L.A. Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

JANE DOE,

Real Party in Interest.

S269608

Second Appellate District, Division Three

B307389

Los Angeles County Superior Court

BC659059

June 1, 2023

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and

Evans concurred.

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v.

SUPERIOR COURT

S269608

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Some statutory schemes provide for the recovery of treble

damages, meaning that actual compensatory damages awarded

to a prevailing plaintiff are multiplied by three. Here we

consider a statute that, as recently amended by the Legislature,

provides for up to treble damages when a plaintiff suing in tort

for childhood sexual assault proves that the assault “was as the

result of a cover up” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (b)(1)

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as section 340.1(b)(1))) by the

defendant, with a “ ‘cover up’ ” being defined as “a concerted

effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault” (id.,

subd. (b)(2)). The specific issue before us is whether enhanced

damages can be awarded under section 340.1(b)(1) against a

public entity named as a defendant in a lawsuit for childhood

sexual assault, or whether such awards are prohibited under

Government Code section 818 (hereinafter sometimes referred

to as section 818), a provision within the Government Claims

Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), which specifies in relevant part

that a public entity may not be held liable in tort for “damages

imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of

punishing the defendant.” (§ 818.)

The Court of Appeal below determined that section 818

shields public entities from liability for enhanced damages

under section 340.1(b)(1). Based on our review of both

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

provisions, we agree with the Court of Appeal. We therefore

affirm the judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the first amended

complaint (hereinafter, complaint) and are assumed true in

light of this case’s procedural posture. (See Turman v. Turning

Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)

Real party in interest and plaintiff below Jane Doe

(hereinafter, plaintiff) was a student at Daniel Pearl Magnet

High School, operated by petitioner and defendant below Los

Angeles Unified School District (the District). Daniel Garcia

was an employee at the school when plaintiff enrolled in the

ninth grade for the 2014–2015 academic year. Garcia began to

give special attention to plaintiff. He acted affectionately

toward her at school, rubbing her legs and holding her hand.

Garcia also sent plaintiff flirtatious and sexual text messages. 1

In November 2014, Garcia sexually assaulted plaintiff. Plaintiff

later told her parents about Garcia’s actions. Her parents

immediately contacted the police. In May 2016, Garcia was

arrested and charged with criminal offenses associated with his

misconduct.

1

The complaint also describes Garcia’s improper conduct

toward other female students at Jane Doe’s high school,

including an allegation that a student complained to the school’s

administration that Garcia had inappropriately touched her.

Despite this misbehavior, the complaint alleges, Garcia was

allowed to remain employed at the school, and “to continue his

grooming conduct directed at Plaintiff, and . . . to sexually abuse

her.”

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Before these events occurred, the District had learned in

February 2014 that Garcia — who at the time worked as an aide

at a different school — was involved in a “boyfriend-girlfriend”

relationship with another female student, H.M. According to

the complaint, this relationship began while Garcia was

employed by the District. The District did not fire Garcia upon

learning of this relationship, but instead transferred him to the

high school where he would encounter plaintiff. The District

also created a false report stating that Garcia and H.M. had met

and dated before Garcia’s employment with the District

commenced. The complaint alleges that this falsehood

represented “an effort to cover-up Garcia’s prior sexual assault

of minor female students within the” District and resulted in the

sexual assault of plaintiff later that same year.

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims for sexual abuse,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sexual

harassment against Garcia. Against the District, plaintiff

advances various negligence theories and a claim for failing to

report suspected child abuse. In addition to economic and

noneconomic damages, plaintiff seeks punitive and exemplary

damages from Garcia and an award of up to treble damages

under section 340.1(b)(1) from the District.

The District brought a motion to strike the portions of the

complaint reciting allegations of a cover up, as well as the

request for up to treble damages. The District argued that the

allegations and request should be stricken pursuant to

section 818. The superior court denied the motion. It concluded

from the legislative history before it that section 340.1(b)(1)’s

treble damages provision was intended to be compensatory, not

punitive.

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The District then sought writ relief from the Court of

Appeal. After issuing an order to show cause, the Court of

Appeal granted the writ petition and directed the trial court to

enter an order granting the District’s motion to strike the treble

damages request and related allegations. (Los Angeles Unified

School Dist. v. Superior Court (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 549, 567

(Los Angeles Unified School Dist.).)

In granting the petition, the Court of Appeal determined

that section 818 protects public entities from the imposition of

enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1). The Court of

Appeal reasoned that because plaintiffs suing for childhood

sexual assault should receive full compensation for their injuries

in any event should they prevail at trial, the additional damages

authorized under section 340.1(b)(1) are primarily punitive and

thus cannot be assessed against a public entity. (Los Angeles

Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 561–562.)

According to the Court of Appeal, plaintiff had not articulated

“any injury from a childhood sexual assault or coverup for which

normal tort damages fail to provide full compensation” (id. at

p. 561), and the court itself had not identified any harm that

might be uncompensated or undercompensated without a

damages enhancement (ibid.). As for any other nonpunitive

purpose that might exist, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion

that the treble damages provision could be characterized as

nonpunitive because the possibility of enhanced damages might

incentivize lawsuits by victims of childhood sexual assaults. (Id.

at p. 566.) Summing up, the Court of Appeal explained that

“The treble damages provision in [Code of Civil Procedure]

section 340.1 does not have a compensatory function; its primary

purpose is to punish past childhood sexual abuse coverups to

deter future ones. While this is a worthy public policy objective,

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it is not one for which the state has waived sovereign immunity

under the Government Claims Act.” (Id. at p. 567.)

We granted review. Since that time, other Courts of

Appeal also have determined that enhanced damages under

section 340.1(b)(1) are not recoverable against public entities.

The appellate court in X.M. v. Superior Court (2021)

68 Cal.App.5th 1014, review granted December 1, 2021,

S271478 (X.M.) opined that “[i]t is the rare treble damages

provision that isn’t primarily designed to punish and deter

misconduct” (id. at pp. 1019–1020) and “treble damages will be

considered punitive when they apply to intentional misconduct

or morally offensive behavior, and the Legislature has not

clearly indicated an additional, compensatory purpose” (id. at

p. 1024). Regarding section 340.1(b)(1) specifically, the court

concluded that “the primary purpose of section 340.1’s treble

damages provision is punitive because it was designed to deter

future cover ups by punishing past ones,” with “the economic

and noneconomic damages available under general tort

principles . . . already [being] designed to make childhood sexual

assault victims whole — both for the physical and emotional

harm from the abuse itself, as well as for any additional

emotional harm from learning the abuse was the result of a

cover up.” (X.M., at p. 1019.) The court in X.M. regarded

section 818 as foreclosing application of section 340.1(b)(1) even

if enhanced damages might confer additional compensation

upon victims of childhood sexual assault or provide an incentive

for these individuals to bring lawsuits. (X.M., at pp. 1026‒

1030.) Despite such possibilities, the court determined,

“nothing in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 340.1 or its

legislative history convinces us the Legislature intended the

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

increased award to be more compensatory (or incentivizing)

than deterrent.” (Id. at p. 1020; see also id. at pp. 1027, 1030.)

Even more recently, the court in K.M. v. Grossmont Union

High School Dist. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717 also concluded that

section 818 precludes the application of section 340.1(b)(1) to

public entities. (K.M., at p. 742.) The K.M. court’s reasoning

generally aligned with that of the X.M. court and the Court of

Appeal below. (Id. at pp. 742–750.)

II. DISCUSSION

In deciding the issue before us, we first examine the

language of and rationales behind Government Code

section 818, as well as our case law applying this provision. We

then turn to section 340.1(b)(1) and consider whether

section 818 prohibits an award of enhanced damages under this

provision against a public entity, and we conclude that the

answer is yes.

