Sheba Ethiopian Restaurant, Inc. v. Dekalb County, Georgia

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13077

____________________

SHEBA ETHIOPIAN RESTAURANT, INC.,

d.b.a.

Queen of Sheba Ethiopian Restaurant,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA,

HON. JEFF RADER,

HON. KATHIE GANNON,

JOSEPH COX,

JOHN JEWETT,

ANDREW A. BAKER,

Defendants-Appellants,

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13077

ZACHARY L. WILLIAMS,

et al.,

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-04400-WMR

____________________

Before LUCK, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

LUCK, Circuit Judge:

Sheba Ethiopian Restaurant, Inc., an Ethiopian restaurant in

Georgia, sued DeKalb County and several county officials for race

discrimination. Sheba alleged that the county selectively enforced

its fire and zoning codes against its restaurant and other Ethiopian

restaurants. The county and its officials moved to dismiss, and the

district court denied the motion. In denying the motion, the dis-

trict court concluded that the officials violated clearly established

law by discriminating against the restaurant based on its race and

that the county had a policy or custom of discrimination.

We part from the district court. As to Sheba’s claims against

the officials, there’s no binding law in this circuit clearly establish-

ing that a corporation can have a race or that officials can

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21-13077 Opinion of the Court 3

discriminate against a corporation because of the corporation’s

race. The officials are thus entitled to qualified immunity. As to

Sheba’s claims against the county, we do not have pendent appel-

late jurisdiction over that factually and legally distinct appeal. So

we reverse the part of the district court’s order denying qualified

immunity to the officials and dismiss the county’s appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1998, Sheba opened for business in Atlanta, Georgia.

Sheba was a closely held corporation, owned and operated by Sol-

omon Abebe, a black man from Ethiopia. From the start, Sheba’s

“late-night customers [were] predominantly” black—from Ethio-

pia and other East African counties.

Sheba was a restaurant-turned-nightclub, licensed by DeK-

alb County to offer food, alcohol, and live music. Sheba would

often hire DJs who’d play music late into the night. And although

it didn’t have a dance floor, Sheba allowed its customers to dance

throughout the restaurant. The restaurant also had a hookah

lounge. Sheba was licensed to serve alcohol until 3:55 a.m. on

weekdays and until 2:55 a.m. on Saturdays and Sundays.

In 2008, ten years after the restaurant opened, the county

amended its zoning code. These amendments reclassified certain

establishments as “nightclubs” or “late night establishments.” The

amendments defined nightclubs to include any “commercial estab-

lishment dispensing alcoholic beverages for consumption on the

premises and in which dancing and musical entertainment is

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13077

allowed.” DeKalb Cnty. Code of Ordinances ch. 27, art. 9, § 9.1.3.

The amendments defined late night establishments to include “any

establishment licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages for con-

sumption on the premises where the establishment is open for use

by patrons beyond 12:30 a.m.” Id.

The amendments required all nightclubs and late night es-

tablishments located within 1500 feet of a residential property to

obtain a special land use permit. Sheba fell within both definitions.

It was a nightclub because it served alcohol and allowed dancing

and music. It was a late night establishment because it dispensed

alcohol past 12:30 a.m. And Sheba was located within 1500 feet of

a residential property. Even though Sheba fell within both catego-

ries, the county didn’t require it to obtain a special land use permit.

Instead, the county “grandfathered” Sheba in and allowed it to op-

erate as a legal nonconforming late night establishment.

By all accounts, Sheba’s relationship with the county pro-

ceeded rather smoothly for seven or so years following these

amendments. The relationship started to sour, however, in 2015,

when Martha Gross—a private citizen who lived near Sheba and

several other Ethiopian restaurants—“spearheaded” a campaign to

“cripple” the Ethiopian restaurant community. Gross spoke at the

county’s public meetings and posted on social media about “her

desire to prohibit” certain Ethiopian restaurants and hookah bars

“from operating during late hours . . . either by removing grandfa-

ther[ed] status” or by “preventing the establishments from obtain-

ing [special land use permits].”

