoting Fisher v. Nissan

N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 417 (6th Cir.2020), quoting Kleiber at 869.

{¶13} Ohio employers are required to make reasonable accommodations. See 42

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); R.C. § 4112.02(A)(13); O.A.C. § 4112-5-08(E)(1). Plaintiff

“bears the initial burden of suggesting an accommodation and showing that the

accommodation is objectively reasonable.” Nighswander v. Henderson, 172 F.Supp.2d

951, 963 (N.D.Ohio 2001). Examining the reasonableness of plaintiff’s request for

accommodation, “[r]easonable accommodations consist of ‘[m]odifications or

Case No. 2019-00969JD -5- DECISION

adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the

position * * * is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability * * * to

perform the essential functions of that position.’” Obnamia v. Shinseki, 569 Fed.Appx.

443, 445 (6th Cir.2014), quoting 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(ii). An ADA plaintiff has the burden

of “showing ‘that the accommodation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and

of proportional to costs.’” Keith v. Cty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 927 (6th Cir.2013),

quoting Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir.1996). If a disabled

employee makes a reasonable accommodation request, the employer is obligated to

engage in the “interactive process,” which requires “communication and good-faith

exploration of possible accommodations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); Kleiber, 485 F.3d at

871.

{¶14} For purposes of the direct evidence framework, the Court finds that Plaintiff

was disabled, with major depression and acute stress disorder, and is otherwise qualified

as a prison chaplain despite this disability. The issue with whether Plaintiff made requests

for reasonable accommodations under the circumstances. “A ‘reasonable

accommodation’ under the ADA may include ‘reassignment to a vacant position.’”

Gearhart v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 833 Fed.Appx. 416, 425 (6th Cir.2020),

quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). “However, the ADA does not require an employer to

‘waive legitimate, non-discriminatory employment policies[,] displace other employees’

rights to be considered in order to accommodate the disabled individual,’ or ‘create new

jobs * * * in order to accommodate a disabled individual.’” Id., quoting Burns v. Coca-

Cola Ents., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir.2000).

Northeast Reintegration Center

{¶15} When Plaintiff applied to the Northeast, another ODRC employee with more

seniority had also applied. Employers are not required to “violate a collective bargaining

agreement * * * in order to return a disabled employee to work.” Henschel v. Clare Cty.

Rd. Comm., 737 F.3d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir.2013); see also Rector v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’

Comp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-812, 2010-Ohio-2104, ¶ 16, quoting Woodruff v.

School Bd. of Seminole Cty., 304 Fed. Appx. 795, 801 (11th Cir.2008) (“‘An employer is

not required to grant an employee a transfer to a different position if such a transfer

Case No. 2019-00969JD -6- DECISION

violates a collective bargaining agreement because such an accommodation is not

reasonable.’”). More particularly, “the ADA does not require disabled individuals to be

accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other

employees.” Eckles v. Conrail, 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996); see also Davis v.

Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir.2000) (“[A]n accommodation

that contravenes the seniority rights of other employees under a collective bargaining

agreement is unreasonable as a matter of law.”).

{¶16} A requested transfer that violates collective bargaining is not a reasonable

accommodation. The position at Northeast was a SEIU 1199 collective bargaining unit

position and was required to be filled under the terms of the collective bargaining

agreement. Pennington testified that when two bargaining unit employees apply for the

same position, the more senior employee gets the job unless the junior employee can

show that they are much more qualified. Plaintiff and Tate, a more senior chaplain,

applied for the position. Under the collective bargaining agreement, Tate had the right to

the position based on his seniority rank. ODRC is not required to ask more senior

applicants to withdraw an application. This precedent would infringe on collective

bargaining rights, which the law has historically protected. Even though in hindsight Tate

testified he would have withdrawn his application, requiring all applicants be asked

whether they would withdraw from a collectively bargained position in preference for

another applicant does not constitute a reasonable accommodation to trigger the

interactive process.