A. Government Code Section 818

Our first task is to identify the kinds of damages awards

to which section 818 applies. Plaintiff argues that this provision

prohibits only the imposition of damages that are “simply and

solely punitive.” (People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976)

16 Cal.3d 30, 39 (Younger).) We conclude that section 818 is not

so limited, and instead immunizes public entities from damages

awarded under Civil Code section 3294 and from other damages

that would function, in essence, as an award of punitive or

exemplary damages.

1. Statutory Language and Purpose

Government Code section 818 provides, in full, as follows:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is

not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil

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Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of

example and by way of punishing the defendant.” 2

To ascertain this provision’s reach, we follow our well-

established principles of statutory interpretation. “ ‘ “When we

interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine

the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We

first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and

commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in

isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a

whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to

harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language

is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a

literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the

Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits

more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider

other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and

public policy.’ [Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of

a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory

scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word,

phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the

legislative purpose.’ ” ’ ” (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates,

LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856–857.)

2

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) provides, “In an

action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,

where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the

defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the

plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover

damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the

defendant.”

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Government Code section 818 clearly shields public

entities from punitive damages, which are also sometimes

referred to as exemplary damages. Punitive damages are

distinct from compensatory damages. While compensatory

damages “ ‘are intended to redress the concrete loss that the

plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful

conduct,’ ” punitive damages “ ‘operate as “private fines”

intended to punish the defendant and to deter future

wrongdoing.’ ” (Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. (2016)

63 Cal.4th 363, 371; see also State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.

Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 416 [differentiating

between compensatory damages and punitive damages].) The

California Law Revision Commission comment to section 818

corroborates this reading of the statute, explaining that “[t]his

section exempts public entities from liability for punitive or

exemplary damages.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 pt. 1

West’s Ann. Gov. Code (2012 ed.) foll. § 818, p. 322.)3

3

In enacting this statute, the Legislature apparently

recognized that although punitive and exemplary damages are

“imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of

punishing the defendant” (§ 818), they also could be perceived

as having additional, secondary functions. (Accord, Hofer v.

Lavender (Tex. 1984) 679 S.W.2d 470, 474–475 [reviewing

different purposes that courts have assigned to awards of

punitive damages]; Perry v. Melton (W.Va. 1982) 299 S.E.2d 8,

12–13 [describing various interests served by punitive

damages]; Walker v. Sheldon (N.Y. 1961) 179 N.E.2d 497, 498

[noting that the possibility of a punitive damages award “may

not infrequently induce the victim, otherwise unwilling to

proceed because of the attendant trouble and expense, to take

action against the wrongdoer”].) Although we had previously

described punitive damages as being awarded “purely as

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Yet section 818’s plain language also establishes that its

prohibition can extend to more than just what are

conventionally referred to as “punitive damages.” In providing

that “a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under

Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed

primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the

defendant” (§ 818, italics added), the statute, with its focus on

the practical operation of a damages provision, conveys that it

also captures other kinds of damages when they function, in

essence, as awards of punitive or exemplary damages.

This interpretation of section 818 comports with the

history behind this provision and the role it plays within the

statutory scheme. The majority rule in the United States long

has been that public entities are not liable for punitive damages

arising out of the acts or omissions of their employees, at least

without a clear expression of contrary legislative intent. (See,

e.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 259–

261; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases (1931) 44 Harv.

L.Rev. 1173, 1204.) This rule has been premised on various

policy rationales, including a sense that “[t]he money in the

[public] treasury is derived from the pockets of taxpayers who

have comparatively little to say about the actual management

of the [public] corporation’s business. It is not likely that the

political employee will be punished when the power of punishing

him is in the hands of his political patron, because of the

outcome of a damage suit against the city. Assessment of

punitive damages against a city would probably impoverish the

punishment and by way of example” (Gudarov v. Hadjieff (1952)

38 Cal.2d 412, 417), the Legislature was free to incorporate a

different understanding of these damages into section 818.

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public treasury without serving the admonitory function.”

(Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, at p. 1204; see also Newport,

at pp. 266–271 [detailing the policies that counsel against

allowing punitive damages against municipalities]; City of

Sanger v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 444, 450

[“Requiring . . . public entit[ies] to pay punitive damages would

punish the very group imposition of punitive damages was

intended to benefit”]; City of Gary v. Falcone (Ind.Ct.App. 1976)

348 N.E.2d 41, 42 [reciting explanations for the general rule

that public entities are immune from punitive damages].) The

disinclination to subject public entities to punitive and

exemplary damages has extended to treble damages in

circumstances where these damages are imbued with a

sufficiently exemplary character. (See, e.g., Hunt v. City of

Boonville (1877) 65 Mo. 620, 624–625; cf. Newport, at p. 261

[discussing Hunt].)4

We read section 818 as codifying this common law rule.

The Government Claims Act as a whole reflects an awareness

that although tort claims can draw from public coffers and may

impose additional burdens on taxpayers, to the extent these

awards are necessary to compensate plaintiffs with meritorious

claims for their injuries, they simply reflect the loss-distributing

function of tort law at work. (See Recommendation Relating to

Sovereign Immunity, No. 1 — Tort Liability of Public Entities

and Public Employees (Jan. 1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com.

4

We note that “exemplary” damages are sometimes framed

by statute as a multiple of actual damages incurred, whether

the multiplier serves as a base (e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 891, subd. (a),

1695.7, 2945.6, subd. (a)), ceiling (e.g., id., § 3426.3, subd. (c)), or

amount (e.g., id., § 3336.5, subd. (b)) of the “exemplary” damages

that can be recovered.

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Rep. (1963) pp. 810, 817.) Section 818, however, manifests an

appreciation that when additional impositions upon a public

entity are “primarily for the sake of example and by way of

punishing the defendant” (ibid.), they further drain the public

fisc, create a liability that will be borne not by the immediate

wrongdoers but by taxpayers, and may not effectively achieve

the goals of retribution and deterrence — and for these reasons,

such awards should not be permitted, at least without a clear

indication by the Legislature that they may be imposed. As the

California Law Revision Commission explained in its report

transmitting the proposed law to the Legislature, “Public

entities should not be liable for punitive or exemplary damages.

Such damages are imposed to punish a defendant for

oppression, fraud, or malice. They are inappropriate where a

public entity is involved, since they would fall upon the innocent

taxpayers.” (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity,

at p. 817; cf. Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006)

39 Cal.4th 1164, 1196, fn. 20 (Wells) [describing “the purpose

behind the statutory ban on punitive damages against public

entities” as “to protect their tax-funded revenues from legal

judgments in amounts beyond those strictly necessary to

recompense the injured party”]; accord, Paulson v. County of De

Kalb (Ill.App.Ct. 1994) 644 N.E.2d 37, 40 [construing Illinois

law as prohibiting the imposition of treble damages on a public

entity].)5

5

Whether this court would agree or disagree with these

policy arguments if presented to us as a matter of first

impression is of no consequence; what matters here is that the

Legislature apparently endorsed this reasoning when it enacted

what is now known as the Government Claims Act.

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2. Case Law Construing Government Code Section 818

Section 818 therefore conveys that a damages provision

cannot be applied against a public entity if it functions, in

essence, as an award of punitive or exemplary damages. Yet,

except for its reference to Civil Code section 3294, the statute

does not explain how punitive and exemplary damages are to be

distinguished from other kinds of awards. Our case law

interpreting Government Code section 818 provides insight into

how the statute should be applied. We glean a series of helpful

guidelines from our prior decisions in this area, which we

discuss next.

In Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970)

2 Cal.3d 1, we upheld the trial court’s refusal to allow a public

entity defendant sued in tort to introduce evidence that some of

the plaintiff’s medical bills had already been paid through

insurance. (Id. at pp. 4–6.) Explaining why the trial court’s

ruling, which implicated what is known as the “collateral

source” rule, was consistent with section 818, we regarded the

principle allowing plaintiffs to recover in tort against a

defendant notwithstanding a prior first-party insurance payout

as having “several legitimate and fully justified compensatory

functions.” (Helfend, at p. 13.) Our decision in Helfend

emphasized that “[t]he collateral source rule as applied here

embodies the venerable concept that a person who has invested

years of insurance premiums to assure his medical care should

receive the benefits of his thrift. The tortfeasor should not

garner the benefits of his victim’s providence.” (Id. at pp. 9–10,

fn. omitted.) We also reasoned that “[t]o permit the defendant

to tell the jury that the plaintiff has been recompensed by a

collateral source for his medical costs might irretrievably upset

the complex, delicate, and somewhat indefinable calculations

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which result in the normal jury verdict.” (Id. at pp. 11‒12.) Our

decision further explained that given the likelihood of a

contingency fee arrangement under which a plaintiff’s recovery

would be reduced by the amount owed to counsel, “[t]he

collateral source rule partially serves to compensate for the

attorney’s share and does not actually render ‘double recovery’

for the plaintiff” (id. at p. 12); in this respect, the rule “partially

provides a somewhat closer approximation to full compensation

for his injuries” (id. at p. 13).

The next year, in State Dept. of Corrections v. Workmen’s

Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 885 (State Dept. of Corrections),

we considered the relationship between Government Code

section 818 and Labor Code section 4553. The latter statute is

part of the state workers’ compensation scheme, “pursuant to

which the employer assumes liability for industrial personal

injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for

limitations on the amount of that liability.” (Shoemaker v.

Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.) Labor Code section 4553 provides

that the amount recoverable as workers’ compensation for an

accident “shall be increased one-half, together with costs and

expenses not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250), where

the employee is injured by reason of the serious and willful

misconduct” of the employer. We explained in State Dept. of

Corrections that Labor Code section 4553 “is designed to provide

more nearly full compensation to an injured employee rather

than to penalize an employer.” (State Dept. of Corrections, at

p. 889.) “Although an employer against whom an increased

award is made under [Labor Code] section 4553 is penalized in

the sense that he is required to pay a higher amount of

compensation by reason of his serious and wilful misconduct

than he would have been compelled to pay if his conduct were

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less culpable,” we observed, “the employee does not receive more

than full compensation for his injuries. Thus the increased

award is not a penalty in the sense of being designed primarily

to punish the defendant rather than to more adequately

compensate the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 890.)

Our subsequent decisions addressing section 818 also

involved contextual assessments of the particular awards under

review. In Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d 30, an enforcement action

brought by the state, we assumed that section 818 was

implicated insofar as the action was brought against a public

entity, but held that the statute did not preclude the imposition

of penalties to be paid into the State Water Pollution Cleanup

and Abatement Account (Wat. Code, § 13440) and dedicated to

the remediation of the unquantifiable harms associated with oil

spills. (Younger, at pp. 37–39.) We based this conclusion on our

determinations that these penalties “operate to more fully

compensate the people of this state and are not beyond an

amount equivalent to the harm done.” (Id. at pp. 38–39; see also

San Francisco Civil Service Assn. v. Superior Court (1976)

16 Cal.3d 46, 50–51 (San Francisco Civil Service Assn.)

[applying Younger’s reasoning in an action brought under

§ 13385 of the Wat. Code, also seeking civil penalties].)

Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139 (Kizer)

similarly determined that section 818 did not prevent the state

from seeking statutory penalties from a county-run health care

facility in an enforcement action brought under the Long-Term

Care, Health, Safety, and Security Act of 1973 (Health & Saf.

Code, § 1417 et seq.). (Kizer, at pp. 145–146.) Whereas our

decision in Younger had assumed that a Government Code

section 818 inquiry was implicated, in Kizer we explained that

section 818 was simply inapplicable to the sort of enforcement

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action that was before us. Stressing that the Government

Claims Act is concerned with liability for claims that involve an

“ ‘injury’ ” (Kizer, at p. 145, quoting Gov. Code, § 810.8), we

found “nothing in the . . . Act to suggest that . . . section 818 was

intended to apply to statutory civil penalties designed to ensure

compliance with a detailed regulatory scheme, . . . even though

they may have a punitive effect.” (Kizer, at p. 146.)

Having concluded that the Legislature did not intend for

“the immunity created by Government Code section 818 to apply

to statutory civil penalties expressly designed to enforce

minimum health and safety standards” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d

at p. 146), our opinion in Kizer then went on to explain why, in

any event, the penalties sought in that case were not primarily

punitive. In this portion of our decision, we stressed that unlike

punitive damages, the penalties at issue did not require any

showing of actual harm, were “imposed according to a range set

by statute irrespective of actual damage suffered,” could be

imposed without a showing of malfeasance or state of mind

commonly understood to be deserving of punishment, and were

“to be applied to offset the state’s costs in enforcing the health

and safety regulations” involved. (Id. at p. 147.) We determined

that “[w]hile the civil penalties may have a punitive or deterrent

aspect, their primary purpose is to secure obedience to statutes

and regulations imposed to assure important public policy

objectives” (id. at pp. 147–148), which we described as an

essentially “preventative” function (id. at p. 148, italics

omitted).

These decisions, read together, establish that section 818

requires a fact-specific inquiry concerning the damages

provision or principle being applied. Our cases also yield some

guidance for this analysis. The statutory text and basic

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objective characteristics of the award at issue provide a starting

point. In some situations, as with an assessment of punitive

damages under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) at one

extreme and the conventional imposition of actual compensatory

damages at the other, it may easily be determined whether a

particular award is or is not barred under Government Code

section 818. When further inquiry is necessary, relevant

considerations may include, without limitation, whether the

damages involved go beyond those necessary to fully

compensate the plaintiff (State Dept. of Corrections, supra,

5 Cal.3d at p. 890); whether a damages remedy functions to

offset some otherwise applicable restriction on compensatory

damages (id. at pp. 888–890); whether the challenged form of

damages is conditioned on morally culpable conduct, beyond

mere negligence (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 147); whether

there is an element of discretion by the fact finder in the award

of damages (ibid.); and whether in the normal course actual

damages are likely to be difficult to establish or quantify

(Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 37). Whenever this inquiry

occurs, the ultimate question remains whether, by virtue of

being imposed “primarily for the sake of example and by way of

punishing the defendant” (§ 818), the damages before the court

function, in essence, as a form of punitive or exemplary

damages.

3. Government Code Section 818 Cannot Reasonably

Be Construed as Concerned Only with Damages

That Are “Simply and Solely” Punitive

In arguing that section 818 applies only to damages

provisions that are simply or solely punitive, plaintiff relies on

language appearing in Younger, San Francisco Civil Service

Assn., and Kizer. As explained below, although plaintiff’s

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reliance on these decisions is understandable, we conclude that

the phrasing plaintiff focuses upon mischaracterizes the

section 818 inquiry. We further conclude that these decisions

therefore must be overruled insofar as they articulate a

standard whereby the section 818 inquiry hinges on whether a

damages provision is deemed solely punitive in nature.

Our analysis in Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d 30 began with

the general observation that “[d]amages which are punitive in

nature, but not ‘simply’ or solely punitive in that they fulfill

‘legitimate and fully justified compensatory functions,’ have

been held not to be punitive damages within the meaning of

section 818 of the Government Code.” (Id. at pp. 35‒36.) We

ultimately concluded “that the civil penalties imposed pursuant

to [Water Code section 13350] are not simply and solely punitive

in nature but fulfill legitimate compensatory functions and are

not punitive damages within the meaning of Government Code

section 818 so as to preclude the recovery of such moneys against

public entities.” (Id. at p. 39, italics added.) In a footnote,

Younger distinguished a federal district court decision, People ex

rel. Cal. Reg. W. Q. C. Bd. v. Department of Navy (N.D.Cal. 1973)

371 F.Supp. 82, by stating that the applicable federal standard

at that time, “unlike the California standard set forth in Helfend

and State Dept. of Corrections which provides immunity only if

the damages are simply punitive, grants immunity to the

federal government for damages ‘which do not merely

compensate’ [citation], or where the ‘impact of [the] section is

more punitive than compensatory.’ ” (Younger, at p. 37, fn. 4.)