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To that end, Gross worked with the county to target Ethio-

pian restaurants. According to Sheba, County Commissioner Jeff

Rader “effectively commandeered the [c]ounty’s planning and zon-

ing departments, requiring directors and staff in those depart-

ments . . . to carry out Martha Gross’s directive[]” to “target[] Ethi-

opian . . . restaurants that offer[ed] [h]ookah service for heightened

and arbitrary code enforcement.”

In 2016, shortly after Gross initiated her campaign, the

county upped its enforcement efforts by forming a “Late Night

Task Force” to “randomly select[] and order[] existing restaurants

to complete and submit what it call[ed]” a “letter of entertain-

ment.” The letter of entertainment asked whether the restaurant

served as a late night establishment and/or a nightclub. The

county required Sheba to complete a letter of entertainment in late

2016, when Sheba filed its annual business license renewal applica-

tion. In its letter, Sheba stated that it was a late night establishment

(not a nightclub), and the county approved Sheba’s business li-

cense, saying “grandfathering renewed for [late night establish-

ment].”

Over the next few months (in early 2017), the county’s task

force members—including representatives of the Fire Marshal’s

Office and the Code Enforcement Division—visited Sheba for a se-

ries of inspections. During these inspections, the task force mem-

bers cited Sheba for code violations, including overcrowding by ex-

ceeding occupancy limits, use of sparklers and open flames, failure

to comply with prior orders, failure to obtain permits for

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construction, and operating as a nightclub (recall that Sheba failed

to inform the county that it operated as a nightclub in its letter of

entertainment). Sheba alleged that these were “petty infractions”

and that “[n]one of the alleged violations were a matter of life

safety.”

The county came down hard on Sheba for these violations.

In March 2017, the fire marshal—having cited Sheba for over-

crowding and using sparklers in champagne bottles—issued a “No-

tice of Fire Hazard” directing Sheba to cease all operations until it

received approval to reopen. A month later, in April 2017, the

county decided to (1) revoke Sheba’s alcohol license, certificate of

occupancy, and 2016 business license; (2) deny its 2017 business li-

cense; and (3) terminate its legal nonconforming use status under

the zoning code. The county maintained that these decisions were

justified by Sheba’s repeated code violations, the restaurant’s

change in use, and public safety concerns.

What came next for Sheba was a drawn-out process of com-

pliance efforts and appeals. As to the fire code violations, Sheba

closed and “[i]mmediately . . . consulted with its architect and sub-

mitted the appropriate applications to the [county’s] building and

fire officials.” Sheba also “promptly corrected” “[e]very fire hazard

issue identified by the [c]ounty,” yet the county “refused to issue

the [required] permit[s].” But despite its “repeated efforts to en-

gage and satisfy” the county’s requirements, Sheba was unable to

reopen its business.

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As to the other code violations, Sheba appealed and

achieved mixed results. So, for example, Sheba appealed the

county’s decision to revoke (and deny) its business license. The

review board reversed the county’s decision and ordered the

county to reinstate Sheba’s business license. Sheba also appealed

the county’s decision to revoke its certificate of occupancy. But the

zoning board of appeals denied that appeal. Consistent with these

rulings, the county issued the business license but refused to issue

Sheba’s certificate of occupancy and alcoholic beverage license.

Gross’s campaign to shut Sheba down continued into the fall

of 2017. Unhappy with Sheba’s successful business license appeal,

Gross emailed various officials (including Commissioner Rader) a

list of “17 grounds for denying Sheba’s business license.” She asked

them to “do what you can to stop th[e] issuance of a business li-

cense.” “Minutes later,” Commissioner Rader’s chief of staff re-

sponded to Gross, informing her that Commissioner Rader “re-

ceived the email and [was] reviewing it with [another official] and

the law department.” The next day, Gross emailed the fire depart-

ment about “ways to prevent Sheba from getting” a certificate of

occupancy, saying that it was “a shame that the [c]ounty lawyer

who handled the [business license] appeal bungled it so badly.”

Sheba alleged that its interactions with the county were not

unique but reflected a broader pattern of selective enforcement.

Sheba mainly focused on two Ethiopian restaurants that faced sim-

ilar mistreatment. Both restaurants were black-owned and had ma-

jority-black customers. The first restaurant, Day & Night, was

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cited by the city in 2015 for fire code violations. The county or-

dered the restaurant “to cease operating until [it obtained] all ap-

provals.” Day & Night was “unable to obtain the approvals and

was forced to close.” The second restaurant, Aroma Lounge, was

cited by the county in 2016 for fire code violations. The county

ordered that it, too, “cease operating until all approvals were pro-

vided.” Aroma Lounge “was unable to obtain the approvals and

was forced to close.” Gross worked behind the scenes to close the

restaurant.