{¶17} Plaintiff cites to Tate and Pennington’s testimony that a more senior member

withdrawing his application so a less senior member can obtain a transfer would not

violate the collective bargaining agreement. That may well be true. However, the source

of the withdrawal request must be considered. If ODRC management asked Tate to

withdraw his application so that a less senior member could be hired, that could be viewed

as coercive. As a result, such a course of conduct cannot be said to constitute a

reasonable accommodation. Had Plaintiff herself asked Tate to do so, that would not

have raised the same issue, but to require ODRC management to do so is not reasonable.

{¶18} Upon independent review of the evidence, the Court does not find that

Plaintiff’s transfer request to Northeast was a reasonable accommodation. Accordingly,

Case No. 2019-00969JD -7- DECISION

the Magistrate properly applied the relevant facts to the law. Accordingly, the Court

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s first objection.

Chillicothe Correctional Institution

{¶19} When Plaintiff applied to the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, she was no

longer employed with ODRC. Plaintiff’s employment with ODRC ended on January 18,

2019, when the involuntary disability separation process was completed. ODRC initiated

this process because medical reports showed Plaintiff was unable to perform the

essential functions of her employment due to her disability. Pennington testified that an

involuntary disability separated individual is identified in personnel records as having

been terminated and as such is considered an external candidate because they are not

currently employed by the state. Pennington also testified that there is a hierarchy for

hiring for collective bargaining unit positions: bargaining unit employees who work for the

agency; bargaining unit applicants from other agencies; non-union internal employees;

and finally external candidates. Accordingly, while applying to the position at Chillicothe,

Plaintiff was considered an external candidate. “Moreover, ‘employers simply are not

required to keep an employee on staff indefinitely in the hope that some position may

become available some time in the future.’” Thompson v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co.,

70 Fed.Appx. 332, 337 (6th Cir.2003), quoting Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90

F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir.1996). While there is testimony that ODRC could have kept

Plaintiff employed on unpaid leave, it was not required. Moreover, even if ODRC’s

decision to initiate involuntary disability separation was discretionary, there is no evidence

that keeping an employee on an extended leave of absence was the prevailing policy of

ODRC or likely in this circumstance. ODRC has a policy to keep chaplain positions

actively filled.

{¶20} Plaintiff did not propose the reasonable accommodation to transfer to the

vacant position at Chillicothe when she was still employed because the position was not

vacant at that time and there was no evidence it would become vacant. In fact, the

Chillicothe position did not become vacant until months after Plaintiff’s involuntary

disability separation process was completed. Even if involuntary disability separation is

different than permanent severance of employment, a request was never made to transfer

Case No. 2019-00969JD -8- DECISION

to a vacant position at Chillicothe to trigger the interactive process. “Indeed, a court need

not consider whether there has been a failure to engage in the interactive process when

a plaintiff fails to meet his burden of showing that a position to accommodate him was

vacant.” Arthur v. Am Show, Inc., 625 Fed.Appx. 704, 711 (6th Cir.2015). Plaintiff cites

Arthur as precedent that ODRC had an ongoing duty to accommodate a transfer even

after employment is terminated. However, the Sixth Circuit does not analyze the merits

of this position since it was immaterial to the overall decision, but rather tangentially

alludes to the potential as a case of first impression in a footnote. Id. at fn. 3 (“[Employer]

briefly argues that it had no duty under the ADA to accommodate [employee] since

[employee] was technically no longer an employee of [employer]. [Employer] cites to no

legal authority to support this position and the Court can find none.”). However, here,

Plaintiff did not appeal the disability separation, request to retain her employment longer,

or initiate the reinstatement process at any time before or during her application for the

position at Chillicothe. The Court cannot guess as to the hiring decision at Chillicothe,

but it is apparent from Plaintiff’s testimony that she did not put Chillicothe or Lebanon on

notice of her application. Plaintiff did not communicate the possibility of a reasonable

accommodation relating to the vacant position at Chillicothe to the hiring committee or

prior contacts at Lebanon. Simply, there was never a request for a transfer to a vacant

position at Chillicothe when Plaintiff was still an employee of ODRC.