We explained that “[s]ince the federal standard for ascertaining

punitive damages for federal government immunity purposes

varies so significantly from the California standard,” under

which “the critical question is whether [the penalty] is simply,

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

that is solely, punitive,” the federal decision was inapposite.

(Ibid., italics added.)

Relying on Younger, our decision in San Francisco Civil

Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d 46 described the section 818

analysis as turning on whether the penalties addressed by that

court were “simply and solely punitive in nature or fulfill

compensatory functions so as to remove them from the class of

punitive damages covered by section 818 of the Government

Code.” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn., at p. 50.) Kizer,

meanwhile, described the Younger approach as concerned with

whether damages “are not simply or solely punitive in that they

fulfill legitimate and fully justified compensatory functions.”

(Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145.)

Plaintiff reads Younger, San Francisco Civil Service Assn.,

and Kizer as firmly establishing that only damages that are

“simply and solely punitive” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn.,

supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or

“simply or solely punitive” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145) run

afoul of section 818, and that a damages award that could

operate to incentivize lawsuits, offset or provide redress for

otherwise uncompensated harms or expenditures, or advance

some other policy goal does not meet this standard. As plaintiff

puts it, “damages which are punitive in nature but also aim to

more fully compensate the victim or encourage victims to bring

civil actions or otherwise achieve a non-punitive public policy

objective are not solely punitive and thus fall outside of the

ambit of Government Code section 818.”

There are multiple problems with this interpretation of

the statute. Among them, it collides headlong with the text of

section 818 providing that “a public entity is not liable for

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damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other

damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way

of punishing the defendant.” (Italics added.) “Primarily” (ibid.)

on the one hand, and “simply and solely” (San Francisco Civil

Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; Younger, supra,

16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or “simply or solely” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d

at p. 145) on the other, carry substantially different meanings,

and the Legislature’s use of the former term within section 818

communicates that the statute extends to damages that may

have secondary functions beyond punishment and the setting of

an example.

Indeed, no form of damages — not even punitive damages

awarded under Civil Code section 3294 — would qualify as

“simply and solely punitive” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn.,

supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or

“simply or solely punitive” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145)

under the standard plaintiff asks us to endorse. Some kind of

assertedly nonpunitive function can always be hypothesized for

any award of damages, whether it be the incentivization of

lawsuits by holding out the prospect of a larger return, the

recovery of expenditures on attorney fees or litigation expenses,

or something else. The language of section 818 appears to

recognize the possibility that such secondary functions might be

assigned even to conventional punitive damages. To stay true

to the Legislature’s intent, then, the standard announced in

Younger, San Francisco Civil Service Assn., and Kizer cannot

supply the test for applying section 818. A contrary approach

would artificially and drastically limit this section’s

applicability in a manner inconsistent with its language and

evident purpose.

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The decisions upon which plaintiff relies also include

express qualifications that damages will not be regarded as

simply or solely punitive when they “fulfill compensatory

functions” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d

at p. 50) or “they fulfill legitimate and fully justified

compensatory functions” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145; see

also Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 35‒36). Charitably read,

these qualifications could bring the standards articulated in

Younger, San Francisco Civil Service Assn., and Kizer closer to

conformity with section 818. On balance, however, we find it

necessary to foreclose future invocation of language so clearly at

odds with that of the statute it purports to apply. We therefore

overrule People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court, supra,

16 Cal.3d 30; San Francisco Civil Service Assn. v. Superior

Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 46; and Kizer v. County of San Mateo,

supra, 53 Cal.3d 139 insofar as these decisions articulate a

standard whereby the section 818 inquiry hinges on whether a

damages provision is deemed simply and solely, or simply or

solely, punitive. To repeat, the test under section 818 is whether

damages would be awarded under Civil Code section 3294, or

would otherwise be “imposed primarily for the sake of example

and by way of punishing the defendant” (Gov. Code, § 818) such

that they would function, in essence, as punitive or exemplary

damages.6

6

In concluding that the state’s Uninsured Employers Fund

(UEF) was not liable for penalties under Labor Code

section 5814 for unreasonable delay in the payment of workers’

compensation, our decision in DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals

Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382 referenced Government Code

section 818 and explained that “[i]n light of the partially penal

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Plaintiff’s other arguments in favor of a narrow reading of

section 818 fare no better. She argues that our construction of

this section should be informed by the United States Supreme

Court’s interpretation of language within the Federal Tort

Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.) providing that the federal

government is not liable for “punitive damages” (id., § 2674).

The high court has construed this term as it appears within the

Federal Tort Claims Act as bearing its “widely accepted

common-law meaning” — and not as connoting “ ‘damages

awards that may have a punitive effect.’ ” (Molzof v. United

States (1992) 502 U.S. 301, 306.) Plaintiff also argues that

textual clues within section 818 and elsewhere in the

Government Claims Act convey the Legislature’s intent to

prohibit only a limited array of damages. Specifically, plaintiff

assigns significance to section 818’s repetition of the “for the

sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant”

language appearing in Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a),

and to a reference within Government Code section 825, part of

the Government Claims Act that is concerned with the payment

nature of [Labor Code] section 5814, we believe that application

of the statutory penalty provision to the UEF is not permitted,

absent express legislative authorization.” (DuBois, at p. 398.)

At oral argument, counsel for the District asserted that this

discussion in DuBois manifested an understanding regarding

Government Code section 818’s purview, i.e., that section 818

applies to damages awards that are at least partially penal. It

is not clear whether this passage in DuBois, read in context,

carries this implication. In any event, our decision today makes

clear the standard for determining whether section 818

precludes the imposition of damages upon a public entity is

whether the award would function, in essence, as an award of

punitive or exemplary damages, and we reject any contrary

approach.

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of judgments, that describes section 818 as concerned with

“punitive damages.” (Gov. Code, § 825, subd. (e).)

These arguments do not persuade us to interpret

section 818 as applicable to only a subset of the damages awards

captured by its language and rationale. Whatever the scope of

the Federal Tort Claims Act’s prohibition on punitive damages

may be — an issue we need not delve into here — it is the

language of section 818, read in context, and not the federal

statute that provides the touchstone for our analysis. Likewise,

the evident import of section 818 is not altered by the fact that

it incorporates certain language from Civil Code section 3294,

subdivision (a), or that another provision within the

Government Claims Act describes Government Code section 818

as applicable to “punitive damages.” (Gov. Code, § 825,

subd. (e).) This borrowing and reference are consistent with our

interpretation of section 818, and do not convey a legislative

intent that this section should be interpreted in a manner that

would be inconsistent with its plain language and fail to fully

vindicate its apparent goals.

B. Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1

Having determined that in enacting Government Code

section 818 the Legislature intended to shield public entities

from damages under Civil Code section 3294 and damages that

function, in essence, as punitive or exemplary damages, we now

apply this standard to Code of Civil Procedure

section 340.1(b)(1).

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1. The Enhanced Damages Authorized by

Section 340.1(b)(1) Amount to Punitive Damages for

Purposes of Section 818

Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 is, for the most part,

a statute of limitations. We have described “the intent that

illuminates section 340.1 as a whole” as an aim “to expand the

ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account

individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.” (Doe v.

City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536.) Since its original

enactment in 1986 (Stats. 1986, ch. 914, § 1, pp. 3165–3166), the

statute has been amended on multiple occasions to extend the

filing periods for claims alleging childhood sexual assault and

revive otherwise time-barred claims.

One such amendment occurred through the enactment of

Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill

No. 218) in 2019. (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1.) This revision made

several changes to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. Among

these adjustments, Assembly Bill No. 218 extended the time for

filing claims for childhood sexual assault (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 340.1, subds. (a), (c)) and created a revival window for lapsed

claims (id., subd. (q)), which included relief from the claim

presentation deadlines within the Government Claims Act.