Sheba asserted that, while Ethiopian restaurants faced these

hurdles, the county let similar issues slide when it came to restau-

rants that “cater[ed] to predominately white late-night clientele.”

For example, Bench Warmers Sports Grill was cited for fire code

violations, yet the county didn’t shut it down. Instead, the county

simply had Bench Warmers contact it “to review [its] current use,”

allowing the bar to continue on “unimpeded.” Tin Lizzy’s was also

near a residential district, but the county granted it a special land

use permit that allowed the restaurant to “sell alcohol until 4:00

a.m.”

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For years, Sheba chased the county and its officials in and

out of state court before finally filing this case in federal court. See

Sheba Ethiopian Rest., Inc. v. DeKalb Cnty., 820 F. App’x 889 (11th

Cir. 2020). We exhaustively detailed that procedural history in

Sheba’s first appeal to this court. Id. at 893–94. For our purposes

this time around, we can keep things short.

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Sheba filed this case in July 2019, suing the county and seven

county officials. 1 In its complaint, Sheba brought two counts. First,

Sheba sued the county for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. sec-

tion 1981. Second, Sheba sued the county and the officials for con-

spiring to violate its civil rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3).

Specifically, Sheba alleged that the defendants conspired with

Gross to violate its civil rights by discriminating against the restau-

rant on the basis of its race as proscribed by section 1981. 2

The county and its officials moved to dismiss. As to the

county, they argued that Sheba failed to state a claim under sec-

tions 1981 and 1985(3) for race discrimination because Sheba is a

corporation and so it doesn’t have a race. As to the officials, they

argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because it was

“not clearly established in the Eleventh Circuit that Sheba, a

1

The officials are County Commissioner Jeff Rader, County Commissioner

Kathie Gannon, Fire Marshal Joseph Cox, Fire Inspector John Jewett, Director

Andrew Baker, Chief Operating Officer Zachary Williams, and Chief Building

Officer David Adams.

2

In its complaint, Sheba also alleged that the defendants “conspired with Gross

to deprive Sheba of . . . equal protection of the laws.” On appeal, the defend-

ants argued that, “[t]o the extent Sheba allege[d] a conspiracy to violate its

constitutional rights, res judicata and the law-of-the-case doctrine prevent

Sheba from relitigating those rights.” Sheba never responded to this argu-

ment. It has therefore forfeited any equal protection claim. Sapuppo v. All-

state Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Issues not clearly

raised in the briefs are considered abandoned.” (quoting Marek v. Singletary,

62 F.3d 1295, 1298 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1995))).

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corporation, can acquire a racial identity or suffer race discrimina-

tion.” Sheba, for its part, disagreed. Relying mostly on district

court and out-of-circuit decisions, Sheba argued that it was clearly

established that corporations could bring a race discrimination

claim.

The district court denied (for the most part) the motion to

dismiss. It concluded that, for three reasons, a corporation’s right

against race discrimination was clearly established under section

1981. First, “[m]any circuit courts . . . have interpreted” language

from the Supreme Court saying that corporations cannot have a

racial identity “as dicta and have allowed corporations to assert

[section] 1981 claims.” Second, “there appears to be some indica-

tion from the Supreme Court that the circuit courts’ conclusions

on this issue are sound.” Third, “the Supreme Court determined

that a corporation can have religious beliefs that are subject to con-

stitutional protections.” For these reasons, the district court denied

the motion to dismiss as to the county and all but two officials. 3

The county and the remaining officials timely appealed.

3

The district court granted the motion to dismiss as to two of the seven offi-

cials (Chief Operating Officer Williams and Chief Building Officer Adams) be-

cause it concluded there were “no allegations that [those two officials] took

any action that would suggest participation in the alleged conspiracy.” This

ruling is not on appeal.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo our own jurisdiction,” Morales v. U.S.