{¶21} Upon independent review of the evidence, the Court does not find that

Plaintiff’s application to Chillicothe was a reasonable accommodation transfer request.

Accordingly, the Magistrate properly applied the relevant facts to the law. Accordingly,

the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s second objection.

Plaintiff’s Third Objection

{¶22} Plaintiff next objects to the Magistrate’s conclusion that ODRC did not ratify

Allen’s assault and battery against her. Initially, it is unrefuted that Allen’s actions

constituted the intentional torts of assault and battery and were outside of the scope of

her employment. Accordingly, the issue is whether ODRC’s conduct ratified the assault

and battery.

Case No. 2019-00969JD -9- DECISION

{¶23} It is well settled that an employer may expressly or impliedly ratify the acts

of its employees performed beyond the scope of employment. See Groner v. deLevie,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 00AP-1244, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1928, 27-28 (May 1, 2001).

“The continued employment of an individual who committed an intentional tort is not, in

and of itself, enough to show ratification by an employer. Jackson v. Hogeback, 12th

Dist. Butler No. CA2013-10-187, 2014-Ohio-2578, ¶ 27, citing Fulwiler v. Schneider, 104

App.3d 398, 407, 662 N.E.2d 82 (1st Dist.1995). However, it remains unclear whether

ratification can occur through an employer’s silence or acquiescence. See Lanning v.

Brown, 84 Ohio St. 385, 392, 95 N.E. 921 (1911) (“it seems to be the law that to confirm

or ratify, one must have knowledge of the matter or transaction to be confirmed or ratified,

and that silence or even acquiescence does not amount to such ratification.”); but see

Campbell v. Hospitality Motor Inns. Inc., 24 Ohio St.3d 54, 58, 493 N.E.2d 239 (1986)

(some evidence “could be viewed as demonstrating corporate ratification by silence * *

*.”). Nevertheless, it appears that “there are some situations where one would expect a

principal to act, and thus the failure to act can be viewed as a manifestation of intent to

ratify the agent’s act.” Amato v. Heinika Ltd., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84479, 2005-Ohio-

189, ¶ 6.

{¶24} ODRC ratified Allen’s intentional torts. Allen assaulted Plaintiff on Thursday,

September 20, 2018. While the assault on Plaintiff was the push itself, it is not lost on

the Court that the more serious nature of the assault was the conditions under which it

took place—Plaintiff was pushed into an area where virulent pepper spray had been

deployed, and she was exposed to it. By Monday, September 24, 2018, after learning of

the incident, Warden Harris had reviewed the security footage of the incident, opened a

formal investigation, reassigned another deputy warden to oversee Plaintiff and the

chapel and chaplain services, and ordered Allen to stay away from Plaintiff. Allen

repeatedly failed to obey these orders without consequence. Plaintiff, who was very

fearful of Allen, was significantly shaken up by this series of incidents and by

September 28, 2018, she had contacted her Employee Assistance Program and never

worked again at Lebanon Correctional Institution. Moreover, it was not until March 4,

2019, that Chambers-Smith gave Allen a two-day working suspension. However, even if

these actions superficially show they took the incident seriously, it is not dispositive of the

Case No. 2019-00969JD -10- DECISION

situation when there was not a sufficient investigation of the incident or interpretation of it

with the salient facts considered.

{¶25} Warden Harris and Chambers-Smith failed to take the incident, and Allen’s

prior and subsequent behavior, seriously. Plaintiff had been assaulted by Allen and it is

apparent from her testimony that she was fearful of being around Allen, testimony that

this Court finds credible. First, Warden Harris clearly indicated he was previously aware

that Allen’s workplace management style was described as harassing and disrespectful.