(Gov. Code, § 905 et seq.) The 2019 amendment also revised

section 340.1(b)(1) to provide that in an action seeking damages

suffered due to childhood sexual assault, “a person who is

sexually assaulted and proves it was as the result of a cover up

may recover up to treble damages against a defendant who is

found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor, unless

prohibited by another law.” (Ibid., as amended by Stats. 2019,

ch. 861, § 1.)

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Our application of section 818 to section 340.1(b)(1) begins

with the obvious fact that the latter statute provides for an

award of up to treble damages. While not dispositive, the fact

that it is a treble damages provision before us is nonetheless

significant. This court and others have frequently characterized

treble damages as exemplary or punitive. (Scholes v. Lambirth

Trucking Co. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1094, 1108 [“Many states,

including California, ‘provide[d] for exemplary damages in the

form of double or treble damages, or penalties, for the unlawful

cutting of timber on the land of another or on public land’ ”];

Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381,

394 [“Treble damages are punitive in nature”]; Harris v. Capital

Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1172 [describing

the treble damages authorized by Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a) for a

denial of civil rights as “an exemplary award” that “reveals a

desire to punish intentional and morally offensive conduct”];

Circle Oaks Sales Co. v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 682, 684–

685 [“a treble damages award is punitive in nature, imposed as

punishment against the defendant, rather than compensation to

the plaintiff”].) In adding the treble damages provision to

section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Legislature

presumably was aware of our prior decisions so characterizing

treble damages and understood that the provision could be

perceived similarly. (See Harris, at p. 1155 [courts “generally

presume the Legislature is aware of appellate court decisions”].)

Moreover, in authorizing damages that, by definition, may go

well beyond those necessary to provide full compensation for a

plaintiff’s legally recoverable actual damages, treble damages

provisions such as the one before us implicate a central concern

behind section 818: the protection of “tax-funded revenues from

legal judgments in amounts beyond those strictly necessary to

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

recompense the injured party.” (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at

p. 1196, fn. 20.)

Yet we have also suggested that treble damages may serve

nonpunitive purposes, as well. (See, e.g., Miller v. Municipal

Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 839 [favorably referencing case law

that described a treble damages provision within a federal

statute as having a remedial component].) Similarly, other

courts have determined that particular treble damages

provisions, understood in their respective statutory contexts,

possess an essentially remedial or otherwise nonpunitive

character. (See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,

Inc. (1977) 429 U.S. 477, 486 [explaining that § 4(a) of the

Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15(a)) “is designed primarily as a

remedy”].) Therefore, the fact that we are concerned here with

a treble damages provision, though significant, is not conclusive

on the characterization question. (Accord, Alea London Ltd. v.

American Home Services, Inc. (11th Cir. 2011) 638 F.3d 768, 777

(Alea London Ltd.) [“Whether treble damages under a given

statute are considered compensatory or punitive is an intensely

fact-based inquiry that may vary statute-to-statute”]; see also

PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book (2003) 538 U.S. 401, 405

[noting that the high court’s precedents “have placed different

statutory treble-damages provisions on different points along

the spectrum between purely compensatory and strictly

punitive awards”]; Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler

(2003) 538 U.S. 119, 130 [observing that with treble damages

provisions, “the tipping point between payback and punishment

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

defies general formulation, being dependent on the workings of

a particular statute and the course of particular litigation”].)7

Therefore, we undertake a closer examination of

section 340.1(b)(1). In doing so, we assign some significance to

the fact that section 340.1(b)(1) provides for up to treble

damages “unless prohibited by another law.” This caveat is

reasonably read as having section 818 in mind. Plaintiff has not

identified any law other than section 818 that this language

plausibly might be referring to, and even if there is such a

statute, section 818 is clearly “another law” that could function

7

Courts have wrestled with the categorization of treble

damages in a variety of situations. Classification issues have

arisen not only when a public entity claims immunity from

treble damages on the ground that they are tantamount to

punitive damages, but also in other contexts, including when it

is claimed that allowing both treble damages and punitive

damages would amount to an impermissible double recovery

(e.g., Marshall v. Brown (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 408, 419); that a

reference to punitive or exemplary damages in an agreement

implicitly includes treble damages (e.g., Alea London Ltd.,

supra, 638 F.3d at pp. 776–777); or that treble damages require

the same malice or malfeasance that is demanded for an award

of punitive damages (e.g., District Cablevision Ltd. v. Bassin

(D.C. 2003) 828 A.2d 714, 727).

In each of these scenarios, the classification analysis has

been framed by the statutory scheme or common law principles

involved and the precise legal issue presented. The outcome of

these inquiries may depend on whether a provision is regarded

as entirely, primarily, or only partially punitive in nature.

These subtleties make it conceivable that a particular treble

damages remedy will be regarded as sufficiently punitive to

trigger some consequence, but not so thoroughly punitive as to

bring about another.

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to prohibit damages under section 340.1(b)(1) in an appropriate

case. Although this language within section 340.1(b)(1) stops

short of expressly stating that enhanced damages under the

statute cannot be imposed against a public entity, at the very

least, it cuts against any assertion that the Legislature

affirmatively sought to avoid a section 818 analysis.

Next, the damages authorized under section 340.1(b)(1)

have substantial punitive qualities beyond the simple fact that

they may go well beyond actual damages. These objective

characteristics confirm that enhanced damages under the

statute function, in essence, as punitive or exemplary damages

by serving “to punish past childhood sexual abuse coverups to

deter future ones.” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra,

64 Cal.App.5th at p. 567; see also Adams v. Murakami (1991)

54 Cal.3d 105, 110 [“the quintessence of punitive damages is to

deter future misconduct by the defendant”].)

Several of the pertinent features of the damages available

under section 340.1(b)(1) were described by the court in X.M.,

supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, review granted. In determining

that section 818 prohibited the imposition of enhanced damages

under section 340.1(b)(1) against a public entity, the X.M. court

observed, “First, the statute authorizes treble damages only

upon proof of morally offensive behavior on behalf of the

defendant. A plaintiff receives actual (that is, economic and

noneconomic) damages if they prove they were the victim of

childhood sexual assault. But the statute authorizes an award

of three times their actual damages if they can also prove their

assault was the result of the defendant’s cover up of a previous

sexual assault of a child. [Citation.] Second, even if the plaintiff

presents the requisite proof, the decision to increase the damage

award beyond actual damages lies entirely with the fact finder.

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And third, if the fact finder does decide to increase the damage

award, the amount by which it does so, though capped, is not

fixed. As a result, the fact finder is free to increase the damage

award up to three times the plaintiff’s actual damages based on

factors specific to the defendant.” (X.M., at p. 1026.) The

features described by the X.M. court are important insofar as

they convey that the assessment of enhanced damages under

section 340.1(b)(1) will commonly resemble the imposition of

punitive damages, with the blameworthiness of a defendant’s

conduct and the need for punishment and example-setting

informing the amount of a discretionary damages award that is

additional to an award of actual damages.

In short, the enhanced damages authorized under

section 340.1(b)(1) are recognizable as punitive or exemplary

damages for purposes of a section 818 analysis as a matter of

both substance and procedure. These awards require the

existence of actual injury, but may go substantially beyond the

amounts necessary to fully compensate plaintiffs for the injuries

they have suffered; they are premised on morally culpable

behavior by defendants, namely, participation in “a concerted

effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (b)(2)); and they are assessed on

a case- and fact-specific manner in much the same way that

punitive damages are, albeit being subject to a cap. With their

punitive and exemplary character having been shown, we now

consider whether damages under section 340.1(b)(1) are

nonetheless sufficiently distinguishable from punitive damages

as to fall outside the scope of section 818.