Att’y Gen., 33 F.4th 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2022), and the district

court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334,

1335 (11th Cir. 2003). And “[w]e review a district court’s denial of

an immunity defense de novo.” McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d

1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

DISCUSSION

We split our discussion in two. First, we conclude that the

officials are entitled to qualified immunity because it was not

clearly established that a corporation could have a race or suffer

race discrimination under section 1981. Second, we determine that

we do not have pendent appellate jurisdiction over the county’s

appeal.

The Officials

“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for govern-

ment officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Vinyard

v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted).

“The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to

carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal li-

ability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly

incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.”

Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).

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To qualify for the immunity, the “government official [must

first prove] that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary

authority when the alleged wrongful act occurred.” Gonzalez v.

Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 1998)

(quotation omitted). Here, there’s no dispute that the county offi-

cials were acting within their discretionary authority when they

oversaw Sheba’s licensing.

Where the officials were acting within their discretionary

authority, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified

immunity is not appropriate.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. To meet that

burden, the plaintiff must show “(1) that the . . . official violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly

established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Fuqua v.

Turner, 996 F.3d 1140, 1149 (11th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). We are

“permitted to exercise [our] sound discretion in deciding which of

the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be ad-

dressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at

hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

For a right to be clearly established, “the contours of [the]

right [must be] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (cleaned up). We’ve

identified three ways for the law to be clearly established:

First, the plaintiffs may show that a materially similar

case has already been decided. Second, the plaintiffs

can point to a broader, clearly established principle

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that should control the novel facts of the situation. Fi-

nally, the conduct involved in the case may so obvi-

ously violate the [statute] that prior case law is unnec-

essary.

Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).

We look to the law as it was interpreted at the time of the chal-

lenged conduct by the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh

Circuit, and the Georgia Supreme Court. See id.

In assessing whether the law is clearly established, we must

keep a couple of things in mind. First, where a plaintiff claims that

an official violated a statute, our inquiry must be statute-specific:

an official’s conduct may violate one statutory right that is clearly

established but retain immunity for violating another right that

isn’t clearly established. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12

(1984) (“[O]fficials sued for violations of rights conferred by a stat-

ute or regulation, like officials sued for violation of constitutional

rights, do not forfeit their immunity by violating some other stat-

ute or regulation.”); see also Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d

1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1998) (same). “[O]fficials become liable for

damages only to the extent that there is a clear violation of the stat-

utory rights that give rise to the cause of action for damages.” Da-

vis, 468 U.S. at 194 n.12. This is consistent with the purpose of

qualified immunity: to hold officials liable only for clearly estab-

lished violations of law. A clearly established violation of one law

does not equate to a clearly established violation of another law

that may result in additional (unforeseen) liability.

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Second, the Supreme Court has emphasized the “longstand-

ing principle that clearly established law should not be defined at a

high level of generality.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)

(quotation omitted). “[T]he clearly established law must be partic-

ularized to the facts of the case.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Other-

wise, plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified im-

munity into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleg-

ing violation of extremely abstract rights.” Id. (cleaned up); see also

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (“We

have repeatedly stressed that courts must not define clearly estab-

lished law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids the

crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the partic-

ular circumstances that he or she faced.” (quotation omitted)).

With that, we turn to the facts of this case. Sheba sued the

officials under section 1985(3) for conspiracy. Section 1985(3) “cre-

ates no rights” but merely “provid[es] a civil cause of action when

some otherwise defined federal right . . . is breached by a conspir-

acy.” Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,

376 (1979). Here, Sheba alleged that the defendants conspired to

violate its rights under section 1981 by discriminating against it on

the basis of race. So we ask whether it was clearly established that

an official could be liable under section 1981 for discriminating

against a corporation based on the corporation’s race. It wasn’t.

Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the

same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by

white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. To state a claim under section

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1981 for race discrimination, “a plaintiff must allege (1) he is a

member of a racial minority, (2) the defendant intended to racially

discriminate against him, and (3) the discrimination concerned one

or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.” Jimenez v.

Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010).

Sheba’s claim fails because it wasn’t clearly established—un-

der the first prong—that Sheba was a “member of a racial minor-

ity.” Long ago, the Supreme Court said in dicta that “a corpora-

tion . . . has no racial identity and cannot be the direct target of the

[city’s] alleged discrimination.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.

Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977); see also Conn. Gen.

Life Ins. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 87 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting)

(“Corporations have neither race nor color.”). In light of this lan-

guage from Arlington Heights—and the total absence of binding

law in our circuit contradicting it—we can’t say that “every reason-

able official would have understood that [discriminating against a

corporation] violates” section 1981. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.

Looking to the three ways a law can be clearly established

only confirms this result. First, there is no “materially similar case”

that would support imposing liability on the officials. Terrell, 668

F.3d at 1255 (quotation omitted). The closest case—and the one

Sheba relies on—is Webster v. Fulton County, 283 F.3d 1254, 1256

(11th Cir. 2002). In that case, a corporation alleged that it had filed

a “lawsuit charging Fulton County with a custom or policy of dis-

parate-treatment racial discrimination” and that Fulton County re-

taliated against the corporation by “refus[ing] to award

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[government] contracts to [the corporation] in retaliation for hav-

ing filed th[e] lawsuit.” Id. at 1256. We held—in addressing the

corporation’s section 1981 retaliation claim—that “[i]n a situation

such as the one presented by [that] case, [s]ection 1981’s protec-

tions extend to companies such as [the plaintiff].” Id. at 1256 n.3.

This case differs meaningfully from Webster because Sheba

brought a discrimination claim, not a retaliation claim. And the

elements of those two claims are different. “To state a retaliation

claim under [section] 1981, a plaintiff must allege a defendant retal-

iated against him because the plaintiff engaged in statutorily pro-

tected activity.” Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1311. By contrast, “[t]o state

a claim for . . . discrimination under [section] 1981, a plaintiff must

allege (1) he is a member of a racial minority, (2) the defendant in-

tended to racially discriminate against him, and (3) the discrimina-

tion concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the stat-

ute.” Id. at 1308. The plaintiff’s racial identity is not an element of

a section 1981 retaliation claim but is an element of a section 1981

discrimination claim like the one Sheba asserts.

This distinction between the two claims makes sense. A

plaintiff can be retaliated against for protected activity—like report-

ing or opposing race discrimination—whether the plaintiff has a

race or not. See Webster, 283 F.3d at 1256 (finding retaliation when

a corporation was punished for filing a race discrimination lawsuit).

But a plaintiff cannot suffer race discrimination under section 1981

unless it has a race. See Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1308. Put another

way, a retaliation claim is based on conduct, something

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corporations can do, but discrimination is based on race, some-

thing our law has yet to impute to corporations. The fact, then,

that a corporation can state a retaliation claim (where there is no

race requirement) does not clearly establish that a corporation can

state a discrimination claim (where there is a race requirement).

Second, to show that the law is clearly established, “the

plaintiff[] can [also] point to a broader, clearly established principle

that should control the novel facts of the situation.” Terrell, 668

F.3d at 1255 (cleaned up). “[I]f a broad principle in case law is to

establish clearly the law applicable to a specific set of facts facing a

governmental official, it must do so ‘with obvious clarity’ to the

point that every objectively reasonable government official facing

the circumstances would know that the official’s conduct did vio-

late federal law when the official acted.” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351.

The district court took this tack, concluding that the county

officials violated clearly established law because “[i]t is clearly es-

tablished that [section] 1981 covers racial discrimination.” “As a

general principle, we can all agree with that statement.” Rioux v.

City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Bry-

ant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1300 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We have often

noted the patently obvious illegality of racial discrimination in pub-

lic employment.” (quotation omitted)). But that (by itself) isn’t

enough. “While the general proposition that it is illegal to discrim-

inate against a person on the basis of race is clearly established,

whether the defendant violated clearly established law depends on

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the particular facts of each case.” Brown v. Cochran, 171 F.3d 1329,

1333 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).

Two main principles guide our analysis. One, the Supreme

Court has “repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established

law at a high level of generality.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12

(2015) (cleaned up). It’s not enough to broadly ask (as the district

court did) whether discrimination is illegal. See Griffin Indus. v.

Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Fourteenth

Amendment’s broad command that no state shall ‘deny to any per-

son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’ may, as

it does here, simply operate at too high a level of generality.”).