Allen had other complaints against her for her interactions with employees under her

management. As such, Warden Harris was on notice of Allen’s propensity for this type

of behavior. Second, Plaintiff testified that she reported Allen violating Warden Harris’

stay away order multiple times. Plaintiff testified Allen visited the chapel multiple times,

parked near her, and even came face to face with her while she was speaking with Brown

in his office. However, Warden Harris failed to sufficiently investigate, yet alone stop,

Allen’s ongoing behavior. Third, it was not until February 19, 2019, Chambers-Smith’s

first day as Director, when Allen was issued the two-day working suspension, which was

effective on March 4, 2019. While Chambers-Smith testified that she watched the security

video and read a written conclusion of the incident, it is not evident from her testimony

that she in fact was aware that Plaintiff was shoved into an area where virulent pepper

spray had been deployed, or appreciated the seriousness of the incident, when she made

her decision. Chambers-Smith failed to read the investigation report or further investigate

the incident, even though she knew Allen had been dishonest during the investigation.

Moreover, Chambers-Smith had no knowledge of the stay away order or repeated

violations. Simply put, Chambers-Smith failed to take into account many factors that,

when taken as a whole, undermine the claim that she conducted a serious investigation

prior to issuing Allen’s suspension. Further, a two-day paid working suspension is simply

not consequential enough given the full context not only of the assault, but of Allen’s

inability to comply with Harris’ orders. Fourth, Warden Harris repeatedly referred to the

incident as “horseplay.” Warden Harris characterized the incident as such initially after

watching the security video, and continued to refer to it as such on Allen’s written job

evaluation a year after the incident, which shows a failure to fully grasp the seriousness

of the incident. Finally, the Court does not find it persuasive that any difficulty in replacing

Case No. 2019-00969JD -11- DECISION

a Deputy Warden is evidence for condoning the highly inappropriate conduct of an

employee against another employee, especially a supervisor against a subordinate.

{¶26} While Warden Harris and Chambers-Smith responded to the incident, it is

clear there was no genuine effort to protect Plaintiff or discipline Allen. ODRC’s failure to

act, that is, to understand and appreciate what actually happened, can be viewed as a

manifestation of intent to ratify. An improper or insufficient investigation can constitute

ratification because an employee would (and should) expect their employer to thoroughly

investigate all salient facts of a workplace assault. Such an investigation did not occur in

this case. Under these circumstances, ODRC’s response in relation to Allen’s assault

and battery upon Plaintiff was incomplete and seriously misunderstood. This failure

constitutes ratification.

{¶27} Upon independent review of the evidence, the Court finds ODRC ratified the

assault and battery upon Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Magistrate improperly applied the

relevant facts to the law. Therefore, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s third objection.

Conclusion

{¶28} The Court finds that the Magistrate has properly determined the factual

issues and appropriately applied the law in this case in relation to the failure-to-

accommodate disability discrimination claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first and second

objections will be overruled.

{¶29} However, the Court finds that the Magistrate has not properly determined the

factual issues and appropriately applied the law in this case in relation to the assault and

battery claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third objection will be sustained. Judgment shall be

rendered in favor of Plaintiff.

PATRICK E. SHEERAN

Judge

[Cite as Dove v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2023-Ohio-1840.]

KIMBERLY DOVE Case No. 2019-00969JD

Plaintiff Judge Patrick E. Sheeran

v. JUDGMENT ENTRY

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF

REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION

Defendant

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

{¶30} Upon an independent, de novo review of the record, the Court finds that the

Magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law

with the exceptions noted in the Decision filed concurrently herewith. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s first and second objections are OVERRULED, and Plaintiff’s third objection is

SUSTAINED. Therefore, the Court modifies the Magistrate’s Decision and

Recommendation, including findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein,

consistent with this Decision.

{¶31} The Court finds Defendant liable for the assault and battery upon Plaintiff

through its ratification of its employee’s misconduct. Judgment on the assault and battery

claim is rendered in favor of Plaintiff. A case management conference with the Magistrate

is set for May 3, 2023, at 10:00 a.m., to discuss further proceedings on determination of

damages. Instructions on how to access the conference are attached.

PATRICK E. SHEERAN

Judge

Filed April 17, 2023

Sent to S.C. Reporter 6/2/23