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2. No Nonpunitive Characteristic or Function

Sufficiently Distinguishes Damages Under Code of

Civil Procedure Section 340.1(b)(1) from Punitive

Damages

Plaintiff offers several reasons why section 340.1(b)(1)

should be regarded as applicable to public entities. Some of her

arguments essentially assert that in adopting this enhanced

damages provision, the Legislature did not intend for a

section 818 analysis to apply at all. Her other contentions

assume that such an analysis applies, but characterize damages

under section 340.1(b)(1) as sufficiently nonpunitive in nature

that they may be imposed upon a public entity. We conclude

that all of these arguments are unpersuasive.

First, plaintiff argues that cover ups occurring in schools

featured so prominently in legislative dialogue concerning

Assembly Bill No. 218 that it would be nonsensical to regard

section 340.1(b)(1) as inapplicable to public entities such as

school districts. But the legislative history materials manifest

a concern with childhood sexual assaults occurring not only at

public schools, but also at private schools, sporting leagues and

organizations, religious institutions, and wherever else they

may occur. (See, e.g., Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill

No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 25, 2019, pp. 1,

2; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218

(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, pp. 1, 3, 4,

7.) A Senate analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 referred to “the

systematic incidence of childhood sexual assault in numerous

institutions in this country and the cover-ups that accompanied

them.” (Sen. Rules Com., Office of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis

of Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended

Aug. 30, 2019, p. 5, italics added.) There being significant

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cohorts of defendants that might be subject to treble damages

for engaging in cover ups even if public entities are not, and with

section 340.1(b)(1) providing on its face that enhanced damages

are available “unless prohibited by another law,” we cannot

conclude that the Legislature intended to avoid a section 818

analysis altogether.8

Second, plaintiff contends that the treble damages

provision within section 340.1(b)(1) must be construed as

applicable to public entities, or else it would merely duplicate

plaintiffs’ existing right to pursue punitive damages against

private defendants. Such an interpretation, plaintiff argues,

would render the provision mere surplusage. (See Brennon B.

v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 691 [courts aim

to interpret statutes in a manner that avoids surplusage].) But

our interpretation has no such effect. At a minimum,

section 340.1(b)(1) establishes that enhanced damages may be

awarded to plaintiffs who prove that they were the victims of

sexual assaults that result from cover ups, regardless of whether

these plaintiffs also specifically demonstrate the “oppression,

fraud, or malice” that Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a)

requires for an award of punitive damages. And even if we were

to assume for sake of argument that the evidence necessary to

prove a cover up under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1,

8

Plaintiff also argues that a reference in section 340.1(b)(1)

to claims authorized under Code of Civil Procedure

section 340.1, subdivision (a) implies an intent to make public

entities subject to treble damages, because subdivision (a) refers

to actions “for liability against any person or entity.” (Id.,

§ 340.1, subd. (a)(2), (3).) This argument fails to account for the

significance of section 340.1(b)(1)’s “unless prohibited by

another law” language.

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subdivision (b)(1) and (2) is always sufficient to establish the

“oppression, fraud, or malice” that must be shown by clear and

convincing evidence under Civil Code section 3294,

subdivision (a), “Legislatures are free to state legal principles in

statutes, even if they repeat preexisting law, without fear the

courts will find them unnecessary . . . .” (Reno v. Baird (1998)

18 Cal.4th 640, 658.) The enhanced damages provision is

therefore not surplusage, even as applicable only to private

entities.

Third, in arguing that the Legislature must have intended

for the treble damages provision to apply to public entities,

plaintiff observes that an analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 that

circulated after the “unless prohibited by another law” language

was added to the proposed text of section 340.1(b)(1) by a bill

amendment (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020

Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 2019) explained that the measure “applies

equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and

applies to all local public entities” (Assem. Conc. in Sen.

Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as

amended Aug. 30, 2019, p. 2). Plaintiff also notes that bill

analyses published before and after this amendment included

statements by a contingent of opponents, including but not

limited to public entities, lamenting the treble damages

provision’s potential financial impact and seeking its removal.

(E.g., id., at pp. 2–3; Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill

No. 218, supra, as amended Mar. 25, 2019, p. 2; Sen. Com. on

Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg.

Sess.) as amended Mar. 25, 2019, pp. 12–13.)

These snippets of legislative history carry little weight.

The description of Assembly Bill No. 218 as equally applicable

to public and private entities, read in context, appears directed

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

at the bill’s statute of limitations and claim-revival provisions.

Meanwhile, the views of the bill’s opponents found in committee

and floor analyses regarding this measure shed little light on

the Legislature’s intent, which is the focus of our analysis. (See

American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005)

34 Cal.4th 1239, 1264 [“this restatement of an argument made

by certain industry groups does not purport to reflect debate

within the Legislature”]; Purifoy v. Howell (2010)

183 Cal.App.4th 166, 179, fn. 14 [describing a statement by an

opponent of a bill as “not evidence of the Legislature’s collective

intent”]; accord, Labor Board v. Fruit Packers (1964) 377 U.S.

58, 66 [cautioning “against the danger, when interpreting a

statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents”].)

Even when taken into consideration, the continued entreaties of

opponents to remove the treble damages provision might have

reflected a preference for the certainty that would come from

having the treble damages provision deleted from the measure

entirely (which would be of particularly clear benefit to the

private entities that joined their public counterparts in lobbying

against the bill), over the possibility that a court might later

reject a claim of immunity under section 818 and find both

public and private defendants subject to enhanced damages

under section 340.1(b)(1).

Fourth, plaintiff argues that enhanced damages under

section 340.1(b)(1) serve important nonpunitive functions that

distinguish them from conventional punitive or exemplary

damages. In particular, plaintiff hypothesizes that the damages

authorized under this provision might compensate plaintiffs for

the stress associated with pursuing a claim for childhood sexual

assault in court, or incentivize claims for childhood sexual

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

assault that might not otherwise be expected to lead to

substantial damages awards.

Plaintiff claims to find support for these rationales in the

legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 218. She points to

multiple analyses of this measure that quoted its author as

stating, in relevant part, that Assembly Bill No. 218 “would also

confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from

schools to sports league[s], which result in continuing

victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. The

bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the

defendant who covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly

needed both to compensate victims who never should have been

victims — and would not have been if past sexual assault had

been properly brought to light — and also as an effective

deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to

protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.”

(Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218,

supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4, italics added; see also

Assem. Conc. in Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as

amended Aug. 30, 2019, p. 2; Assem. 3d reading analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as amended Mar. 25, 2019, p. 2.)

Plaintiff also observes that legislators were made aware of

instances in which schoolteachers engaged in a course of

misconduct, some of which may not have led to substantial

actual damages if it had become the subject of a lawsuit. The

treble damages provision, she argues, could have been designed

to address these scenarios, providing an inducement to present

what otherwise might constitute low-value claims and by doing

so, avoid future assaults.

We conclude that plaintiff fails to sufficiently distinguish

the enhanced damages authorized under section 340.1(b)(1)

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LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

from punitive or exemplary damages. As a threshold matter, we

discern that enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1)

represent an awkward and somewhat ineffective way to achieve

the functions plaintiff assigns to them. Because enhanced

damages are available only when a sexual assault “was as the

result of a cover up” (§ 340.1(b)(1)), they are available in only a

subset of the cases identified by plaintiff, involving litigation-

related trauma or low compensatory damages. What is more,

unlike other facts relevant to a claim for childhood sexual

assault, the existence of a prior cover up may be unknown to a

prospective plaintiff until after a lawsuit is filed, blunting any

incentivizing effect. These circumstances make it difficult to

perceive any clear connection between the provision of enhanced

damages for a sexual assault that results from a cover up and

the policy goals that plaintiff assigns to these damages, casting

doubt on whether section 340.1(b)(1) was designed to serve these

ends.

In any event, nothing associated with section 340.1(b)(1)

conveys that a nonpunitive purpose or purposes are sufficiently

implicated here as to allow public entities to be held liable for

enhanced damages under this provision.