Two, “officials become liable for damages only to the extent that

there is a clear violation of the statutory rights that give rise to the

cause of action for damages.” Davis, 468 U.S. at 194 n.12. And so,

in this case, we must look to whether Sheba’s specific cause of ac-

tion was clearly established.

Applying those principles here—and looking to “whether

the violative nature of [the officials’] particular conduct [was]

clearly established,” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (cleaned up)—we

can’t say that every reasonable official would’ve known that sec-

tion 1981 prohibits racial discrimination against a corporation. It is

not at all “obvious” that corporations have a race or can suffer dis-

crimination based on their race. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1351. In-

deed, as the district court observed, the “federal circuit courts have

wrestled with” this issue “over the past several decades.” The Su-

preme Court has even suggested that corporations cannot state a

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race discrimination claim. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 263.

“When the courts are divided on an issue so central to the cause of

action alleged, a reasonable official lacks the notice required before

imposing liability.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 154 (2017).

In similar circumstances, we’ve found that officials are enti-

tled to qualified immunity from race discrimination claims. In Ri-

oux, for example, a deputy fire chief (who was a public employee)

filed a race discrimination claim after he was demoted. Rioux, 520

F.3d at 1273. We noted that “the right to be free from employment

discrimination was clearly established at the time of [the plaintiff’s]

demotion.” Id. at 1283. “However,” we said, “the ‘clearly estab-

lished’ prong of the qualified immunity analysis asks the question

in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition.” Id. at 1283 (quotation omitted). And there, the evi-

dence showed that the officials who demoted the plaintiff had

“mixed motives.” Id. at 1284. In light of those mixed motives, we

found no violation of clearly established law: “[w]e [could not] say

that, even assuming [the officials] were acting with improper race-

based animus . . . , reasonable officials . . . would have known that

demoting [the plaintiff] violated clearly established federal law.”

Id. at 1285. The same is true here.

Third, the final way to show clearly established law is “by

convincing us that the case is one of those rare ones that fits within

the exception of conduct which so obviously violates the [statute

at issue] that prior case law is unnecessary.” Powell v. Snook, 25

F.4th 912, 920 (11th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). No one has argued

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20 Opinion of the Court 21-13077

that this case presents one of those rare instances—and for good

reason. Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the

same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by

white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We can’t say it’s obvious from

the statute’s text that corporations can state a race discrimination

claim. For all of these reasons, Sheba hasn’t met its burden of

showing that the officials violated clearly established law. The of-

ficials are thus entitled to qualified immunity.

Against all this, Sheba raises four arguments—all unavailing.

First, Sheba points to the Supreme Court’s recognition that “the

[c]ourts of [a]ppeals to have considered the issue have concluded

that corporations may raise [section] 1981 claims.” Domino’s

Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 473 n.1 (2006). But the Su-

preme Court expressly left the issue open in Domino’s, noting

that—because the corporation in that case had settled—it “ha[d] no

occasion to determine whether, as a corporation, [the plaintiff]

could have brought suit under [section] 1981.” Id. So Domino’s

didn’t clearly establish that corporations may raise section 1981

claims. And the fact that other circuits have decided the question

can’t clearly establish the law in this circuit. See Thomas ex rel.

Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the

argument that “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority would

be able to establish law clearly”).

Second, Sheba asserts that, “[a]t least implicitly, the Supreme

Court has recognized that corporations can have racial characteris-

tic[s] by allowing white-owned corporations to challenge

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21-13077 Opinion of the Court 21

contractor (minority) set asides.” See City of Richmond v. J.A.

Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.

Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). But in those cases, the Court simply held

that “the Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all

race-based action by state and local governments.” Adarand, 515

U.S. at 222; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. Neither decision considered

whether corporations can state a race discrimination claim. As the

Supreme Court has explained, “[q]uestions which merely lurk in

the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled

upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to con-

stitute precedents.” Cooper Indus., v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157,

170 (2004) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)). So

these decisions don’t help.

Third, Sheba presses that, because “religious beliefs can be

imputed to corporations,” racial identity must be attributed to cor-

porations as well. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.

682 (2014), the Supreme Court held that a “for-profit corporation

[may] engage in the ‘exercise of religion’ within the meaning of [the

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993].” Id. at 713. While

Sheba may be right that Hobby Lobby’s logic might support attrib-

uting a race to corporations under section 1981, we can’t say that

Hobby Lobby “placed the statutory . . . question beyond debate.”