We do not perceive any clear indication in the text of the

statute or in its legislative history that legislators intended for

enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1) to compensate

plaintiffs suing for childhood sexual assault for litigation-

related stress that would otherwise go unremedied. Regarding

the more generic references to compensation in legislative

analyses (e.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill

No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4) and the

broader function of providing larger recoveries for prevailing

plaintiffs, as the Court of Appeal below recognized (Los Angeles

34

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 561–562),

conventional damages principles already provide for full

compensation for victims of childhood sexual assault who prove

their claims at trial. With or without a cover up, individuals

who establish that they were victimized by a childhood sexual

assault are entitled to actual, compensatory damages in an

“amount which will compensate for all the detriment

proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been

anticipated or not.” (Civ. Code, § 3333; see also id., § 3282

[defining “[d]etriment” as “a loss or harm suffered in person or

property”].) These damages may, as appropriate, include

compensation for mental suffering. “[I]t is settled in this state

that mental suffering constitutes an aggravation of damages

when it naturally ensues from the act complained of, and in this

connection mental suffering includes nervousness, grief,

anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation and indignity as well as

physical pain.” (Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425,

433; see also X.M., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1028, review

granted; Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th

at p. 561.) Enhanced damages are therefore not necessary here

to fill an obvious gap or deficiency in compensation.

The legislative history materials that plaintiff draws from

must be understood in this light. With plaintiffs already being

entitled to full compensation for their injuries, the assertions

within the legislative analyses that additional damages under

section 340.1(b)(1) would function to “compensate” some

prevailing plaintiffs (e.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4) fail

to sufficiently distinguish these awards from the assessment of

punitive damages. Such references could well have used

“compensate” in the colloquial sense of providing plaintiffs with

35

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

greater monetary recoveries. But, as we have already

explained, all damages — even punitive damages under Civil

Code section 3294 — have that effect. If a bare acknowledgment

of this fact by legislators considering a proposed law were

enough to make section 818 inapplicable, the statute would be

eviscerated.

Additionally, the significance of any references to

compensation within legislative history materials is lessened by

the fact that these same analyses also reveal an appreciation

among legislators that the enhanced damages available under

section 340.1(b)(1) would function to punish defendants who

engage in cover ups. As excerpted above, analyses prepared

during the Legislature’s deliberations coupled mentions of the

need to “compensate” victims of sexual assault with references

to the essentially punitive deterrent effect that the imposition of

enhanced damages would have. (E.g., Assem. Com. on

Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced

Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4.) To similar effect, a committee analysis of

Assembly Bill No. 218 explained that “[t]he bill also exposes

those who cover up the sexual abuse of children to additional

punishment. In addition to extending the statute of limitations

for childhood sexual assault, reviving old claims, and removing

the protections of the [Government Claims Act] from local public

entities, this bill allows a victim of childhood sexual assault to

recover tremble [sic] damages against a defendant if the victim’s

assault was the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior

sexual assault of a minor.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis

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LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 9,

boldface omitted.)9

Ultimately, we conclude that the legislative history of

Assembly Bill No. 218 does not provide substantial support for

plaintiff’s view that the enhanced damages authorized under

section 340.1(b)(1) are meaningfully distinguishable from

punitive or exemplary damages on the ground that they

recognize and provide redress for litigation-related trauma.

This is not a situation where, in the words of the court in X.M.,

supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, review granted, the Legislature has

“clearly indicated an additional, compensatory purpose” (id. at

p. 1024) of sufficient magnitude that it would allow us to regard

a treble damages provision as outside of section 818’s purview.

There is also no clear indication in the text of

section 340.1(b)(1), its practical application, or its legislative

history that legislators sought to use the possibility of enhanced

damages to incentivize the filing of claims that might involve

relatively modest damages awards. We presume that such cases

are possible; the statutory definition of “ ‘[c]hildhood sexual

assault’ ” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (d)) captures a range of

conduct. (Cf. People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 442

[construing Pen. Code, § 288], 447 [discussing Court of Appeal

9

The reference within the above-quoted committee analysis

to “removing the protections of the [Government Claims Act]

from local public entities” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis

of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 9),

read in context, appears to refer to the bill’s lifting of the act’s

claim-presentation deadline incident to the revival of lapsed

claims (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q)), and not to

Government Code section 818.

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LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

decisions applying that statute].) Still, the fact remains that

childhood sexual assaults that implicate Code of Civil Procedure

section 340.1 would not normally be expected to yield only

minimal damages, and the fact that members of the Legislature

may have been aware of counterexamples does not establish

that these circumstances were a significant motive behind the

treble damages provision.10

Even if we were to sum the various nonpunitive rationales

advanced by plaintiff or otherwise capable of being

hypothesized, and indulge the possibility that, in practice, the

prospect of enhanced damages will have an incentivizing effect

on some lawsuits and provide additional recoveries to plaintiffs

that may offset litigation-related expenditures or contribute to

their financial recoveries, that would not alter our conclusion.

We remain convinced that the enhanced damages authorized

under section 340.1(b)(1) are “imposed primarily for the sake of

example and by way of punishing the defendant” (§ 818), and

therefore are incapable of being imposed upon a public entity.

As has been explained, the objective characteristics of these

awards establish that they qualify as a form of punitive or

exemplary damages for purposes of a section 818 analysis, and

10

In supplemental briefing filed shortly before oral

argument, plaintiff asserted that a recent amendment (Stats.

2022, ch. 442, § 3) to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16,

which prescribes the statute of limitations for claims of sexual

abuse suffered as an adult, and legislative history materials

associated with this amendment provide additional indications

of the nonpunitive intentions behind the 2019 revision of Code

of Civil Procedure section 340.1 through Assembly Bill No. 218

to add its treble damages provision. Having reviewed these

materials, we do not regard them as probative of the

Legislature’s intent in this respect.

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LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

there are no clear indications within the statutory text, the

expected application of section 340.1(b)(1), or otherwise of a

nonpunitive purpose or purposes that carry sufficient force here

as to compel a different characterization.

3. Case Law Cited by Plaintiff Is Distinguishable

Plaintiff asserts that several Court of Appeal decisions

support her view that section 818 does not preclude the recovery

of enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1) from a public

entity. We conclude that those matters are all fundamentally

distinguishable from the circumstances before us and thus do

not provide significant support for plaintiff’s position. These

distinctions also mean we need not pass on whether those cases

were properly decided, or entirely correct in all their particulars.

Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281 did not

involve Government Code section 818 or a treble damages

provision. It instead addressed whether the double damages

authorized under Probate Code section 859 for the improper

taking, concealment, or disposal of a vulnerable person’s

property were a kind of punitive or exemplary damages that,

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.42, cannot be

recovered against the successor of a deceased defendant. (Hill,

at pp. 1285–1286.) Hill, like this case, involved a prohibition on

the recovery of certain enhanced damages. But here we are

concerned with the availability of treble damages, not double

damages (cf. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United

States ex rel. Stevens (2000) 529 U.S. 765, 784 [regarding an

amendment to the federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729 et

seq.) that increased the available damages from double damages

to treble damages as making its remedies “essentially

punitive”]), and we are construing an altogether different pair

39

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

of statutes. The court in Hill perceived Code of Civil Procedure

section 377.42 as recognizing a strict distinction between

“ ‘punitive or exemplary damages’ ” (Hill, at p. 1285, quoting

Code Civ. Proc., § 377.42) on the one hand and a “statutory

penalty,” including treble damages, on the other (Hill, at

p. 1286). Here, as explained previously, the language of

section 818 and the intent behind this text call for a more

functional analysis that does not cleave in quite the same

manner. Under the analysis that applies here, enhanced

damages under section 340.1(b)(1) may be regarded as “other

damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way

of punishing the defendant” (§ 818) and thus incapable of being

recovered against a public entity.

Next, the issue presented in Beeman v. Burling (1990)

216 Cal.App.3d 1586 and Kelly v. Yee (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 336

was whether an award of treble damages authorized under a

local rent ordinance was preempted by Civil Code section 3294.

These courts concluded that there was no conflict warranting a

finding of preemption because the ordinance’s automatic

trebling of damages awards and the role of this trebling in

promoting enforcement of the rent ordinance distinguished the

treble damages provision from punitive damages awarded under

Civil Code section 3294. (See Beeman, at pp. 1597–1598

[discussing the character of the ordinance’s treble damages

provision]; Kelly, at p. 342 [explaining that trebling of actual

damages serves to “promote effective enforcement of the

ordinance on behalf of low-income tenants”].) In light of the

differences between the legal issues, treble damages provisions,

and underlying claims involved in those cases and this one,

there is no manifest inconsistency between the outcomes in

Beeman and Kelly and our determination that enhanced

40

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

damages under section 340.1(b)(1) are “imposed primarily for

the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

(§ 818.)

In LeVine v. Weis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 201 (LeVine), the

court concluded that section 818 did not prohibit an award of

double back pay under Government Code section 12653, part of

the state False Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.), against

a public entity. (LeVine, at p. 209.) In so holding, the court

emphasized that Government Code section 12653 expressly

distinguishes between back pay and punitive damages in its

description of available remedies, and lists back pay among the

kinds of relief necessary to make an employee “ ‘whole.’ ”

(LeVine, at p. 209, quoting Gov. Code, § 12653, former subd. (c).)

These features persuaded the Court of Appeal that “the statute

treats double backpay as remedial” (LeVine, at p. 209), and serve

to distinguish the section 818 question that was before that

court from the one we address here.

Marron v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049

involved a claim that a defendant was “guilty of recklessness,

oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of [elder or

dependent adult] abuse . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.)

Upon a sufficient showing of such misconduct, the plaintiffs

could recover attorney fees and costs as well as pain and

suffering damages that otherwise would have been prohibited

under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34. (Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 15657, subds. (a), (b).) The Court of Appeal in Marron

determined that Government Code section 818 did not prohibit

holding a public entity liable for these awards, reasoning that

“[p]unitive damages are dissimilar to pain and suffering and

other compensatory damages” (Marron, at p. 1063), that the

pain and suffering damages provided compensation for the

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LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

decedent’s “actual loss or injury” (id. at p. 1062), and that the

relevant legislative history and codified findings established

that Welfare and Institutions Code “[s]ection 15657’s

authorization of awards of attorney fees and costs was intended

to act as an incentive for attorneys to accept elder or dependent

adult abuse cases that involve recklessness or more egregious

conduct” (Marron, at p. 1064). The court also saw nothing in the

statute or its history to suggest “that awards of reasonable

attorney fees and costs under [Welfare and Institutions Code]

section 15657 are intended to punish defendants.” (Id. at

p. 1065.) Marron thus involved different kinds of awards from

those involved in this case — one of which simply removed an

otherwise applicable limitation on compensatory damages —

and there the Legislature appears to have provided more

evidence of nonpunitive intent than exists here.11

Similarly distinguishable is Los Angeles County

Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Superior Court (2004)

123 Cal.App.4th 261 (Los Angeles Transportation Authority), in

which the court considered a challenge to the imposition of

statutory penalties under Civil Code section 52 for violations of

Civil Code section 51.7, the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976. The

Court of Appeal in Los Angeles Transportation Authority

determined that these penalties could be imposed upon a public

11

The Legislature recently amended Code of Civil Procedure

section 377.34 to provide that “in an action or proceeding by a

decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest on

the decedent’s cause of action, the damages recoverable may

include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement if the

action or proceeding was granted a preference pursuant to [Code

of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 36 before January 1, 2022, or was

filed on or after January 1, 2022, and before January 1, 2026.”

(Id., subd. (b), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 448, § 1.)

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LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

entity, Government Code section 818 notwithstanding. (Los

Angeles Transportation Authority, at pp. 263–264.) Among the

distinctions between this case and Los Angeles Transportation

Authority, Civil Code section 52 separately authorizes both

exemplary damages (id., subd. (b)(1)) and penalties (id.,

subd. (b)(2)) for violations of Civil Code section 51.7; the

penalties authorized under section 52 are fixed at $25,000, and

not tethered to actual damages (id., subd. (b)(2)); and there were

more compelling indications that legislators regarded penalties

under Civil Code section 52 as having an important nonpunitive

function than appears in the legislative history for Assembly

Bill No. 218 (Los Angeles Transportation Authority, at pp. 268–

271).12

12

We note that portions of the analysis in Los Angeles

Transportation Authority, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 261 relied

heavily on our characterization of section 818 as concerned

exclusively with damages that are “simply and solely punitive”

(San Francisco Civil Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50;

Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or “simply or solely punitive”

(Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145), an understanding of the

statute that we have rejected today. (Los Angeles

Transportation Authority, at pp. 272–275.) Similarly, the court

in LeVine, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 201 drew from our now-

repudiated analysis of section 818 in Younger in characterizing

double back pay as having “a legitimate and fully justified

compensatory function,” to wit, serving “to more fully

compensate the employee for the incalculable risk he takes

when he threatens to disclose or discloses his employer’s false

claim.” (LeVine, at p. 209.) Although such reliance on Younger

and its progeny is no longer permitted, we do not otherwise

believe it necessary to review the reasoning of these decisions

beyond what we have discussed in the main text.

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LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

To summarize, due to differences in the issues they

involved, the statutes they interpreted, and the prominence and

plausibility of the nonpunitive rationales they considered, the

Court of Appeal decisions described above neither conflict with

our holding today nor suggest that we should interpret or apply

section 818 differently than we have.

In closing, we observe that our decision today does not in

any way minimize the trauma that victims of childhood sexual

assault must endure. Yet our job is to interpret Code of Civil

Procedure section 340.1 as written, relying on the guideposts the

Legislature has provided and our own interpretive tools. As it

appears before us, the statute, read in conjunction with

Government Code section 818, does not reveal an intent to have

section 340.1(b)(1) apply to public entities. The Legislature may

as a matter of course choose to revisit the issue if it believes that

these entities should potentially be held liable for enhanced

damages when a childhood sexual assault is the result of a cover

up.

44

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

III. DISPOSITION

We hold that Government Code section 818 prohibits the

imposition of enhanced damages under Code of Civil Procedure

section 340.1, subdivision (b)(1) against a public entity. We

therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

45

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Los Angeles Unified School District v. Superior

Court

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 64 Cal.App.5th 549

Review Granted (unpublished)

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S269608

Date Filed: June 1, 2023

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: Shirley K. Watkins

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Gutierrez, Preciado & House, Calvin House and Arthur C. Preciado for

Petitioner.

Leone Alberts & Duus, Louis A. Leone and Seth L. Gordon for

Northern California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Southern

California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Statewide Association of

Community Colleges and School Association for Excess Risk as Amici

Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Meyers Fozi & Dwork, Golnar J. Fozi and Daniel S. Modafferi for

Association of Schools for Cooperative Insurance Programs, Public

Risk Innovation, Solutions, and Management and California

Association of Joint Powers Authorities as Amici Curiae on behalf of

Petitioner.

Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates and Ryan D. Miller for

Hesperia Unified School District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of

Respondent.

Taylor & Ring, David M. Ring, Natalie L. Weatherford; Esner, Chang

& Boyer, Holly N. Boyer, Kevin K. Nguyen and Kathleen J. Becket for

Real Party in Interest.

The Zalkin Law Firm and Devin M. Storey for National Center for the

Victims of Crime as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Alan Charles Dell’Ario for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus

Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Calvin House

Gutierrez, Preciado & House, LLP

3020 East Colorado Boulevard

Pasadena, CA 91107

(626) 449-2300

Holly N. Boyer

Esner, Chang & Boyer

234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 975

Pasadena, CA 91101

(626) 535-9860