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Indeed, Hobby Lobby dealt with different

facts under a different statute. Because it was an “unsettled ques-

tion of law whether [Hobby Lobby] would be extended to this

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22 Opinion of the Court 21-13077

case,” the officials are entitled to immunity. Daniel v. Taylor, 808

F.2d 1401, 1403 (11th Cir. 1986).

Fourth, Sheba contended at oral argument that whether a

corporation can bring a race discrimination claim simply goes to

who may assert the right against racial discrimination, not to

whether that right is clearly established in the first instance. But

even if that is correct, Sheba doesn’t attempt to assert another’s

rights; it’s asserting its own rights. This case thus concerns more

than who may assert a race discrimination claim. This case pre-

sents the question whether the county officials committed race dis-

crimination at all—in light of the fact that the target was a corpo-

ration.

In other words, the illegality of the conduct itself was an

open question in this case. Consider, for example, a law that read:

“a person is liable for attacking a police officer.” If a teacher was

attacked and sued her assailant under this law, the question

wouldn’t simply be whether the teacher had standing. Instead, the

question would be whether there was a violation of our hypothet-

ical statute at all. The same is true here. The question isn’t just

whether a corporation can bring a section 1981 claim. Instead, it’s

whether the county officials can be liable even though their con-

duct—targeting a corporation—was not clearly covered by the stat-

ute. Cf. Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1458 (7th Cir. 1990)

(granting qualified immunity because it wasn’t “clearly estab-

lished . . . that whites as a class came within the protection” of

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21-13077 Opinion of the Court 23

section 1985(3)). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, they

cannot.

In sum, we do not address whether corporations can—or

cannot—state a race discrimination claim under section 1981. We

hold only that there was no clearly established law in our circuit

determining that officials are liable under section 1981 for discrim-

inating against a corporation. In this absence, the officials in our

case were entitled to qualified immunity.

The County

That leaves us with Sheba’s claim against the county. But

we lack pendent appellate jurisdiction over the county’s appeal of

the district court’s order denying the county’s motion to dismiss.

We generally have appellate jurisdiction only over “final de-

cisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But “[a] public

official . . . may file an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified

immunity.” Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d 1338,

1344 (11th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). And “[a]n appeal from the de-

nial of qualified immunity may implicate this [c]ourt’s discretion-

ary pendent appellate jurisdiction to review otherwise non-appeal-

able matters.” Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.

2016). “Pendent appellate jurisdiction is limited and rarely used.”

Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2019).

“Pendent appellate jurisdiction is proper if the non-appeala-

ble matters are inextricably intertwined with an appealable deci-

sion or if review of the former decision is necessary to ensure

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24 Opinion of the Court 21-13077

meaningful review of the latter.” Smith, 834 F.3d at 1292 (quota-

tion omitted). So, if we can “resolve the qualified immunity issue

in [a] case without reaching the merits” of an otherwise nonappeal-

able interlocutory ruling, that ruling generally “does not fall within

our pendent appellate jurisdiction.” Moniz v. City of Ft. Lauder-

dale, 145 F.3d 1278, 1281 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998).

We lack jurisdiction over the county’s appeal. Because we

resolved the officials’ qualified immunity appeal on the clearly es-

tablished prong without reaching the merits, the county’s appeal—

which would require us to go further and reach the merits of

Sheba’s race discrimination claim—is not inextricably intertwined

with or necessary for deciding the officials’ appeal. See, e.g., Harris

v. Bd. of Educ. of Atlanta, 105 F.3d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding

no pendent appellate jurisdiction because we “resolve[d] the quali-

fied immunity issue without reaching the merits of the remaining

questions raised by the individual defendants”).

CONCLUSION

The officials are entitled to qualified immunity because

there was no law clearly establishing that they could be held liable

under section 1981 for discriminating against a corporation based

on its race. We reverse the part of the district court’s order denying

qualified immunity to the officials and remand for the district court

to grant the officials’ dismissal motion. But, because we do not

have pendent appellate jurisdiction over the county’s appeal, we

dismiss that part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

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21-13077 Opinion of the Court 25

REVERSED and REMANDED in part, and APPEAL DIS-

MISSED in part.